State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1585

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Daniel Lee Plantenberg,
Appellant.

Filed August 7, 2017
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Meeker County District Court
File No. 47-CR-15-1070

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Edwin W. Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, St.
Paul, Minnesota; and

Brandi Schiefelbein, Meeker County Attorney, Litchfield, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
In this appeal from his conviction of second -degree assault, appellant argues that
the district court denied him his right to present a complete defense by preventing him from
2
questioning witnesses about his wife’s re lationship with the victim at the time of trial .
Because appellant was not prejudiced by the exclusion of such evidence, we affirm.
FACTS
On November 29, 2015, appellant Daniel Lee Plantenberg and his wife, H.P., were
separated, and H.P. was having her l awyer draft divorce papers. H.P. continued to live at
the rural marital home, while Plantenberg lived elsewhere. Around 5:30 p.m., Plantenberg
called H.P. wanting to discuss a reconciliation, but H.P. told him that she was busy. About
ten seconds later, Plantenberg drove his truck down the driveway to the marital hom e at a
high rate of speed. After exiting the truck, Plantenberg encountered D.H. outside the house.
H.P., who described D.H. as a neighbor at trial, had invited D.H. to her house earlier that
day. Plantenberg confronted D.H. and told him, “[Y] ou know you’re m essing with a
married woman.”
Plantenberg entered the house, yelled at H.P., and pushed her. Plantenberg then left
the house and told D.H. to leave. D.H., who was standing by the open door of his vehicle,
replied that h e was getting ready to leave. Plantenberg went to his tr uck, grabbed a
muzzleloader, pointed it toward D.H., and told him again to leave the property.
Eventually, D.H. left the residence, and Plantenberg fled into a detached garage and
then a neighboring field with the muzzleloader. At this point, H.P. call ed 911. Law
enforcement arrived and, after talking with Plantenberg on the phone, were able to take
him into custody without incident.
After being read a Miranda warning, Plantenberg agreed to talk to a Meeker County
sheriff’s d eputy. Plantenberg admi tted to confronting D.H. and arguing with H.P.,
3
although he denied pushing H.P. Plantenberg stated that he pointed his muzzleloader at
D.H.’s vehicle, but admitted that because D.H. was standing next to the vehicle, D.H.
probably thought the muzzleloader was pointed at him.
Plantenberg was charged with second-degree assault and making threats of violence,
and a jury trial was held in May 2016.1 The jury found Plantenberg guilty of second-degree
assault, but not guilty of threats of violence. The district court sentenced Plantenberg to a
guidelines sentence of 36 months. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Plantenberg argues that the district court deprived him of his constitutional right to
present a defense by limiting his examination regarding wh ether D.H. and H.P. were in a
romantic relationship at any point after the incident. Plantenberg contends that he should
have been allowed to question H.P. and D.H. regarding whether they were in a romantic
relationship at the time of trial in order to de termine whether they were biased and had a
motive to fabricate their testimony.
At trial, the state moved to exclude any evidence of a relationship between H.P. and
D.H., arguing that such evidence was not relevant and “goes to character.” Defense counsel
stated that he intended to inquire into whether H.P. and D.H. had a relationship in order to
provide context to the eve nts surrounding the incident. Defense counsel stated that he

1 Plantenberg was originally charged with second-degree assault and domestic assault, but
the state subsequently amended the complaint by dismissing the domestic assault charge
and adding a charge of threats of violence.
4
“intend[ed] to ask [H.P.] . . . whether or not she is or was involved in a romant ic
relationship with [D.H.].”
The district court stated that while the potential evidence may be relevant, it
“border[ed] on character evidence.” As a result, the district court ruled that defense counsel
could only ask whether H.P. and D.H. were in a romantic relationship on the date of the
incident.2
“A criminal defendant has the right to a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense. This right necessarily includes the ability to present the defendant’s
version of the facts th rough witness testimony.” State v. Penkaty , 708 N.W.2d 185, 201
(Minn. 2006) (citation omitted). “The right to present a defense is not without limitations,
however—in exercising this right, both the accused and the state must comply with
procedural and evidentiary rules designed to ensure both fairness and reliability in the
ascertainment of guilt and innocence.” State v. Richardson, 670 N.W.2d 267, 277 (Minn.
2003) (quotation omitted).
Rulings regarding the admission of evidence lie within the district court’s broad
discretion and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Hall, 764 N.W.2d
837, 841 (Minn. 2009). A defendant claiming that the district court erroneously admitted
or excluded evidence “must show both the error and resulting prejudice.” Id.
Bias evidence is admissible to impeach the credibility of testifying witnesses. Minn.
R. Evid. 616; State v. Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d 635, 640 (Minn. 1995) (noting that bias of

