State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1493

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Virgil Ernest Beaulieu,
Appellant.

Filed June 12, 2017
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-8832

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth R. Johnston, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Erik I. Withall, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Pr esiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Kalitowski, Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant argues that he is entitled to with draw his guilty plea to third-degree assault
because the district court violated his due-process rights by “rejecting the plea agreement”
when it imposed a harsher intermediate sanction than that to which he agreed without first
conducting an evidentiary hear ing to determine whether he violated the terms of the
agreement. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Virgil Beaulieu with third-degree
assault based on evidence that he punched his girlfriend in the eye, causing her to need
medical care, including stitches. Beaulieu pleaded guilty to the charge under a plea
agreement negotiated with the state. 1 Under the plea agreement, the parties agreed that
Beaulieu would be released from jail pending sentencing so that he could participate in and
complete chemical-dependency treatment before sentencing. At the plea hearing, the state
summarized the terms of the agreement as follows:
The defendant will plead guilty to Count 1 for a stay of
execution of 18 months for thre e years and 150 days in jail.
Other terms and conditions will be dictated by a PSI, which he
will complete out of custody, as we are agreeing to release him
to [chemical-dependency] treatment before sentencing.
Your Honor, we discussed this in chambers and I
wanted to make a clear record that should the defendant violate
the terms of this conditional re lease such as absconding from
treatment or not complying with any plans put in place by

1 The district court deferred acceptance of Beaulieu’s guilty plea until the time of
sentencing.

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treatment that the State will ask for more time at sentencing,
and the defendant will not be able to withdraw his plea.

Beaulieu’s counsel “agree[d] with everything the State said” regarding the plea agreement,
and Beaulieu informed the district court that he understood the agreement and did not have
any questions.
But, at the plea hearing after entering his plea of guilty, Beaulieu expressed concern
about the requirement that he attend chemical-dependency treatment, stating, “It feels like
I‘m going into this under duress into treatment. I haven’t been to a treatment.” The district
court then explained the release conditions to him:
Well, and here’s the bottom line. If you go to treatment
and cooperate with treatment and you do well—the conditions
are you remain law abiding and you show up for court, and you
cooperate with treatment. If you do all of that, then we’re going
to go ahead with the deal the way that it is.
If you aren’t—if you don’t rema in law abiding or you
don’t show up for court and yo u don’t have a good reason for
not showing up for court, or if you get kicked out of treatment,
then you’re looking at some different deal, more time.

In answering Beaulieu’s follow- up questions about treatment, the court told him, “[Y]ou
have to do what they tell you to do.” When Beaulieu asked the court whether he could go
to “a Native-American treatment,” defense co unsel volunteered to look into whether a
culturally specific treatment program might be available. But defense counsel also
suggested that it would be best if Beaulieu started treatment at a non-culturally specific
program and that Beaulieu should request a change if he had any issues. The district court
agreed and told Beaulieu:
So, why don’t we do that. Get you into [Restoration
Counseling & Community Services] and if you find that’s not

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working, don’t leave, but call [y our attorney]. Call probation
and call [your attorney]. If you find that it’s not working for
you, don’t leave the program cause then you’re going to be in
violation of my order. So, the worst thing you can do is leave.
Call [your attorney]. Call your probation officer, and they’ll
work at getting you into a culturally specific program.

Beaulieu entered chemical-dependency trea tment but was discharged within about
eight days for refusing to undergo a recommended mental-health evaluation.
On May 26, 2016, at a hearing before a different judge than the one who heard
Beaulieu’s guilty plea, the state informed th e district court that, “Allegations of the
conditional release violation are that he washed out of [Restoration Counseling &
Community Services] treatment after being in it for about eight days and then he refused a
mental health evaluation.” Ap pearing with a substitute atto rney, Beaulieu informed the
district court that he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court informed
Beaulieu that he could raise the matter at his scheduled sentencing on June 22 or earlier if
counsel obtained an earlier date from the sentencing judge, and ordered Beaulieu’s
continued custody without bail pending sentencing.
At his sentencing hearing, Beaulieu moved the district court to withdraw his plea,
stating that he “felt like [he] was coerced and stuff into pleading guilty.” He admitted that
he refused to undergo the mental-health evaluation at the chemical-dependency treatment
center but argued that his refusal did not viol ate his release terms, explaining: “I need
alcohol treatment, not an addict treatment. I need abstinence from al cohol. I don’t need
mental health treatment. . . . And, therefore, there was no violation. ” The district court
denied Beaulieu’s plea-withdrawal motion, sentenced him to 18 months’ imprisonment

