State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1481

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Christopher Blane Hughes,
Appellant.

Filed August 14, 2017
Affirmed
Cleary, Chief Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69VI-CR-15-1125

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney , Sharon N. Chadwick, Assistant County
Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cleary, Chie f Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Toussaint,
Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CLEARY, Chief Judge
Appellant Christopher Blane Hughes cha llenges his conviction of a controlled-
substance crime in the third degree, arguing that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress the drug evidence. In the alternative, Hughes argues that he is entitled
to be resentenced to the penalty for a contro lled-substance crime in the fifth degree under
the 2016 Drug Sentencing Reform Act (DSRA) and the amended sentencing guidelines
grid. Because law enforcement had a reasonable suspicion that Hughes was committing a
crime and was armed and dangerous, we affirm . We also conclude that Hughes is not
entitled to resentencing under the DSRA-amended fifth-degree controlled-substance crime
because the legislature did not intend for the DSRA’s increased-weight threshold to apply
to Hughes’s crime, and the DSRA-amended se ntencing grid does not mitigate Hughes’s
sentence.
FACTS
Around 2:00 a.m. on July 16, 2015, Offi cer Chiaverini of the East Range Police
Department was on patrol in his squad car in Aurora. Chiaverini activated his emergency
lights and pulled over a maroon ve hicle for failing to signal a turn. After stopping the
vehicle, the officer approached the driver’s side door.
He began speaking with M.B., the driver. With the window rolled down, Chiaverini
smelled a “strong odor of marijuana coming fro m the vehicle.” He could not detect from
where inside the vehicle the odo r was emanating. He did not initially confront the driver
about the odor of marijuana because he wanted to call for backup.
3
Hughes, who was the passenger in the vehicl e, told Chiaverini that he owned the
vehicle but that he had no insurance card in the vehicle. M.B. handed the officer a driver’s
license with a clipped corner, which, to th e officer, indicated M.B.’s license might be
expired. Chiaverini returned to his squad car to run M.B.’s license and make local checks
on both Hughes and M.B. He called for backup and was able to confirm on his computer
that M.B.’s license was valid.
Before backup arrived, the officer approached the vehicle again. When Chiaverini
asked the driver, M.B., about the odor of marijuana, M.B.’s legs and hands started shaking.
M.B. was nervous, very slow to respond to questions, and avoided eye contact. M.B.
eventually handed him a baggie of marijuana. Chiaveri ni asked M.B. if he had anything
else on his person, and M.B. admitted he had knives. The officer then asked M.B. to exit
the vehicle and he complied. M.B. further admitted that he had a marijuana pipe.
He then searched M.B., loca ting two knives on his person. He also found another
small container of marijuana, a pouch with a marijuana pipe, and two baggies containing
trace amounts of a white powdery substa nce, which later tested positive for
methamphetamine. The officer handcuffed M.B. and set him on the curb when his backup,
Officer Garrick, arrived. He testified that M.B. was cooperative.
After securing the evidence found on M.B., Chiaverini then turned his attention to
Hughes. On approaching the vehicle, the o fficer could still smell an odor of marijuana
from the vehicle. He asked Hughes to exit th e vehicle as a safety precaution because the
officer wanted to search where M.B. had been sitting. Hughes was very tense, would not
4
make eye contact, his hands were shaking, and his voice was shaky. Chiaverini told him
to relax.
He then told Hughes to place his hands behind his back and he pat-frisked Hughes.
Hughes denied he had anything of interest on his person. On pat-frisking Hughes’s pants,
Chiaverini noticed a “heavy[,] bulky item” in hi s right pocket that seemed to be a case.
The officer removed the object . The object was a soft, zippered case, and Chiaverini
testified he could feel hard objects within it.
He asked Hughes what was in the case, bu t, at first, Hughes would not answer.
When asked a second time, Hughes told Chia verini, “You already know what is in the
case.” When the officer said he did not know what was in the case, Hughes stated it
contained methamphetamine. Officer Garrick placed Hughes in handcuffs, and then
Chiaverini opened the case, fi nding a baggie of a substance that later tested positive for
methamphetamine, a methamphetamine pipe, and some marijuana. The methamphetamine
weighed 6.854 grams. Police arrested both Hughes and M.B.
On August 17, 2015, the state charged Hughes with one count of a controlled-
substance crime in the third degree for possession of three or more grams of
methamphetamine. In November 2015, the district court held a contested omnibus hearing
where Hughes moved to suppress the drug evidence.