2 Despite this ruling by the dist rict court, Plantenberg did not ask either H.P. or D.H.
whether they were in a romantic relationship on the date of the incident.
5
a witness is “always relevant” to discredit witness’ test imony) (quotations omitted).
“Evidence of bias is almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher
of credibility, has historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the
accuracy and truth of a witness’ testimony.” State v. Clifton, 701 N.W.2d 793, 797 (Minn.
2005) (quotation omitted).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that a district court committed reversible
error by prohibiting the defendant from cross -examining the victim and a witness about
their romantic relationship, reasoning that informing the jury that the victim and witness
were “merely friends” could have misled the jury and that “the prohibited cross -
examination had the potential to demonstrate” the victim’s and the witness’ ulterior
motives and interest in the outcome of the trial. State v. Pride, 528 N.W.2d 862, 866 –67
(Minn. 1995). But, the right to introduce evidence for the purpose of show ing bias is not
unlimited, as such evidence may be excluded if it is overly attenuated or when the d anger
of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. State v. Larson , 787
N.W.2d 592, 598–99 (Minn. 2010); see also Minn. R. Evid. 403.
Plantenberg did not explicitly argue that the evidence of H.P. and D.H.’s current
relationship was admissible to show bias, and the record does not reflect that the district
court specifically considered whether the evidence was admissible to show bias or whether
the evidence was overly attenuated or the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed the
probative value of such evidence. However, even if the district court erred in excluding
the evidence here, we conclude that Plantenberg was not prejudiced by the exclusion.
6
The parties dispute our standard of review in determining whether Plantenberg was
prejudiced by the district court’s refusal to allow him to present evidence of the victim’s
relationship with his wife at the time of trial. The state contends that Plantenberg failed to
properly preserve the evidentiary issue and therefore plain error review applies. “Under
the plain-error standard, relief is available only if there is (1) error, (2) that was plain, and
(3) that affected the defendant’s substan tial rights.” State v. Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d 609,
618 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). If the test is satisfied, we then determine whether
we need to address the error in order “to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial
proceedings.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Plantenberg argues that we should apply the more favorable to the defendant
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt standard in determining whether he was
prejudiced. If the exclusion of evidence violated a defendant’s ability to present a complete
defense, an appellate court “will reverse the conviction unless the error is found to be
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ” In re Welfare of M.P.Y. , 630 N.W.2d 411, 415
(Minn. 2001). “An error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the jury’s verdict was
surely unattributable to the error.” State v. Davis , 820 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Minn. 2012)
(quotation omitted). “When the alleged error implicates a constitutional right, . . . the
[s]tate bears the burden to prove the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State
v. McAllister, 862 N.W.2d 49, 59 (Minn. 2015).
We need not resolve the parties’ dispute because, even under the harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt standard proposed by Plantenberg, we would affirm. Assuming that
the district court’s exclusion of the evidence was erroneous, the error was harmless beyond
7
a reasonable doubt because the jury’s verdict was sure ly unattributable to the error.
Plantenberg was convicted of second -degree assault. Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1
(2014), provides that a person is guilty of second -degree assault if he or she “assaults
another with a dangerous weapon.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10 (2014), defines
“assault” as “an act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily har m or
death” or “the intentional infliction of or attempt to inflict bodily harm upon another.”
Plantenberg claims that evidence that H.P. and D.H. were in a relationship at the
time of trial would have shown the jury that H.P. and D.H. had motive to falsely claim that
Plantenberg pointed the muzz leloader at D.H. But, Plantenberg himself corroborated
H.P.’s and D.H.’s testimony that Plantenberg pointed a gun in D.H’s direction in his post-
Miranda statement to law enforcement. Although Plantenberg denied pointing the
muzzleloader at D.H., he stated, “I pointed [my gun] at [D.H.’s] truck, which, he was
standing next to his truck so I’m guessing he probably thou ght I was pointing at him.”
When the officer followed up and asked whether D.H. could have percei ved that
Plantenberg was pointing the muzzleloader at him, Plantenberg st ated, “He probably
could’ve.” The officer inquired further into where Plantenberg was pointing the gun and
where D.H. was standing, and Plantenberg stated again that where he was pointing the gun
was “fairly close to where [D.H.] would, he would actually think th at I was pointing it at
him.”
Even if the jury had credited Plantenberg’s statement that he was pointing the gun
at D.H.’s truck instead of D.H., the jury could have still found that Plantenberg was guilty
of second -degree assault, as fear of immediate bodily harm or death is a natural and
8
probable cause of po inting a gun near a person . See Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1
(defining second -degree assault); State v. Cooper , 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997)
(stating that “the jury may infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences
of his actions”).
Moreover, while the district court ruled that Plantenberg could not inquire into H.P.
and D.H.’s relationship at the time of trial, the jury heard testimony suggesting that H.P.
and D.H. were in a relationship both at the time of the incident and at the time of trial. D.H.
testified that when Plantenberg first confronted him, he stated, “[Y]ou know you’re
messing with a married woman.” And, defense counsel elicited the follo wing testimony
from a neighbor who witnessed some of the altercation between Plantenberg and D.H.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Did you recall . . . what kind of vehicle [D.H.] had?
NEIGHBOR: A green Chevy pickup . . .
DEFENSE COUNSEL: You ever see that vehicle before?
NEIGHBOR: Oh, yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Where?
NEIGHBOR: I see it drive by and go up to [H.P.’s] house. I actually seen it
last night between six-thirty and seven.

