In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: B. G. and B. C., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1512

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
B. G. and B. C., Parents.

Filed March 13, 2017
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Chippewa County District Court
File No. 12-JV-16-95

Douglas D. Kluver, Kluver Law Office and Mediation Center PLLC, Montevideo,
Minnesota (for appellant-father B.C.)

David Gilbertson, Chippewa County Attorney, Matthew Haugen, Assistant County
Attorney, Montevideo, Minnesota (for respondent Chippewa County)

Susan Elaine Peterson-Bones, Granite Falls, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Appellant-father challenges the termination of his parental rights. Because clear
and convincing evidence supports the district court’s determination that reasonable efforts
failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s out -of-home placement and
termination is in the child’s best interests, we affirm.

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FACTS
The child who is the subject of these proceed ings, A.C., was born in September
2013 to father B.C. and mother B.G. The small family lived in Montevideo with extended
family nearby. A.C.’s cousin and uncle, and the uncle’s girlfriend, C.S ., lived within
eyesight of A.C.’s home, and A.C.’s aunt also lived in the area. Friction arose between the
parents and the extended family over the care of A.C.
In July 2015, the aunt reported to police that she removed the child from the home
because the parents were arguing . Four days later, the aunt disclosed to police concerns
over mother’s drug use, smoking, and overall lack of parenting.1 A week later, father had
an appointment and mother was at work, so father asked the cousin to babysit, but the
cousin never agreed. Father left for his appointment. C.S. saw father leave and wondered
if the child was left alone. The cousin went into the home to investigate and found two-
year-old A.C. sitting in his highchair, home alone. The child was taken to C.S.’s home ,
and she contacted police, who contacted social services.
Police arrived first and spoke with C.S., who expressed frustration over the child’s
care and alleged “ several domestic situations.” Social workers then arrived to find the
child, members of the extended family, and police gathered outside C.S.’s residence. A.C.
was dirty, with a full diaper, and wearing one shoe. Social workers spoke with the aunt ,
who said that two weeks prior she had seen methamphetamine accessible to A.C. in a back

1 As a result of the aunt’s disclosures, Chippewa County contacted the parents and offered
voluntary services through the Parent’s Support Outreach Program, but those services were
declined.
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bedroom and that she had once seen A.C. pick up a marijuana pipe. She expressed concern
about the child not being fed and the dirty conditions of the home and stated that the parents
used garbage bags as diapers. C.S. echoed these concerns and said that she had seen father
beating up mother in front of the child.
Father returned from his appointment to find the group gathered outside C.S. ’s
residence. F ather was questioned about the alleged drug use, lack of food, domestic
violence, and conditions of the home. Social workers wanted to inspect the home in light
of the allegations of drugs and dangerous conditions in the home , but f ather refused.
Because of the concerns raised by family members, as well as the fact that a two -year-old
had been left home alone, police signed a temporary 72-hour hold, which allowed them to
take immediate custody of A.C. A.C. was placed with his aunt. Days later, in an effort to
return A.C. to the parental home, social workers met with the parents, offered a safety plan,
and requested drug testing and a safety check of the home; the parents refused.
On August 5, 2015, a child in need of protection o r services (CHIPS) petition was
filed and an emergency protective care (EPC) hearing was held .2 Both mother and father
appeared at the EPC hearing. Following the hearing, the district court issued an EPC order
that concluded that (1) the CHIPS petition established a prima facie showing that A.C. was
without adequate care and that the parental home was a dangerous or injurious
environment, and (2) A.C. should remain in protective care. Father did not appeal the EPC

