State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1499

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Shane Kenneth Halverson,
Appellant.

Filed July 24, 2017
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-CR-15-550

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Karen B. McGillic, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Shane Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Pr esiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his request for a voluntary-
intoxication jury instruction and its denial of his request for a bifurcated trial to allow him
to present a mental-illness defense. We affirm.
FACTS
On June 20, 2015, appellant Shane Halver son stole a car in St. Cloud, Minnesota.
The owner immediately reported the theft. Less than an hour later, a police sergeant
attempted to stop appellant fo r speeding. Appellant fled in the car. In marked police
vehicles with lights and sirens activated, mul tiple officers pursued appellant at speeds of
up to 90 miles per hour from Spicer to Willmar. During the chase, the sergeant pulled his
patrol car next to the stolen vehicle and w itnessed appellant stick his head out of the
window and yell at the sergeant.
Officers in Willmar were info rmed that the chase was leading into the town so they
placed “stop sticks” in two areas of the town in an attempt to stop appellant. Appellant
drove around the first set of stop sticks by driving into the opposing lane of traffic.
Appellant attempted to maneuver around the second set of stop sticks, but as he did so the
stolen car jumped a curb and came to a stop.
Appellant “bore his teeth and screamed” at the officers when they approached. A
police vehicle was driven against the door of the stolen car in an attempt to prevent
appellant from exiting the vehicle. Appellant then climbed through the window of the car
and onto the hood of the police car. Because the officers believed that appellant intended

3
to fight them, a Taser was used to subdue appellant. When asked for his identity, appellant
stated, “You all know who I am.”
Appellant was charged with theft of a mo tor vehicle, fleeing a police officer in a
motor vehicle, reckless driving, and driving after cancellation. At appellant’s request, the
district court ordered a mental examinatio n of him under Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.02.
Appellant was evaluated by a clinical and fo rensic psychologist who diagnosed appellant
with a “history of substance/ medication-induced psychotic di sorder.” The psychologist
reported that appellant’s history of hallucinations and delusional beliefs was related to his
substance use and occurred in close temporal association with such use. The psychologist
concluded that appellant was suffering from the effects of an intoxicating substance at the
time of the charged offenses, but that he was not suffering from such a defect of reason so
as not to know the nature of his acts or that they were wrong.
Following the issuance of the psychologist’s report, appellant requested and was
granted a continuance in order to explore a defense related to “meth psychosis.” Appellant
thereafter asserted that he wa s not guilty and that he was not guilty by reason of mental
illness or defect because he was suffering fro m a psychosis brought on by the use of
methamphetamine. Appellant requested both a voluntary-intoxication instruction and a
bifurcated trial on the mental-illness defense. At a pretrial hearing held a week before the
trial started, defense counsel was unable to identify an expert who would testify concerning
substance-induced psychosis. The district court reserved its decision concerning a
voluntary-intoxication instruction until trial, and it denied the request for a bifurcated trial

4
for a mental-illness defense unless appellant made a showing sufficient to support the
mental-illness defense.
Appellant testified at trial that he had used drugs, including methamphetamine,
heavily for several years, but that he had not used drugs for several days prior to the night
of the charged offenses. Appellant testified that he had started to believe that he was being
followed, and that people had been watching hi m for his whole life. He testified that, on
the night of the charged offenses, he heard voices in his head telli ng him to get into a
vehicle and leave town. He believed that his life was in danger and that someone had left
a vehicle for him to take. He admitted to breaking the window of the car and taking it
without permission. He testified that he did not stop for the police because he did not know
if they were truly the police or someone out to get him. He testified that he was not going
to stop for anyone. When appellant was asked by the prosecutor if he was intoxicated while
driving the vehicle that night, appellant resp onded that he had not been intoxicated while
driving.
At the close of the evidence, the district court ruled that the requested voluntary-
intoxication jury instruction would not be given, because appellant testified that he was not
intoxicated or using drugs at the time of the conduct in question. Because appellant had
not produced any expert testimony to support his mental-illness defense, the district court
declined to separately submit to the jury a question concerning appellant’s claimed mental
illness. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts.
This appeal followed.

