State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1486

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Randell James Allen,
Appellant.

Filed August 28, 2017
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-CR-16-625

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Lo ri H. Conroy, Assistant County Attorney,
Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Toussaint, Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of failu re to register as a predatory offender,
arguing that the district court abused its discretion by admitting his two prior failure-to-
register convictions as Spreigl evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2008, appellant Randell James Allen wa s charged with first-degree burglary,
domestic assault, and false imprisonment. Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant pleaded
guilty to burglary and assault, and the false-imprisonment charge was dismissed. Because
the false-imprisonment charge arose out of the same set of circumstances as the offenses
for which appellant was convicted, appellan t was required to register as a predatory
offender until 2018. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b (2) (2014). Appellant was
convicted of failure to register in 2011 and 2013. Following each conviction, appellant’s
required registration period was extended.
In February 2016, while i nvestigating another matter, a sergeant with the Moorhead
Police Department came into contact with appe llant and learned that appellant was not in
compliance with his registration requirement . On February 26, respondent State of
Minnesota charged appellant with failure to register under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd.
5(a) (2014).
Prior to trial, the state moved to admit appellant’s prior convictions for failure to
register in 2011 an d 2013 primarily as Spreigl evidence, probative of appellant’s duty to
register and his knowledge of this duty, and secondarily for impeachment purposes. Over
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appellant’s objection to the state’s motion in limine, the district court admitted the prior
convictions as Spreigl evidence. The district court did not rule on whether the prior
convictions were admissible for impeachment purposes.
The jury found appellant guilty of failure to register, and the district court sentenced
appellant to 24 months in prison. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
“Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conf ormity therewith.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b).
However, such evidence, which is often referred to as Spreigl evidence, may be admissible
for other purposes, including to prove knowledge. Id.; State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139
N.W.2d 167 (1965). The general concern over admitting Spreigl evidence is that the jury
might use the evidence for an improper purpose, “such as suggesting that the defendant has
a propensity to commit the [charged] crime.” State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn.
2006).
Before the district court can admit Spreigl evidence, (1) the state must give notice
of its intent to admit the evidence; (2) the state must clearly indicate what the evidence will
be offered to prove; (3) the de fendant’s participation in the other act must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence; (4 ) the evidence must be releva nt to the state’s case; and
(5) the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its potential for unfair
prejudice to the defendant. Minn. R. Evid. 4 04(b). We review a district court’s decision
to admit Spreigl evidence for an abuse of discretion. Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 685. Appellant
bears the burden of showing any error and resulting prejudice. Id.
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Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting his 2011
and 2013 convictions for failure to register as a predatory offender as Spreigl evidence for
three reasons: (1) the convictions were neither relevant nor material to the state’s case;
(2) even if the convictions were relevant or material, any probative value was substantially
outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice ; and (3) the erroneous admission of the
convictions was not harmless because it significan tly affected the outcome of the trial.
Appellant’s arguments fail because, even if we were to assume without deciding that
admitting appellant’s prior conv ictions was erroneous, we co nclude that any error was
harmless.
We will reverse a conviction where th e district court improperly admits Spreigl
evidence if “there is a reasonable possib ility that the wrongfu lly admitted evidence
significantly affected the verdict.” Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 691.1 The factors we consider are
(1) whether other evidence was offered on the i ssue; (2) whether the district court read a
limiting instruction to the jury ; and (3) whether the state highlighted the evidence in its
closing argument. State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 320 (Minn. 2009).
Here, the district court admitted appellant’s prior convictions as Spreigl evidence
relevant to the first and second elements of the charged crime: (1) appellant is required to
register and (2) appellant knowingly violated that requirement. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166.

1 Appellant did not renew his objection to the admission of the Spreigl evidence at trial;
however, we do not subject his claim to plain-error review because the district court made
a definitive ruling on the state’s motion in limine that the prior convictions are admissible
Spreigl evidence. Cf. State v. Word , 755 N.W.2d 776, 782- 83 (Minn. App. 2008)
(“[E]videntiary objections should be renewed at trial when an in limine or other evidentiary
ruling is not definitive . . . .”).
5
In addition to offering certified copies of appellant’s prior convictions as self-authenticated
documents under Minn. R. Evid. 902, subd. 4, the state presented multiple documents that
appellant signed, acknowledging his duty to register. Also, a Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension agent testified that appella nt was provided with information on his
registration requirement after being released from prison following his prior convictions.
And, significantly, appellant testified that he knew about his duty to register and that he
attempted to register prior to the February 2016 charge.
The district court did not give a cautio nary instruction to the jury about the Spreigl
evidence. Appellant’s trial attorney did not request a limiting instruction.
Finally, the trial transcript indicates that the state did not unduly highlight the
Spreigl evidence during its closing argument and rebuttal. The state noted that “twice since
2008 [appellant] has been convicted of the offense[] . . . of failing to register,” and served
time in prison for the offenses. The state’ s mention of appellant’s prior convictions
consisted of approximately half of one transcribed page of the state’s 24-page closing
argument and rebuttal.
The district court should have read to th e jury a limiting instruction regarding the
use of the Spreigl evidence. See State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d 191, 197 (Minn. 1995) (noting
that district court should give cautionary instruction upon admitting Spreigl evidence and
during final instructions, even if defense counsel does not request it). But, on this record,
we conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that admitting appellant’s 2011 and
2013 convictions significantly affected the ve rdict because other evidence presented to
establish appellant’s duty to register and his knowing violation of that duty was strong. In
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addition, the state’s mention of appellant’s prior convictions during closing argument and
rebuttal was brief. See Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 691 (affirmi ng conviction where supreme
court could not conclude that admission of Spreigl evidence significantly affected verdict).
Accordingly, any alleged error in admitting a ppellant’s 2011 and 2013 failure-to-register
convictions does not require reversal.
Affirmed.