State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1601

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Brian Donald Rinkel,
Appellant.

Filed September 11, 2017
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Morrison County District Court
File No. 49-CR-15-1378

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian Middendorf, Morrison C ounty Attorney, Todd L. Ko sovich, Assistant County
Attorney, Little Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Kirk, Presid ing Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant argues that the evidence at his trial was insufficient to sustain his second-
degree assault conviction. Because the circum stances proved at trial are consistent with
appellant’s guilt and inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis, we affirm.
FACTS
In July 2015, A.K. drove past a farm that he owned with his brother. He noticed
that the doors of a shed were open and that a pickup with a trailer was backed up to the
shed. He investigated and found appellant Brian Donald Rinkel sitting in the pickup.
A.K. confronted Rinkel, who is deaf, a nd asked what he was doing. Rinkel “made
some grunting noises,” shut the door of his pickup, and starte d his engine. A.K. went to
the front of the pickup and put his hands on the hood. Rinkel revved the engine, causing
A.K. to jump out of the way, and quickly dr ove off. A.K. telephone d for help and gave
chase, reaching speeds of 90 mph.
The chase continued for appr oximately ten minutes, and A.K. got very close to the
pickup at times, including points where he “was right up next to the trailer.” A.K. reached
a big hill and lost track of the pickup as it went over the top. When he came to the top of
the hill, he saw that the pick up was headed towards him in his lane, abou t “500 to a
thousand yards” away. Rinkel’s pickup was moving fast.
A.K. stepped on his brakes, “slammed it in reverse, and started going as fast as [he]
could in reverse.” He was “really scared” that the pickup was going to hit him head on.
Ultimately, the pickup’s trailer, which was wider than the pickup, did hit A.K.’s vehicle on
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the front driver’s side, causing damage. A. K.’s vehicle was hit while it was still on the
road, in the proper lane of travel, and it ende d up going in the ditch. Rinkel stopped his
pickup, got out, reached in th e back of his cab, pulled out a tire iron, and “proceeded to
come down in the ditch.” According to A.K., Rinkel raised the tire iron, frightening A.K.
Rinkel then threw the tire iron in the back of his truck and drove off.
Rinkel was charged with two counts of second-degree assault: count one involving
the use of a motor vehicle, and count two involving the use of a tire iron. Over the course
of a two-day jury trial, testimony was received from A.K., as well as two police officers.
Rinkel moved for judgment of acquittal, and the district court dismissed count two. Rinkel,
who did not testify in his ow n defense, was found guilty of count one, second-degree
assault with a dangerous weapon , a motor vehicle. He was sentenced to 49 months in
prison. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Rinkel argues that there was insufficient evidence of his intent to assault A.K. with
his pickup. When addressing a sufficiency -of-the-evidence challenge, “we conduct a
painstaking review of the r ecord to determine whether the evidence and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, were sufficient
to allow the jury to reach its verdict.” Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017)
(quotation omitted).
Rinkel was convicted of violating Minn . Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2014), which
states that “[w]hoever assaults another with a dangerous weapon may be sentenced to
imprisonment.” “Assault” is defined, in relevant part, as “an act done with intent to cause
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fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10(1)
(2014). The phrase “with intent to” means that “the actor eith er has a purpose to do the
thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act, if succe ssful, will cause that
result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2014).
Intent is generally proved through circ umstantial evidence because “it involves a
state of mind.” State v. Davis, 656 N.W.2d 900, 905 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied
(Minn. May 20, 2003). A conviction base d upon circumstantial evidence requires
heightened scrutiny. Loving, 891 N.W.2d at 643. Under the circumstantial-evidence
standard, an appellate court reviews the evidence using a two-step analysis: the appellate
court first identifies the circumstances proved , deferring “to the jury’s acceptance of the
proof of these circumstances and rejection of ev idence in the record that conflicted with
the circumstances proved by the [s]tate.” State v. Robertson, 884 N.W.2d 864, 871 (Minn.
2016) (quotation omitted). Second, the revi ewing court “independently examine[s] the
reasonableness of all inferences that migh t be drawn from the circumstances proved,
including inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“In order to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved as a whole must be consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis
except that of guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted). The reviewing court must view not only the
circumstances proved as a whole, but also mu st consider the inferences drawn therefrom
as a whole. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 600 (Minn. 2017).
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Here, the circumstances proved at trial ar e consistent with Rinkel’s guilt and
inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis. After being discovered in A.K.’s shed and
revving his engine, causing A.K. to jump ou t of the way, Rinkel drove away, and an
extended pursuit followed. Af ter summiting a hill, Rinkel tu rned his vehicle around and
drove quickly towards A.K., in A.K.’s lane of traffic. Rinkel continued to drive towards
A.K., even as A.K. drove in reverse, a nd Rinkel ultimately collided with A.K., causing
damage to A.K.’s vehicle. Rinkel then stopped his pickup, brandished a tire iron, rendered
no assistance, and drove off.
Rinkel asserts that “[t]he circumstances support the reasonable inference that [he]
did not see [A.K.’s] car as he was driving up the hill, and that when he did see that [A.K.’s]
car was in the same lane, he moved over to avoid a collision but his trailer still caught
[A.K.’s] car.” The evidence as a whole makes Rinkel’s theory seem unreasonable, as his
account fails to explain why he was in A.K.’s lane and remained there for at least “500 to
a thousand yards,” ultimately striking A.K.’s vehicle as it drove in reverse. Possibilities of
innocence do not require reversal if “the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories
seem unreasonable.” State v. Taylor , 650 N.W.2d 190, 206 (Minn. 2002) (quotation
omitted). Moreover, after driving in A.K.’s lane for a considerable distance and colliding
with A.K.’s vehicle, Rinkel did not stop to render aid. Rather, he brandished a tire iron
and then drove off. This is further evidence of Rinkel’s intent to cause fear. See State v.
Bickham, 485 N.W.2d 923, 926 (Minn. 1992) (stati ng that a jury may infer a defendant’s
intent from the totality of circumstances).
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The circumstances of this case are consistent with the hypothesis that Rinkel drove
quickly towards A.K. intending to cause fear of immediate bo dily harm or death. The
circumstances proved are inconsistent with a ny other reasonable or rational hypothesis.
See Robertson, 884 N.W.2d at 871.
Affirmed.