State of Minnesota, ex rel., Arturo Martinez, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1604

State of Minnesota, ex rel.,
Arturo Martinez, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Tom Roy,
Commissioner of Corrections,
Respondent.

Filed May 15, 2017
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-16-2569

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief A ppellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Michael J.
McLaughlin, Assistant Public Defenders, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Rachel E. Bell, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Kalitowski,
Judge.*

* Retired judge o f the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
PETERSON, Judge
In this appeal from an order denying a habeas corpus petition, appellant argues that
the district court erred by dismissing his petition as moot and denying him credit against
his conditional release time. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2012, a ppellant Arturo Martinez was adjudicated delinquent of second -degree
criminal sexual conduct, an offense that he committed when he was age 17. The district
court imposed a stayed extended juvenile jurisdiction sentence of 36 months in prison and
10 years of conditional release. This sentence was executed in 2014. Martinez was placed
on supervised release on May 19, 2015, and was sent back to prison for 90 days for
violation of his release terms on June 25, 2015. Following this action, M artinez was
considered to be a level-II sex offender who required intensive supervised release (ISR).
After his 90 days of accountability time, the Hearings and Release Unit (the HRU)
held a review hearing on September 21, 2015. Because his ISR release was contingent on
“an agent-approved plan” and Martinez had been unable to find approved housing, the
HRU continued his incarceration “for up to 90 days to accommodate release planning.”
Martinez had submitted four housing proposals, and all of them had been rejected. Among
the four, the Department of Corrections (DOC) halfway hous e in Mankato was rejected
because a Mankato ordinance does not allow level -II offenders to be housed at that
property. Martinez was advised that he could “be released as soon as an agent-approved
release plan is secured.”
3
A second review hearing was held on December 14, 2015. Martinez and his
supervising agents had reviewed several options, including the Mankato DOC house, but
had been unable to find appropriate housing. Martinez’s incarceration was extended
another 90 days, and he was again advised that he would be released as soon as an approved
plan was established. On March 7, 2016, another review hearing was held. Martinez’s
case manager presented seven housing options, none of which was immediately available.
The HRU officer noted that Ma rtinez’s sentence-expiration date would be May 18, 2016 ,
and continued his incarceration to that date. On May 11, 2016, Martinez’s agent secured
temporary housing at a motel in Mankato, using DOC rental -assistance funds. Martinez
was released on ISR on May 18, 2016, and was placed on conditional release until March
29, 2026.
On May 16, 2016, Martinez’s attorney filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that (1) he was being unlawfully held by the commissioner of corrections; (2) the
commissioner wa s not authorized to hold “review hearings”; and (3) the Mankato
ordinance prohibiting registered offenders from residing in the DOC halfway house was
preempted by state statute. The district court dismissed the petition as moot and denied
Martinez’s request for credit against his conditional-release term for the time served in
Lino Lakes during his supervised-release term. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
“A person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of liberty . . . may apply for a writ of
habeas co rpus to obtain relief from imprisonment or restraint.” Minn. Stat. § 589.01
(2016). “[T]he function of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve one from unlawful
4
restraint.” State v. Schnagl , 859 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). A
writ of habeas corpus may also be used to challenge conditions of confinement or to raise
claims involving fundamental constitutional rights or significant restraints on liberty. State
ex rel. Guth v. Fabian , 716 N.W.2d 23, 26 -27 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied (Minn.
Aug. 15, 2006). The grounds for a petition for habeas corpus are limited to constitutional
issues and jurisdictional challenges. Beaulieu v. Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., 798 N.W.2d
542, 546-48 (Minn. App. 2011), aff’d on other grounds, 825 N.W.2d 716 (Minn. 2013).
We review the district court’s findings on a denial of a habeas petition to determine
if they are reasonably supported by evidence, but we review questions of law de novo.
Guth, 716 N.W.2d at 26 . The petitioner bears the burden of proving unlawful detention.
Bedell v. Roy, 853 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Minn. App. 2014).
I.