On December 31, 2015, the district court denied Hughes’s moti on. In March of
2016, Hughes stipulated to th e prosecution’s evidence to ob tain review of the pretrial
ruling, pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, and th e district court found Hughes
5
guilty of a controlled-substan ce crime in the third degree, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 152.023, subd. 2(a)(1) (2014).
On June 20, 2016, Hughes was sentenced to a stayed sentence of 21 months, and six
months of local jail time. Hughes now appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. Expansion of the Scope of the Stop
Appellate courts undertake a de novo review to determine whether law enforcement
possessed reasonable suspicion or probable cau se to justify a search or seizure. State v.
Burbach, 706 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. 2005). We independently review the facts and
determine, as a matter of law, whether th e district court erred in suppressing or not
suppressing the evidence. State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). Usually the
district court’s factual findings are review ed for clear error, but when the facts are
undisputed, our review is entirely de novo. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d at 487.
A. Investigation of the Marijuana Odor
Hughes first argues that police unlawfully expanded the scope of the traffic stop in
investigating the marijuana smell. We disagree.
Both the United States and Minnesota Co nstitutions protect against “unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “A search
conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is generally unreasonable.” State
v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 248 (Mi nn. 2007). The Fourth Amendment prohibits law
enforcement from searching an individual without a warra nt, subject only to a few
6
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. State v. Varnado , 582 N.W.2d
886, 889 (Minn. 1998).
One exception to the warrant requireme nt is an investigatory stop, or Terry stop,
which allows law enforcement to temporarily detain a suspect if an officer has a reasonable,
articulable, and particularized suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d
836, 842-43 (Minn. 2011) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)); State
v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995). Th e reasonable-suspicion standard is not
high, Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 843, and “an actual violation is not necessary.” State v.
Haataja, 611 N.W.2d 353, 354 (Minn. App. 2000) (quotation omitted), review denied
(Minn. July 25, 2000). However, a stop that is the product of “mere whim, caprice or idle
curiosity” is invalid. State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921-22 (Minn. 1996).
Under the Minnesota Constitution, th e principles and framework of Terry are
applied when evaluating the reasonableness of searches and seizures during traffic stops,
even when there is probable cause that a minor traffic law has been violated. State v.
Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 363 (Minn. 2004). Ever y incremental intrusion during a
traffic stop must be tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate
purpose of the stop; (2) independent probable cause; or (3) reasonableness, as defined in
Terry. Id. at 365.
Here, the officer’s suspicion that Hu ghes may have possessed marijuana was
reasonable to warrant an expansion of the scope of the stop because the officer smelled an
odor of marijuana after he approached the ve hicle. After the officer found marijuana on
M.B., and M.B. was seized, the officer continued to smell marijuana when he approached
7
the vehicle to speak with Hughes. The expansion of the stop was justified under Terry
principles because the marijuana odor provided the officer with a reasonable suspicion that
Hughes could be in possession of a criminal amount of marijuana.
B. Search of Hughes Under the Search-Incident-to-Arrest Exception
Next, Hughes argues that the officer had no basis to search his person and that the
pat-frisk was an unconstitutional expansion of the scope of the stop.
A pat-frisk of a person ordered out of a vehicle is an incremental intrusion during a
traffic stop. Such an intrusion requires that an officer have either independent probable
cause, or a reasonable suspicion under Terry. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365; see
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12, 98 S. Ct. 330, 334 (1977) (holding that the
Terry test controls when determin ing the validity of a pat-frisk after a person has been
ordered out of a vehicle).
Here, the district court conc luded that the pat-frisk sear ch of Hughes was justified
by probable cause and was valid under the s earch-incident-to-arrest exception to the
warrant requirement. This exception allows police “to conduct a full search of the person
who has been lawfully arrested.” State v. Bernard , 859 N.W.2d 762, 767 (Minn. 2015)
(quotation omitted), aff’d sub nom . Birchfield v. North Dakota , 136 S. Ct. 21 60 (2016).
When police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, police can then conduct a search
incident to arrest even if the s earch occurs before the arrest. In re Welfare of G.M ., 560
N.W.2d 687, 695 (Minn. 1997). “A search incident to arrest can extend to small containers
on the person and can be followed by a warrantless seizure of discovered contraband.” Id.
8
The district court further concluded that based on the smell of marijuana emanating
from the vehicle, law enforcem ent had probable cause to pe rform a pat-frisk search of
Hughes for a “criminal amount of marijuana.” The court concluded that the container of
methamphetamine found on Hughes provided the probable cause to arrest Hughes for the
crime charged. In its analysis, the district court determined that “[t]he odor of marijuana
provides an officer with probab le cause to search a vehicle and its occupants without a
warrant.” (Emphasis added.) The court determ ined that “the smell of marijuana allowed
a search of . . . Hughes’ person for a crimin al amount of marijuana and the search which
elicited the case of methamphetamine was proper as a search incident to arrest even though
the search occurred prior to . . . Hughes’ formal arrest.”
