State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1582

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

C. E. S.,
Appellant.

Filed May 1, 2017
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File Nos. 62-K3-98-003179
62-CR-08-7025
62-K9-00-002247

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney; Laura Rosenthal, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

C.E.S., St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s orders denying her requests for
expungement of her criminal records arisin g out of three convictions. Because the district
court did not abuse its discretion or err in interpreting the expungement statutes, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant C.E.S. was convicted of gross misdemeanor intent to engage in
prostitution on November 16, 1998. She received a stayed sentence of one year in the
Ramsey County Workhouse. During the term of the stay, she admitted two separate
probation violations. She was discharged in November 2000.
On December 22, 2000, C.E.S. was convicted of felony third -degree controlled -
substance c rime. She received a stay of imposition of sentence and was placed on
probation, during which she admitted committing two probation violations. After her
second probation violation, C.E.S. requested execution of her sentence, which was granted.
On September 27, 2004, the district court vacated the stay, imposed a 27-month sentence,
and C.E.S. was committed to the commission er of corrections. She was discharged in
November 2005.
On August 13, 2008, C.E.S. was convicted of misdemeanor prostitution charges.
The district court stayed exe cution of C.E.S.’s sentence; she successfully completed one
year of supervised probation and was discharged on August 13, 2009.
C.E.S. petitioned the district court for expungement of each of these three criminal
records. Each criminal record was considered in one expungement proceeding and the
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district court issued three separate orders denying C.E.S.’s petitions . The district court
determined that C.E.S. is ineligible for expungement of her first prostitution conviction and
her controlled-substance conviction because she was convicted of crimes within the four-
and five -year periods prescribed by law. See Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3(a)(4) –(5)
(2016). The district court also concluded that C.E.S. ’s third-degree controlled-substance
conviction could not be expunged because the legislature did not include the offense in its
list of felonies that may be expunged. Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3(b).
Regarding C.E.S.’s 2008 prostitution conviction, the district court determined that
C.E.S. failed to meet her burden that “sealing the record would yield a benefit to [her]
commensurate with the disadvantages to the public and public safety.” The district court
considered the factors set out in Minn. Stat. § 609A.03 , subd. 5(c) (2016), and found that
C.E.S. presented some evidence of rehabilitation, but she presented no evidence of being
denied employment or housing due to her convictions . The district court commented that
C.E.S.’s “ 11 convictions over 20 ye ars weigh[ed] against her,” and C.E.S.’s multiple
failures to successfully complete probation before 2008 also weighed against her. The
district court denied expungement after concluding that C.E.S. did not establish that sealing
the record would benefit her in proportion to “the disadvantages to the public and public
safety of: (1) sealing the record; and (2) burdening the court and public authorities to”
comply with an expungement order. C.E.S. appeals.
D E C I S I O N
We understand C.E.S. to argue that the district cour t erred in concluding that she
was statutorily ineligible for expungement and that the court abused its discretion in
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denying her petitions because she is seeking expungement for housing and employment
purposes. While C.E.S makes no reference to the expungement statute, it appears that this
is the basis for her petitions. The record does not reflect that C.E.S. asked the district court
to consider expungement under its inherent authority.1 Thus, we address the district court’s
orders with respect to the applicable expungement statutes.
A district court is authorized to order expungement by statute. Minn. Stat.
§§ 609A.01–.03 (2016); State v. Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d 256, 257 (Minn. 2000). This court
will review a district court’s interpreta tion of the expungement statute de novo. Ambaye,
616 N.W.2d at 258. We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny expungement for
abuse of discretion. State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Minn. 2013).
A person seeking expungement must file a petition stating, among other things, why
expungement is sought, the authority for expungement, and what steps the person has taken
toward rehabilitation. Minn. Stat. § 609A.03, subd. 2(a)(1) –(9). An expungement petition
may be filed for a misdemeanor conviction if an individual has no new convictions “for at
least two years since the discharge of the sentence.” Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3(a)(3).
For a gross misdemeanor conviction, the individual must have no new convictions “for at
least four years since discharge of the sentence.” Id., subd. 3(a)(4). For a felony conviction,
the crime must be enumerated in the statute, and the individual must have no new

