In the Matter of the Appeal of the Determination of the Responsible Authority for the South Washington County Schools (ISD #833) that Certain Data about Loren Lorenz are Accurate and/or Complete.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1395

In the Matter of the Appeal of the
Determination of the Responsible Authority for the
South Washington County Schools (ISD #833) that
Certain Data about Loren Lorenz are Accurate and/or Complete.

Filed August 7, 2017
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Halbrooks, Judge

State of Minnesota Administration Department
OAH Docket No. 65-0205-32378

Loren L. Lorenz, Hastings, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Trevor S. Helmers, Kristin C. Nierengarten, Rupp, Anderson, Squires & Waldspurger P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Independent School District No. 833)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Nathan J. Hartshorn, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Minnesota Department of Administration)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
In this certiorari appeal, relator argues that the commissioner of administration erred
by dismissing his data-practices-act challenge to the accuracy and completeness of certain
information contained in an April 16, 2014 termination letter maintained by respondent
former employer. We affirm in part , reverse in part, and remand for modification of the
termination letter as described in section II.B of this decision.
FACTS
Relator Loren Lorenz was employed as a bus driver for respondent South
Washington County School District (the district) from Septem ber 2008 through April 16,
2014. Lorenz knew that bus driver s must, “[f]ollow [] the policies and procedures in
accordance with the South Washington County Transportation Department Handbook” (the
handbook), and understood that the handbook required him to “immediately report all
crashes [defined as ‘any time [a] bus makes contact with any object’], however slight, to
the management of transportation.”
Lorenz was involved in two crashes while driving a school bus for the district. On
December 19, 2013, Lorenz’s bus made contact with the bumper of a car in a busy
intersection at about 3:20 p.m. Lorenz informed management about the crash by e-mail at
5:52 p.m. that afternoon. On January 9, 2014, Lorenz met with Carrie Olson, the district’s
assistant dire ctor of transportation, and Ronald Meyer, the district’s director of
transportation services, to discuss Lorenz’s failure to report the accident according to
department procedures. The district court issued Lorenz a written reprimand and
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suspended him without pay for three days. In addition, the reprimand advised him that
future failure to comply with department policies and federal, state, and local laws would
result in further disciplinary action, including termination.
On April 2, 2014 , while driving an empty bus at approximately 4:00 p.m., Lorenz
scraped a guardrail as he tried to pass a stopped vehicle. Lorenz informed management of
that crash by e -mail at approximately 12:55 a.m. on April 3. On April 11, Lorenz met
again with Olson and Meyer to discuss the April 2 crash. During the meeting, Meyer told
Lorenz that his employment might be terminated because of his failure to immediately
report the crash. Following the meeting, Meyer and Olson decided to terminate Lorenz’s
employment. Olson drafted a termination letter, and Meyer reviewed the letter before
presenting it to Lorenz.
Olson and Meyer again met with Lorenz on April 16 and gave Lorenz the
termination letter. The letter informed Lorenz that he was immediately terminated from
his employmen t with the district and stated in relevant part that (1) Lorenz engaged in
“conduct unbecoming an employee” ; (2) “during [the] meeting on April 11, 2014, [he]
became belligerent, disrespectful and made threatening remarks to [Meyer]”; and (3) his
“continued pattern of gross insubordination . . . has caused undue disruption to the
district.” Lorenz accepted the letter but left the office before Meyer could finish reading
the letter aloud to him.
On or about July 25, Lorenz sent a letter to the district’s human-resources director,
requesting that the district remove the termination letter from his personnel file pursuant
the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA), Minn. Stat. § 13.04, subd. 4
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(2016), and Minn. R. 1205.1600 (201 5). When the district did not respond to his letter,
Lorenz filed an appeal with the commissioner of the Minnesota Department of
Administration, again requesting that the termination letter be removed from his file. A
representative from the Information Policy Analysis Division (IPAD) of the department of
administration responded to Lorenz’s request for an appeal , explaining that the
commissioner could not accept it without more information. The IPAD representative
explained that his request must be addressed to the school superintendent because “[t]he
school superintendent is the ‘responsible authority’ for your data request, not the Human
Resources department.”
In a letter addressed to the school superintendent, Lorenz asked that the termination
letter be removed from his human-resources file pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 13.04, 181.962
(2016), and Minn. R. 1205.1600. The district responded to Lorenz, denying his request ,
stating that “[t]he District believes that the dat a contained in these two letters is accurate,
and was fully supported by a preponderance of the evidence.”
After a hearing, an administrative-law judge ( ALJ) issued a recommendation that
the district reverse the decision denying Lorenz’s challenge to the termination letter. The
ALJ determined that Lorenz had “established by a preponderance of the evidence that” the
challenged statements and conclusions contained in the termination letter are not accurate
and/or complete as defined in Minn. R. 1205.1500, subp. 2. Based on these determinations,
the ALJ recommended that the commissioner order the district to remove the challenged
statements from the termination letter.
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Lorenz petitioned the department of administration for reimbursement of expenses
associated with his MGDPA action. The ALJ denied Lorenz’s petition. The commissioner
issued a final decision on August 19, concluding that, “After reviewing the record, the
Director1 finds that there is insufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion that
Lorenz proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged statements within
the April 16, 2014, Termination Letter are inaccurate or incomplete.” Based on this
conclusion of law, the commissioner ordered that “all challenges by . . . Lorenz to the
accuracy and completeness of data about him contained within the [termination letter] . . .
maintained by [the district] are DISMISSED.” This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Lorenz argues that the commissioner’s decision that the challenged statements in
the termination letter are accurate and complete is not supported by substantial evidence or
is arbitrary or capricious. This court may reverse or modify a final decision on an MGDPA
complaint if the substantial rights of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because the
administrative findings, inferences, conclusion, or decision are, in relevant part, affected
by an error of law or unsupported by substantial evidence. Minn. Stat. § 14.69(d), (e)
(2016).
This court “must defer to an agency’ s decision so long as it is reasonable and
supported by substantial evidence, and [this court] may not substitute [its] judgment for

