John Frederick Stolte, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1331

John Frederick Stolte, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Kathleen Marie Stolte,
Appellant.

Filed July 17, 2017
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19-F3-88-008751

Deborah N. Dewalt, Burnsville, Minnesota (for respondent)

Merlyn L. Meinerts, Burnsville, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
John Frederick Stolte and Kathleen Marie Stolte were married from 1970 to 1989.
When their marriage was dissolved, the district court awarded Kathleen permanent spousal

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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maintenance. In 2016, the district court granted John’s motion to terminate spousal
maintenance because his income substantially dec reased after he retired and because
Kathleen is able to support herself. We affirm.
FACTS
John and Kathleen were married in 1970. They have two adult children. Their
marriage was dissolved in 1989.
In the dissolution decree, the district court found that John’s monthly net income
was $2,759 and that his reasonable monthly expenses were $1,700. The district court found
that Kathleen’s monthly net income was $1,352 and that her reasonable monthly expenses
were $1,650. The district court awarded Kathleen permanent spousal maintenance of $350
per month, with an adjustment every two years for increases in the cost of living.
John retired in March 2014 at the age of 66 . In February 2016, when spousal
maintenance was $625 per month, John moved to terminate his spousal -maintenance
obligation. He argued that his income had substantially decreased because of his
retirement. He stated in an a ffidavit that he “retired for good faith reasons” and that his
reasonable monthly expenses are $4,710. In response, Kathleen argued that John did not
retire in good faith but that his retirement was “motivated by a desire to terminate his
spousal maintenance obligation.” She submitted an affidavit stating that her income
consists only of spousal maintenance and worker’s compensation benefits. She stated that
her monthly expenses are $4,096 and that she supports one of the couple’s adult children.
The district court found that John’s monthly net income is $2,87 9 and that his
reasonable monthly expenses are $2,650. The district court found that Kathleen’s monthly
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net income is $3,075, which is the amount of her worker’s compensation benefits, which
she will receive for the rest of her life, with adjustments for increases in the cost of living.
The district court found that Kathleen’s reasonable monthly expenses are “approximately
$3,000.00.” The district court found that “there has been a substantial change in
circumstances” because John retired in good faith , which resulted in decreased income .
The district court found that Kathleen is no longer in need of spousal maintenance because
her monthly net income is greater than her reasonable monthly expenses. Thus, the district
court granted John’s motion and terminated his spousal-maintenance obligation. Kathleen
appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Kathleen argues that the district court erred by granting John’s motion to terminate
spousal maintenance.
A district court may grant an award of spousal maintenance if it finds that one
spouse either
(a) lacks sufficient property, including marital
property apportioned to the spouse, to provide for reaso nable
needs of the spouse considering the standard of living
established during the marriage, especially, but not limited to,
a period of training or education, or

(b) is unable to provide adequate self -support, after
considering the standard of living es tablished during the
marriage and all relevant circumstances, through appropriate
employment, or is the custodian of a child whose condition or
circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be
required to seek employment outside the home.