1 C.E.S. did not provide a transcript of the expungement hearing and did not make an
explicit request in her expungement petitions for the district court to consider the petitions
under its inherent authority. See State v. L.W.J., 717 N.W.2d 451, 456 (Minn. App. 2006)
(declining to consider whether district court had in herent authority to expunge criminal
records because petitioner did not make that request in the district court and the district
court did not grant expungement under that theory).
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convictions “for at least five years since discharge of the sentence.” Id. subd. 3(a)(5); § Id.,
subd. 3(b)(1)–(50).
If the petitioner meets these initial requirements, she must prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that expungement would “yield a benefit to the petitioner
commensurate with the disadvantages to the public and public safety of: (1) sealing the
record; and (2) burdening the court and public authorities to” comply with an expungement
order. Minn. Stat. § 609A.03, subd. 5(a). In determining whether a petitioner has satisfied
her burden under Minn. Stat. § 609A.03, the district court must consider 12 factors
including, but not limited to, “the petitioner’s criminal record,” the petitioner’s current risk
to society, “the length of time since the crime occurred,” the petitioner’s progress toward
rehabilitation including “employ ment and community involvement,” and “other factors
deemed relevant by the court.” Id., subd. 5(c)(1)–(12).
The first issue is whether C.E.S. is eligible to expunge each conviction. We examine
each of C.E.S.’s convictions in turn.
C.E.S. was convicted of a gross misdemeanor offense on November 16, 1998, and
was discharged in November 2000. Within approximately one month of her discharge, on
December 22, 2000, C.E. S. was convicted of a new offense. Thus, she failed to have no
new convictions “for at least four years since the discharge of” her sente nce, as required
by the statute. Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3(a)(4 ). The district cou rt did not err in
concluding C.E.S. was ineligible to expunge her 1998 conviction.
C.E.S. was discharged from her felony sentence sometime in November 2005. On
August 13, 2008, she wa s convicted of a new offense. Thus, C.E.S. faces two barriers to
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expunging her 2000 felony conviction. First, t hird-degree felony controlled -substance
crime is not an enumerated offense under the expungement statute and, second, C.E.S. was
convicted of a new crim e less than five years after discharge from her felony sentence.
Minn Stat. § 609A.02, subds. 3(a)(5), (3)(b)(1)–(50). For both of these reasons, the district
court did not err in concluding C.E.S. was ineligible to expunge her felony conviction.
The second issue is whether the district court abused its discretion in denying
C.E.S’s petition to expunge her 2008 conviction. The district court determined that C.E.S
is eligible to expunge the 2008 conviction, but failed to meet her burden of proof that
sealing the record would provide her a benefit in proportion to the disadvantages to the
public and public safety of sealing the record and burdening the system by enforcing an
expungement order. Minn. Stat. § 609A.03, subd. 5(a). The district court weighed several
factors. The court specifically considered that C.E.S. had no new convictions since 2008
and had presented evidence of rehabilitation , including that she attended therapy,
participated in a restorative justice program, attended chu rch, and taught Sunday school.
The district court also considered that C.E.S. offered no evidence of being denied housing
or employment opportunities. Also, the court determined that C.E.S.’s extensive criminal
history weighed against her, as did her consistent failure to successfully complete probation
before her most recent misdemeanor charge. The district court concluded that, on balance,
the statutory factors “weigh[] against Petitioner.”
C.E.S. essentially asks this court to reweigh the evidence. But it is not for this court
to do so. State v. Johnson, 568 N.W.2d 426, 435 (Minn. 1997). Our role is to review the
district court’s interpretation of the statute for error and its decision for an abuse of
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discretion. Because the district court weighed C.E.S.’s rehabilitation against other statutory
factors, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
C.E.S. failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the benefit of expun gement
would be commensurate to the “disadvantages to the public and public safety.”
We commend C.E.S’s efforts to turn around her life and serve her community.
Nothing in our opinion today precludes C.E.S., in the future, from gathering more evidence
and petitioning the district court to expunge those criminal records for which she is eligible
to seek expungement.
Affirmed.