State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1414

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Chelsey Marie Conn,
Appellant.

Filed June 5, 2017
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Martin County District Court
File No. 46-CR-15-435

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Terry Viesselman, Martin Coun ty Attorney, Kathryn Karjal a-Curtis, Assistant County
Attorney, Fairmont, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Sche llhas, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges her sentence for second-degree possession of a controlled
substance, arguing that she is entitled to be resentenced un der the 2016 Minnesota drug
sentencing reform act because the act became effective before her conviction became final.
We affirm.
FACTS
On May 7, 2015, re spondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Chelsey Conn
with one count of second-degree possession of a controlled substance for possessing about
eight grams of methamphetamine in violati on of Minn. Stat. § 15 2.022, subd. 2(a)(1)
(2014); one count of failure to affix tax st amps; one count of driving without proof of
insurance; one count of driving after license revocation; one count of possession of a small
amount of marijuana; and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. On May 12, 2016,
Conn pleaded guilty to second-degree possession of a controlled substance in exchange for
dismissal of the other charges and a 44-mont h executed sentence, a downward durational
departure from the presumptive 58-month executed sentence. The district court convicted
Conn of second-degree possession of a c ontrolled substance and sentenced her in
accordance with the plea agreement.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
When Conn committed the second-degree controlled-substance crime by possessing
about eight grams of methamphetamine, the severity level of that crime was eight and the

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presumptive sentence was 58 months’ impris onment for a defendant, like Conn, with a
criminal-history score of one. See Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 2(a)(1); Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 4.A (2014). But after amendm ents made by the 2016 Minnesota drug
sentencing reform act (DSRA), possession of eight grams of methamphetamine is
classified as a fifth-degree controlled-subs tance crime, which carries a presumptive
sentence of one year and one day stayed for a defendant with a criminal-history score of
one. See Minn. Stat. §§ 152.023, subd. 2(a)(1), . 025, subd. 2(1) (2 016); Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 4.C (2016). Conn argues that she is entitled to be resentenced under the DSRA
amendments because the act became effective before he r conviction became final.
Although Conn did not raise this sentencing argument in district court, we address the issue
in the interest of judicial economy. See Edstrom v. State, 326 N.W.2d 10, 10 (Minn. 1982)
(“Normally, we would not consider this issue because it was not clearly raised in the trial
court. However, in the interest of judicial economy, we address the issue . . . .”).
“The retroactivity of a statute is a matter of statutory interpretation, which we review
de novo.” State v. Basal, 763 N.W.2d 328, 335 (Minn. App. 2009). As a general rule, “[n]o
law shall be construed to be retroactive unle ss clearly and manifestly so intended by the
legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 64 5.21 (2016). When a law is amended, “the new provisions
shall be construed as effective only from the date when the amendment became effective.”
Minn. Stat. § 645.31 (2016). “In Minnesota no statute shall be construed to be applied
retroactively unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the legislature.” State v. Traczyk,
421 N.W.2d 299, 300 (Minn. 1988) (quotation omitted). “[T]here must exist clear evidence

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that the legislature intended retroactive application such as mention of the word
‘retroactive.’” Id. (quotation omitted).
The relevant sections of the DSRA provide , “This section is effective August 1,
2016, and applies to crimes committed on or after that date .” 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160,
§§ 4, 7, at 579–81, 583–85. Conn neverthe less argues the sentencing provisions in the
DSRA should be applied to reduce her sentence because of the common-law rule that “the
legislature intends for newly-enacted laws reducing the punishment for a criminal offense
to apply to all cases that are not final when the law takes effect,” citing State v. Coolidge,
282 N.W.2d 511, 514–15 (Minn. 1979). Coolidge holds that “a statute mitigating
punishment is applied to acts committed befo re its effective date, as long as no final
judgment has been reached.” 282 N.W.2d at 514.
But, as Conn concedes, the supr eme court narrowed the holding of Coolidge in
Edstrom, clarifying that Coolidge’s rule only applies “absent a contrary statement of intent
by the legislature.” 326 N.W.2d at 10. The act at issue in Edstrom provided that “crimes
committed prior to the effective date of this act are not affected by its provisions.” 1975
Minn. Laws ch. 374, § 12, at 1251. Edstrom committed his offense in March 1975, and the
effective date of the act was August 1, 1975. Edstrom, 326 N.W.2d at 10. The supreme
court therefore declined to apply the statut e as amended by the act to offenses committed
before the effective date, including Edstrom’s offense. Id. at 10–11.
This court has addressed the relationship between Coolidge and Edstrom in two
published opinions. In the act at issue in State v. McDonnell, the legislature stated that the
subject amendment “‘is effective August 1, 2003, and applies to violations committed on

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or after that date.’” 686 N. W.2d 841, 846 (Minn. App. 2004) (quoting 2003 Minn. Laws
1st Spec. Sess. ch. 2, art. 9, § 1, at 1446), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2004). This court
characterized that language as an “explicit legislative statement that . . . demonstrates that
the legislature did not clearly and manifestly intend the amendment to be retroactive.” Id.
We therefore concluded that the principle stated in Coolidge did not apply because the
legislation included a statement of intent that the amendment would not apply to violations
that preceded the effective date. Id. Citing Edstrom, we affirmed the appellants’
convictions because “there [wa]s no basis fo r us to construe the amendment to be
retroactive.” Id.
In Basal, this court again declined to appl y an amended statute to offenses
committed before the effective date of the am ending act where “the legislature provided
for a specific effective date,” thereby indicating that “the legislature did not intend for the
amendment to apply to conduc t occurring before the effective date.” 763 N.W.2d at 336
(citing 2007 Minn. Laws ch. 147, art. 2, § 64, at 1901). Because the effective-date language
of the subject legislative amendment was equiva lent to the language that was at issue in
Edstrom, we concluded that Coolidge did not require retroactivity. Id.
The DSRA similarly provides that its relevant sections are “effective August 1,
2016, and appl[y] to crimes committed on or after that date.” Minn. Laws. ch. 160 §§ 4, 7
at 579–81, 583–85. Yet Conn insists that this language is insufficient “[t]o avoid
application [of the DSRA ] to non-final cases.” According to Conn, “ Edstrom requires
something more,” su ch as a specific statement that the amended law does not apply to
‘“past and present’” prosecutions for crimes committed before the effective date of the

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amendment. She provides no authority for her argument other than Edstrom, which does
not support her argument.
Conn also argues that “[b] ecause an affirmative statem ent of non-applicability to
pending cases is absent from [certain sections of the DS RA] there is no basis for not
applying the common-law rule.” But this argument also fails because, as discussed above,
the common-law rule articulated in Edstrom and reiterated by this court in McDonnell and
Basal supports a conclusion that the effective-date language found in the relevant sections
of the DSRA is sufficient to demonstrate that the legislature did not intend the amendment
to apply to offenses committed before the effective date of those sections.
Finally, Conn argues that this court should apply “the DSRA’s ameliorative
provisions” here because doing so is consistent with the policy objec tives of the act. We
disagree. If the legislature had intended retro active application of the DSRA to crimes
committed before August 1, 20 16, the legislature could ha ve clearly indicated that
intention, but it did not do so.
Affirmed.