A16-1610 Precedential Affirmed Processed

In re the Marriage of: Robert David Stoffey, petitioner, Respondent,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed July 24, 2017

The holding in the court’s own words

Because we conclude that the cash payment was a property division for which contempt is not an available remedy for enforcement, we affirm the district court’s decision to deny wife’s contempt motion.

Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.

Authorities cited

Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.

Opinion text

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1610

In re the Marriage of:
Robert David Stoffey, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Mari Lou Stoffey,
Appellant.

Filed July 24, 2017
Affirmed
Toussaint, Judge

Mower County District Court
File No. 50-FA-13-2102

Scott Cody, Tarshish Cody, PLC, Richfield, Minnesota (for respondent)

Thomas C. Baudler, Baudler, Maus, Forman & King, LLP, Austin, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and
Toussaint, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
TOUSSAINT, Judge
In this contempt dispute arising out of a dissolution -of-marriage judgment,
appellant-wife Mari Lou Stoffey argues that the district court (1) erred in concluding that
a $1.1 million cash payment respondent-husband Robert David Stoffey agreed to pay wife
was a property division and (2) erred in determining that contempt was not an available
remedy to enforce the cash payment. Because we conclude that the cash payment was a
property division for which contempt is not an available remedy for enforcement, we affirm
the district court’s decision to deny wife’s contempt motion.
D E C I S I O N
I.
Wife argues that the district court erred in concluding that the cash payment was a
property division, rather than spousal maintenance, because this conclusion was not
supported by findings or the evidence.
This court reviews questions of law related to spousal maintenance de novo. Melius
v. Melius, 765 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Minn. App. 2009). Spousal maintenance is an award
“from the future income or earnings of one spouse for the support and ma intenance of the
other.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3a (2016). Maintenance is awarded based on a
showing of need . Lyon v. Lyon , 439 N.W.2d 18 , 22 (Minn. 1989) (reversing award of
maintenance where wife’s annual income from her share of marital property met her need).
Marital property includes real or personal property acquired by parties to a dissolution
proceeding at any time during the marriage. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b (2016). To

3
determine whether an award is maintenance or a property divi sion, courts look to the
parties’ intent and the true nature of the award. Ruud v. Ruud, 380 N.W.2d 765, 766 (Minn.
1986).
Citing Bormann v. Bormann , 644 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. App. 2002), husband
asserts that this court’s review is limited to determining whether the district court’s findings
support its conclusions of law because wife did not obtain a transcript of the hearing on the
contempt motion. However, the record includes sufficient information to allow this court
to conduct a meaningful review of the district court’s conclusion. For example, the record
includes wife’s motion for contempt, husband’s responsive motion, and affidavits
containing the parties’ arguments in support of and against the motion. See Mesenbourg
v. Mesenbourg, 538 N.W.2d 48 9, 494 (Minn. App. 1995) (“While a transcript would be
helpful in discerning exactly what arguments were made before the trial court, the record
is not so inadequate that the appeal must be dismissed. The issues on appeal are legal. The
motions, memoranda, and affidavits of the parties, together with the decisions of the trial
court, provide an adequate record upon which this court can make its decision.”).
Neither party asserts that the judgment and decree that dissolved their marriage was
ambiguous. The judgment and decree clearly states that husband is to make reasonable
efforts to pay wife $1.1 million within 60 days of the parties’ stipulation and that the cash
payment was included in the consideration for wife’s waiver of spousal maintenance.
Based on the record presented, the district court did not err in concluding that the
cash payment was part of the property division. Although the cash payment is included
under its own heading in the judgment and decree, separate from “spousal maintenance”

