Timothy Ayman Bakdash, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1575

Timothy Ayman Bakdash, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed April 10, 2017
Affirmed in part and vacated in part
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-11-11987

Timothy Bakdash, Bayport, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, He nnepin County Attorney, Jean Burdorf, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court erroneously determined that it lacked
jurisdiction to decide his motion for sentence correction while his appeal of his earlier
postconviction proceeding was pending . Because appellant’s motion for sentence
correction, like his earlier petition for postconviction relief, challenged the validity of his
convictions, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to decide
the motion, and we vacate as void the district court’s other rulings on the motion.
FACTS
In March 2012, a jury found appellant Timothy Ayman Bakdash guilty of seco nd-
degree intentional murder, felony murder, and criminal vehicular homicide for the death of
B.V.H., as well as two counts of attempted second -degree murder, two counts of second -
degree assault, and two counts of criminal vehicular operation against S.B. and K.H. The
district court sentenced Bakdash to two concurrent prison terms of 173 months for the two
counts of attempted second-degree murder to be served consecutively with his sentence of
307 months for second -degree murder. This court affirmed the c onvictions, and the
supreme court denied review. State v. Bakdash, 830 N.W.2d 906, 909 (Minn. App. 2013),
review denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 2013).
Bakdash petitioned for postconviction relief, challenging his convictions on the
grounds of newly discovered evidence, inconsistent verdicts, and ineffective assis tance of
counsel. The postconviction court denied relief, Bakdash appealed, and this court affirmed.
Bakdash v. State , No. A16-0337, 2016 WL 7439086, at *1 (Minn. App. Dec. 27, 2016) ,
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pet. for review filed (Minn. Feb. 23, 2017). While Bakdash’s postconviction appeal was
pending, he moved for sentence correction under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. The
district court concluded, in response to an argument by the state, that it did not have
“jurisdiction to make a determination on the present motion” because the postconviction
appeal was pending. Despite this conclusion, t he district court construed the sentence -
correction motion as a petition for postconviction relief, concluded that the claims were
time-barred and procedurally-barred, and denied Bakdash’s additional motions challenging
the state’s response to his motion for sentence correction. Bakdash appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Bakdash contends that the district court retained jurisdiction to decide his motion
for sentence correction while his postconviction appeal was pending . He argues that his
motion for sentence correction “in no way require [d] consideration of the issues being
appealed from the denial of his [postconviction petition], nor do they depend on the merits
of the issues on appeal.”
This court reviews “[q]uestions concerning the au thority and jurisdiction of
[district] courts” de novo . State v. Pflepsen , 590 N.W.2d 759, 763 (Minn. 1999) .
Generally, “the filing of a timely and proper appeal suspends the [district] court’s authority
to make any order that affects the order or judgment appealed from.” Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 108.01, subd. 2. “The purpose of this rule is to avoid the confusion and waste of time
potentially arising from having the same issue before two courts at the same time.” State
v. Dwire, 409 N.W.2d 498, 502 (Minn. 1987) (quotation omitted). However, th e rule is
subject to exceptions.
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Pending a duly executed appeal, the jurisdiction of a [district]
court is suspended only as to those matters necessarily
involved in the appeal, not as to those matters which are
independent of, or which are supplemental to, the appeal or
collateral to the proceeding in which the appealed order or
judgment was rendered . Among the matters over which the
[district] court retains jurisdiction pending an appeal are those
which are ancillary or supplemental to the appeal as in aid of
its proper presentation, such as orders to correct the record, to
make and certify a settled case or bill of exceptions.