Martinez challenges the district court’s dismissal of his petition as moot. Martinez’s
habeas petition was based on his continuing incarceration and the failure of the
commissioner to release him into the community. By the time of the hearing, Martinez had
been placed in housing in the community and was no longer incarcerated. A matter is
“moot when an event occurs that makes a decision on the merits unnecessary o r an award
of effective relief impossible.” Limmer v. Swanson, 806 N.W.2d 838, 839 (Minn. 2011)
(quotation omitted). Mootness raises a question of jurisdiction; it “has been described as
the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite persona l interest that must exist
at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence
(mootness).” Dean v. City of Winona , 868 N.W.2d 1, 4 -5 (Minn. 2015) (quotation
5
omitted). “An appeal should be dismissed as moot when a deci sion on the merits is no
longer necessary or an award of effective relief is no longer possible.” Id. at 5. On its face,
Martinez’s habeas petition was moot by the time of the hearing because Martinez was no
longer incarcerated.
There are two exceptions to the mootness doctrine: a court may consider an
otherwise moot issue that is likely to reoccur but would also co ntinue to evade judicial
review, and a court may consider a case if it “is functionally justiciable and of statewide
significance.” Id. (quotation omitted). Under the first exception, the aggrieved party must
show that the challenged action is of such a short duration that it cannot “be fully litigated
prior to its cessation or expiration,” and that there is “a reasonable expectation that the
same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” Mertins v. Comm’r
of Nat. Res., 755 N.W.2d 329, 335 (Minn. App. 2008) (quotation omitted). Martinez had
eight months in which to bring a habeas petition but did not do so. 1 His continu ing
incarceration was not of such a short duration that review was impossible.
A court may also consider an otherwise moot case “when the case is functionally
justiciable and presents an important question of statewide significance that should be
decided immediately.” Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 6 (quotation omitted). “A case is functionally
justiciable if the record contains the raw material (including effective presentation of both

1 Appellate counsel informed this court that Martinez is once again in prison following
violation of his release conditions. This does not change our view th at Martinez’s habeas
petition is moot. Martinez was re-incarcerated for violating his release conditions, not for
lack of housing.
6
sides of the issues raised) traditionally associated with effective judicial decision-making.”
Id. (quotation omitted).
Martinez’s argument is based primarily on the constitutionality of a Mankato city
ordinance that limits the housing available to registered offenders. This may meet the
definition of statewide significance: Martinez asserts that 39 Minnesota communities have
similar ordinances. But the city of Mankato is not a party, and is not in a position to defend
or explain its position, which does not permit an “effective presentation of both sides of
the issues.” Further, we are not persuaded that a habeas petition is the proper vehicle for
challenging an ordinance. The commissioner has no power over the city and no power to
modify the ordinance or declare it to be unconstitutional. See Minn. Stat. § 241.01, subd.
3a (2016) (setting forth powers and duties of the commissioner of corrections). Martinez’s
claim must be addressed to the city, which has the power to enact, modify, or repeal
ordinances. See, e.g., Dean v. City of Winona, 843 N.W.2d 249, 256-57 (Minn. App. 2014)
(discussing powers of home -rule-charter cities and stating that such “cities have all the
legislative power possessed by the legislature of the state, save as such power is expressly
or impliedly withheld” (quotation omitted) ), appeal dismissed , 868 N.W.2d 1 (Minn.
2015).
The supreme court has “long held that a declaratory judgment action is proper to
test the validity of a municipal ordinance, regardless of whether another remedy exists.”
McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing , 808 N.W.2d 331, 337 ( Minn. 2011). This court wrote
that “[w]e have not found any authority that permits a district court to grant general
declaratory or injunctive relief in a habeas proceeding[,]” concluding instead that habeas
7
proceedings are limited to constitutional claims and jurisdictional challenges related to
unlawful confinement or conditions of confinement. Rud v. Fabian, 743 N.W.2d 295, 304-
05 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied (Minn. Mar. 26, 2008). Martinez’s claims of
preemption and unconstitutionality should be raise d in a different proceeding in which
Mankato is a party and can defend its ordinance. In either a declaratory judgment action
or a criminal action, the proper party would be joined and permitted to defend its ordinance
or explain the use of its municipal power. See McCaughtry , 808 N.W.2d at 337
(declaratory judgment action); State v. Kuhlman , 729 N.W.2d 577, 57 8-79 (Minn. 2007)
(challenging enforcement of stoplights through use of cameras); State v. McElroy , 828
N.W.2d 741, 744 (Minn. App. 2013) (challeng ing Minneapolis noise ordinance as
overbroad and vague), review denied (Minn. June 26, 2013).
