State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1441

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Fabian Jonathan Suggs,
Appellant.

Filed September 25, 2017
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-29219

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Fabian Jonathan Suggs was convicte d of first - and second -degree
criminal sexual conduct for sexual contact with his girlfriend’s minor daughter. He argues
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that the child’s uncorroborated testimony was insufficient evidence to sustain his
convictions. Because the child’s testimony was con sistent and specific, and Suggs
admitted to having sexually contacted the child, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2015, Suggs lived with his girlfriend and her three child ren at an apartment in
St. Louis Park. Suggs was often responsible for looking after the children because the
girlfriend had a long commute to and from work. On one occasion, in the middle of the
night, Suggs directed S.L., who was 11 years old and the eldest of the children, to get on
her hands and knees. He pulled down her pants and underwear. He licked S.L. near her
vagina. S.L. testified that Suggs also touched her vagina with his finger, but S.L. protested
when Suggs said he was going to “stick it in.” Suggs stopped and explained to S.L. that he
was trying to discipline her.
On a separate occasion, according to S.L., Suggs instructed her to get on her hands
and knees. He pulled down her pants and squeezed hand sanitizer out of a bottle, which
ran down from S.L.’s anus to her vagina. S.L. said it felt like “a hundred pinches.”
In early October 2015, S.L. told her mother that Suggs had been “touching me in
my lower girl part, he had licked me in my lower girl part, he had burned me in my lower
girl part.”1 Her mother told S.L. that she would talk with Suggs. Shortly thereafter, during
an overnight at a friend’s apartment, S.L. told her friend and the friend’s mother that Suggs

1 S.L. identified her vagina as her “lower girl part,” clarifying that her lower girl part was
“[w]here the baby comes out.”
3
had touched her private parts. The friend’s mother alerted the police, who arrived to
conduct a welfare check.
Suggs was arrested and charged with first - and second -degree criminal sexual
conduct in violation of Minnesota Statutes sections 609.342, subd ivision 1(a); .343,
subdivision 1(a) (2014).2 In a Mirandized statement, Suggs admitted that he licked S.L.’s
buttocks. During an interview at CornerHouse, a child -abuse evaluation center that
provides forensic interview services and family resources , S.L. confirmed the occurrence
of the sexual contacts . During that interview, S.L. stated specifically that it felt as if
Suggs’s tongue went inside her vagina during the licking incident. Due to a lapse in time
between the incidents and police intervention, there was no sexual assault examination of
S.L.
After a three -day trial, the jury found Suggs guilty of first - and second -degree
criminal sexual conduct. The district court sentenced Suggs to 144 months’ imprisonment
and placed him on ten years’ conditional release for the first -degree conviction and
imposed no sentence for the second-degree conviction.3 Suggs appeals.

2 At trial, the state amended the initial complaint to include the second -degree charge, but
an amended complaint was not included in the district court record on appeal.

3 While the district court entered a judgment of conviction on both counts of criminal sexual
conduct, the district court explained on the warrant of commitment that the sentence for
the second-degree conviction “merged with sentence on [the first-degree conviction.]” Cf.
Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (2014) (prohibiting sentencing for more than one offense
arising out of the same course of conduct). Because Suggs was not sentenced on his
second-degree conviction, we do not consider his challenge to that conviction. See State
v. Ashland, 287 N.W.2d 649, 650 (Minn. 1979) (declining to review sufficiency challenge
on unadjudicated counts where no sentence was imposed).
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D E C I S I O N
Suggs argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he sexually
penetrated S.L. We will not disturb a verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the
presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could
reasonably conclude the defendant wa s guilty of the charged offense . Bernhardt v. State,
684 N.W.2d 465, 476 -77 (Minn. 2004). In our review, we assume that the jury believed
the state’s evidence and disbelieved any contrary evidence. State v. Heiges, 806 N.W.2d
1, 17 (Minn. 2011). This is true even if there are inconsistencies in the state’s case. State
v. Pieschke, 295 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 1980). And we defer to th e jury’s credibility
determinations. See State v. Barshaw, 879 N.W.2d 356, 366 (Minn. 2016).
To obtain a conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct, the state must prove
that Suggs “ engage[d] in sexual penetration with ” S.L. Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1.
Any intrusion, however slight, into the genital or anal openings constitutes sexual
penetration. Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 12(2) (2014). Sexual penetration also includes
cunnilingus, which is defined as any contact with the female genital opening of one person
with the mouth, tongue, or lips of another . Id., subd. 12(1); see 10 Minnesota Practice,
CRIMJIG 12.05 (2014).