5
D E C I S I O N
I. Mental-illness defense
We review a district court’s decision on whether a defendant established a prima
facie showing of mental illnes s for abuse of discretion. State v. McClenton, 781 N.W.2d
181, 189 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. June 29, 2010); see also State v.
Voorhees, 596 N.W.2d 241, 251 (Min n. 1999) (holding that a district court abused its
discretion by instructing the jury on involuntary intoxication when the defendant had failed
to make a prima facie showing of temporary mental illness).
“Defendants have a due process right under the federal and Minnesota constitutions
to assert a mental illness defense.” State v. Martin, 591 N.W.2d 481, 486 (Minn. 1999).
Minnesota law provides:
No person having a mental illness or cognitive
impairment so as to be incapable of understanding the
proceedings or making a defense shall be tried, sentenced, or
punished for any crime; but th e person shall not be excused
from criminal liability except up on proof that at the time of
committing the alleged criminal act the person was laboring
under such a defect of reason, from one of these causes, as not
to know the nature of the act, or that it was wrong.

Minn. Stat. § 611.026 (2014). If a defendant raises both a mental -illness defense and
maintains a not-guilty pl ea, the trial must be bifurcated into a guilt phase of trial and a
mental-illness phase of trial. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.02, subd. 7(a); Martin, 591 N.W.2d at
486.
The right to present a mental-ill ness defense is not absolute. McClenton, 781
N.W.2d at 189. Before a trial will be bifu rcated, “[a] defendant must allege threshold

6
evidence of mental illness or mental deficiency sufficient to raise a defense under each of
the elements found in section 611.026.” Martin, 591 N.W.2d at 487. The defendant must
establish that, at the time of the offense,
(1) the defendant did not know th e nature of the act; (2) even
if the defendant did, the defenda nt did not understand that the
act was wrong; and (3) the defe ndant’s failure to know the
nature of the act or that it was wrong was the result of a defect
of reason caused by mental illness or mental deficiency.

Id. at 486. In considering whether a defendant has met his burden of production under
section 611.026, the district c ourt is not to weigh the eviden ce offered by a defendant in
support of his mental-illness claim. Id. at 487.
Appellant argues that he made a prima f acie showing that he suffered from a mental
illness which prevented him from understanding the wrongfulness of his actions. He cites
the psychologist’s rule 20 report and the reported “history of Substance/Medication-
Induced Psychotic Disorder” in support of his argument that he was suffering from a mental
illness or mental deficiency on June 20. He also argues that his testimony was sufficient
to permit a jury to find that th is disorder caused him to not understand, at the time of the
offenses, that his actions were wrong.
The rule 20 examiner reported that a ppellant had experienced hallucinations and
“possible delusional thought processes at th e time of the offenses,” but opined that
appellant’s “psychotic symptoms stem from the direct physiological effects of the
substances he was using.” The examiner concluded that appellant had been suffering “the
effects of an intoxicating substance” at the time of the events, but he was able to understand
the nature of his acts and that they were wrong.

7
Minnesota law does not permit a mental-ill ness defense if the mental illness was
caused by voluntary intoxication. Martin, 591 N.W.2d at 486 (“[M]ental illness caused by
voluntary intoxication is not a defense.”); State v. Patch , 329 N.W.2d 833, 836 (Minn.
1983); State v. Clarken , 260 N.W.2d 463, 463 (Minn. 1977). The psychologist’s report
indicates that appellant was suffering from the e ffects of his apparent past voluntary drug
use. It does not suffice as a prima facie showing of mental illness.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognize d that “mental illness is a specialized
field where expert knowledge and experience are required.” State v. Fratzke, 354 N.W.2d
402, 409 (Minn. 1984). The district court afforded appellant ample time to locate an expert
witness to support his mental-illness defense. No such expert was ever identified. At the
close of the evidence at trial, the district court noted that appellant had not proffered expert
testimony in support of his defense. The only expert opinion in the record concerning the
cause of appellant’s behavior is that of the rule 20 examiner, who concluded that appellant
was able to understand the wrongfulness of his actions on June 20.
Appellant did not offer the rule 20 examin er as a witness who could testify about
the diagnosis of the substance-induced psychotic disorder, despite having the ability to do
so under the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Pr ocedure. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.02, subd. 5
(“If the defendant’s mental condition is an i ssue, any party may call the court-appointed
examiner to testify as a witness at trial . . . .”). Appellant produced no other evidence that
his conduct “was the result of a defect of reason caused by mental illness or mental
deficiency.” Martin, 591 N.W.2d at 486. Appellant did not meet his burden of production
to support his mental-illness defense.