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stayed, and placed Beaulieu on probation for three years with the following terms: an
intermediate sanction of 365 days 2 in the Hennepin County Adult Correctional Facility
(ACF) with jail credit of 78 days; completion of the Telesys chemical-dependency program
and Cognitive Skills program at the ACF; completion of the Domestic Abuse Program
following confinement at th e ACF; undergo a gambling assessment, refrain from
consuming alcohol or any mood-altering subs tance to be monitored by the probation
department, refrain from having any contact with L.J.A.O. and stay at least three blocks
away from the 1100 block of 80th Street Ea st in Bloomington; not possess a firearm or
ammunition; provide probation with a DNA sample; and remain in contact with and follow
all of the rules of probation.
Beaulieu now appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Beaulieu argues that the district court reje cted the terms of his plea agreement and
therefore abused its discretion by not allowing him to withdraw his guilty plea. “[Appellate
courts] review a district c ourt’s decision to deny a wit hdrawal motion for abuse of
discretion, reversing only in the rare case.” State v. Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn.
2010) (quotation omitted).
“In Minnesota plea agreements have been analogized to contracts and principles of
contract law are applied to determine their terms.” In re Ashman , 608 N.W.2d 853, 858
(Minn. 2000). “[I]nterpretation and enforcement of plea agreements involve issues of law

2 The intermediate sanction contemplated by the plea agreement was 150 days.

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that [appellate courts] review de novo.” State v. Rhodes , 675 N.W.2d 323, 326 (Minn.
2004). “Where a defendant’s liberty interests are implicated in a criminal proceeding, . . .
we generally temper contract principles with safeguards to insure the defendant receives
what is reasonably due in the circumstances, and in close cases, plea agreements should be
construed in favor of defendants.” Ashman, 608 N.W.2d at 858 (c itations and quotations
omitted).
Recently, this court addressed a defendan t’s rights under a plea agreement in
circumstances similar to Beaulieu’s in State v. Montez , ___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. App.
June 5, 2017). In Montez, this court held that when a defendant’s plea agreement provided
that a particular sentence would be impose d if the defendant co mplied with certain
conditions, and the defendant di d not comply with those cond itions, the district court did
not violate the plea agreement by imposing a different sentence and the defendant was not
entitled to withdraw the plea. ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, No. A16-1071, slip op. at 7; see also
State v. Rud, 372 N.W.2d 434, 435 (Minn. App. 1985) (concluding that district court was
not required to honor plea agreement that defendant knowingly breached), review denied
(Minn. Sept. 26, 1985).
Terms of Plea Agreement
Beaulieu argues that the record demonstrates that he did not violate the conditions
of his release, i.e., the terms of his plea agreement, and that the district court simply rejected
the plea agreement when it imposed a harsher intermediate sanction than that contemplated
by the agreement. Beaulieu asserts that, at th e plea hearing, the district court entitled him
to request a culturally appropriate program and that he followed the court’s release

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conditions. He appears to argue that he did not voluntarily leave the chemical-dependency
treatment program—he was discharged from it—and that he therefore satisfied the court’s
release condition that he remain in treatment . But Beaulieu’s argume nt ignores the clear
terms of the plea agreement that required him to “comply[] with any plans put in place by
treatment,” and the district court’s explicit in struction that he “cooperate with treatment”
and “do what they tell [him] to do,” as well the court’s admonition that “if [he] g[o]t kicked
out of treatment, then [he would be] looking at some different deal, more time.”
Although Beaulieu is correct that the court did not specifically order him to undergo
a mental-health assessment as a release c ondition, the treatment center requested the
mental-health evaluation in order to best provide him chemical-dependency treatment, and
the request was a “plan[] put in place by treatment” under the terms of the plea agreement.
And in addition to Beaulieu’s refusal to undergo the mental-health assessment, the record
is replete with evidence that Beaulieu failed to cooperate with other aspects of his
treatment, including that he was late for several of his scheduled groups and attempted “to
overtake the groups with his feedback and opinions or minimally engaged at all.”
According to the treatment di scharge summary, he “reporte d that he lied on his Rule 25
about his use to get out of ja il and obtain his driver’s licen se,” and “denied that he has
anything that he needs to change.” While Beaulieu may have followed the court’s release
condition not to simply leav e treatment, he violated hi s plea agreement and release
condition when he was discharged from treatment for refusing to cooperate.