The district court erred because the sme ll of marijuana emana ting from a vehicle,
on its own, does not provide probable cause to arrest the vehicle’s occupants and conduct
a full search incident to arrest. To support the conclusion that the odor of marijuana from
the vehicle provided the officer with probable cause to search Hughes’s person, the district
court cited State v. Schultz, 271 N.W.2d 836, 837 (Minn. 1978), State v. Piece, 347 N.W.2d
829, 833 (Minn. App. 1984), and State v. Ortega (Ortega I), 749 N.W.2d 851, 854 (Minn.
App. 2008). But in Schultz, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the smell of marijuana
in a motor vehicle provided police with sufficient cause under the “motor vehicle”
exception, which requires probable cause to search the vehicle, not probable cause to arrest
and search the occupant. 271 N.W.2d at 837; see Flowers, 734 N.W.2d at 248 (stating that
police may search a vehicle without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe the
9
vehicle contains contraband). Pierce says the same—that an odor alone may constitute
probable cause to search an automobile. 347 N.W.2d at 833.
In Ortega I, 749 N.W.2d at 854, this court held, citing State v. Wicklund, 295 Minn.
403, 405, 205 N.W.2d 509, 511 (1973), that the smell of burnt marijuana gave police
probable cause to search the vehicle’s occupants. This court rejected the argument, like
Hughes’s here, that the change in the marijuana laws making smaller amounts of marijuana
possession noncriminal changed the probable-cause analysis. Id.
But the reasoning in Ortega I is no longer good law. While the Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed this court’s decision in Ortega I in State v. Ortega (Ortega II), 770 N.W.2d
145, 151-52 (Minn. 2009), it did so on very different grounds. The supreme court found
that police had probable cause to arrest and then search the occupant of a vehicle incident
to arrest when police detected an od or of marijuana coming from the vehicle and upon
finding cocaine in the vehicle in a locati on to which both the driver and passenger had
access. Ortega II, 770 N.W.2d at 151. In a footno te, the supreme court disapproved of
this court’s reasoning in Ortega I. 770 N.W.2d at 149 n.2. The supreme court clarified
that (1) an odor of marijuana providing probable cause that a person possesses a
noncriminal amount of marijuana does not, in and of itself, create probable cause to trigger
a search incident to arrest, a nd (2) while “probable cause to arrest” satisfies that search-
incident-to-arrest exception, “probable caus e to search” does not necessarily trigger an
exception to the warrant requirement or lead to the conclusion that a search of a person was
otherwise reasonable. Id. (noting that 1976 Minn. Laws ch. 42, § 1, at 101-02 (codified at
10
Minn. Stat. § 152.15, subd. 2(5) (1976)) reduced possession of a small amount of marijuana
from a criminal offense to a petty misdemeanor).
As noted by the supreme court in G.M., probable cause to search and probable cause
to arrest are distinct concep ts. 560 N.W.2d at 695. “Wher eas probable cause to search
requires police to have a reasonable belief th at incriminating evid ence is in a certain
location, probable cause to arrest requires police to have a reasonable belief that a certain
person has committed a crime.” Id. (citation omitted).
The district court erred as a matter of la w because the smell of marijuana, on its
own, cannot create probable cause to arrest , triggering the search-incident-to-arrest
exception. Further, even if police had probable cause to search the vehicle under the
automobile exception, without more, this doe s not create a probable cause to search
Hughes’s person.
The district court erred as a matter of law in finding that police had probable cause
to arrest Hughes and conduct a search of Hughes incident to that arrest.
C. Pat-Frisk Based on Terry Principles
Nevertheless, police may still have had th e requisite cause to expand the scope of
the stop in pat-frisking Hughes based on Terry principles.
Under Terry, “police may stop and frisk a person when (1) they have a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer
reasonably believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous.” State v. Dickerson, 481
N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992) ( Dickerson I) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at
1884), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993). If both of those facts are present, a
11
police officer may conduct a “carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such person
in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.” Id.
Here, the officer had a reasonable suspic ion that Hughes was in possession of a
criminal amount of marijuana in the vehicle, based on the continuing marijuana smell, and
Hughes’s nervousness. The reasonable suspicion standard is “not high,” Diede, 795
N.W.2d at 843, and only requires that police are not acting out of “mere whim, caprice or
idle curiosity,” Pike, 551 N.W.2d at 921-22.