Defense counsel also elicited testimony from D.H. that he was a guest of H.P. on the
evening of the incident and that he is a frequent guest of H.P.3 The jury heard Plantenberg
say in his statement to law enforcement that he thought H.P. was cheating on him with
D.H. and tha t D.H. was his “replacement.” Defense counsel relied on this evidence in
closing argument, stating that Plantenberg suspected D.H. was his “replacement” and that
“[i]t’s pretty much common sense, that he’s prob ably right about that.” Defense counsel

3 Defense counsel asked D.H. whether he was a guest of H.P.’s on the evening of the first
day of trial, but the state objected and the district court sustained the objection.
9
also stated that the evidence that D.H. refused to tell Plantenberg his name and that
Plantenberg learned D.H.’s name from one of the children “gives you some inference of
what . . . shenanigans [are] going on.” Because the jury heard this evidence, it was able to
consider whether H.P. and D.H.’s apparent relationship affected their testimony.
Additionally, the value of the examination that Plantenberg requested was minimal,
given that both H.P. and D.H. gave statements to law enforcement on the date of the
incident that were consistent with their statements at trial. The recordings of these
statements were played for the jury at trial. In these statements, both H.P. and D.H. stated
that Plantenberg pointed the gun at D.H.
Because the district court permitted Plantenberg to inquire into H.P. and D.H.’s
relationship at the time of the incident, Plantenberg could have asked H.P. and D.H.
whether their apparent relationship at the time of the incident caused them to make false
statements to the police. The fact that Plantenberg had the opportunity to question H.P.
and D.H. about whether their relationship impacted their state ments to law enforcement
further demonstrates lack of prejudice to Plantenberg due to the exclusion of evidence.
Under these circumstances, the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the district
court’s limitation of Plantenberg’s examination of H .P. and D.H.’s relationship and any
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Affirmed.