State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1454

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Yusuf Odowa Ali,
Appellant.

Filed August 14, 2017
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-CR-15-1452

Lori Swanson, Attorney Gene ral, Edwin W. Stockmeyer, A ssistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Dan McIntosh, Steele County Attorney, Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael W. Kunkel, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and
Connolly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Yusuf Odowa Ali challenges the sufficiency of the ev idence to support
his conviction of first-degree robbery. Sp ecifically, Ali argues that his conviction

2
depended on accomplice te stimony that was not adequa tely corroborated. Because
sufficient evidence supports a fi nding that the witness at i ssue was not an accomplice to
the robbery, and because, in any event, that witness’s testimony was adequately
corroborated, we affirm.
FACTS
This case arises from a drug sale that turned into an aggravated robbery of the seller
and his friends.
Four high school students—A.H, Cha.H., Che.H., and B.H.—met S.P. at a house in
Owatonna on April 20, 2015. A.H. asked S. P. if he knew anyone who wanted to buy
marijuana. Later that day, S.P. contacted A.H. and arranged for A.H. to sell marijuana to
S.P.’s friends.
A.H. drove Cha.H., Che.H., and B.H. to a park to sell marijuana to S.P. and his
friends. When A.H. and his companions arrived, they parked next to a Chevy Impala. S.P.
got out of the Impala, and A.H. partially opened his car door to speak with S.P. While
A.H. was speaking with S.P., someone walked up to A.H., pulled hi m out of the car, and
began punching him in the face. Someone else pulled Cha.H. out of the car and hit him on
the head with a baseball bat. Che.H. was pu lled out of the car and pushed to the ground.
Someone dragged B.H. out of the car and tried to take her purse. Another person hit B.H.
in the eye with a bottle. Among other things , the assailants took A.H.’s wallet. S.P.
watched the incident but did not intervene. The assailants and S.P. then left in the Impala.
A.H. drove Cha.H., Che.H., and B.H. to the hospital and contacted the police. B.H.
told a police officer that S.P. was at the robbery and that the assailants had been driving an

3
Impala. The police found the Impala in front of S.P.’s house and discovered that the Impala
was registered to Ali’s mother. At a photo lineup the next day, A.H., Cha.H., Che.H., and
B.H. identified Ali as a par ticipant in the robbery. Ali was charged with first-degree
aggravated robbery and aiding and abetting first-degree aggravated robbery.
A jury trial was held. A. H., Cha.H., Che.H., B.H., S.P., and several police officers
testified.
A.H., Cha.H., and Che.H. testified that they were “pretty certain” that the person
they identified in the photo lineup was present at the robbery. A.H. also testified that the
person he identified in the p hoto lineup had punched him. But the four victims offered
conflicting in-court identifications. Cha.H. testified that he remembered seeing Ali at the
robbery. Che.H. testified that Ali was not the person who punched A. H. A.H. and B.H.
could not identify Ali at trial.
S.P. testified about the events that occu rred before, during, a nd after the robbery.
According to S.P., Ali and three of Ali’s friends picked S.P. up in an Impala. Ali and his
friends wanted to purchase some marijuana. S.P. then c ontacted A.H. and arranged for
A.H. to meet the group at a park. Once the two cars arrived at the park, S.P. got out of the
Impala and spoke with A.H. As S.P. was speaking to A.H, Ali grabbed A.H. and began
punching him in the face. One of Ali’s friends pulled Cha.H. out of the car and hit him on
the head with a baseball bat. Another friend pulled either Che.H. or B.H. out of the car and
tried to take her cellphone. S.P. testified that Ali and his friends took two phones, A.H.’s
wallet, and the marijuana. The district court instructed the jury to determine whether S.P.

4
was an accomplice and, if th e jury found that S.P. wa s an accomplice, whether his
testimony was corroborated by other evidence.
The jury returned a verdic t finding Ali guilty of first-degree aggravated robbery and
aiding and abetting first-degree aggravated robbery. The district court entered a judgment
of conviction for first-degree aggravated robbery.1
Ali appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Ali argues that the evidence is insufficient to support Ali’s conviction because the
evidence is insufficient to support a finding that S.P. was not an accomplice and the state
failed to adequately corroborate S.P.’s testimon y, which, he asserts, was indispensable to
proving his guilt. Ali does not argue that he was entitled to a jury in struction identifying
S.P. as an accomplice as a matter of law. Cf. State v. Pendleton , 759 N.W.2d 900, 907
(Minn. 2009) (holding that a district court di d not err in failing to give an instruction
identifying a witness as an accomplice). Th e state counters that sufficient evidence
supported Ali’s conviction because (1) sufficient evidence supports a finding that S.P. was
not an accomplice requiring corroboration a nd (2) even if S.P. was necessarily an

1 At sentencing, the district court entere d a judgment of conviction of first-degree
aggravated robbery but not aiding and abetting first-degree aggravated robbery because the
two crimes arose from the same behavioral incident under the same course of conduct. But
the district court’s warrant of commitment stated that Ali was convicted of both first-degree
aggravated robbery and aiding an d abetting first-degree aggrav ated robbery. While this
appeal was pending, the district court amen ded its warrant of commitment to correctly
reflect Ali’s conviction of only first-degree aggravated robbery. The district court’s
correction of the clerical error was proper under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 10.

