Busad Kheyre, et al., Appellants,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1461

Busad Kheyre, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

M & S Properties LLC,
Respondent,

Mohammad Sabri d/b/a J&S Services Ltd.,
Defendants.

Filed June 12, 2017
Affirmed in part and reversed in part
Halbrooks, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-14-14925

Michael T. Cain, Daniel L.M. Kennedy, Kennedy & Cain PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for appellants)

Gregory Mark Miller, Siegel Brill PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Worke,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
In this appeal arising from a landlord-tenant dispute, appellant tenants challenge the
denial of their motion for summary judgment, arguing that the district court erred in

2
concluding that respondent proprietor’s counterclaim is not barred by collateral estoppel.
Appellants also challenge the district court’s findings of fact, conclusi ons of law, and
judgment, arguing that the district court erred in concluding that they failed to meet their
burden of proving damages related to their breach -of-lease claim. We affirm in part and
reverse in part.
FACTS
Appellants Busad Kheyre and Asha H ibad are shareholders of Somali Senior
Center, Inc. In January 2010, they entered into a lease with 3005 Cedar, LLC, for
commercial space at 3015 Cedar Avenue South. This commercial space is part of a larger
development of several buildings with a single tax-parcel address of 1825 East Lake Street
in Minneapolis. Defendant Mohammad Sabri signed the lease on behalf of 3005 Cedar.
The lease agreement divided appellants’ monthly payments into two parts: base rent
and additional rent. Appellants’ monthly b ase rent was $5,200. The lease defines
appellants’ additional rent as 30% of “Tenant’s proportionate share of Operating Expenses
and Real Estate Taxes.” It also provides:
Upon completion of each calendar year during the term of this
Lease or any renewal or extension thereof, Landlord shall
cause its accountants to determine the actual amount of the
Real Estate Taxes, and Operating Expenses payable in such
calendar year and Tenant’s share thereof and deliver a written
certification of the amounts thereof t o Tenant. If Tenant has
underpaid its share of Real Estate Taxes and Operating
Expenses for such calendar year, Tenant shall pay the balance
of its share of same within ten (10) days after the receipt of
such statement, if Tenant has overpaid its share of Real Estate
Taxes, or Operating Expenses for such calendar year, Landlord
shall either (i) refund such excess, or (ii) credit such excess
against the most current monthly installment or installments

3
due landlord for its estimate of Tenant’s share of Real Estate
Taxes and Operating Expenses for the next following calendar
year.

In 2010, appellants’ additional rent was $1,784, which w as the sum of $645 in monthly
operating expenses and $1,139 in monthly estimated real estate taxes. Appellants’ failure
to pay rent under this lease resulted in several eviction actions and this breach-of-contract
action on appeal.
After 3005 Cedar filed the first eviction action against appellants for nonpayment
of rent, the parties signed a settlement agreement on September 23, 2010. Under the
settlement agreement, appellants agreed to continue paying $6,984 1 in rent each month to
3005 Cedar and to pay $46,000 in past rent, payable at $730.602 per month, to SABA, LLC.
Following this settlement agreement, 3005 Cedar brought a second eviction action,
claiming that appellants failed to pay rent from November 2010 to January 2011. To bring
appellants current in all of their payments, the district court ordered them to pay $12,013.
The district court’s 2011 judgment also stated, “The current rent due is $6,984 per month
and February rent should be paid by [February 15, 2011]. [Appellants] need to either
negotiate with [3005 Cedar] and put in writing or bring an appropriate action to reform the
lease before these amounts can be changed.” Appellants paid 3005 Cedar $12,013 to
become current on all payments.

1 This amount includes the $5,200 base rent and $1,784 additional rent, based off the 2010
calculations.

2 The settlement agreement contains two different monthly payment amounts —$750.60
and $730.60. But the parties agree that the correct monthly payment is $730.60.