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Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1 (20 16). An award of spousal maintenance “shall be in
amounts and for periods of time, either temporary or permanent, as the court deems just,
without regard to marital misconduct, and after considering all relevant factors.” Minn.
Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2016). The relevant factors are the financial resources of the
spouse seeking maintenance to provide for his or her needs independently, the time
necessary to acquire education to find appropriate employment, the age and healt h of the
recipient spouse, the standard of living established during the marriage, the length of the
marriage, the contribution and economic sacrifices of a homemaker, and the resources of
the spouse from whom maintenance is sought. Id.; see also Kampf v. Kampf, 732 N.W.2d
630, 633-34 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied (Minn. Aug. 21, 2007). No single factor is
dispositive. Broms v. Broms, 353 N.W.2d 135, 138 (Minn. 1984). In essence, the district
court balances “the recipient’s needs against the obligor’ s ability to pay.” Prahl v. Prahl,
627 N.W.2d 698, 702 (Minn. App. 2001).
A district court may modify an award of spousal maintenance if there has been a
substantial change in circumstances that makes the existing award unfair and unreasonable.
Minn. Sta t. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a), (b) (20 16). The circumstances that may warrant
modification include a “substantially increased or decreased gross income of an obligor or
obligee” and a “substantially increased or decreased need of an obligor or obligee.” Id.,
subd. 2(a)(1), ( 2). If the district c ourt finds a substantial change in circumstances, the
district court must consider the factors applicable to an initial award of spousal
maintenance and determine whether the obligee, at the time of the motion to modif y, “is
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unable to provide adequate self-support.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1(b); see also Minn.
Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(e) (2016).
The party moving to modify a spousal -maintenance award bears the burden of
demonstrating a substantial change in circumstances that renders the existing award unfair
and unreasonable. Hecker v. Hecker , 568 N.W.2d 705, 709 (Minn. 1997) ; Youker v.
Youker, 661 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Minn. App. 2003) , review denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2003) .
This court applies a clear -error standard of review to a district court’s findings of fact
concerning spousal maintenance, Gessner v. Gessner, 487 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn. App.
1992), and an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s decision regarding
whether to modify an existing maintenance award, Hecker, 568 N.W.2d at 709-10.
Kathleen contends that the district court erred for several reasons. We construe her
brief to argue that the district court erred for five particular reasons, as follows.
A. Substantial Change in John’s Circumstances
Kathleen asserts three reasons why the district court erred in finding that there has
been a substantial change in circumstances due to John’s reduced income.
First, Kathleen contends that the district court erred by not including all of John ’s
investment income when making a finding concerning his income. John presented
evidence to the district court that his annual gross income consists of $30,552 in social
security benefits and $12,685 in investment income and that his annual income taxes are
$8,691. There was no other evidence of John’s investment income. Based on simpl e
arithmetic, John’s evidence suggests that his annual net income is $34,546, which implies
a monthly net income of $2,879. That is what the district court found. Kathleen contends
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that John’s investment income is understated because the district court did not consider
$44,000 in transfers from a “Pershing Brokerage” account to his checking account during
an 11-month period. But there is no evidence in the record as to whether that brokerage
account belongs to John or his current wife. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record
as to whether those transfers are periodic payments of income as opposed to conversions
of assets from one form to another form. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a) (2016) (defining
“gross income” for purposes of spousal maintenance to mean “periodic payment to an
individual”); Duffney v. Duffney, 625 N.W.2d 839, 842-43 (Minn. App. 2001) (concluding
that proceeds from sale of asset was not income for purposes of child support). Kathleen
also suggests that the district court should have imputed a greater amount of investment
income to John based on the value of his investments and an assumed rate of return. But
Kathleen did not present such a n argument to the district court. The district court did not
clearly err in its consideration of John’s investment income when finding his monthly net
income.
Second, Kathleen contends that the district court erred by finding that John’s income
had decreased. She notes that his monthly net income of $2,875 is greater than it was at
the time of the 1989 dissolution decree, when it was $2,759. Her contention doe s not
account for inflation. John argued to the district court that, after adjusting for inflation, his
1990 monthly net income is equivalent to $4,938 in today’s dollars, which means that his
monthly net income now is 42% less than it was at the time of dissolution. The district
court did not make a specific finding concerning inflation, but such a finding may be
