State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1603

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lance Cedric Carr,
Appellant.

Filed August 7, 2017
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-33629

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth Roosevelt Johnston, Assistant
County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Connolly,
Judge.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of first-degree assault against a p eace officer
with deadly force, arguing that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
used or attempted to use deadly force. Because sufficient evidence supports the jury’s
verdict that appellant was guilty, we affirm.
FACTS
A police officer responding to a noise complaint found that the source of the noise
was a parked car. Appellant Lance Carr was inside the car. The officer learned that
appellant had an outstanding felony warrant and approached the car in order to arrest him.
Appellant exited his car and at first complied with the officer’s orders, but when he was in
a position to be placed in handcuffs, he began to physically resist the arrest and to fight
with the officer. As they struggled, the officer fell to the ground. He then felt a tug on his
duty belt, near his handgun, saw appellant’s hands on the handgun, and felt appellant
manipulate the safety mechanisms on the handgun. The officer rolled onto his side to pin
his handgun to the ground.
Appellant then alternated between reaching for the handgun and striking the officer
in the head. When the officer began to lose consciousness, he tried to distance himself
from appellant by standi ng up . Both the officer and appellant then fell to the ground.
Appellant wrapped his arms around the officer’s neck, in a hold similar to a vascular neck
restraint. This hold causes unconsciousness; if performed improperly , it can crush the
windpipe and cause death. When the officer attempted to maneuver out of the hold,
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appellant forced his forehead back, which exposed his neck and allowed appellant to
strengthen his hold. During this time, appellant continued to manipulate the holster of the
officer’s g un. The officer then drew his handgun himself, with the intent of shooting
appellant. But the gun first discharged into the ground and then malfunctioned.
Other officers arrived, were alarmed by the officer’s “ghostly” ap pearance, and
subdued appellant. The officer was taken to the hospital and treated for his injuries,
including possible head trauma. Appellant also was taken to the hospital, where he said
that he had been resisting arrest, that he was angry about “curre nt race issues with police
officers and black individuals” and that “[the] white boy had what was coming and all
police officers have what’s coming to them.”
At trial, appellant denied attempti ng to take the officer’s handgun , but admitted to
putting the o fficer in a chokeh old; he also said he had never received any training on
chokeholds. Appellant acknowledged both the potentially let hal danger of using a
chokehold and the risk of two people struggling over a firearm.
The jury found appellant guilty of assault of a peace officer with deadly force. This
appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
This court’s review of a sufficiency -of-the-evidence claim is limited to “a
painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the
verdict which they did.” State v. Ortega , 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation
omitted). “[A] conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence merits stricter scrutiny
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than convictions based in part on direct evidence.” State v. Jones, 516 N.W.2d 545, 549
(Minn. 1994).
In applying the circumstantial-evidence standard, this court uses a two-step analysis.
State v. Silvernail , 831 N.W.2d 594 , 598 (Minn. 2013). “The first step is to identify the
circumstances proved. In identifying the circumstances proved, we defer “ to the jury’s
acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that
conflicted with the circumstances proved by the state .” Id. at 598-99 (quotation and
citation omitted). “The second step is to determine whether the circumstances proved are
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id.
at 599 (quotation omitted). The circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that,
in view of the evidenc e as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to
exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any inference other than guilt. Jones, 516 N.W.2d at
549. A jury, however, is in the best position to evaluate circumstantial evidence, and its
verdict is entitled to due deference. State v. Webb , 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989).
Appellate courts “will not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the
presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, cou ld
reasonably conclude that a defendant was guilt y of the offense charged .” Bernhardt v.
State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted).
“[W]hoever assaults a peace officer . . . by using or attempting to use deadly force
against the officer . . . while the person is engaged in the performance of a duty imposed
by law, policy, or rule” is guilty of using deadly force against a peace officer. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.221, subd. 2(a) (2016). “Deadly force” is defined as “force which the actor uses with
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the purpose of causing, or which the actor should reasonably know creates a substantial
risk of causing, death or great bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.066 (2016). Intent is a state
of mind generally proved through circumstantial evidence “by drawing inferences from the
defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances.” State v.
Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997).
Appellant contends that the state failed to pro ve that he acted with the intent of
“killing or causing great bodily harm to [the officer], or that his actions created a substantial
risk of causing death or great bodily ha rm.” Specifically, appellant argues that his effort
to take the officer’s handgun was only an attempt to use deadly force, not the actual use of
deadly force. For this argument, he relies on State v. Trei, 624 N.W.2d 595, 598-99 (Minn.
App. 2001) (reversing dismissal of charge of assaulting police officer against individual
who moved towards officer “with knives in hand while uttering words to the effect that he
wished to engage [the officer] in combat,” but stoppe d when the officer drew his gun).
Here, appellant did not have knives or other weapons when he approa ched the officer, but
his effort to seize the officer’s firearm was the equivalent of approaching the officer with
a weapon. See State v. Ortiz, 626 N.W.2d 445, 449 (Minn. App. 2001) (“Bare hands . . .
can administer deadly force in many situations.” (quotation omitted )), review denied
(Minn. June 27, 2001). One such situation is using bare hands to seize an officer’s firearm.
Ortiz also refutes appellant’s argument that his use of his hands and fists to assault the
officer did not rise to the level of deadly force.
Appellant admitted to struggling with the officer over the handgun and to knowing
that physically struggling over a firearm creates a substantial risk of death or great bodily
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harm. See State v. Bernardi , 678 N.W. 2d 465, 468-69 (Minn. App. 2004) (holding t hat
accelerating a vehicle toward a police officer constitutes assault when the officer jumped
onto the hood of the car, because the driver reasonably should have known his conduct
created a substantial risk of causing death or great bodily harm). The use of deadly force
requires that the actor either use force with the purpose of causing death or great bodily
harm or use force which the actor should reasonably know creates a substantial risk of
bodily harm. Minn. Stat. § 609.066. Appellant need not have actually acted with the
purpose of causing death or great bodily harm; acting with force that he should have
reasonably known created a substantial risk of causing death or great bodily harm is also
“the use of deadly force” within the meaning of the statute.
Moreover, appellant tried to choke the officer to death. Appellant acknowledged at
trial the danger of death or great bodily harm that is created by placing a person in a
chokehold. While appellant may not have actually inflicted death or great bodily harm on
the officer, he had actual knowledge that the chok ing and beating of the officer created a
substantial risk of death or great bodily harm. He acknowledged at trial the danger of death
or great bodily harm that is created by placing a person in a chokehold. The officer had a
ghostly appearance and lost consciousness multiple times when taken to the hospital. The
only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence is that appellant used force which
he reasonably knew created a substantial ri sk of great bodily harm. Sufficient evidence
supports the jury’s verdict.
Affirmed.