8
II. Voluntary-intoxication instruction
“A defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case if there is evidence
to support it.” State v. Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d 780, 787 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
We review the denial of a requested jury in struction for abuse of discretion and focus our
analysis “on whether the court’ s refusal to give [the] reque sted instruction resulted in
error.” State v. Kuhnau , 622 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Minn. 2001 ). If a district court errs by
failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication, we w ill reverse unless the evidence
establishing that the defendant “formed the re quisite intent is so overwhelming that the
instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Wilson, 830 N.W.2d
849, 857 (Minn. 2013).
Minnesota law provides:
An act committed while in a state of voluntary
intoxication is not less criminal by reason thereof, but when a
particular intent or other stat e of mind is a necessary element
to constitute a particular crime, the fact of intoxication may be
taken into consideration in determ ining such intent or state of
mind.
Minn. Stat. § 609.075 (2014). A defendant must introduce sufficient evidence to meet his
burden of production be fore a voluntary-intoxication inst ruction will be provided to the
jury. Wilson, 830 N.W.2d at 854. To receive the requested instruction, “(1) the defendant
must be charged with a specific-intent crime; (2) there must be ev idence sufficient to
support a jury finding, by a preponderance of the eviden ce, that the defendant was
intoxicated; and (3) the defendant must offer intoxication as an explanation for his actions.”
State v. Torres, 632 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Minn. 2001). When deciding whether a defendant

9
has met his burden of production, the district court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the defendant. Wilson, 830 N.W.2d at 855.
The state concedes that the first element ha s been satisfied with regard to the charges
of fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle and theft of a motor vehicle. See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.487, subds. 1, 3 (2014) (defining “fle e” for purpose of fleeing a police officer as
“with intent to attempt to elude”); Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(17) (2014) (requiring that
the defendant committed the act while knowing or having reas on to know that the owner
did not consent). The state argues that ap pellant neither met his burden of producing
sufficient evidence to establish that he was intoxicate d, nor offered intoxication as an
explanation for his actions.
The record contains evidence that appe llant was intoxicated on the night of the
offenses, but also contains evidence to the contrary. The police sergeant testified that signs
of methamphetamine use include paranoia, irr itability, and confusion. He did not testify
that appellant was exhibiting those signs, but other officers testified that appellant seemed
agitated during and after the ch ase. Appellant testified th at he had been experiencing
hallucinations and believed people were following and watching him. But, significantly,
appellant also testified that he had not used drugs for several days and was not intoxicated
when he stole the car. Viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, the record
contains sufficient evidence to support a fi nding that appellant was intoxicated. See
Black’s Law Dictionary 950 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “intoxicated” as “[h]aving the brain
affected by the presence in the body of a drug or alcohol”). See also Wilson, 830 N.W.2d
at 856 (holding that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, evidence

