State of Minnesota, Respondent,

`This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1598

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Nathaniel Emmanuel Collins,
Appellant.

Filed August 21, 2017
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-4075

Lori M. Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota; (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Charles F. Clippert,
Special Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this appeal following a court trial, appellant argues that this court must reverse
his conviction of first -degree burglary under Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c) (2014)
because the evidence was insufficient. We affirm.
FACTS
On February 8, 2016, T.J. visi ted D.S. at an apartment D.S. shared with his
roommate, who was moving out. 1 Early in the afternoon, T.J.’s estranged husband,
appellant Nathaniel Emmanuel Collins, came to the apartment and D.S. said he could take
a shower. After his shower, Collins attempted to get into bed with T.J., who was l ying on
a mattress in the living room. T.J. rebuffed Collins, who “went into the other room” and
began drinking with D.S. and the roommate. Sometime during the a fternoon, Collins and
the roommate went to a nearby liquo r store and bought more alcohol. Collins, D.S., and
the roommate continued to drink throughout the day.
Later that e vening, Collins helped the roommate load his belongings into a car .
Collins attempted to re-enter the apartment to get his cell phone, but someone had locked
the door. Collins became upset and “said he would count to three before kicking in the
door.” Collins then kicked in the door, damaging the door frame and bre aking a mirror
behind the door. Once i nside the apartment, Collins grabbed T.J. and “slung” her by her
sweatshirt hood into the bathroom, “causing her to hit the sink and suffer pain.” Collins

1 The district court order references a party with the initials G.S., but this appears to be a
clerical error.
3
left and D.S. called the police.2 Officers responded to the apartment and spoke to D.S. and
T.J. One officer testified that D.S. appeared “very intoxicated,” “confused,” and “crawled
around the floor” before lying down and “going to sleep.”
The state charged Collins with one count of first-degree burglary. Collins waived a
jury trial and testified in his own defense. Collins admitted to kicking i n the apartment
door, but denied having a physical altercation with T.J. The district court issued its written
findings.
Because of the amount of alcohol the witnesses consumed , the district court
determined “that the general testimony of D.S., T.J., and [Collins] was not credible.” The
district court also determined, however, that T.J.’s account “had the ring of truth” and that
“several facts corroborate an assault.” Moreover, the district court noted Collins’s
aggressive behavior during trial, especially while T.J. was testifying. Collins “glared” at
T.J., “shook his head during [her] testimony,” and “waived his arms wildly during a portion
of testimony.” The district court adm onished Collins to stop the behavior, but noted in its
findings that Collins did not stop. The district court also found that T.J. “was visibly upset
and refused to look” at Collins during her testimony. The district court determined that the
state proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, convicted Collins of first-degree burglary,
and imposed an executed sentence of 48 months. This appeal follows.

2 The distr ict court order states that the roommate called the police, but the record
establishes otherwise.
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D E C I S I O N
Collins challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of
burglary, arguing that, because the district court discredited witnesses, this court should
view the evidence under the circumstantial-evidence standard. Collins cites no authority
for his argument and we conclude he forfeited the circumstantial evidence issue . State v.
Andersen, 871 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 2015) (st ating party waives allegations of error
unsupported by authority).
When sufficiency of the evidence is raised on appeal , we thoroughly review the
record “to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the
conviction, was sufficient to permit the [factfinder] to reach the verdict which [it] did.”
State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016) (quoting State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426,
430 (Minn. 1989)). Factfinders may make legitimate inferences from the evidence
presented. State v. Cooper , 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997). The same standard of
review applies for court trials and jury trials. State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn.
2011). When the factfinder has acted with due regard for the presumption of innocence, we
will not disturb the verdict. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476 (Minn. 2004).
A person commits first-degree burglary when he enters a building without consent,
commits a crime wh ile in the building , and assaults a person within the building. Minn.
Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c). An assault is “the intentional infliction of or attempt to inflict
bodily harm upon another.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10 (2014).
Collins argues that because the district court discredited his testimony and that of
the state witnesses, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. But the district
5
court did not entirely discredit T.J. and D.S. Rather, it concluded that T.J.’s testimony had
“the ring of truth,” and that T.J.’s and D.S.’s testimony about Collins “slinging” T.J. into
the bathroom was “consistent throughout the trial” and “corroborate[d]” the assault. While
Collins is correct that T.J.’s and D.S.’s testimony was inconsistent on se veral points, his
argument fails because inconsistencies are not indicative of false testimony, and factfinders
are “free to accept part and reject part of a witness’s testimony .” State v. Colbert , 716
N.W.2d 647, 653 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted) . Moreover, “[t]he resolution of
conflicting testimony is the exclusive function of the [factfinder.]” State v. Lloyd , 345
N.W.2d 240, 245 (Minn. 1984).
Collins also ignores that the district court relied on other evidence, including
physical evidence, that corroborated the assault. First, the district court noted the “anger
and force required to break down the apartment door is consistent” with the testimony
about the assault. Second, the district court found that Collins admitted he did not recover
his cell phone during the incident, which is consistent with T.J.’s testimony that Collins
was “angry about not being able to find his phone.” Moreover, the district court noted
Collins’s “aggressive b ehavior” during trial. T he district court was entitled to make
legitimate inferences from the evidence presented, and it appropriately determined that the
evidence of a broken door and mirror , and Collins’s aggressive behavior during trial
inferentially established that Co llins assaulted T.J. by “slinging” her into t he bathroom.
Cooper, 561 N.W.2d at 179.
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Because the district court credited consistent testimony and drew legitimate
inferences from the evidence presented, the evidence was sufficient to support Collins’s
conviction of first-degree burglary based on the commission of an assault in the building.
Collins also submitted a pro se supplemental brief, but we do not specifically
address the issues in the pro se brief because they are ident ical to the principle brief. We
note, however, that in his pro se brief, C ollins alleges the district court stated, “Though I
have no evidence of an assault I’m going to assume that there was an assault.” After a
careful review of the record, we conclude that the district court did not say this.
Affirmed.