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Alleged Due-Process Violation
Beaulieu argues that the district court vi olated his right to due process when it
imposed a harsher intermediate sanction,3 i.e., a longer period of confinement at the ACF,
than contemplated by his plea agreement without first holding an evidentiary hearing.4 The
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure do not squarely address whether an evidentiary
hearing is required under these circumstances. While rule 6.03, subdivision 3, provides that
defendants are entitled to hearings on alleged violations of pretrial release conditions, and
rule 27.04, subdivision 3, sim ilarly requires revocation heari ngs on alleged violations of
probation conditions, the rules do not explicitly address heari ngs with respect to alleged
violations of post-guilty-plea, presentence release conditions. While no rule is directly on
point, Beaulieu argues that the Due Process Clause nevertheless requires a hearing in this
situation.
The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Cons titution provides that a state shall not
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or prope rty without due process of law.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1; see also State v. Krause, 817 N.W.2d 136, 144 (Minn. 2012) (“The due
process protection provi ded under the Minnesota Constitu tion is identical to the due

3 Beaulieu does not challenge the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea because the plea was allegedly coerced.
4 Beaulieu refers to this hearing in his appellate brief as a “Morrissey hearing,” in reference
to Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2602 (1972). In Morrissey, the
Supreme Court held that due process require s, among other things, that a parolee be
afforded an informal hearing to determine if there is reason to believe that the parolee has
violated a parole condition. 408 U.S. at 48 4, 92 S. Ct. at 2602. Because Beaulieu was not
a parolee at the time of his sentencing hearing, this opinion will use the term evidentiary
hearing.

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proces[s] guaranteed under the Constitution of the United States.” (quotation omitted)).
“Whether due process is required in a particular case is a question of law, which [appellate
courts] review de novo.” Carrillo v. Fabian, 701 N.W.2d 763, 768 (Minn. 2005).
We conclude that Beaulieu forfeited his due-process challenge by failing to raise it
in district court. Appellate courts genera lly will not decide matters not argued to and
considered by the district court, including co nstitutional questions of criminal procedure.
Roby v. State , 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996). Al though, at his sentencing hearing,
Beaulieu disputed that he violated the conditi ons of his post-plea, presentence release, at
no point did he or his counsel request an evidentiary hearing or argue Beaulieu was entitled
to any additional process. Because the issu e of whether due process necessitated an
evidentiary hearing was never presented to or considered by the district court, the issue is
forfeited. See id.
Even if Beaulieu were entitle d to an evidentiary hearing, the record shows that, at
his sentencing hearing, he availed himself of the opportunity to challenge the alleged
release violation and he argued mitigating circumstances. Indeed, much of the sentencing
hearing’s 20-page transcript is comprised of Beaulieu’s argument to the district court about
why he should not receive a harsher intermed iate sanction. Despite the lengthy colloquy
between Beaulieu and the district court, Beaulieu cites State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602
(Minn. 2005), and State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246 (Minn. 1980), and states that “probation
reflexively sought revocation. ” But Beaulieu’s reliance on Modtland and Austin is
misguided because they concern probation revocation, not post-plea, presentence release.
Cf. State v. Cottew, 746 N.W.2d 632, 634 (Min n. 2008) (holding that Austin findings are

10
not required when a district court imposes lo cal incarceration as an intermediate sanction
for a probation violation and does not execute an underlying sentence); State v. Batchelor,
786 N.W.2d 319, 322−23 (Minn. App. 2010) (concluding that due process did not require
Austin findings regarding defendant’s intentional or inexcusable failure to appear at
scheduled sentencing hearing before impos ing sentence that deviated from agreed-on
sentence that was expressly conditione d upon appearance at sentencing), review denied
(Minn. Oct. 19, 2010).
Beaulieu suggests that the district court judge was insufficiently neutral. Citing State
v. Anyanwu, 681 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Minn. App. 20 04), Beaulieu argues that the district
court stepped into the state’ s role because the sentencing hearing “was more-or-less a
discussion between Beaulieu and the Judge.” But Anyanwu involved an allegation that a
district court improperly injected itself in to plea negotiations when it promised the
defendant a particular sentence. 681 N.W.2d at 415. Nothing in Anyanwu suggests that the
district court judge usurped the responsibility of counsel under the facts of this case.
Finally, Beaulieu argues for th e first time in his reply brie f that this situation is
analogous to convictions for constructive criminal contempt. See Peterson v. Peterson, 278
Minn. 275, 279, 153 N.W.2d 825, 829 (1967) (noting that, with respect to conduct
committed outside the presence of the court, “formal proceed ings are needed . . . to
establish the contumacious conduct involved and to give the person accused notice and
opportunity to be heard”). “Gen erally, arguments not made in appellant’s principal brief
will be deemed waived.” State v. Stockwell , 770 N.W.2d 533, 541 (Minn. App. 2009).

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Because Beaulieu did not present the argument in his principal appellate brief, we will not
consider it.
Affirmed.