1 The final order was written by the director of IPAD, under delegated authority from the
commissioner of the department of administration. As a result, this decision is referred to
as a decision by the commissioner throughout this opinion.
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that of the agency.” In re A.D. , 883 N.W.2d 251, 259 (Minn. 2016). “The substantial-
evidence standard addresses the reasonableness of what the agency did on the basis of the
evidence before it.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[A] substantial basis in the record to support
an agency’s determination exists w here, considering the evidence in its entirety, there is
relevant evidence that a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id.
Interpretation of the MGDPA presents a question of law subject to de novo
review. KSTP-TV v. Metro. Council, 884 N.W.2d 342, 345 (Minn. 2016). The MGDPA
provides that “[a]n individual subject of the data may contest the accuracy or completeness
of public or private data.” Minn. Stat. § 13.04, subd. 4(a). Under the MGDPA, “accurate”
means the “data in question is reasonably correct and free from error,” and “complete”
means “that the data in question reasonably reflec ts the history of an individual’ s
transactions with the particular entity.” Minn. R. 1205.1500, subp. 2. A, B (201 5).
“Omissions in an individual’s history that place the individual in a false light shall not be
permitted.” Id., subp. 2.B.
“[A] subjective assessment that, standing alone, is not objectively verifiable” can be
contested under the MGDPA when “the stated basis for the subjective assessment . . . is a
verifiable, falsifiable statement of fact.” Schwanke v. Minn. Dep’t of Admin., 851 N.W.2d
591, 594 (Minn. 2014) . A verifiable, falsifiable statement of fact “is capable of being
proven true or false.” Id. at 595. But “mere dissatisfaction with a subjective judgment or
opinion cannot support a challenge under the [MGDPA].” Id.
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I.
Lorenz challenges the basis underlying the commissioner’s decision, arguing that
the commissioner erred by using an incorrect definition of substantial evidence. When
deciding an appeal regarding a challenge to the accuracy and completeness of data pursuant
to the MGDPA, the commissioner is required to make an independent examination of the
record by applying the substantial -evidence test. See In re Excess Surplus Status of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Minn., 624 N.W.2d 264, 274 (Minn. 2001). Quoting Urban Council
on Mobility v. Minn . Dep’t of Nat. Res. , 289 N.W.2d 729, 733 (Minn. 1980) , t he
commissioner defined “substantial evidence” as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion .” The commissioner also cited
Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst , 256 N.W.2d 808, 825 (Minn. 1977 ), and Hennepin Cty.
Cmty. Servs. Dep ’t v. Hale , 470 N.W.2d 159, 163 ( Minn. App. 1991) , which describe
“substantial evidence” as (1) “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion”; (2) “more than a scintilla of evidence”; (3) “more than
‘some evidence’ ”; (4) “more than ‘any evidence’”; and (5) “evidence considered in its
entirety.”
Lorenz contends that the commissioner’s definition is incorrect because the exact
wording quoted is found in only one of the three cases cited, and there was no explanation
regarding why the commissioner “chose to ignore the five -part definition.” The fact that
the commissioner cited two cases listing the five-part substantial -evidence definition
demonstrates that the commissioner did not ignore that definition. Lorenz does not
articulate the precise legal significance of the four phrases in the five-part definition that
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were omitted from the commissioner’s quoted definition or explain how t he omission
makes the commissioner’s definition substantially different. Finally, Lorenz provides no
authority supporting his assertion that the failure to include the other four parts of the
substantial-evidence definition makes the commissioner’s definition incorrect. This
argument is without merit.
II.
Lorenz asserts that the commissioner erred by dismissing his MGDPA challenge
because the commissioner’s determination that the challenged statements are neither
accurate nor complete is not supported by substantial evidence. Lorenz argues that there
were “serious contradictions” in the district’s evi dence that “taken in its entirety, cannot
pass the test of . . . a ‘reasonable mind’” i n the commissioner ’s substantial -evidence
definition. But we do not resolve conflicts in evidence . We instead defer to an agency’s
credibility determinations and concl usions about conflicts in evidence so long as the
conclusions are supported by substantial evidence . See Blue Cross, 624 N.W.2d at 278
(stating that appellate courts “defer to an agency’s conclusions regarding conflicts in
testimony . . . and the inferences to be drawn from testimony”).
A.
Lorenz first focuses on the reference in the termination letter that characterized his
behavior as “conduct unbecoming an employee ,” arguing that the characterization is not
accurate or complete because the fac ts that form the basis for this characterization are not
supported by substantial evidence in the record. Olson testified that she based her opinion
that Lorenz demonstrated conduct unbecoming an employee on his behavior at the April
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11 meeting, including “standing up, pointing his finger, raising his voice, and leaving the
meeting.” Meyer testified that Lorenz engaged in conduct unbecoming an employee based
on the fact that Lorenz did not timely report crashes involving his school bus on two
occasions and because Lorenz “raised his voice, pointed his finger, and stated an intention
to seek legal counsel” during the April 11 meeting.2
The commissioner concluded that, “[t]he objectively verifiable basis for Olson’s
and Meyer’s opinions [that Lorenz engage d in conduct unbecoming an employee] is not
‘capable of being proved false’ because it is supported by the record.” The commissioner
adopted the ALJ’s finding of fact #15, which states:
In response to Meyer’s statement about termination,
Lorenz stood up, pointed his finger at Meyer, and expressed
his intention to seek legal counsel if the School District
intended to terminate his employment. Lorenz also
commented that Meyer did not treat women in the Department
fairly and that Meyer was likely retaliating against Lorenz for
a report Lorenz made to the State Patrol.