2 An EPC hearing is a hearing that is generally required if a child has been taken into
temporary protective care, as occurred here with the 72 -hour hold. Its purpose is to
determine if the child should be returned to the parental home or remain in protective care.
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 28.01, 30.01, subd. 1.
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order. The district court ordered supervised visitation for the parents at the discretion of
family services, but permitted the establishmen t of unsupervised visitation upon
completion of drug screening and a home-safety inspection.
Six days later, an admit/deny hearing was held where the parents could either admit
or deny the allegations set forth in the CHIPS petition. 3 Mother attended; father did not
attend. The district court continued the matter,4 and two days later at the continued hearing
both parents failed to appear. The district court proceeded by default, adjudicated A.C. a
child in need of protection or services, and maintained his out-of-home placement. These
adjudications were set forth in a CHIPS order. Father did not appeal the CHIPS order.
In late-August 2015, the aunt became unable to care for A.C. Efforts were made to
place the child with a relative. Mother had pro vided a list of three potential placement
options: two family friends and A.C.’s grandfather. Father failed to provide a list of
potential placement options. Social services spoke with the grandfather, but ultim ately
determined that he was not a viable option because he had medical issues. A.C. was placed
with a foster family in September 2015.
In an effort to reunify the family, Chippewa County Family Services developed an
out-of-home placement plan providing the following services for the parents: (1) parenting
education/classes; (2) child care services; (3) mental health assessments/services;
(4) chemical health services and drug screens; and (5) case management. The district court

3 Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 34.01, 35.01, subd. 1.
4 The parents had yet to fill out attorney applications. Mother was directed to fill out an
application; the district court continued the matter and appointed one attorney, Krystal
Lynne, to represent both parents.
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approved the plan , which was subsequently revised twice to provide further services,
including transportation services, supervised visitation services, and a child development
assessment. The parents were provided with transportation to facilitate visitation since
A.C.’s foster home was outside of the Montevid eo area and visitations were moved to
St. Cloud.
In order to comply with the out -of-home placement plan, f ather was expected to
(1) cooperate with social services and attend scheduled appointments; (2) complete
chemical testing and undergo a chemical -use assessment if issues were identified;
(3) participate in parenting classes in September 2015; (4) complete a diagnostic
assessment and follow all recommendations; and (5) provide a list of relatives for
placement options and a list of friends that could assist with A.C.’s care. The plan further
ordered supervised visitation between the parents and the child.
Initially, father failed to comply with most important aspects of his case plan . He
was noncompliant with chemical testing and failed to keep appointments, attend hearings,
and attend scheduled visitations. As the case moved into September 2015, he began
attending visitations, but failed to attend scheduled parenting classes . The following
month, he completed his required diagnostic assessment, which recommended individual
therapy, but he began missing visit ations again . Further, he failed to attend individual
therapy as recommended.
On November 7, 2015, father was arrested for fifth-degree drug-possession; he was
convicted and served jail time. While in jail, he underwent a chemical-use assessment and
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began chemical dependency treatment, which he eventually completed . He was released
in January 2016. He did not attend visitations with A.C. during his time in jail.
Father resumed visita tions in February 2016 , and the next month he completed a
comprehensive assessment and enrolled in parenting classes . His comprehensive
assessment recommended a chemical dependency aftercare program. He engaged in
aftercare, but missed numerous sessions. Around this time he was charged with theft and
attended only one visit with the child in March.
In mid-April 2016, father started to regularly attend visitation . H e was court
ordered to find independent housing, and he did secure an apartment in Willmar. However,
when a safety check of his apartment was completed, several areas of concern were noted,
including an obstructed window and a la ck of electrical -outlet covers and child -proof
cabinets. Father failed to make arrangements for a recheck , and a subsequent visit by a
social worker revealed that not all of the safety concerns had been addressed.5
Through the end of April and May 2016, father began consistently attending
visitation and he completed his parenting classes. However, visitation agai n became
inconsistent in June and July 2016. Around this time, p olice were called to father’s
residence because of a verbal argument between father and mother.
On June 7, 2016, a termination of parental rights ( TPR) petition was filed against
father, alleging that the conditions leading to A.C.’s out -of-home placement had not been