10
was sufficient to meet the burden of produc tion on the intoxication element when the
defendant smelled of alcohol, looked very confused and had a different look on her face,
and offered testimony that alcohol would limit her perceptions).
Although the record is sufficient to support a finding that appellant was intoxicated,
appellant clearly and repeatedly testified at trial that his actions were not due to voluntary
intoxication. He expressly denied having used drugs on or in the days preceding June 20.
He also denied that he was intoxicated that night. Nevertheless, appellant argues on appeal
that his request for a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication and his argument during
summation were a sufficient offer of intoxication as an explanation for his actions.
In Wilson, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the defendant had met the
burden of establishing that sh e “offered intoxication as an explanation for her actions,”
where she requested the voluntary-intoxication instruction and made an offer of proof that
she would have testified to th e effect alcohol had on her ability to perceive events on the
night of the incident. Id. at 856-57. Unlike Wilson, appellant did not te stify that he was
under the influence of drugs or that it was th is intoxication that affected his actions.
Therefore, and even if appellant really was using drugs on June 20, he did not claim that
his criminal conduct was caused by the drug use. In Torres, the Minnesota Supreme Court
contemplated that evidence of intoxication ma y be “so overwhelming as to constitute the
effective offer of intoxication as an explanation for the defendant’s actions.” 632 N.W.2d
at 617. Here, there is not overwhelming evidence of appe llant’s intoxication or that
intoxication caused his acts. The district c ourt did not abuse its di scretion in concluding
that appellant had not met his burden of production concerning the requested instruction.

11
Moreover, and even if the district court could be considered to have abused its
discretion by not giving a volu ntary-intoxication instruction, any error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. An erroneous om ission of a requested jury instruction is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the om ission did not have a significant impact on
the verdict. Wilson, 830 N.W.2d at 857. The omission does not significantly impact the
verdict if the evidence establishing that a ppellant formed the requisite intent is
overwhelming. Id. Here, the evidence that appellant formed the requisite intent is
overwhelming. Appellant acknowledged that he did not have permission to take the car,
he decided to “steal” it, and he smashed the window of the car. He acknowledged that he
was not going to stop for anyone, including the police officers whom he acknowledged
seeing before and during the chas e. “[T]he possibility of int oxication does not create the
presumption that a defendant is thereby rend ered incapable of intending to do a certain
act.” Torres, 632 N.W.2d at 617. Though it is possi ble that appellant was intoxicated on
the night of the offenses, the evidence presented at trial demonstrates beyond a reasonable
doubt that he intended to steal the car and flee the officers who attempted to stop him.
III. Conclusion
Appellant asks this court to recognize, for purposes of a de fense under section
611.026, a mental illness or mental deficien cy caused by voluntar y drug use but which
manifests itself post-intoxication. Appellant argues that we should apply the mental-illness
standard from the state of Indiana, whereby a defendant is permitted to assert a mental-
illness defense if he shows that he voluntarily used intoxicants, “to the point that it has
produced mental disease,” Jackson v. State , 402 N.E.2d 947, 949 (Ind. 1980), or the

12
standards applied in the states of Florida, Oklahoma, and Illinois, which permit a mental-
illness defense if the defendant’s voluntary drug use has caused a “fixed” mental disorder.
Cirack v. State, 201 So.2d 706, 709 (Fla. 1967); People v. Free, 447 N.E.2d 218, 232 (Ill.
1983); Jones v. State, 648 P.2d 1251, 1255 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982). We need not reach
the issue of whether such a defense is pe rmitted under Minnesota law because appellant
did not offer an expert opinion or other evidence of such a mental illness. Minn. Stat.
§ 611.026 requires the defendant to be “laboring under such a defect of reason . . . as not
to know the nature of the act, or that it was wrong.” The only expert opinion in the record
is that appellant did not suffer from such a defect at the time of his offenses.
Applying current Minnesota law, we discern no reversible error. If the law is to be
changed, that is the province of the legislature or of the Minnesota Supreme Court. Sefkow
v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (“Th e function of the court of appeals is
limited to identifying erro rs and then correcting th em.” (citations omitted)); Tereault v.
Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Min n. App. 1987) (“[T]he task of extending existing law
falls to the supreme court or the legislat ure, but it does not fall to this court.”), review
denied (Minn. Dec. 18, 1987).
Affirmed.