4
On March 3, 2011, after a third eviction action was initiated , the district court
appointed a receiver to oversee the properties owned by 3005 Cedar, including the 1825
East Lake Street parcel . During the receivership , SABA assigned its right to collect the
monthly payment of $730.60 under the 2010 settlement agreement to Sabri Properties,
LLC. On July 8, 2013, 3005 Cedar transferred ownership in the 1825 East Lake Street
parcel to respondent M & S Properties LLC (M & S). Sabri owns M & S. The receivership
ended on July 12, 2013, when the und erlying eviction action was dismissed. M & S filed
the fourth eviction action against appellants on August 14, 2013, which was dismis sed
without prejudice on August 27, 2013.
M & S brought a fifth eviction action against appellants on October 7, 2013. In this
action, M & S also sought monetary relief, claiming that appellants underpaid the
additional rent amount in 2012 and 2013 and breached the settlement agreement by failing
to pay $730.60 per month. At trial, the district court received evidence that SABA assigned
its rights under the settlement agreement to Sabri Properties . M & S claimed that Sabri
Properties assigned its rights under the settlement agreement to M & S on the same day but
provided no evidence to support this claim.
The district court dismissed M & S’s claims in the fifth action after trial (2013
judgment). It concluded, based on the evidence in the record, that M & S had no right to
collect payments under the settlement agreement.
In the current action, appellants filed a lawsuit against M & S. Relevant to this
appeal, appellants alleged that they are entitled to reimbursement of additional rent that
they paid because M & S breached the terms of the lease regarding calculation of additional

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rent. M & S counterclaimed that appellants breached the terms of the settlement agreement
by failing to make monthly payments as required by the lease. Appellants contended that
M & S’s counterclaim was barred by the district court’s 2013 judgment, and M & S argued
that appellants failed to prove damages related to its breach -of-lease claim because they
were required to pay additional rent under the 2011 judgment. M & S move d for partial
summary judgment on its breach -of-the-settlement-agreement counterclaim, and
appellants moved for partial summary judgment on its breach-of-lease claim and M & S’s
counterclaim.
In support of its motion , M & S presented two documents to demo nstrate that it is
entitled to collect under the settlement agreement: (1) an assignment of rights under the
settlement agreement from Sabri Properties to M & S, dated April 25, 2012 and (2) an
acknowledgment of the assignment under the settlement agreemen t that states that M & S
“is the sole o wner of any and all interest.” The district court concluded that neither
res judicata nor collateral estoppel applied because the acknowledgment of the assignment
created a new set of factual circumstances and because the district court’s 2013 judgment
was not a judgment on the merits. It denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment,
and the matter proceeded to trial.
At trial, the district court entered judgment for M & S on its counterclaim and
determined that appellants breached the settlement agreement. It ordered appellants to pay
$43,808.20 to M & S. Both parties testified regarding the calculation and payment of
additional rent. The district court concluded that M & S breached the lease with respect to
additional rent because it did not properly calculate additional rent pursuant to the 2013

6
judgment. Although it concluded that M & S breached the lease, the district court
dismissed appellants’ claim with prejudice based on its finding that they failed to prove
damages. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I.
Appellants contend that the district court erred by denying their motion for partial
summary judgment because collateral estoppel or res judicata bar M & S’s counterclaim.
M & S did not file a brief in this appeal, but we nonetheless determine the matter on the
merits. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03. “On appeal fr om summary judgment, we must
review the record to determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact and
whether the district court erred in its application of the law.” Dahlin v. Kroening , 796
N.W.2d 503, 504-05 (Minn. 2011). “Whether collateral estoppel precludes litigation of an
issue is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo.” Hauschildt v.
Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2004). “We review the application of
res judicata de novo.” Rucker v. Schmidt, 794 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Minn. 2011).
Collateral estoppel, commonly known as issue preclusion, precludes relitigation of
an issue once it has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, and it applies if:
(1) the issue was identical to one in a prior adjudication;
(2) there was a fin al judgment on the merits; (3) the estopped
party was a party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication; and (4) the estopped party was given a full and
fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue.

Kaiser v. N. States Power Co. , 353 N .W.2d 899, 902 (Minn. 1984) (quotation omitted).
Similar to collateral estoppel, res judicata

7
precludes parties from raising subsequent claims in a second
action when: (1) the earlier claim involved the same set of
factual circumstances; (2) the earlier claim involved the same
parties or their privities; (3) there was a final judgment on the
merits; [and] (4) the estopped party had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the matter.

Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co. , 732 N.W.2d 209, 220 (Minn. 2 007)
(quotation omitted). The district court concluded that neither res judicata nor collateral
estoppel bar red M & S’s counterclaim for breach of contract because the counterclaim
involved a different set of facts and the 2013 dispute did not res olve the issues on the
merits.
We begin by noting that whether the application of res judicata or collateral estoppel
is proper here involves an analysis of the same facts and issues. Because the requirements
for res judicata and collateral estoppel are similar in the context of this appeal, we analyze
them together. Our analysis begins by addressing the factual circumstances at issue.
A.
Appellants argue that the district court erred in concluding that the facts have
changed since the initiation of thi s action. The district court determined that “ [t]he 2013
dispute and the current dispute both involve interpretation of the Lease in light of the
Settlement Agreement” but concluded that acknowledging the assignment of rights
executed after initiation of this lawsuit meant that the facts “apparently changed.” A prior
judgment cannot bar a subsequent claim, if new facts or conditions intervene prior to the
second dispute that furnishes a new basis for the claims and defenses of the parties.
Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc. , 456 N.W.2d 434, 439

8
(Minn. 1990). Central to this question is whether the two disputes involve the same “group
of operative facts.” Hauschildt, 686 N.W.2d at 840 (quotation omitted).
Appellants contend that acknowledgment of the assignment does not establish any
new facts because the assignment from Sabri Properties to M & S existed at the time of the
2013 dispute and the acknowledgment “was [an] attempt to create new evidence where
none existed.” We agree.
The operative facts in this dispute revolve around the settlement agreement, in
which appellants agreed to pay $730.60 per month to SABA. SABA assigned its rights in
the settlement agreement to Sabri Properties on April 25, 2012. In the 2013 dispute, M & S
alleged that it had rights to collect sums owing pursuant to the settlement agreement by
valid assignment, but the district court concluded that Sabri Properties, not M & S, had
rights under the settlement agreement.
M & S provided two additional documents in the current matter to prove that Sabri
Properties had validly assigned its interest in the settlement agreement to M & S. First, it
submitted the assignment, dated April 25, 2012. This document does not constitute a new
set of facts because it existed at the time of the 2013 dispute. Second, M & S provided an
acknowledgment of the assignment that states that M & S “is the sole owner of any and all
interest” in the settlement agreement. Sabri Properties, M & S, and other entities that were
involved in the settlement agreement signed and dated this acknowledgment on August 14,
2015—after initiation of the current dispute. This document is evidence that attempts to
bolster the validity of the assignment itself; it does not contain any new facts. Because the

9
acknowledgment does not include any new facts, we conclude that this dispute involves
the same set of factual circumstances that existed at the time of the 2013 dispute.
Appellants also argue that the issue of standing to sue under the settlement
agreement is identical in both matters. The district court determined that “ [t]he 2013
dispute and the current dispute both involve interpretation of the Lease in light of the
Settlement Agreement.” In the 2013 dispute, the district court dismissed M & S’s claim
related to the settlement agreement because it concluded that the right to collect the
monthly payment was never assigned to M & S. Here, M & S again claims that the right
to collect under the settlement agreement was assigned to it. We conclude that the issue of
whether M & S has standing to sue under the settlement agreement is identical in both
disputes.
B.
With respect to the requirement that the same parties must have been involved in
the earlier suit , a ppellants assert, and the district court concluded, that the parties are
identical in both the 2013 dispute and this matter. See Kaiser, 353 N.W.2d at 902 (stating
that the application of collateral estoppel requires the estopped party to have been a part y
or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication). We agree.
C.
Appellants contend that dismissal of M & S’s claim in the 2013 dispute operated as
a final judgment on the merits. Normally, a judgment arising from an eviction action has
a limited p reclusive effect based on the summary nature of the court proceeding. Real
Estate Equity Strategies, LLC v. Jones , 720 N.W.2d 352, 357 -58 (Minn. App. 2006); see

10
Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 4 (2016). But here, the nature of the 2013 dispute wen t
beyond the scope of an eviction proceeding because M & S also requested monetary relief.
See Jones , 720 N.W.2d at 358 (concluding that the scope of an eviction proceeding is
limited to determining which party has “the right to present possession of the premises”).
In the 2013 dispute, M & S claimed that appellants breached the terms of the
settlement agreement by failing to make pay ments as the agreement required. It alleged
that it had standing to sue under the settlement agreement because Sabri Properties validly
assigned its right to collect payments to M & S. As previously noted, t he district court
dismissed this claim because it concluded that only Sabri Properties —not M & S —had
standing to collect payments under the settlement agreement. Th e district court did not
address whether appellants breached the terms of the settlement agreement.
Here, M & S again alleges that appellants breached the settlement agreement and
maintains that it is entitled to collect payments and sue under the settlem ent agreement.
The district court concluded that the 2013 judgment was not a judgment on the merits
because it did not resolve the issue of which party, if any, breached the lease and settlement
agreement.
First, a ppellants maintain that the 2013 judgment was a final judgment because
M & S did not appeal it. A “judgment becomes final when it is entered in the district court
and it remains final, despite a pending appeal, until it is reversed, vacated or otherwise
modified.” Brown-Wilbert, Inc., 732 N.W.2d at 221. M & S did not appeal the 2013
judgment. We therefore conclude that the 2013 judgment was a final judgment. Next, we
must determine whether the 2013 judgment was a judgment on the merits.