Lorenz testified at the hearing that he did not stand up at the April 11 meeting, point
his finger, or comment that Meyer did not treat women fairly. As a result, the ALJ, as fact-
finder, was required to resolve the conflict in the testimony based on a credibility
determination. The ALJ resolved the conflict between the testimony of Meyer and Lorenz
by crediting Meyer’s account of what happened . Because the record contains sufficient
relevant evidence for a reasonable mind to accept the commissioner’s conclusion that the

2 Lorenz does not deny that he failed to immediately report two crashes involving his school
bus as required by district policy.
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challenged statement is accurate and complete, we conclude that the commissioner did not
err by determining that this statement is accurate and complete as required by the MGDPA.
B.
Lorenz also focuses on the accuracy of the statement in the termination letter that
Lorenz “became belligerent, disrespectful and made threatening remarks to [Meyer].” The
ALJ stated in conclusion #20 of his order:
[Lorenz] . . . established b y a preponderance of the
evidence that the statement . . . that [Lorenz] “ became
belligerent, disrespectful and made threatening remarks to
[Meyer]” is not accurate and is not complete, as those terms are
defined in Minn. R. 1205.1500, subp. 2. Based upon the
evidence presented at hearing, the statement is not reasonably
correct and does not conform to fact. Moreover, the statement
places [Lorenz]’s words and actions on April 11, 2014, in a
false light.