Even if we were to address his challenge, as add ressed below, Suggs does not
dispute that he admitted to licking S.L.’s buttocks in his Mirandized statement. We
conclude that his admission corroborated S.L.’s statement and that constituted sufficient
evidence for the jury to conclude that he touched S.L.’s private parts and that he was guilty
of second -degree criminal sexual conduct. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.343, subd. 1; .341,
subds. 5, 11(a)(i) (stating that to constitute second-degree criminal sexual conduct, the state
must prove that the defendant to uched the victim’s “intimate parts,” which includes the
buttocks).
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Suggs contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. He
argues th at, given inconsistencies in S.L.’s testimony and the suggestive nature of the
CornerHouse interview, corroboration of S.L.’s testimony was necessary. We disagree.
Overall, S.L.’s testimony was both consistent and specific. At trial S.L. testified
that Suggs had inappropriately touched her on two separate occasions. S.L. explained that
Suggs was licking her labia near her vagina in one incident. He also used his finger, but
S.L. said his finger “didn’t go in but he was touching my lower girl part.” In critical
portions, S.L.’s testimony at trial was also consistent with her statement in a prior recorded
CornerHouse interview, which was played for the jury. During her interview, she
explained that Suggs licked her between her anus and vagina, “close t o where you have a
baby.” In the video, she pointed to an anatomical doll to demonstrate where Suggs had
licked her. She stated specifically that it felt as if Suggs’s tongue went inside her vagina
during the licking incident. And she said that she felt his cold finger touching her vagina.
See Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 12(2) (stating that any intrusion, however slight, into the
genital or anal openings establishes sexual penetration). We recognize that while S.L. was
inconsistent about details (e.g., mother’s presence in the home during the incidents and the
precise location of the sexual contact ), S.L. consistently asserted that the sexual contacts
occurred. Cf. State v. Mosby , 450 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied
(Minn. Mar. 16, 1990) (“[I]nconsistencies are a sign of human fallibility and do not prove
testimony is false, especially when the testimony is about a traumatic event.” ). And her
recorded interview included specific evidence of sexual penetration. Nor does our review
reveal that the interview was overly suggestive. For instance, while Suggs takes issue with
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the interviewer introducing the word “tongue”, this took place after S.L. explained that
Suggs had licked her.
In light of S.L.’s unwavering assertion that sexu al contact occurred, corroboration
of S.L.’s testimony was unnecessary. First, inconsistencies in the state’s case do not
require reversal of the jury verdict. See Pieschke, 295 N.W.2d at 584. Second, credibility
determinations are for the jury. Barshaw, 879 N.W.2d at 366. And we assume that the
jury resolved minor inconsistencies in S.L.’s testimony in favor of the state. See Heiges,
806 N.W.2d at 17. Third, the victim’s testimony in cases of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct need not be corroborated. Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1 (2014). Like the
principal case that Suggs relies upon, State v. Ani , 257 N.W.2d 699, 700 (Minn. 1977),
corroboration is unnecessary where the victim’s testimony was “not contradicted” and
“corroborated by other evidence.”
Significantly, Suggs corroborated S.L.’s testimony. In his statement, Suggs
explained that the incident occurred in the living room and in the early morning. He had
asked S.L. to get on her hands and knees. He admitted to removing her pan ts and licking
her. Although he denied licking S.L.’s vagina, Suggs acknowledged that he licked S.L.
near her anus, which he suspected that she had confused with her vagina when she spoke
with police. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence for th e jury to conclude that
Suggs sexually penetrated S.L.
Affirmed.