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Appellants assert that the 2013 judgment was a judgment on the merits because,
under these circumstances, a dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits pursuant
to Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(c) and because the 2013 judgment referenced M & S’s failure of
proof—not lack of standing —as the reason that it was not entitled to collect u nder the
settlement agreement.
Generally, standing “focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a . . .
court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated.” Sundberg v. Abbott , 423
N.W.2d 686, 688 (Minn. App. 1988) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 88 S. Ct.
1942, 1952 (1968)), review denied (Minn. June 29, 1988). A dismissal operates as an
adjudication on the merits unless the court specifies otherwise in its order or the dismissal
is “for lack of jurisdiction, for forum non conveniens, or for failure to join a party
indispensable.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(c). Standing is essentially a jurisdictional defect
“because the existence of a justiciable controversy underlies the court’s jurisdiction.” State
v. Nodes, 538 N.W.2d 158, 161 (Minn. App. 1995), review granted (Minn. Dec. 20, 1995)
and appeal dismissed (Minn. Feb. 9, 1996). Consequently, a “[d]ismissal for lack of
standing is not a judgment on the merits.” Goldberger v. Kaplan, Strangis & Kaplan, P.A.,
534 N.W.2d 734, 736 n.1 (Minn. App. 1995), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 1995).
Here, the 2013 judgment dismissed M & S’s claim related to the settlement
agreement because only Sabri Properties was entitled to collect under the settlem ent
agreement; M & S had no rights under the settlement agreement. Because the district court
dismissed M & S’s claim in the 2013 dispute based on its lack of standing, Minn. R. Civ.

12
P. 41.02(c) does not apply here. We therefore reject appellants’ argument that the 2013
judgment was a final judgment on the merits.
Even though M & S’s claim in the 2013 dispute was not a final judgment on the
merits, appellants argue that collateral estoppel should bar the issue of whether M & S has
a right to sue un der the settlement agreement because it was properly litigated and was a
major component of the 20 13 dispute. Because a dismissal based on lack of standing is
not a final judgment on the merits, res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply in a
technical sense. Goldberger, 534 N.W.2d at 736 n.1; Sundberg, 423 N.W.2d at 688. But
our analysis does not end there.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that the “underlying principle that an
adjudication on the merits of an issue is conclusive, and shou ld not be relitigated, clearly
applies” even if collateral estoppel does not apply in a technical sense. Loo v. Loo , 520
N.W.2d 740, 743-44 (Minn. 1994). Collateral estoppel has “the dual purpose of protecting
litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy
and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S. Ct. 645, 649 (1979). “The issue on which collateral
estoppel is to be applied must be the same as that adjudicated in the prior action and it must
have been necessary and essential to the resulting judgment in that action.” Hauschildt,
686 N.W.2d at 837.
According to appellants, the issue on which collateral estoppel applies is not
whether appellants breached the terms of the settlement agreement but whether M & S has
standing to sue appellants under the settlement agreement. In the 2013 dispute, the district

13
court determined that M & S did not have standing to collect payments pursuant to the
settlement agreement because those rights had been validly assigned to Sabri Properties.
Here, M & S argues again that it had the right to collect payments pursuant to the settlement
agreement by valid assignment . We conclude that collateral estoppel bars M & S from
attempting to relitigate this issue because it was previously resolved by the district court.
We note that f ederal courts have similarly applied colla teral estoppel to preclude
relitigation of a standing issue in a subsequent lawsuit. McCarney v. Ford Motor Co., 657
F.2d 230, 233-34 (8th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n , 663 F. Supp. 2d
747, 767 (D. Minn. 2009); see also Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1218-
19 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[E]ven a dismissal without prejudice will have a preclusive effect on
the standing issue in a future action.”). Although not binding, we find these cases
persuasive. Hinckley Square Assocs. v. Cervene, 871 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. App. 2015)
(“Federal caselaw does not bind Minnesota courts . . . .”).
The Eighth Circuit addressed the “narrow issue of whether a dismissal for lack of
standing to invoke a particular statute can act as a bar to a later suit based upon the same
factual allegations” in McCarney. 657 F.2d at 231. In an earlier action, the federal district
court determined that plaintiffs lacked s tanding to sue under a particular statute. Id. In
McCarney, plaintiffs filed another lawsuit against the same defendant asserting different
theories of relief. Id. at 231-32. The Eighth Circuit held that “a decision to dismiss based
on any of the doctrines under the justiciability heading should preclude relitigation of the
same justiciability issue but not a second suit on the same claim even if arising out of the
identical set of facts.” Id. at 233. It determined that the plaintiffs’ second suit “would have

