State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1352

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Santino Lamar Watson,
Appellant.

Filed July 31, 2017
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-16-3078

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Samuel J. Clark, St. Paul City Attorney, Lynel Rae Nelson, Assistant City Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer L. Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and
Connolly, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his misdemeanor convictions, arguing that it was reversible
plain error for the state to elicit testimony that violated the district court’s ruling regarding
relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2016). Because we conclude there was
no error, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Santino Watson and L.H. were in a relationship from 2006 to 2016. In
March 2016, L.H. called 911 to report that she had maced appellant because he would not
stop beating her. Later that night, she called to ask that police come to her apartment
because appellant and his sister were about to enter it. T he police came and investigated.
As a result of their investigation, appellant was charged with two counts of misdemeanor
domestic assault and one count of misdemeanor disorderly conduct.
On June 29, before the trial, the district court noted that the state intended to
introduce evidence of appellant’s relationship with L.H. under Minn. Stat. § 634.20.1 The
evidence would be limited to three points: (1) appellant and L.H. had been together for ten
years, during which L.H. said appellant had hit and beat L.H.; (2) appellant “punched [her]
a few days ago”; and (3) appellant “ hit [her] with a belt.” The district court asked the
prosecutor for a time frame for the abuse ; the prosecutor replied tha t the police report

1 Minn. Stat. § 634.20 provides in relevant part: “Evidence of domestic conduct by the
accused against the victim of domestic conduct . . . is admissible unless the probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . . ‘Domestic conduct’
includes, but is not limited to, evidence of domestic abuse. . . .”
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indicated ten years of hitting and beating, “quite recent” punching, and hitting with a belt
“before.” The district court then said that it would have to give a cautionary instruction if
the relationship evidence were admitted and that such instructions usually specified a time
frame. Appellant’s attorney argued that any probative value of such evi dence would be
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and would confuse the jury. The district
court said that the state should limit L.H.’s testimony and be as specific as possible, adding
that the more specific an incident was, the more likely it was that evidence about the
incident would be admitted.
At the end of the day before trial , the prosecutor told the district court and
appellant’s attorney that, when he asked L.H. about the time frame of the abuse, she said:
(1) the hitting and beating occurred over the entire ten years and got progressively worse ,
(2) the punching incident “a few days ago” was the current incident, and (3) appellant
hitting her with a belt was three to four months prior to the current incident. The prosecutor
noted that L.H.’s testimony, in light of what had happened to her over ten years, would be
“a very . . . sanitized and very limited instance [] of [Minn. Stat. §] 634.20 [(providing that
evidence)].”
The district court then found that:
[T]he State’s proposed testimony concerning
[appellant] hitting and beating [L.H.] over the course of their
ten-year relationship, getting progressively worse recently[,] is
appropriate. And also the statement about . . . [appellant]
hitting [L.H.] with a belt three or four months prior to the
charge[d offense], that would likely be November or December
2015, that is also appropriate.
Now, I will give this caveat to the State. Hitting an
individual with a belt three or four months ago is pretty
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specific. . . . [But on t] he issue of hitting and beating [L.H.]
over the course of the 10 -year relationship, the court is not
going to permit the State to go on and on regarding everything
that has ever happened between [appellant] and [L.H.]. . . .
. . . .
. . . [T]he Court will not permit endless questioning on
various incidents. It sounds from our discussion that the State
does not intend to do that. [The state] will limit it most likely
to more current instances, and the Court will be watching
closely to make sure that the State holds to that promise.

On the first day of trial, the district court told the attorneys it w ould allow L.H. to
testify that appellant “hit and beat her over the course of their 10-year relationship, and that
[he] hit her with a belt three to four months before the current offense,” but would not allow
“a long history of this relationship.”
Before L.H.’s relationship testimony, the district court gave the jury a cautionary
instruction.
The State is about to introduce evidence of conduct
from November or December of 2015, and perhaps a few
instances earlier in time [than] December of 2015.
This evidence is being offered for the limited purpose
of demonstrating the nature and extent of the relation ship
between [appellant] and [L. H.], in order to assist you in
determining whether [appellant] committed those acts with
which [he] is charged in the complaint.
[Appellant] is not being charged [with] and may not be
convicted of any behavior other than the charged offenses.
You are not to convict [him] on the basis of conduct that [L.H.]
may testify about from November or December of 2015 or
earlier in time. To do so might result in unjust double
punishment.

The prosecutor then questioned L.H.:

Q: [Y]ou’ve known [appellant] or been a couple for about
10 years; is that right?
A: Yes.
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Q: And have you ever been assaulted or abused by him
during those 10 years?
A: Yes. The whole time. It just got worse.
Q: And is there anything that you specifically remember?
A: Yeah. I remember this one day when he beat me real
bad with a belt.
Q: Do you know approximately when that was?
A: I think around November. I t was November or
December, one of those.
Q: Of 2015?
A: Yeah.
Q: So in March of 2016 when you were saying you were
scared, is part of it because of that past abuse?
A: Yes.