5 Social services also believed that mother was residing with father at the apartment, which
was a concern because father had been directed to obtain independent housing after a TPR
petition was filed against mother.
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corrected.6 In August 2016, the TPR proceedings came on for t rial. That day, mother
voluntarily terminated her rights to A.C. Father moved forward with the trial, and
testimony was received from mother, father, two social workers, A.C.’s foster paren t,
A.C.’s guardian ad litem, and a therapist.
Following the trial, the district court filed an order terminating father’s parental
rights, finding that the conditions leading t o A.C.’s out-of-home placement had not been
corrected despite reasonable efforts. The district court found that father (1) attended 28 of
57 scheduled visits with A.C. , (2) did not appear for drug testing on five occasions and
refused testing on three occasions near the time of trial, (3) missed or was late for several
appointments, (4) failed to find safe, independent housing because he lived with mother
and neglected to correct safet y concerns in the home, (5) missed numerous therapy
appointments, (6) failed to provide a list of relatives and complete a me dical form in a
timely manner, and (7) failed to comply with the supervised visi tation transportation
policy. The district court also found that termination of father’s parental rights was in
A.C.’s best interests. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Father steadfastly maintains that his child’s initial removal from the home was
wrongful. There was no evidence, he asserts, that the child had been abused or that his
basic needs were unmet. Rather, according to father, the only lapse was that he
momentarily left the child alone. This is not sufficient evidence to support removal, he

6 A TPR petition was filed against mother in February 2016.
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contends, and even if the removal was appropriate, father alleges that he resolved the “only
actionable basis ” for removal (leaving the child unsupervised) so that the conditions
leading to the child’s out-of-home placement were successfully addressed.
Because father failed to appeal the initial CHIPS and EPC determinations, his
arguments concerning the legality of the initial removal are not properly before us. And
because we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the district court’s
determination that reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s
out-of-home placement and termination is in the child’s best interests, the termination of
father’s parental rights was proper.
I. Father’s challenges to the EPC and admit/deny proceedings are untimely.
Father asserts that his due process rights were violated when the district court failed
to receive evidence at the EPC hearing and adjudicated A.C. a child in need of protection
or services by default at the admit/deny hearing. He also challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence for removing A.C. from the home and alleges removal was the result of his refusal
to consent to a search of his residence. His challenges are untimely.
In a juvenile protection matter, persons aggrieved by a final order affecting a
substantial right may appeal that order, but such an appeal must be filed within 20 days of
notice of the filing of the final order. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 47.02, subds. 1, 2. Here, father
has appealed only the district court’s order of August 29, 201 6, terminating his parental
rights.
In this case, the EPC order was not an appealable final order affecting substantial
rights. See In re Welfare of E.G., 876 N.W.2d 872, 873-74 (Minn. App. 2016) (ruling that
9
intermediate dispositional orders are not ap pealable as a matter of right ).7 The CHIPS
order was an appealable final order. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 47.02, subd. 1. Father could
have raised his challenges to the EPC and admit/deny proceedings following the CHIPS
order, but he did not. Because the time for appealing the CHIPS order has expired, that
order is final, and challenges to that order amount to an improper collateral attack on that
ruling. See Dieseth v. Calder Mfg. Co. , 275 Minn. 365, 370 -71, 147 N.W.2d 100, 103
(1966) (stating, in a civil case, that “[e]ven though the decision of the trial court in the first
order may have been wrong, if it is an appealable order it is still final after the time for
appeal has expired”); Nussbaumer v. Fetrow , 556 N.W.2d 595, 599 (Minn. App. 1996)
(stating Minnesota does not permit collateral attack s on facially valid judgments), review
denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 1997).
II. Clear and convincing evidence supports the district court’s termination of
father’s parental rights on the ground that reasonable efforts have failed to
correct the conditions leading to A.C.’s out-of-home placement.