14
clearly been precluded by their earlier suit which decided the standing issue,” but collateral
estoppel did not bar their claims because they alleged different theories of relief. Id. at
233-34. In Johnson, the court determined that a dismissal for lack of standing is not a
judgment on the merits but that collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating the
same issue of subject -matter jurisdiction that provided a basis for dismissing an earlier
case. 663 F. Supp. 2d at 767.
We conclude that the district court’s dismissal of M & S’s claim in 2013 was a
judgment on the mer its as it relates to the issue of standing to sue under the settlement
agreement.
D.
Appellants contend that M & S had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this matter.
The district court did not address this question. To determine whether a party had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate a matter, we generally focus “on whether there were
significant procedural limitations in the prior proceeding, whether the party had the
incentive to litigate fully the issue, or whether effective litigation was limited by the nature
or relationship of the parties.” State v. Joseph , 636 N.W.2d 322, 328 (Minn. 2001)
(quotation omitted).
Here, M & S filed the 2013 dispute in district c ourt as an eviction proceeding
pursuant to Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 602. M & S also claimed it was entitled to monetary relief
under the settlement agreement. The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure apply to eviction
proceedings if they are not inconsistent with the general rules of practice . Minn. R. Gen.
Pract. 601. At summary judgment, M & S d id not argue that significant procedural

15
limitations, limitations by the parties, or lack of incentive to litigate the issue impeded its
ability to litigate this matter fully and fairly. Because M & S did not argue that a procedural
limitation preclud ed it from entering into evidence t he assignment of the settlement
agreement from Sabri Propertie s to M & S and because we find no procedural limitation
existed, we conclude that M & S had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue in the
2013 dispute.
In sum, we conclude that collateral estoppel bars M & S from relitigating the issue
of whether it can collect payments pursuant to the 2010 settlement agreement. The parties
in this matter are identical to the parties in the 2013 dispute, and M & S had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the validity of the assignment of the 2010 settlement agreement in
that case. The issue has not changed. Moreover, the district court’s dismissal of M & S’s
claim in 2013 operated as a judgment on the merits as it relates to the issue of standing .
Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that collateral estoppel did not apply to
M & S’s breach-of-the-settlement-agreement claim.
II.
Appellants contend that the district court erred by not awarding them damages as a
result of M & S’s breach of the lease. The district court held that M & S breached the lease
as it related to the calculation of additional rent but concluded that appellants failed to meet
their burden of proving damages because (1) they “provided no credible evidence, such as
receipts or accounting ledgers, that they paid additional rent,” (2) the 2011 judgment barred
recovery of additional rent from November 2010 to July 2013, and (3) appellants failed to
prove that they “suffered any damage by overpaying in additional rent from 2010 to 2013.”

16
A.
Appellants argue that the district court clearly erred in concluding that they failed
to meet their burden of proving damages, because M & S’s sole witness at trial testified
that they paid additional rent until Novemb er 2013. “Findings of fact, whether based on
oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the [district] court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co. , 832 N.W.2d
790, 797 (Minn. 2013). Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if this court is “left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Rasmussen, 832 N.W.2d at
797 (quotation omitted).
“In an ordinary civil action the plaintiff has the burden of proving every essential
element of his case, including damages by a fair preponderance of the evidence.” Wick v.
Widdell, 276 Minn. 51, 53 -54, 149 N.W.2d 20, 22 (1967). Fair preponderan ce of the
evidence is evidence offered to prove a given fact that “fairly outweigh[s] the evidence
offered in opposition to it and be of greater convincing force and effect.” Carpenter v.
Nelson, 257 Minn. 424, 427, 101 N.W.2d 918, 920 (1960).
Here, appellants argue that credible evidence established that they paid additional
rent from 2010 to 2013. Appellants offered into evidence two documents, which they argue
conclusively demonstrate that they have met their burden of proving damages. First,
appellants submitted a statement showing a rent balance due of $0 on November 30, 2013,
which they argue demonstrates that they had paid additional rent up to that point. Second,
appellants contend that a letter from Sabri, notifying them that their monthly rent was past