5
accomplice, his testimony was sufficiently corroborated. The district court instructed the
jury to decide (1) whether S.P. is an accomplice and (2) if S.P. was an accomplice, whether
sufficient evidence corroborates S.P.’s testimony. We may affirm Ali’s conviction if
sufficient evidence supports a finding that S.P. was not an accomplice or if the evidence
sufficiently corroborated S.P.’s testimony.
Accomplice testimony must be “corroborated by such ot her evidence as tends to
convict the defendant of the commission of the offense, and the corroboration is not
sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.”
Minn. Stat. § 634.04 (2014).
First, we ask whether sufficient evidence supports a finding by the jury that S.P. was
not an accomplice. If the question of whether a witness is an accomp lice is disputed or
subject to different interpretations, then the issue is one of fact for the jury. Pendleton, 759
N.W.2d at 907. Our review on appeal is limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to
determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction,
was sufficient to permit the jury to find that S.P. was not an accomplice. See State v. Webb,
440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989) (describing the standard of review for sufficiency-of-
the-evidence challenges generally).
Second, if we conclude that a witness must have been an accomplice, we ask
whether sufficient evidence corrobor ates the witness’s testimony. State v. Clark , 755
N.W.2d 241, 251 (Minn. 2008). “[I]n revi ewing the sufficiency of the corroborating
evidence of an accomplice’s testimony, we revi ew the evidence just as we would on a
sufficiency challenge—in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and with all conflicts

6
in the evidence resolved in favor of the verdict.” State v. Nelson, 632 N.W.2d 193, 202
(Minn. 2001); see Clark, 755 N.W.2d at 253-55.
I. Sufficient evidence supports a finding th at S.P. was not an accomplice to the
robbery.

Ali argues that the evidence is insufficient to support a fi nding that S.P. is not an
accomplice and, therefore, corroboration of hi s testimony was required under Minn. Stat.
§ 634.04. The state counters that corroboration of S.P .’s testimony was not required
because sufficient evidence supports a finding that S.P. was not an accomplice to the
robbery.
“An accomplice is one who co uld have been ch arged with and co nvicted of the
crime with which the accused is charged” and who appears to have cooperated with, aided,
or assisted the defendant in the commission of th e crime either as a principal or an
accessory. State v. Vasquez, 776 N.W.2d 452, 457 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted).
Mere presence at the scene of a crime is insu fficient to establish that the witness is an
accomplice; the witness must have played a “knowing role” in the crime. Pendleton, 759
N.W.2d at 907. A witness wh o is guilty of one crime is not necessarily an accomplice to
the accused’s separate and distinct crime. State v. Pederson, 614 N.W.2d 724, 733 (Minn.
2000). After-the-fact assistance is not relevant to an accomplice determination. Pendleton,
759 N.W.2d at 908.
Ali makes three arguments that S.P. must have been an accomplice. First, Ali argues
that S.P. was an accomplice because he helped broker the drug deal where the robbery took

7
place. But S.P. is not an accomplice to the robbery merely because he was an accomplice
to the drug deal. See Pederson, 614 N.W.2d at 733.
Second, Ali argues that S.P. must have been an accomplice because he helped spend
the money from the robbery and lied to the police. After-the-fact assistance is not relevant
in determining whether a witness is an accomplice. Pendleton, 759 N.W.2d at 908. S.P.’s
decision to lie to the police is after-the-fact assistance and is not relevant to determining
whether S.P. was an accomplice to the robbery. See id. Moreover it is not clear that S.P.
helped spend money from the robbery. When asked whether the group used the money
from the robbery to purchase alcohol, S.P. testified, “Not necessarily. They had their own
money.”
Third, Ali argues that S.P. must have been an accomplice because he led the parties
to a secluded location, one of his passengers came with a baseball bat, and he watched the
assaults happen without intervening. But conflicting evidence may also support a finding
that Ali was not an accomplice. In Pendleton, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded
that the district court did not err in failing to instruct the jury that a witness was an
accomplice because the jury could have reasona bly found that a witness to a murder was
not an accomplice. 759 N.W.2d at 907. The witness was with the appellant the night of
the murder, opened the door while the appellant carried the victim to the car, remained with
the appellant after the murder, and lied to the police about the ev ents of the night. Id. at
905, 908. In reviewing the evidence, the supreme court noted that the witness stayed near
the car during the murder and that the witne ss’s decision to open the door was just as
consistent with acting out of fear as acting to aid the crime. Id. at 908. The supreme court