Upon review, t he commissioner concluded that the ALJ’s conclusion of law #20 is “not
supported by the record” because “ [a]fter reviewing the record . . . there is insufficient
evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion.” Because we conclude that the record contains
sufficient evidence to support a portion of the challenged statement, we examine the
elements of the challenged statement separately.
Belligerent and disrespectful
Olson testified that the “belligerent [and] disrespectful” description in the
termination letter was based on Lorenz’s comment about Meyer not treating women fairly
and his general tone of voice. Meyer testified that he characterized Lorenz’s conduct as
belligerent and disrespectful because Lorenz stood up during the meeting, raised his voice,
pointed his finger, and express ed an intent to seek legal advice. We conclude that the
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record, when considered in its entirety, provides sufficient relevant evidence to support a
reasonable person’s conclusion that Lorenz became belligerent and disrespectful during
the April 11 meeting. The commissioner therefore did not err by concluding that this
language in the termination letter describing his behavior in the meeting as belligerent and
disrespectful is accurate.
Made threatening remarks to Meyer
But Lorenz also contends that the commissioner erred by determining that the
statement that Lorenz “made threatening remarks to [Meyer]” during the April 11 meeting
is accurate and complete because there is no evidence that he engaged in physically
threatening behavior. Citing Schwanke, 851 N.W.2d at 595, the commissioner concluded
that Lorenz’s complaint about the statement that he “made threatening remarks to
[Meyer],” “amounts to nothing more than ‘mere dissatisfaction’ with subjective data,
which is insufficient to sustain a challenge under section 13.04 and must be dismissed as a
matter of law.” We disagree.
The statement that Lorenz “made threatening remarks to [Meyer]” is a factual
statement that is capable of being proved false, i.e., “falsifia ble” under Schwanke. See
Schwanke, 851 N.W.2d at 595. To determine the truth or falsity of the statement, it is
necessary to define what a threat is. A threat is defined as: (1) “A communicated intent to
inflict harm o r loss on another or on another’ s p roperty”; (2) “An indication of an
approaching menace”; or (3) “A person or thing that might well cause harm.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 1708-09 (10th ed. 2014). The American Heritage College Dictionary 1411 (3d
ed. 2000) defines “threat” as (1) “[a]n expression of an intention to inflict pain, injury, evil,
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or punishment”; (2) “[a]n indication of impending danger or harm ”; or (3) “[o]ne that is
regarded as a possible danger, a menace.” Based on the dictionary definitions, we conclude
that a prospective employer would reasonably interpret the termination letter to mean that
Lorenz threatened to inflict pain, injury, or harm to Meyer. If that statement is not accurate,
it has the potential to adversely and unfairly impact Lorenz’s efforts to find another job.
The parties do not seem to dispute the underlying factual basis for the statement that
Lorenz “made threatening remarks to [Meyer].” According to Meyer, Lorenz threatened
to “hire an attorney” and “move forward with an attorney towards the District” in a way
that Meyer found threatening “not just in the language that was used, but in the anger that
[Lorenz] presented the information.” Meyer testified that he recalled Lorenz “standing up,
pointing . . . and saying . . . [h]e was not going to allow me to move forward and that, if we
did move forward with termination, tha t he would hire an attorney and . . . move forward
with an attorney t owards the District .” Meyer explained that, “[t] o me, that felt like a
threatening demeanor and language that he used. ” Olson stated that, “ the threatening
[remarks] were more the actions, the motions, pointing at [Meyer], yelling at [Meyer].”
Lorenz’s threat was that he would hire an attorney, not that he would physically
harm Meyer or Olson. We therefore conclude that the statement in the termination letter ,
that Lorenz “made threatening remarks to [Meyer],” is not accurate or complete as those
terms are defined in Minn. R. 1205.1500, subp. 2 , because it places Lorenz’s words and
actions on April 11 in a false light. The commissioner’s conclusion that the statement in
Lorenz’s termination letter that he “made threatening remarks to [Meyer]” is not supported