The district court did not err by determining that Martinez’s petition for a habeas
corpus writ was moot.
II.
Martinez asks this court to rule on the lawfulne ss and constitutionality of HRU
review hearings, alleging due process violations. Martinez argues that the commissioner
used review hearings to unlawfully extend his incarceration. Although Martinez raised this
issue in his habeas petition, the district court did not decide it because it concluded that the
petition was moot. Because Martinez addresses a constitutional question related to
conditions of confinement, it is appropriately raised by a habeas petition. See Rud, 743
N.W.2d at 304-05.
8
A court a sks two questions when conducting a due process analysis: (1) does the
complainant have “a liberty or property interest with which the state has interfer ed”; and
(2) if a deprivation of interest has occurred, has the complainant been afforded
constitutionally sufficient procedures to challenge the deprivation of a liberty or property
interest? Carrillo v. Fabian , 701 N.W.2d 763, 768 (Minn. 2005). The supreme court
concluded that an inmate has a protected liberty interest in his initial supervised -release
date, based on Minn. Stat. § 244.101, subd. 3 (2016), which states that an inmate’s executed
sentence shall consist of a minimum of two -thirds of the sentence to be served in prison
and a maximum of one-third of the sentence to be served on supervised release. Id. at 773.
After sanctions are imposed, an inmate’s liberty interest is limited by the necessity
of adhering to conditions of release. See State ex rel. Marlowe v. Fabian, 755 N.W.2d 792,
794-95 (Minn. App. 2008) (distinguishing an inmate’s liber ty interest in his initial
supervised-release date from an inmate’s continuing confinement because he cannot find
approved housing). Martinez has at best a limited liberty interest in his release following
violation of release conditions.
An inmate’s sup ervised release may be revoked for violations of conditions of
release for an “appropriate period of time” that “may not exceed the period of time
remaining in the inmate’s sentence.” Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 3 (2016). The
commissioner initially revoked Martinez’s supervised release for 90 days after he violated
the release conditions in June 2015. During this period, the commissioner determined that
Martinez could only be released under ISR. See Minn. Stat. § 244.12 (setting forth
conditions of elig ibility for ISR) , .14 (2016) (setting forth basic elements of ISR). “The
9
commissioner may impose appropriate conditions of release on the inmate . . . . ” Minn.
Stat. § 244.05, subd. 6(b) (2016).
Martinez challenges the review hearings as the means by which he was deprived of
liberty, but the hearings are calculated to provide him with procedural due process. At
each review hearing, the HRU reviewed the efforts that Martinez, his agent, and his ca se
manager were making to identify appropriate housing and informed Martinez that he would
be released immediately once he had suitable housing. Procedural due process requires
that a person have “notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before a fair and
impartial decisionmaker.” Marlowe, 755 N.W.2d at 794. The review hearings afforded
Martinez procedural due process.
Martinez touches on the issue of substantive due process, arguing that the
commissioner deprived him of his rights by enforcing the Mankato city ordinance. “The
doctrine of substantive due process . . . protects individuals from certain arbitrary, wrongful
government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.”
Gustafson v. Comm’r of Human Servs., 884 N.W.2d 674, 683 (Minn. App. 2016) (quotation
and citation omitted). If a fundamental right is at stake, “the state must show that its action
serves a compelling government interest.” Id. (quotation omitted). If no fundamental right
is implicated, the state must merely show that there is a rational basis for its actions. Id.