17
due from December 2013 demonstrates that they had paid their rent up to that point.
Appellants also argue that the following exchange at trial serves as an admission by Sabri
that appellants paid additional rent:
APPELLANTS’ ATTORNEY: And until that letter, which is
about a week after [the district court’s] order, [appellants] had
been paying that $6,984 every month, correct?
. . . .
APPELLANTS’ ATTORNEY: I’m starting back from 2010,
where it gives this estimate—
SABRI: Okay.
APPELLANTS’ ATTORNEY: —which is $6,984.
SABRI: Correct.
APPELLANTS’ ATTORNEY: Is that the same amount that
[appellants] paid every month until [the district court’s] order
in November of 2013?
SABRI: Yes.

At summary judgment, M & S argued not only that appellants paid additional rent but also
that they were obligated to do so under the lease agreement and based on the 2011
judgment.
Because M & S offered no evidence to oppose appellants’ assertion that they paid
additional rent, we conclude that the district court erred in concluding that appellants failed
to prove that they paid additional rent. But even if they established that they paid additional
rent, appellants’ burden requires them to prove that they overpaid in additional rent. We
turn to that issue next.
B.
Appellants claim that they are entitled to reimbursement of additional rent paid
between 2010 and 2013. The district court concluded that appellants failed to prove that
they overpaid additional rent over the entire time period. From January 2010 to October

18
2010, the district court determined that the settlement agreement barred reimbursement of
additional rent. From November 2010 to July 2013, it concluded that the 2011 judgment
barred reimbursement of additional rent paid based on the law-of-the-case doctrine. With
respect to the months after July 2013, the district court concluded that appellants failed to
provide any evidence that they paid additional rent. Appellants only challenge the district
court’s conclusion that the law -of-the-case doctrine barred recovery of damages from
November 2010 to July 2013 . “No deference is given to a lower court on questions of
law.” Modrow v. JP Foodservice, Inc., 656 N.W.2d 389, 393 (Minn. 2003).
The law -of-the-case doctrine provide s that a competent court’s “decision should
continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.” In re Welfare
of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). It “is a rule of practice, not of substantive
law.” Braunwarth v. Control D ata Corp. , 483 N.W.2d 476, 476 n.1 (Minn. 1992).
Generally, it does not apply to a district court’s decisions in earlier cases . Kornberg v.
Kornberg, 542 N.W.2d 379, 386 & n.2 (Minn. 1996) (concluding that one district court
judge has the authority to amend a different district court judge’s order related to the same
case). Instead, the law-of-the-case doctrine “commonly applies to issues decided in earlier
stages of the same case.” M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d at 375.
Appellants maintain that the law -of-the-case doctrine is inapplicable because the
2011 judgment is not part of this case on appeal. The 2011 judgment was a final judgment
on court file number 27-CV-HC-11-399. This appeal stems from a final judgment on court
file number 27-CV-14-14925. Because these are not the same cases, we conclude that the
law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply.

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Notwithstanding that conclusion, the district court did not err in determining that
appellants failed to prove damages. “[T]he appropriate measure of damages for breach of
contract is that amount which will place the plaintiff in the same situation as if the contract
had been performed.” Peters v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. , 420 N.W.2d 908, 915 (Minn.
App. 1988). Here, the record demonstrates that appellants paid additional rent, but not that
they overpaid additional rent. To prove damages for their breach-of-lease claim, appellants
were required to demonstrate that the amount of additional rent that they paid exceeded the
amount of additional rent that was agreed to in the lease.
We affirm the district court’s dismissal of appellants’ breach -of-lease claim.
Although appellants paid additional rent during the relevant time period of the claim, the
district court properly held that appellants did not meet their burden of proving damages
because they did not demonstrate that they overpaid additional rent. We reverse the district
court’s denial of appellants’ partial motion for summary judgment on M & S’s breach-of-
the-settlement-agreement claim. Collateral estoppel precludes M & S from relitigating the
issue of whether M & S has standing to sue under the settlement agreement because the
district court adjudicated the issue in 2013.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.