8
thus concluded that the evidence was susceptible to conflicting interpretations and the jury
could have reasonably found that the witness was not an accomplice to the murder. Id.
Like in Pendleton, the evidence in this case leads to conflicting interpretations. S.P.
remained by the car during the robbery and did not intervene on behalf of either the victims
or Ali and his friends. According to S.P.’s testimony, S.P. remained with the group after
the robbery because Ali and hi s friends wanted to “know what [he] was doing.” S.P.
testified that he initially lied to the police because he was afraid he would “get hurt” by Ali
and his friends. S.P.’s actions are consistent with acting out of fear of retaliation. See id.
Other evidence suggests that S.P. did not know that Ali and his friends intended to rob the
victims. See id. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we
conclude that sufficient evidence supports a finding that S.P. was not an accomplice to the
robbery, making corroboration of his testimony unnecessary.
II. Even if S.P. was an accomplice, his testimony was sufficiently corroborated.

Assuming that S.P. was an accomplice to the robbery, Ali argues that the state did
not sufficiently corroborate S.P.’s testimony. “[T]he accomplice’s testimony need not be
corroborated on every point.” State v. England, 409 N.W.2d 262-64 (M inn. App. 1987).
“Corroborating evidence may be found in a defendan t’s association with others involved
in the crime in such a way as to suggest joint pa rticipation, from the defendant’s motive
and opportunity to commit the crime, and from his proximity to the place where the crime
was committed.” State v. Her , 668 N.W.2d 924, 927 (Mi nn. App. 2003) (quotation
omitted), review denied (Minn. Sept. 30, 2003). Corroboration is sufficient if it “reinforces
the truth of the accomplice’s testimony and poi nts to the defendan t’s guilt in some

9
substantial degree.” State v. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d 521, 532 (Minn. 1995). But when the
corroborating evidence is as consistent with the defendant’s innocenc e as with his guilt,
the evidence is not sufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony. See State v. Wallert ,
402 N.W.2d 570, 571 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. May 18, 1987).
We conclude that sufficient evidence corroborates S.P.’s testimony in three material
respects. First, S.P. testifie d that they drove Ali’s maroon Impala to the park. Cha.H.
testified that the car was “reddish-maroon,” A.H. testified that the car appeared to be an
Impala, and an officer testified that the Impa la was registered to Ali’s mother. Second,
S.P. identified Ali as the pe rson who pulled A.H. out of th e car and punched him in the
face. All four victims testified that someone pulled A.H. out of the car and began punching
him in the face. All four victims identified Ali as a person who was present at the robbery
at a photo lineup, and Cha.H iden tified Ali again at trial. A.H. testified at trial that the
person he identified at the photo lineup was the person who hit him. Finally, S.P. testified
that Ali had A.H.’s wallet when they left the park. A.H. testified that his wallet was missing
after the incident. The corroborating evidence shows that Ali’s vehicle was used to drive
to the park, Ali was present at the robbery, Ali punched A.H., and A.H.’s wallet was
missing. See Her, 668 N.W.2d at 927. Sufficient eviden ce reinforces the truth of S.P.’s
testimony and points to Ali’s guilt to a substantial degree. See Bowles, 530 N.W.2d at 532.
Ali argues that the corroboratin g evidence is as consistent with his innocence as
with his guilt because Che.H. testified that Ali was not th e one that punched A.H. and
neither A.H. nor B.H. coul d identify Ali at trial. See Wallert , 402 N.W.2d at 571.
Weighing the conflicting in-cou rt identifications and photo- lineup identifications is an

10
evidentiary and credibility issue left to the jury. See State v. Dahlin, 695 N.W.2d 588, 596
(Minn. 2005). The jury may have reasonably found that the photo lineup was more reliable
than the in-court identifications because the photo lineup occurred the day after the
robbery. Moreover, the jury may have reas onably found that Che.H. was not credible
because her testimony was substantively di fferent from the testimony of the other
witnesses. Unlike the other witn esses, Che.H. testified that th ere were a total of eight or
nine people who robbed them and that not everyone arrived in the Impala. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury may have reasonably found that
the photo-lineup identifications we re more credible than Che.H .’s in-court identification.
The corroborating evidence is not equally consistent with Ali’s innocence as with his guilt.
See Wallert, 402 N.W.2d at 571.
We thus conclude that, even if S.P. was an accomplice, his testimony was
sufficiently corroborated. See Minn. Stat. § 634.04.
Affirmed.