by the record.
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Because the statement, “made threatening remarks to [Meyer],” is not accurate, we
direct the district to delete that language from Lorenz’s termination letter or correct it by
amending it to state that Lorenz threatened to hire an attorney. When amended, the
termination letter will no longer give a reader the inaccurate impression that Lorenz
threatened to inflict pain, injury, or harm on Meyer.
C.
Lorenz argues that the commissioner erred by concluding that the term “gros s
insubordination” in the termination letter is accurate or complete because the commissioner
used an improper definition of insubordination since the commissioner omitted the phrase
“‘a refusal to obey an order that a superior officer is authorized to giv e.’” We disagree.
“Insubordination” is defined as (1) “[a] willful disregard of an employer’s instructions, esp.
behavior that gives the employer cause to terminate a worker’s employment” and (2) “[a]n
act of disobedience to proper authority; esp., a ref usal to obey an order that a superior
officer is authorized to give.” Black’s Law Dictionary 919 (10th ed. 2014).
The commissioner defined insubordination as “ [a] willful disregard for an
employer’s instructions, esp. behavior that gives the employer cause to terminate a
worker’s employment.” We conclude that t he definition used by the commissioner is
appropriate because the stated factual basis for Lorenz’s “gros s insubordination” is
Lorenz’s failure to follow the policy and procedures in the handbook requiring him to
immediately report any crash with his school bus. Lorenz was issued a written reprimand
and suspended for three days without pay on January 10, 201 4 for failing to immediately
report the December 19, 2013 crash. The written reprimand required Lorenz to “follow
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the policies and procedures set forth in the [handbook],” and warned Lorenz that “failure
to comply with this directive will result in further disciplinary actions, up to and including
termination.” Lorenz disobeyed both the handbook requirement to report the crash
immediately and the direc t instruction from his superior when he did not immediately
report the second crash. Lorenz’s argument that the commissioner erred in concluding that
the term “gross insubordination” in the termination letter is unpersuasive and therefore
fails.
Lorenz also appears to argue that the commissioner was biased in favor of the
district because he showed “an unexplained interest in a minor and irrelevant topic that
favored” the district by mentioning three times that Lorenz’s e-mails reporting the crashes
“were sent ‘hours’ after the two incidents” when “[t]here was no legitimate reason for the
[commissioner’s] ‘hours’ emphasis.”
The commissioner’s reference to the e -mails being sent “hours” after the crashes
occurred goes directly to the basis for concluding that there was insubordination. District
policy required that crashes be reported “immediately” over t he radio. Immediately has
two dictionary definitions, (1) “[w]ithout delay,” and (2) “[w]ith no intermediary; directly.”
The American Heritage College Dictionary 679 (3 d ed. 2000). The record contains
substantial evidence that Lorenz admitted that he re turned the bus and went home before
reporting either crash. There was a significant interval of time in both cases before Lorenz
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reported the crashes. The commissioner’s reference to “hours” is relevant to the district’s
requirement that drivers immediately report crashes and is not indicative of bias.3
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

3 We decline to consid er Lorenz’s First Amendment and whistleblower claims because
they were not addressed by the commissioner and are not prop erly within the scope of a
MGDPA challenge. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (“A reviewing
court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were presented and
considered by the [district] court in deciding the matter before it.” (quotation omitted) ).
And we decline to consider Lorenz’s argument about an award of damages or expenses
because this argument was inadequately briefed and unsupported by legal analysis or
citation. Ganguli v. Univ. of Minn., 512 N.W.2d 918, 919 n.1 (Minn. App. 1994); see also
State, Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn.
1997) (explaining that a ppellate courts decline to reach an issue in absence of adequate
briefing).