State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1549

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Alvin Alexander Bonilla-Sanchez,
Appellant.

Filed July 24, 2017
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-34370

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Lydia Maria Villalva Lijó,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Toussaint, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, arguing
the evidence was not sufficient to establish that he res ided regularly in the same dwelling
as the victim. We affirm.
FACTS
On December 6, 2015, L.D.G. reported that her daughter, 13 -year-old K.G., had
been sexually assaulted by appellant Alvin Alexander Bonilla-Sanchez. At the time of the
incident, Bonilla-Sanchez worked with L.D.G. and her husband as a painter, and had been
living in their basement for three weeks. Bonilla-Sanchez admitted to police that he had
engaged in sexual intercourse with K.G. every day over a two-week period, and that he had
been staying in the basement of her home for three weeks.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Bonilla -Sanchez with one count each of
first-degree and third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Bonilla-Sanchez waived his right to
a jury trial, and the c ase proceeded to a court trial in which the parties stipulated to the
evidence.1 The district court found Bonilla-Sanchez guilty of both offenses. After denying
Bonilla-Sanchez’s motion for a dispositional or durational departure, the district court
imposed a 144-month sentence for the first-degree conviction. Bonilla-Sanchez appeals.

1 The stipulated evidence includes relevant police incident reports and interviews, reports
concerning and statements made by K.G., and photographs of the residence.

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D E C I S I O N
In reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, this court reviews the record
“to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favor able to the
conviction, was sufficient to permit the [fact-finder] to reach the verdict [it] did.” State v.
Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). We will not disturb the verdict if the fact -
finder, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocenc e and the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude the defendant was guilty of
the charged offenses. State v. Alton, 432 N.W.2d 754, 756 (Minn. 1988). And we use the
same standard of review in court trials and jury trials in evaluating the sufficiency of the
evidence. State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011).2
To support a conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342, subd. 1(h)(iii) (2014), the state must prove that the defendant
engage[d] in sexual penetration with another person, . . . the
[defendant] has a significant relationship to the complainant,
the complainant was under 16 years of age at the time of the
sexual penetration, and . . . the sexual abuse involved multiple
acts committed over an extended period of time.

A s ignificant relationship exists if the defendant is “an adu lt who jointly resides
intermittently or regularly in the same dwelling as the [victim] and who is not the [victim]’s
spouse.” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 15(3) (2014 ). Bonilla-Sanchez argues that the

2 The state and district court identify the proceeding as a stipulated-facts trial under Minn.
R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3. We disagree. The district court made findings of fact based on
stipulated evidence. Accordingly, we review the sufficiency of the evidence as we would
in any case involving a court trial. Dereje v. State, 837 N.W.2d 714, 720-21 (Minn. 2013).

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evidence is insufficient to establish that he resided with K.G. and did so “intermittently or
regularly.” We are not persuaded.
In analyzing the “significant relationship” element of the first-degree criminal -
sexual-conduct offense, this court previously concluded that “[t]o reside means to ‘live,
dwell, abide, sojourn, stay, remain, lodge *** [or] have a settled abode for a time.’” State
v. Sebasky, 547 N.W.2d 93, 100 (Minn. App. 1996) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1308
(6th ed. 1990)), review denied (Minn. June 19, 1996).3 And we observed that a “dwelling
is any ‘place of residence.’” Id. (quoting Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary
567 (2d ed. 1983)). Applying the plain meaning of the statutory terms, we concluded that
Sebasky resided intermittently with the complainants because they stayed overnight at his
apartment almost every weekend, and sometimes stayed up to six days at a time. Id. We
rejected Sebasky’s argument that the statute only applies if the defendant l ives in the
complainant’s house, stating that the law mere ly requires “that the two reside in the same
place.” Id.
It is undisputed that Bonilla -Sanchez had been living in the basement of K.G.’s
residence for at least three weeks at the time of his arrest. During that time, he had no other
place of residence, a ll of his belongings were in the basement, and h e had access to the
entire house. The fact that Bonilla-Sanchez did not pay rent to K.G.’s parents and intended
to move out of the residence in the future to pursue his employment is irrelevant. Bonilla-
Sanchez lived in only one place from November to December 2015—K.G.’s home. On

3 The current edition of Black’s Law Dictionary does not define “reside.” But neither party
contends that this omission undermines the precedential value of Sebasky.

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this undisputed record, sufficient evidence demonstrates that Bonilla-Sanchez resided with
K.G. at the time of the offenses.
Bonilla-Sanchez next argues that he did not reside i n the same dwelling as K.G.
“intermittently or regularly” because he did not plan to stay there permanently. While the
statute does not define “regularly,” we are guided by the term’s plain meaning. Minn. Stat.
§ 645.08(1) (2014). “Regular” is relevantly defined as “[c]ustomary, usual, or normal . . .
[n]ot varying; constant.” The American Heritage Dictionary 1480 (5th ed. 2011). Bonilla-
Sanchez had constantly resided in the basement of K.G.’s home during the three weeks
preceding his arrest. He did n ot stay anywhere else during that period of time; it was his
usual place of abode. Neither the plain meaning of “regular” nor the statutory language
suggest that the defendant must intend to permanently dwell with the victim to establish a
significant rel ationship. The undisputed evidence that Bonilla-Sanchez lived in K.G.’s
home on a full-time, indefinite basis is sufficient to establish that he regularly resided with
K.G. at the time of the offenses.
Affirmed.