implied. See Umphlett v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 533 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Minn. App.
7
1995). The district court did not clearly err by finding a substantial decrease in John’s real
income despite a slight increase in the nominal amount of his income after 26 years.
Third, Kathleen contends that the district court erred by not making an express
finding that the substantial change in circumstances made the existing spousal-maintenance
award “unreasonable and unfair .” See Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a). Kathleen is
simply incorrect. T he district court’s order states, on page 5, “It would be unreasonable
and unfair to require [John] to maintain the support obligation from the Decree.”
Thus, the district court did not err by finding that there has been a substantial change
in circumstances.
B. Kathleen’s Ability to Provide Self-Support
Kathleen asserts two reasons why the distric t court erred in finding that she is
capable of supporting herself and, thus, no longer in need of spousal maintenance.
First, Kathleen contends that the district court erred by not considering the factors
in section 518.552, as required when considering a motion to modify spousal maintenance.
See Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2( e). The district court ’s order includes two pages of
discussion of Kathleen’s income, assets, and expenses. The district court did not fail to
consider the relevant factors in section 518.552.
Second, Kathleen contends that the district court erred by finding that she is capable
of supporting herself without spousal maintenance. The district court found that her
monthly net income is $3,075. Kathleen submitted a document showing monthly expenses
of $4,096, but the district court found that her reasonable expenses are $3,000. Given its
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findings on her income and her reasonable expenses, the district court further found that
Kathleen is able to support herself with a $75 monthly surplus.
The district court found that Kathleen’s claimed amount of monthly expenses is
unreasonable for two reasons: because she spends $1,146 on payments on a mortgage loan
on a lake cabin, which is her second home, and because she spends an unknown amount
on an adult child who resides with her. Kathleen focuses her appellate arguments on the
district court’s reasoning with respect to the mortgage loa n on the lake cabin. Kathleen
explains that she executed a mortgage on the lake cabin when she refinanced her primary
residence. She introduced evidence that she obtained the most favorable terms by paying
off the mortgage loan on her primary residence and instead securing a loan with a mortgage
on the lake cabin.
If th e lake cabin were the sole reason for the district court’s reduction of her
reasonable monthly expenses, Kathleen might have a valid argument for reversal. But the
district court’s finding of her reasonable expenses also is based on evidence that Kathleen
pays some of the liv ing expenses of an adult child. It is well settled that expenses
attributable to adult children “cannot be considered by a court in determining an
appropriate level of maintenance.” Reif v. Reif, 410 N.W.2d 414, 416 (Minn. App. 1987).
Kathleen does not challenge the district court’s reasoning with respect to the expenses
attributable to the adult child. The district court did not make detailed findings concerning
the amount of such expenses, but the evidentiary record contains ample evidence to support
such a general finding. See Driscoll v. Driscoll, 414 N.W.2d 441, 446 (Minn. App. 1987)
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(stating that this court will affirm spousal-maintenance award that “has an acceptable and
reasonable basis in fact”).
Kathleen admitted to the district court that she provides the adult child with food
and clothing. Kathleen’s monthly budget states that she spends $600 on groceries and
household supplies and $ 100 on clothing. A fact -finder could infer that half of those
expenses are attributable to the adult child. Her monthly budget also includes $100 for
“tuition” and expressly notes that it is for the adult child. Kathleen’s credit-card statements
show that the adult child charges, on average, approximately $600 per month , mostly on
goods and services other than groceries, clothing, and tuition, and Kathleen’s bank
statements show that she pays those credit -card bills. In addition, it may be inferred that
the adult child’s presence in Kathleen’s household increases other expenses, such as
utilities and transporta tion. Considering all of these expenses, t he district court was
justified in reducing Kathleen’s budget by $1,096 on the ground that she incurs expenses
of that amount or more because of the adult child.
Thus, the district court did not clearly err in i ts findings concerning Kathleen’s
income and reasonable expenses and did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
Kathleen is able to support herself.
C. Reservation of Jurisdiction
Kathleen last argues that the district court erred by not reserving jurisdiction over
the matter of spousal maintenance. In response, John argues that Kathleen did not preserve
this argument because she did not ask the district court to reserve jurisdiction. John is
correct. At no time during district court proceedings did Kathleen request that the district
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court reserve jurisdiction in lieu of terminating spousal maintenance. Thus, we will not
consider the issue for the first time on appeal . See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582
(Minn. 1988); Doe 175 v. Columbia He ights School Dist., 842 N.W.2d 38, 42 -43 (Minn.
App. 2014).
Affirmed.