Assuming, as Martinez claims, that he has a fundamental liberty interest in his release
during his supervised-release term, he must show “governmental conduct so egregious that
it shocks the conscience.” Mumm v. Mornson , 708 N.W.2d 475, 487 (Minn. 2006)
(quotation omitted). This requires something more than “deliberate indifference” and has
10
been described as “conduct evi ncing a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate
object” of an official’s action. Id. (quotation omitted). Martinez has not alleged conduct
that meets these standards. As to his claim that the commissioner has deprived him of
substantive rights by enforcing the Mankato city ordinance, he has not demonstrated how
the commissioner is responsible for the Mankato city ordinance or a basis for the
commissioner to ignore the city ordinance.
Finally, Martinez challenges whether the commissioner has authority to hold review
hearings. Under Minn. Stat. § 243.05, subd. 1 (2016), the commissioner has the power to
supervise and enforce conditions of release. In order to do so, the commissioner may
designate staff members to act as hearing officers and del egate his duties to them. Minn.
Stat. § 243.05, subd. 4 (2016). The commissioner has established rules to effectuate these
duties, including the creation of the HRU. Minn. R. 2940.0100-.5700 (2015). These rules
include the authority to review an inmate’s progress while on supervised release, Minn. R.
2940.1700, to restructure release conditions, Minn. R. 2940.2700, and to revoke an
inmate’s release for violating conditions of release, Minn. R. 2940.3800. The HRU must
conduct progress reviews at least annually in order to assess, modify, or develop conditions
of supervised release. Minn. R. 2940.0900 , subps. 1, 2 . The use of review hearings is
consistent with these powers and duties.
III.
Martinez argues that the district court erred by refusing to di rect the commissioner
to give him credit against his conditional-release term for the time he spent in prison when
he should have been on supervised release. The district court denied this request for relief
11
based on State ex rel. Pollard v. Roy , 878 N.W. 2d 341, 349-50 (Minn. App. 2016). In
Pollard, this court stated that “time served on supervised release refers to a time during the
offender’s executed sentence after the offender is actually released from prison.” 878
N.W.2d at 348 (quotation omitted). This court concluded that an offender is not entitled
to a reduction of his conditional-release term for time served on supervised release unless
the offender is actually released from prison. Id. at 349 -50 (quotation omitted). The
supreme court vacated this court’s opinion and remanded the case to this court for
reconsideration in light of State ex rel. Duncan v. Roy , 887 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 2016).
State ex rel. Pollard v. Roy, No. A15-1580 (Minn. Dec. 27, 2016) (mem.).
An inmate’s executed sentence is divided into “two parts: (1) a specified minimum
term of imprisonment that is equal to two -thirds of the executed sentence; and (2) a
specified maximum supervised release term that is equal to one -third of the executed
sentence.” Minn. Stat. § 244.101, subd. 1 (2016). An inmate’s supervised-release term is
subject to revision if the offender violates its conditions. Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 3(1).
Under the statute in effect at the time of Martinez’s offense in June 2011, the district court
was obligated to impose a ten-year conditional-release term. Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd.
6 (2010). The statute provided that an offender would receive credit against the
conditional-release term for the time the offender served on supervised release. Id.
In State ex rel. Duncan v. Roy, 887 N.W.2d 271, 274-75 (Minn. 2016), the supreme
court reviewed the question of whether an inmate can be credited with supervised -release
time when he was unable to be released into the community because there was no agent -
approved housing available. The sole reason that Duncan was not on supervised release
12
was because he did not secure approved housing, which was a violation of his supervised-
release conditions. Duncan, 887 N.W.2d at 273. The supreme court reasoned, “When the
DOC revokes an inmate’s supervised release and returns the inmate to prison, that inmate
is no longer serving time on supervised release.” Id. at 278. The supreme court concluded,
“Consequently, an inmate is not entitled to credit against a conditional-release term for any
time the inmate spends in prison after the DOC has revoked the inmate’s supervised
release.” Id. The district court did not err by refusing to credit Martinez ’s conditional-
release term for the time he spent incarcerated when he was unable to meet the conditions
of his supervised release.
Affirmed.