Father argues that the statutory criteria for termination of his p arental rights were
not met because he corrected the condition that led to A.C.’s removal. He argues that the
only substantiated basis for removal of A.C. was lack of supervision, and this condition

7 As a practical matter, father has not provided this court with transcripts from either the
EPC or the CHIPS proceedings, so we are left with a limited picture of what occurred.
While it is unclear what evidence was admitted in those prior proceedings, we do note that
an EPC determination may be based upon the allegations set forth in the petition if those
allegations constitute a prima facie showing of endangerment. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 30.08,
subd. 1. As such, father’s argument that the district court failed to receive evidence at the
EPC hearing appears unavailing even if it were properly before us.
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was corrected through parenting classes. Father also argues that he substantially complied
with the requirements imposed by the district court.
A district court may terminate parental rights if there is clear and convincing
evidence establishing at least one statutory ground for termination and termination is in the
child’s best interests. In re Welfare of Children of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004).
We review the district court’s findings in a termination case for clear error, In re Welfare
of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660 (Minn. 2008), and its decision to termina te for
an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn.
App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
Here, termination of father’s parental rights required a showing that reasonable
efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to A.C.’s out -of-home placement. Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5) (2016). Given father’s challenges to the termination of his
parental rights, it must be determined what conditions led to A.C.’s out-of-home placement
and whether those conditions were corrected. We first address the conditi ons that led to
A.C.’s out-of-home placement.
In determining what conditions led to a child’s out -of-home placement, reviewing
courts examine the conditions that gave rise to the child’s CHIPS adjudication. In re Child
of E.V., 634 N.W.2d 443, 44 7-48 (Minn. App. 2001); In re Welfare of M.A. , 408 N.W.2d
227, 235-36 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 1987). Here, the CHIPS
order found that (1) the parents were unable or unwilling to provide necessary food,
clothing, shelter, education, or o ther required care; and (2) the child’s environment was
injurious or dangerous.
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Contrary to father’s argument that the only condition leading to the child’s out-of-
home placement was a single incident of lax supervision , the conditions leading to A.C.’s
out-of-home placement were more numerous and substantial. A.C. was removed because
of inattentive and neglectful parenting, as well as alleged drug use and domestic abuse in
the home.8
We next turn to determine whether t hese conditions were corrected. There is a
presumption that the conditions leading to the child’s out-of-home placement have not been
corrected if the parent has not “substantially complied with the [district] court’s orders and
a reasonable case plan.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5)(iii). Here, the district court
found that father had not complied with the court’s orders and a reasonable case plan. Clear
and convincing evidence supports this determination.
Court-approved case plans are presumed reasonable . In re Welfare of Chi ldren of
S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381 , 388 (Minn. 2008). Here, under the court approved case plan,
father was expected to (1) cooperate with social services and attend scheduled
appointments; (2) complete chemical testing and undergo a chemical -use assessment i f
issues were identified; (3) participate in parenting classes in September 2015; (4) complete
a diagnostic assessment and follow all recommendations; and (5) provide a list of relatives