4
and “property settlement,” the judgment and decree identifies multiple forms of
consideration for the parties’ waiver of spousal maintenance, including “the parties’
income per year from employment, income-producing assets, their ability to provide fully
for his and her own support, and the property division contained” in the stipulation.
Moreover, under the judgment and decree, husband is to receive “[a]ll retirement accounts,
investment accounts, and cash accounts in his name once [he] has made the required cash
payment,” which evidences an understanding that the source of the cash payment would
be husband’s current accounts rather than his future income. This is contrary to the
statutory definition of maintenance. Finally, wife admits in her affidavit tha t she can
purchase a house without the additional $600,000 from husband and does not argue that
she is unable to support herself based on her income-producing assets and the property she
has received.
Wife also argues that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing prior
to concluding that the cash payment was part of the property division. Wife does not cite
to any authority holding that a hearing was required prior to the district court’s conclusion.
Moreover, contrary to wife’s assertion that her affidavit in support of the contempt motion
was the only evidence bearing on the characterization of the cash payment, the record also
includes husband’s affidavit and responsive motion as well as documents filed in the
district court since husb and filed a petition for dissolution in 2014. The evidence in the
record supports the district court’s conclusion without need for supplementation. Further,
wife’s contention that the district court did not make appropriate findings lacks merit

5
because “there is no requirement for findings when a contempt motion is denied.” Tatro
v. Tatro, 390 N.W.2d 461, 464 (Minn. App. 1986).
II.
After receiving $500,000 from husband , wife argues that the district court
erroneously concluded that contempt was not an available remedy to enforce the remaining
$600,000 payment because contempt is allowed under Minn. Stat. § 550.02 (2016) where
husband failed to act as directed by the court when he did not make all reasonable efforts
to pay wife within 60 days.
Generally, we review a district court’s decision to invoke its contempt powers for
an abuse of discretion. Mower Cty . Human Servs. Ex. Rel. Swancutt v. Swancutt , 551
N.W.2d 219
, 222 (Minn. 1996). But “[t]he interpretation of a statute or case law is . . .
reviewed de novo.” In re Custody of D.T.R., 796 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 2011). Under
Minn. Stat. § 550.02:
Where a judgment requires the payment of money , . . . it may
be enforced in those respects by execution. Where it requires
the performance of any other act , a certified copy of the
judgment may be served upon the party against whom it is
given, or the person or officer who is required the reby or by
law to obey the same. A person so served who refuses may be
punished by the court as for contempt, and the individ ual’s
obedience thereto enforced.
(Emphasis added.) In Minnesota, property settlements are generally treated as ordinary
debts enforceable by execution. Minn. Stat. § 550.02; Nelson v. Quade, 413 N.W.2d 824,
827 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Dec. 22, 1987).

6
In Burgardt v. Burgardt , this court “decline[d] to permit the use of contempt to
enforce a property settlement that require[d] the payment of money in the absence of
express statutory authority to do so.” 474 N.W.2d 235, 237 (Minn. App. 19 91). Wife
attempts to distinguish Burgardt on the basis that she moved to hold husband in contempt
for failure to perform the act of “mak[ing] all reasonable efforts to make the payment in 60
days,” while in Burgardt, the purpose of the contempt motion wa s to enforce a property
settlement that required the payment of money. However, under both scenarios, wife seeks
to hold husband in contempt for his failure to pay the full $1.1 million. Therefore, the
district court did not err in determining that conte mpt was not a remedy available to wife
to enforce the cash payment because the district court appropriately concluded that the cash
payment was a property division.
Moreover, wife’s reliance on Burt v. Minneapolis Stock -Yards & Packing Co. , 56
Minn. 397
, 57 N.W. 940 (1894), is misguided because this case is distinguishable. In Burt,
the availability of the contempt remedy was undisputed, and the district court granted a
contempt motion. Accordingly, the issue on appeal in Burt was not whether the district
court could properly use its contempt power, but whether the district court abused its
discretion in granting the contempt motion. Finally, wife’s citation to unpublished
opinions in support of her argument is unpersuasive. Unpublished opinions are not binding
precedent. Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3.
Affirmed.