(Emphasis added.)
Appellant did not object to the words “assaulted or abused” at trial, but argues on
appeal that it was reversible error for the prosecutor to ask L.H. if she had been “assaulted
or abused” instead of “hit or beaten” by appellant.
D E C I S I O N
“Appellate courts should use the plain error doctrine when examining unobjected -
to prosecutorial misconduct.” State v. Ramey , 721 N .W.2d 294, 299 (Minn. 2006).
“[B]efore an appellate court reviews unobjected -to trial erro r, there must be (1) error,
(2) that is plain, and (3) affects substantial rights. If these three prongs are satisfied, the
court then assesses whether the error sho uld be addressed to ensure fairn ess and the
integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Id. at 302 (citation omitted) . “[T]he burden . . .
continue[s] to be on the nonobjecting defendant to demonstrate both that error occurred
and that the error was plain.” Id. “An error is plain if it was clear or obvious. Usually this
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is shown if the error contravenes case law, a rule or a standard of conduct.” Id. (quotation
and citation omitted).
[W]hen the defendant demonstrates that the prosecutor’s
conduct constitutes an error that is plain, the burden . . . then
shift[s] to the state to demonstrate lack of prejudice; that is, the
misconduct did not affect substantial rights. . . . [T]he state . . .
need[s] to show that there is no reasonable likelihood that the
absence of the misconduct in question would have had a
significant effect on the verdict of the jury.

Id. (quotation and citations omitted).
Appellant offers no support for the view that using the words “assaulted or abused”
instead of the words “hit or beaten” was plain error. The district court did not specify any
particular language; it stressed that L.H.’s testimony was to be lim ited to a few specific
instances rather than list every incident during a ten -year relationship. Because “hitting
and beating” are specific terms that necessarily involve violent physical contact, while the
terms “assaulting or abusing” are less graphic and more general, it is at least arguable that
the prosecutor’s choice of words minimized rather than emphasized appellant’s treatment
of L.H.
Appellant argues that the use of the word “assault” made “[t]he suggestion . . . that
[appellant] is known to the courts for his misdeeds.” For this argument, he relies on State
v. Jones, 277 Minn. 174, 177 -78, 152 N.W.2d 67, 71 (1967) (concluding that defendant
did not have a fair trial and noting that there were “so many separate items of impropriety
in the trial that it [was] impracticable to discuss them all”). But Jones is distinguishable,
most obviously because it involved many errors at trial, while the only error alleged on this
appeal is the use of “assaulted and abused” instead of “beat and hit.”
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In Jones, a crime investigator was asked if he recognized the defendant’s name when
he saw it in an address book, which “[left] with the jury the innuendo that this crime
investigator was familiar with [the] defendant and . . . therefore [the] defendant was a man
of bad character” and elicited indirectly evidence of the defendant’s previous charge that
would not have been admissible directly . Jones, 277 Minn. at 189, 152 N.W.2d at 78.
Here, the jury learned nothing to appellant’s disadvantage by the use of the words “assault
and abuse” instead of “beat and hit.” Moreover, L.H. was not asked if appellant was
charged with or convicted of assault or abuse during their relationship; she was asked if he
had assaulted or abused her during the relat ionship. The question was directed to elicit
what appellant had done to L.H., not what the legal system had done to appellant.
Appellant also relies on State v. Underwood, 281 N.W.2d 337 (Minn. 1979), State
v. Flowers, 261 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. 1977), and State v. Hogetvedt, 623 N.W.2d 909 (Minn.
App. 2001), review denied (Minn. May 29, 2001), to argue that the state failed to ensure
that L.H. knew the limits of permissible testimony. All three cases are distinguishable.
In Underwood, when the defendant’s attorney asked an arresting officer whether the
officer had talked to the defendant, the officer answered that he had asked the defendant if
he would put the statement he had just given the officer on tape, and the defendant said he
would not. Underwood, 281 N.W.2d at 342. The supreme court noted that the defense
attorney had not been attempting to elicit improper testimony and that “were this the only
error, . . . reversal would be unnecessary,” but concluded that “[b]ecause of the nature of
this case . . . the officer’s improper testimony may have contributed to the defendant’s
prejudice . . . .” Id. Here, there were no allegations of other errors, there is no support for
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the position that the use of “assault and abuse” was an error , much less a plain error, and
there is no basis to assume that any error prejudiced appellant.
In Flowers, the district court issued an order that “it would be inappropriate for the
State to introduce evidence or to discuss or mention the [prior] criminal conviction [for an
act with the same victim]” and the state referred to the incident underlying that conviction
“several times during trial.” Flowers, 261 N.W.2d at 89 . Here, L.H. was questioned and
testified only about the two points both the state and the district court said were appropriate
relationship evidence. Thus, Flowers is distinguishable.
Finally, in Hogetvedt, “[the a]ppellant was denied a fair trial when the state’s
witness, a police officer, disregarded a specific court instruction to refrain from testifyin g
as to his personal opinion regarding [the] appellant’s guilt.” Hogetvedt, 623 N.W.2d at
916. Here, the district court instructed the state to limit relationship evidence to two points,
and the state complied.
Appellant has not met any of the elemen ts of the plain -error test for unobjected -to
testimony.
Affirmed.