In Re the Matter of the Application of: John Doe for a Change of Birthdate to April 10, 1976.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1392

In Re the Matter of the Application of:
John Doe for a Change of Birthdate to April 10, 1976.

Filed April 17, 2017
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-16-5100

Kathryn M. Lammers, Blaine L. M. Balow, Heimerl & Lammers, Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for appellant John Doe)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Caitlin M. Micko, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for amicus curiae Minnesota Department of Health)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Pres iding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s de nial of his petition to modify his birth
record under the Minnesota Vital Records Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 144.211-.227 (2016), to alter
his date of birth. Because the district court did not err by determining that appellant’s birth
record was not “incomplete, inaccurate, or false” under Minnesota Statutes § 144.218,
subdivision 4, we affirm.

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FACTS
This appeal arises from the denial of appellant’s petition to modify the date of birth
on his birth record under Minnesota Statutes section 144.218, subdivision 4. Appellant’s
undisputed date of birth is Ap ril 10, 1969, which date is re flected on his birth record.
Appellant sought to modify his birth date to April 10, 1976, claiming that he is a “survivor
of a profound mental illness” early in his life that has ha d a “profound impact on his
identity” at present, causing him to identify as younger than his chronological age.
Appellant appended three supporting letters to his petition. David L. Stagner, M.D.,
who met with appellant on eight occasions, opined that appellant suffered from a disorder
during his teenage years which “essentially robbed him of normal and expected adolescent
developmental experiences.” As a result of these early experiences, Stagner found that
appellant “feels most comfortable” considering as his peers people 5 to 15 years younger
than his chronological age. Psychologist Gary R. Perrin also submitted a letter of support,
stating that he has been providing psychothera py services to appellant on a weekly basis
since January 2014. In his opinion, appellant “identifies as an age significantly younger
than his chronological age,” an d a change in his birth reco rd could allow appellant to
“develop a more cohesive sense of self” and “relate more satisfacto rily to his peers.”
Lastly, appellant submitted a letter from Mich ael S. North, Assistant Professor of
Management and Organizations at New York University, who wrote generally about the
“presence and pervasiveness of age stereotypes and age role expectations in society,”
without addressing appellant’s petition or his personal situation.

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The district court denied a ppellant’s petition, holding that appellant’s birth record
“is not incomplete, inaccurate or false within the meaning of the statute, which the Court
finds is clear and unambiguous.” The dist rict court noted that it was “not without
sympathy” for appellant’s situ ation and found that appellant ’s petition was both “honest
and heartfelt.” Nevertheless, the district court concluded that “the law does not
contemplate making the change [appellant] requests, and it is not within this Court’s power
to grant it.” The petition was therefore denied, and this appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant seeks to alter the date of birth on his birth record from April 10, 1969, to
April 10, 1976, on the ground that he experiences a psychological disconnect between his
biological age and the age at wh ich he now identifies, owing to developmental delays in
his youth. The district court denied the petition as seeking relief not authorized by the plain
language of the statute. The question pres ented on appeal is whether Minnesota law
permits a petitioner to modify the date of birth on his or her birth record when the date of
birth, as recorded, is not incomplete, inaccurate, or false.
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law which an appellate court reviews
de novo. Christianson v. Henke , 831 N.W.2d 532, 535 (Minn. 2013). The goal of all
statutory interpretation is to “ascertain and e ffectuate the intention of the legislature.”
Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2016). “If the language of a statute is clear and free from ambiguity,
the court’s role is to apply the language of the statute and not explore the spirit or purpose
of the law.” Toyota-Lift of Minn., Inc. v. Am. Warehouse Sys., LLC, 886 N.W.2d 208, 211
(Minn. 2016) (citing Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2014)). A statute is ambiguous only when it is