State v. Barnes, 249 Minn. 301, 302-03, 81 N.W.2d 864, 866 (1957) (footnotes omitted);
see Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 108.01, subd. 2 (“[T]he [district] court retains jurisdiction as to
matters independent of, supplemental to, or collateral to the order or judgment appealed
from.”).
For example, jurisdiction is not suspended where the district court does not need to
consider the merits of any issue on appeal in making its decision. See, e.g., Spaeth v. City
of Plymouth, 344 N.W.2d 815, 825-26 (Minn. 1984) (concluding that district court retained
jurisdiction over a c laim for attorney and expert fees because such a claim “should be
treated as a matter independent of the merits of the litigation”); In re Thulin, 660 N.W.2d
140, 143 (Minn. App. 2003) (concluding that the district court retained jurisdiction over a
determination regarding continued commitment because it involved “a different standard
of proof and a new set of facts” than the initial commitment order). In contrast, the district
court’s jurisdiction is suspended when the district court must consider the merits of an issue
on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Friberg, 435 N.W.2d 509, 512 n.1 (Minn. 1989) (noting that
the district court “should have refused to hear the mot ion to vacate judgment since the
judgment of conviction was being appealed ”); In re Welfare of C. Children , 348 N.W.2d
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94, 99 (Minn. App. 1984) (stating that the juvenile court retains jurisdiction to modify a
disposition of a child but it “ does not have the power to alter its adjudication of neglect
once an appeal of this determination has been perfected”).
Bakdash asserts that his motion to correct his sentence and his postconvicti on
petition “could not be more dissimilar.” He generally argues that his motion for sentence
correction challenged his sentence, whereas the postconviction petition challenge d his
convictions. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
Bakdash moved for sentence correction under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9,
which states that the “ court may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law .”
Although Bakdash’s motion was captioned as a motion for sentence correction under rule
27, the substance of his memorandum in support of the motion shows that he actually
challenged his convictions. As a basis for relief, Bakdash discussed Minn. Stat. § 609.035,
subd. 1 (2010), which prohibits multiple punishments for crimes committed during a single
behavioral incident. See Langdon v. State, 375 N.W.2d 474, 476 (Minn. 1985) (stating that
the bar against m ultiple punishment s in section 609.035 refers to sentences, not to
convictions). However, Bakdash did not argue for the district court to resentence his
existing convictions under section 609.035. Instead, he relied on section 609.035, as well
as Minn. Stat. § 609.04 (2010) (prohibiting conviction of both the crime charged and an
included offense) and Minn. Stat. § 611.02 (2010 ) (requiring conviction of the lowest
degree when an offense has been proved, if there is reasonable doubt as to the degree), and
argued that the district court should vacate all but one of his convictions and resentence
him on the remaining conviction. Specifically, Bakdash’s memorandum asserted that “[a]ll
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convictions are in violation of section 609.0 35 and only [one] can remain” and that he
“must be resentenced consistent with the law once the convictions in violation of the law
have been vacated .” In sum, Bakdash’s motion for sentence correction and his
postconviction petition both challenged the validity of his convictions.
Bakdash also argues that his motion for sentence correction and his postconviction
petition did not raise the same issues because his grounds for challenging his convictions
in his postconviction petition were different than the grounds he asserted in support of his
motion for sentence correction . Once again, Bakdash’s motion for sentence correction
actually challenged the validity of his convictions , and he does not cite any authority that
allows a district court to determine a challenge to a conviction when the validity of the
same conviction is pending appeal.
As reflected in the purpose of the rule generally suspending the district court’s
jurisdiction over a case that is pending appeal, we do not favor piecemeal appeals. Cf.
Emme v. C.O.M.B., Inc. , 418 N.W.2d 176, 179 (Minn. 1988) (“[T]he thrust of the rules
governing the appellate process is that appeals should not be brought or considered
piecemeal.”). To hold otherwise would create the possibility of a district court considering
the validity of a conviction on one theory while this court is considering the validity of the
same conviction on another theory. Such a result is a potential waste of judicial resources.
See Spaeth, 344 N.W.2d at 825 (recognizing that “the rule divesting a [district] court of
jurisdiction is designed to avoid the confusion and waste of time potentially arising from
having the same issues before two courts at the same time” and is based on the policy
against piecemeal appeals).
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In conclusion, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Bakdash’s motion for
sentence correction because the motion challenged the validity of his convictions and that
issue was pending appeal. Because the district court lacked jurisdiction, it correctly
concluded that it could not determine Bakdash’s motion. We therefore affirm the district
court’s ruling that it lacked jurisdiction , hold that its remaining rulings on Bakdash’s
motion are void, and vacate those rulings. Cf. Vang v. State, 788 N.W.2d 111, 117 (Minn.
2010) (“When the court lacks subject -matter jurisdiction over a proceeding at the time it
imposes a sentence, the sentence is void.”).
Affirmed in part and vacated in part.