Hughes argues that because certain amount s of marijuana in a motor vehicle are
noncriminal, police could not have a reasonable suspicion based on the odor of marijuana
that Hughes possessed a criminal amount of marijuana. While this argument may be
availing when the standard is probable cause to arrest, it is less convincing under the much
lower reasonable-suspicion standard. Furthe rmore, even if police only had a reasonable
suspicion that Hughes was possessing a petty -misdemeanor amount of marijuana, police
may conduct a Terry stop for minor infractions constituting petty misdemeanors. See State
v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Mi nn. 1997) (determining that an officer has sufficient
cause to stop a vehicle based on a violation of an “insignificant” traffic law).
Officer Chiaverini also had a reasonable suspicion that Hughes might be armed and
dangerous to justify the pat-frisk.
An officer must have an objec tive articulable basis that a
person may be armed and danger ous to conduct a lawful pat
search. The examination of re asonableness is a fact-sensitive
inquiry. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the
individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent
man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that
his safety or that of others was in danger.
12

State v. Lemert , 829 N.W.2d 421, 424 (Minn. App. 2013) (quo tations and citations
omitted), aff’d, 843 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 2014). Under Terry principles, the suspicion must
be individualized and particular as to Hughes. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
417-18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981) (requiri ng that police have a “particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity”).
Here, Hughes sat next to M.B. in the front passenger area of the vehicle before the
stop occurred. The stop occurred around 2:00 a.m. Chiaverini found two knives on M.B.,
just prior to frisking Hughes. Hughes was nervous, as his ha nds were shaking, his voice
was shaky, and he was looking away. Nervousness “must be coupled with other
particularized and objective facts” to justify a pat-frisk. State v. Syhavong , 661 N.W.2d
278, 282 (Minn. App. 2003). Even though the knives were found on M.B., the fact that
Hughes was recently sitting with in the same vehicle as M. B., where other knives could
have been present, is an objective fact particularized to Hughes. Under the totality of these
circumstances, the officer had a reasonabl e suspicion that Hughes was armed and
dangerous to justify a pat-frisk for officer safety.
Finally, Chiaverini executed a proper pat-frisk, leading to the discovery of the drug
evidence. A pat-frisk must be “a carefully limited search of the outer clothing to discover
weapons which might be used against the officer.” State v. Wiggins, 788 N.W.2d 509, 513
(Minn. App. 2010) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Nov. 23, 2010). “During the
course of the frisk, if the officer feels an object that cannot possibly be a weapon, the officer
is not privileged to poke around to determine what that object is.” Dickerson I, 481 N.W.2d
13
at 844. If during a lawful pat-frisk, an officer “feels an object whose contour or mass makes
its identity immediately apparent,” then there is no invasion of privacy beyond that already
authorized and the object may be seized without a warrant. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508
U.S. 366, 375-76, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 21 37 (1993) ( Dickerson II); see State v. Burton , 556
N.W.2d 600, 602-03 (Minn. App. 1996) (applying the “plain feel” exception in Dickerson
II under the Minnesota Constitution), review denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 1997). During a
lawful pat-frisk for weapons, an officer may remove a “hard object of substantial size,”
from a suspect even though “the precise shape or nature of [the object] is not discernible
through outer clothing.” State v. Bitterman , 304 Minn. 481, 486, 232 N.W.2d 91, 94
(1975). This is because “weapons are not alwa ys of an easily discernible shape, [and] a
mockery would be made of the right to frisk if the office rs were required to positively
ascertain that a felt object was a weapon prior to removing it.” Id.
Here, the officer felt a heavy, bulky object when he patted Hughes’s outer clothing.
Unlike in Dickerson II , there is no evidence that the o fficer manipulated the object to
determine its nature or removed the object af ter already concluding it was not a weapon.
508 U.S. at 378, 113 S. Ct. at 2138. Wh ile the object’s identity was not immediately
apparent, the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the heavy, bulky object was a weapon,
or a case holding a weapon, to justify its re moval and his further questioning of Hughes
about the nature of the object. Hughes voluntarily told the officer that the object contained
methamphetamine. At that point, the officer had probable cause to arrest Hughes.

14
II. Resentencing Under the 2016 Drug Sentencing Reform Act
Next, Hughes argues that, because his conviction was still on appeal when the
legislature changed the threshold amount of a controlled-substance crime in the third
degree, he should be resentenced under the 2016 law for fifth-degree possession, according
to the 2016 drug-offender sentencing grid, which provides a presumptive twelve-month
stayed sentence for a fifth-degree controlled-substance crime. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines
4.C (2016).