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reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. Marks v. Comm’r of Revenue, 875
N.W.2d 321, 324 (Minn. 2016).
The relevant statutory authority for our inquiry is Chapter 144 of the Minnesota
Statutes, the Vital Records Act. The Vital Records Act provides that a birth record for each
live birth in Minnesota must be filed with the state registrar within five days after the birth.
See Minn. Stat. §§ 144.211, .215, s ubd. 1; Minn. R. 4601.0100, subp. 17 (2015). A vital
record may be amended or corrected “only according to [the Vital Records Act] and rules
adopted by the commissioner of health to protect the inte grity and accuracy of vital
records.” Minn. Stat. § 144.2181(a); see also Minn. R. 4601.0600-.1400 (2015). In the
case of birth records:
If a court finds that a birth record is incomplete,
inaccurate, or false . . . , the court may order the registration of
a replacement vital record, and, if necessary, set forth the
correct information in the order. Upon receipt of the order, the
registrar shall register a replacement vital record containing the
findings of the court. The prior vital record shall be
confidential . . . and shall not be disclosed except pursuant to
court order.
Minn. Stat. § 144.218, subd. 4.
While the Vital Records Act does not separa tely define “incomplete, inaccurate, or
false” for purposes of this section, Minn. St at. § 144.212, the plain and ordinary meaning
of those words designates a piece of in formation which is factually incorrect, see The
American Heritage Dictionar y of the English Language 637, 885, 889 (5th ed. 2011)
(defining “false” as “[c]ontrary to fact or truth,” defining “inaccurate” as “[m]istaken or
incorrect; not accurate,” and defining “incomplete” as “[n]ot complete”); see also Toyota-

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Lift of Minn., 886 N.W.2d at 212 (identifying canon of construction that courts “construe
words and phrases according to their plain a nd ordinary meaning” when interpreting a
statute).
It is an undisputed fact that appella nt’s date of birth is April 10, 1969. See Minn. R.
4601.0100, subp. 6 (2015) (“‘Date’ means m onth, day, and year.” ). Appellant’s birth
record accurately and correctly reflects this date. The plain and unambiguous terms of
section 144.218, subdivision 4, permit modi fication of a birth record when it is
“incomplete, inaccurate, or false.” Because a ppellant’s birth record is not “incomplete,
inaccurate, or false” as it relates to his date of birth, he does not fa ll within the class of
persons entitled to redress under the statute. 1 Thus, because the di strict court had no
statutorily conferred authority to modify the birth record, it did not err by denying
appellant’s petition.
Appellant asserts that his request is ma de in good faith. The district court
thoughtfully addressed appellant’s situation, noting that it was
not without sympathy for [appella nt]’s plight. [Appellant]’s
mental health struggles have been real, and his developmental
delay has been the unfortunate result. His request is honest and
heartfelt. But the law does not contemplate making the change
[appellant] requests, and it is not within this Court’s power to
grant it.

1 We have reviewed these supporting letters s ubmitted by appellant to th e district court.
North’s letter does not address the facts of th is case. And while Dr s. Stagner and Perrin
wrote in support of the petition, their letters must be viewed from a therapeutic standpoint
and cannot overcome the plain language of controlling law.

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Although we are likewise sy mpathetic to appellant’s concerns, we are bound by
clear Minnesota law. Nothing in Minnesota Statutes section 144.218, subdivision 4, allows
for modification of a petitioner’s date of birth, where the birth record accurately reflects
the date, and “[i]t is not the function of this court to establish new causes of action.” Jane
Doe 43C v. Diocese of New Ulm, 787 N.W.2d 680, 690 (Minn. App. 2010) (citing Stubbs
v. N. Mem’l Med. Ctr ., 448 N.W.2d 78, 80-81 (Minn. App. 1989), review denied (Minn.
Jan. 12, 1990)). The district court properly applied section 144.218, subdivision 4, and we
affirm.2
Affirmed.

2 Appellant asks us to analogiz e his petition to modify his birt h record to change his date
of birth to a petition to modify a birth reco rd to change a petitioner’s sex-designation.
Appellant cites no relevant authority, in any jurisdiction, to support his position, which we
decline to adopt. See Fannie Mae v. Heather Apartments Ltd. P’ship , 811 N.W.2d 596,
600 n.2 (Minn. 2012) (declining to consider arguments made without citation to legal
support). We are similarly unpersuaded by appellant’s public policy arguments, which are
better directed to the Minnesota Supr eme Court or to the legislature. See Tereault v.
Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Min n. App. 1987) (“[T]he task of extending existing law
falls to the supreme court or to the legislature, but it does not fall to this court.”), review
denied (Minn. Dec. 18, 1987).