8 As noted in the district court’s TPR order, A.C. was removed due to “suspected drug use,
ineffective parenting, neglect of the c hild, the presence of domestic abuse in the presence
of the child, failure to supervise the child, access by the child to drugs and drug
paraphernalia, refusal to complete drug screens and allow the home to be inspected, and
unwillingness to work with family services to develop a safety plan.”
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for placement options and friends that could assist with A.C.’s care. Further, supervised
visitation was established by order of the district court.
Father attended only 28 of 57 scheduled visits with A.C. As noted by the district
court, these missed visits prevented father from progressing to unsupervised and trial home
visitation “so that meaningful work towards reunification could occur.” His attendance at
family services appointments was poor. He did not complete all of hi s required drug
screens. The district court specifically found that he refused drug testing three times total
in July/August 2016, which was just prior to trial, and failed to appear for drug screens five
times total in January/February 2016. He missed aftercare appointment s and failed to
complete aftercare by the time of trial. He was ordered to “maintain an independent,
permanent home suitable for [A.C.], ” but was living with mother and failed to correct
safety concerns in the home . He failed to provide a list of relatives , which impeded
placement with a relative and led to A.C.’s placement with a foster family. And he failed
to consistently attend individual therapy, as recommended by his diagnostic assessment.
Clear and convincing evidence supports the district court’s conclusion that father
did not substantially comply with h is reasonable case plan and the district court’s orders.
As such, the record supports the statutory presumption that father failed to correct the
conditions leading to A.C.’s out -of-home placement. The district court agreed with
therapist Deena McMahon’s assessment of father’s case compliance: “[Father] has simply
not done the work his son needed him to do.”
Father contends that he did substantially comply. He argues that he completed
parenting classes, obtained appropriate housing , completed treatment, and commenced
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individual therapy. Father overstates his compliance. He did eventually complete
parenting classes . However, he did not attend the classes that had been scheduled in
September 2015; he did not complete parenting classes until May 18, 2016. Regarding
housing, father failed to correct safety concerns in his home and was residing with mother,
despite being ordered to live independently. He completed treatment after being convicted
and serving jail time for drug possession, but he continued to miss drug tests and aftercare
appointments, and he had not completed recommended aftercare by the time of trial.
Lastly, father admitted to not attending individual counseling.
As such, the district court properly concluded there was a presumption that father
failed to correct the conditions leading to A.C.’s out-of-home placement. The district court
ultimately concluded that father failed to overcome this presumption, a conclusion that is
supported by the record, which indicated persisting issues with parental neglect, drug use,
and domestic disturbances in the home.
And beyond any statutory presumption relating to his case compliance, there is clear
and convincing evidence that father failed to correct the conditions that led to A.C.’ s out-
of-home placement. He only attended half of his scheduled visita tions. This evidences
ongoing neglect of parental duties and an unwillingness to provide A.C. necessary care .
We have previously stated that “a parent has a duty to maintain the relationship of parent-
child with a child in foster care ” and held that attending only half of scheduled visits and
minimally cooperating with reunification efforts is sufficient grounds for termination. In
re Welfare of D.C., 415 N.W.2d 915, 917-19 (Minn. App. 1987). While father’s inability
to obtain safe and stable housing , his conviction for drug possession , and his failures to
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consistently submit to testing and undergo individual therapy are all clear evidence that
father did not correct the conditions leading to the child’s removal, the most convincing
evidence is the chronic f ailure to visit with the child. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in terminating father’s parental rights.
III. Termination of father’s parental rights was in A.C.’s best interests.
In a termination -of-parental-rights case, the best interests of the child is “the
paramount consideration.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2016). A district court must
make “findings regarding how the order is in the best interests of the child.” Minn. R. Juv.
Prot. P. 42.08, subd. 1(b). In analyzing the best interests of the child, the district court must
balance three factors: “(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent -child relationship;
(2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent -child relationship; and (3) any competing
interest of the child.” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992). This
court applies an abuse -of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s determination
that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905.
Here, the district court made extensive findings on why termination of father’s
parental rights was in A.C.’s best interests. The district court concluded that A.C.’s
interests in “a healthy , stable and safe environment” outweighed any interests in
maintaining the parent -and-child relationship. The district court noted that father loves
A.C., but the child is not attached to father and is confused by visits, a confusion
compounded by the fact that father “chose to cancel or not request six visits in June and
July” of 2016. The district court’s determination is consistent with the testimony of A.C.’s
guardian ad litem, who testified that she feared moving A.C. from his foster home
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placement would create an “attachment disruption.” Likewise, therapist Deena McMahon,
who performed an attachment assessment, testified that the child was not attached to father
and that it would be devastating for A.C. to be removed from his foster parents. The district
court concluded that termination of father’s parental rights is in A.C.’s best interests. We
agree.
Affirmed.