Hughes relies on State v. Coolidge, 282 N.W.2d 511, 514 (Minn. 1979), where the
supreme court ruled that “a statute mitigati ng punishment is applied to acts committed
before its effective date, as long as no final judgment has been reached.” But the effect of
Coolidge was limited in Edstrom v. State, 326 N.W.2d 10, 10 (Minn. 1982). The supreme
court in Edstrom determined that a mitigating statute applies to acts committed before the
effective date as long as no fina l judgment has been reached, “ at least absent a contrary
statement of intent by the legislature .” Id. (emphasis added). The court in Edstrom
concluded that the legislature clearly indicates its intent for a statute not to apply to crimes
committed before its effective date when it specifically provides that a statute will have no
effect on crimes committed be fore the effective date. Id.; see 1975 Minn. Laws ch. 374,
§ 12, at 1251 (“Except for section 8 of this act, crimes committed prior to the effective date
of this act are not affected by its provisions.”).
Here, the DSRA, signed into law on Ma y 22, 2016, amended the third-degree
controlled-substance-crime statute under wh ich Hughes was convicted and sentenced.
2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, § 5 at 581-82, 59 2. The new law provides that “effective
15
August 1, 2016,” for a person to be guilty of a controlled- substance crime in the third
degree under Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 2(a)(1) (2016), the person would need to possess
at least ten grams of a narcotic drug other than heroin. 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, § 5, at
582.
Hughes possessed 6.854 grams of metham phetamine, and under the 2014 law he
could be convicted and punished for a thir d-degree controlled-substance crime, which
required possession of three or more grams of methamphetamine. Minn. Stat. § 152.023,
subd. 2(a)(1) (2014). If the new 2016 law applied to Hughes’s conduct, Hughes could only
be convicted and sentenced for a controlled-substance crime in the fifth degree, because he
possessed less than ten grams. Minn. Stat. §§ 152.023, subd. 2(a )(1), .025, subd. 2(1)
(2016).
The legislature indicated its intent that the statute would not apply to crimes
committed before the effective date, as both the 2016 third- and fifth-degree controlled-
substance-crime statutes provide that the laws will be “effective August 1, 2016,” and that
they apply “to crimes committed on or after that date.” 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, §§ 5, 7
at 582, 584-85. Even thou gh Hughes’s conviction was on a ppeal and not final when the
law was amended, the 2016 amendments in the DSRA that increased the threshold amount
for a conviction of a third-degree controlle d-substance crime do not apply to Hughes’s
case. Hughes is not entitled to be resentenced under the amended fifth-degree controlled-
substance-crime statute.
Our conclusion is consistent with the re cently released opinion of the Minnesota
Supreme Court in State v. Otto, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2017 WL 3161109, at *2-3 (Minn.
16
July 26, 2017). In Otto, the supreme court held that a person convicted of a controlled-
substance crime, for which the controlled-substance weight threshold was increased by the
DSRA before his conviction was final, was not entitled to have hi s conviction reversed
because the language of sections 3 and 4 of the DSRA clearly establish that the legislature
intended to abrogate the effect of the amelioration doctrine. Otto, 2017 WL 3161109, at
*2. Here, the effective-date language under section 5 of the DSRA is identical to the
effective-date language under sections 3 and 4. 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, §§ 3-5 at 579-
82.
The DSRA-amended sentencing grid also does not affect Hughes’s case. In State
v. Kirby , ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2017 WL 3161079 , at *9 (Minn. July 26, 2017), the
supreme court held that the amelioration doc trine requires the resentencing of a person
whose conviction was not yet final on the effec tive date of section 18(b) of the DSRA.
Here, while Hughes’s conviction was not yet final on the effective date of section 18(b) of
the DSRA, that section does not mitigate punishment fo r a third-degree controlled-
substance crime. 2016 Minn. La ws ch. 160, § 18(b) at 591. At sentencing, Hughes had
zero criminal-history points, and whether Hughes was sentenced for a third-degree
controlled-substance crime under the previous sentencing guidelines grid or the DSRA-
amended sentencing grid makes no difference: in both instances, the result is a 21-month
stayed sentence. Compare Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A (Supp. 2015), with Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 4.C (2016).
In sum, Hughes is not entitled to be rese ntenced under the am ended fifth-degree
controlled-substance-crime statute because the DSRA’s increa se of the threshold weight
17
for a third-degree controlled-substance crime does not apply to Hughes’s offense. Finally,
the DSRA-amended sentencing grid does not affect Hughes’s case because it did not
mitigate punishment for a third-degree controlled-substance crime.
Affirmed.