State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1438

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Gerald Michael Feran, II,
Appellant.

Filed July 24, 2017
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-35104

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, Christopher Reisdorfer (certified student attorney), St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Randall,
Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his prohibited -person-in-possession-of-a-firearm conviction,
arguing that the f irearm should have been suppressed because the officers impermissibly
expanded the scope of the traffic stop. We affirm.
FACTS
On December 14, 2015, at approximately 3:20 p.m., an identified caller told a 911
operator that a suspicious vehicle with Texas license plates was blocking her driveway and
the female driver was throwing something into the caller’s trashcan. Minneapolis Police
Officers Todd Harder and Aaron Womble responded and observed a vehicle matching the
caller’s description leaving the alley. Officer Harder followed the vehicle for less than a
minute before initiating the stop.
The officers simultaneously approached the vehicle. As Officer Harder neared the
driver’s door, appellant Gerald Michael Feran II opened the door, stating that his window
did not work. Officer Harder asked Feran for his driver’s license; Feran indicated that he
did not have one. After asking Feran his name, Officer Harder observed what appeared to
be a 12 -inch-long metal knife 1 on the floor between the driver’s seat and the vehicle’s
frame, and a syringe containing a brown substance , which Officer Harder believed to be
heroin, inside the driver’s door compartment . Out of concern for officer safety, Officer
Harder asked Feran to exit the vehicle. Feran complied, and Officer Harder saw a firearm

1 This item was later determined to be a metal file.

3
on the driver’s seat. Officer Harder yelled , “Gun!” to alert Officer Womble, who was
standing near the passenger’s side of the vehicle. The o fficers handcuffed Feran and
secured the two passengers.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Feran with being a prohibited person in
possession of a firearm. Feran moved to suppress the firearm, arguing that the officers
unlawfully expanded the scope of the stop. The distr ict court denied the motion,
concluding that requesting Feran’s driver’s license was reasonably related to and justified
by the circumstances giving rise to the stop. Following a bench trial, the district court
found Feran guilty and sentenced him to 60 months in prison. Feran appeals.
D E C I S I O N
“When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we may
independently review the facts and determine whether, as a matter of law, the district court
erred in suppressing or not suppressing the evidence.” State v. Askerooth , 681 N.W.2d
353, 359 (Minn. 2004). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and
its legal determinations de novo. State v. Gauster , 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008).
When, as in this case, the u nderlying facts are not disputed, we review the denial of a
motion to suppress evidence de novo. Id.
Feran does not challenge the validity of the stop, but argues Officer Harder
impermissibly expanded its scope by asking the male driver for his driver’s license.
Expansion of a traffic stop beyond its original purpose is permissible if an officer has
reasonable, articulable suspicion of other criminal activity. State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d
125, 135 (Minn. 2002). An officer’s suspicion cannot be based o n a hunch; it must be

4
objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d
346, 351 (Minn. 2012). Evidence discovered during an invalid search must be suppressed.
Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 370. Feran contends that t he officer impermissibly expanded
the scope of the traffic stop by asking Feran for his driver’s license and by focusing on
anyone other than the female occupant. We are not persuaded.
First, police officers are entitled to ask for a driver’s license when they stop a
vehicle. Our supreme court has held that asking for a driver’s license is a standard
procedure in traffic-stop cases, observing that any rule limiting when an officer may ask to
see a license would create unnecessary confusion. State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105,
109 (Minn. 1983). And we have held that a police officer who stops a vehicle “ may
reasonably ask for the driver’s license and registration and ask the driver about his
destination and the reason for the trip” without expanding the scope of the stop. State v.
Syhavong, 661 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn. App. 2003). This caselaw is consistent with Minn.
Stat. § 171.08 (2014), which mandates that
[e]very licensee shall have the license in immediate possession
at all times when operating a motor vehicle and shall display it
upon demand of a peace officer, an authorized representative
of the department, or an officer authorized by law to enforce
the laws relating to the operation of motor vehicles on public
streets and highways.

Accordingly, asking Feran for his driver’s license and identifying information did not
expand the scope of the stop.
Feran’s reliance on State v. Hickman is misplaced. 491 N.W.2d 673 (Minn. App.
1992), review denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 1992) . In Hickman, the police of ficer stopped

5
Hickman’s vehicle because it did not have a valid registration sticker . Id. at 674. But
before he approached the driver, the officer saw the vehicle had a valid temporary permit
in the window. Id. Because the officer’s suspicion concerning the vehicle’s registration
status was dispelled before he made contact with Hickman, and the officer had no suspicion
of other criminal activity, we concluded the officer had no basis to ask Hickman for his
driver’s license. Id. at 675.2 In contrast, Officer Harder’s suspicions of criminal activity
had not been dispelled at the time he approached Feran. The officer’s concerns —that the
vehicle’s occupants had committed theft or some other crime—could not be dispelled until
he confronted the driver and passengers. And once Officer Harder saw what appeared to
be a knife and a controlled substance, he reasonably suspected other criminal activity.
Second, we are not persuaded by Feran’s contention that the officer ’s reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity only extended to the female passenger. The 911 caller
reported concern that the occupants of the suspicious vehicle were involved in criminal
activity, including the woman who placed something into the trashcan . Officer Harder
reasonably suspected that the woman may have discarded evidence of a crime, such as the
contents of a stolen purse . Because the 911 operator reported that a woman was driving
the car, Officer Harder may have suspected a woman was behind the wheel until he got up
close to the already-opened driver’s door . As the district court found, at the very least,
Officer Harder had “[r]easonable articulable suspicion that the driver of the vehicle was

2 The Hickman court cited to Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1401
(1979), for the notion that it is constitutional to ask for a driver’s license if there is
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the vehicle or any of its occupants are involved in
illegal activity. 491 N.W.2d at 675.

6
aiding an offender, by driving her to a location where she could dispose of the evidence.”
In sum, neither asking Feran for his driver’s license nor contacting anyone other than the
female occupant of the vehicle impermissibly expanded the scope of the stop.
Affirmed.