In the matter of the Administrative Citation: RFS 14-1071686, June 02, 2016, 4037 Washburn Avenue South, Issued to: Mary Shields
The holding in the court’s own words
7 We conclude that the hearing officer’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Dietz v. Dodge County 487 N.W.2d 237
- State Ex Rel. Ging v. Board of Education 213 Minn. 550
- Staeheli v. City of St. Paul 732 N.W.2d 298
- Troy K. Scheffler v. City of Anoka, City of Coon Rapids, Hicken, Scott, Howard & Anderson, … 890 N.W.2d 437
- Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co. 290 Minn. 518
Opinion text
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1621
In the matter of the Administrative Citation: RFS 14-1071686, June 02, 2016,
4037 Washburn Avenue South, Issued to: Mary Shields
Filed December 18, 2017
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge
Minneapolis Department of Regulatory Services
File No. RFS 14-1071686
Mary Shields, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se relator)
Susan L. Segal, Minneapolis City Attorney, Lee C. Wolf, Assistant City Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent City of Minneapolis)
Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
Relator-homeowner challenges an administrative hearing officer’s orders requiring
her to repair the siding of her home and pay civil penalties totaling $1,500. Because the
hearing officer’s order is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.
2
FACTS
This appeal arises from an administrative hearing officer’s orders enforcing
citations and fines issued by respondent City of Minneapolis (the city) to relator Mary
Shields for the failure to maintain or repair her home’s exterior. Shields was 92 years old
at the time of the hearing and, according to the testimony of her son, Bennett, relied on
others to perform home maintenance. Bennett testified at the hearing that, before the
issuance of any citations, Shields had the shake siding removed so they could repair rotten
wood underneath. Bennett explained that, once the siding was gone, they found hornet
nests and chipmunks, which had caused additional damage.
On September 3, 2014, the city cited Shields for violating section 244.500 of the
city ordinance code and ordered her to repair or replace the house exterior, giving her one
month to cure the defect. Minn. Code of Ordinances (MCO) § 244.500 (2013).
Over the course of two years, the city granted Shields five extensions, allowing her
additional time to comply with the ordinance. 1 One extension was granted to allow work
to be completed after winter had concluded. Bennett did some repairs and Shields
eventually hired a contractor to do additional repairs. The contractor agreed to work under
the arrangement that he would be paid after the job was finished and approved by the city.
1 Before the fifth extension period expired, the city issued another citation to Shields for
violating MCO §§ 229.50 (2013), 541.90 (2013), and 541.450 (2015). The citations were
for (1) unlawfully storing “tarps, pails, cans, doors, fluid containers, ice boxes, igloos, and
any other materials on the entire rear of the property or on the building along the fence and
in the rear,” (2) “parking inoperable vehicles on property,” and (3) “parking an excessive
number of vehicles on the property.” Shields initially challenged these citations but
eventually complied with the ordinances. These citations are not at issue in this appeal.
3
Neither Bennett nor the contractor finished the repairs. At some point, the contractor
stopped working altogether. As a result of Shields’s continuous violations, the city issued
two fines, one for $500 and another for $1,000. 2 Shields contested the citations and fines,
requesting a hearing.
On August 1, 2016, an administrative hearing officer conducted a hearing to resolve
the dispute. The city presented testimony by a housing inspector, who stated that he had
recently inspected the house exterior and found no change. Additionally, the city’s
enforcement supervisor testified that the city would “rather that [Shields] take that money
[for the fines] and put it on the house instead of paying it to the city. Our goal is not to fine
you, but you have to show . . . your mother has to show us that there are some certain
steps—to move this along.”
Bennett appeared and testified on behalf of his mother, who was present but did not
testify. Bennett did not dispute the condition of the home exterior. Instead, Bennett testified
regarding why the repairs had not been completed, including the contractor leaving the job,
Bennett’s inability to do the work himself, and Shields’ s inability to pay for the work or
the fines. Bennett testified that Shields lives on less than $1,200 per month and he is
unemployed. The hearing officer took the violation under advisement.
On August 8, 2016 , the hearing officer issued two order s, with nearly identical
findings of fact and conclusions of law, but ordering payment of two separate fines. The
officer found that Shields had violated section 244.500 for failing to maintain her home’s
2 Initially, the city imposed a fine of $250, but it was cancelled after Bennett called the city
and requested additional time to make repairs.
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“[f]oundations, roofs, exterior walls and surfaces.” The hearing officer also found that
Shields had been given “many extensions” and had offered “many excuses” for her failure
to comply with the city’s orders. The officer noted that Shields “has little money” and that
money spent on a “penalty would be better spent on complying with the city’s orders to fix
her house.” In its conclusions of law, the hearing officer expressly considered several
factors including the violation itself, Shields’s action or inaction after receiving a notice,
the impact of the fine, Shields’s history of prior violations, and the public interest.
The hearing officer ordered Shields to pay two separate fines. The hearing officer
ordered Shields to pay a penalty of $500, of which $300 was stayed pending three
conditions: (1) Shields’s payment of $200 by September 10, 2016; (2) completed work on
Shields’s home to the satisfaction of the city by December 10, 2016; and (3) no additional
violations for one year. The hearing officer also stayed a penalty of $1,000 on the condition
that Shields have no additional violations for one year.
On October 7, 2016, one month after the payment deadline on the $500 fine, Shields
sought review by writ of certiorari.
D E C I S I O N
I. The record supports the administrative hearing officer’s decision.
Shields primarily argues that the administrative hearing officer’s decision is not
supported by the evidence, and is arbitrary, capricious, and oppressive.
On certiorari review of a governmental entity’s quasi-judicial administrative
decision, our inquiry is limited to questions of jurisdiction, regularity of the proceedings,
and “‘as to merits of the controversy, whether the order or determination . . . was arbitrary,
5
oppressive, unreasonable, fraudulent, under an erroneous theory of law, or without any
evidence to support it. ’” Dietz v. Dodge County, 487 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn. 1992)
(quoting State ex. rel. Ging v. Bd. of Educ., 213 Minn. 550, 571, 7 N.W.2d 544, 556 (1942)
(quotation omitted)). “As a reviewing court, we will not retry facts or make credibility
determinations, and we will uphold the decision if the lower tribunal furnished any legal
and substantial basis for the action taken.” Staeheli v. City of St. Paul, 732 N.W.2d 298,
303 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted). “An agency ’s decision is arbitrary and
capricious when it represents the agency’s will and not its judgment.” Brinks, Inc. v. Minn.
Pub. Utils., 355 U.S.2d 446, 452 (Minn. App. 1984).
The administrative hearing officer issued an order requiring Shields to comply with
Minneapolis Code of Ordinances § 244.500 regarding foundations, roofs, exterior walls
and surfaces. The ordinance provides, as follows:
(a) . . . . [E]very exterior wall, chimney, foundation and roof
shall be reasonably weathertight, watertight and rodentproof;
and shall be kept in a professional state of maintenance and
repair. Exterior walls shall be maintained and kept free fro m
dilapidation by cracks, tears or breaks or from deteriorated
plaster, stucco, brick, wood or other material that is extensive
and gives evidence of long neglect.
(b) The protective surface on exterior walls of a building above
ground level shall be maintained in good repair so as to provide
a sufficient covering and protection of the structural surface
underneath against its deterioration.
MCO § 244.500(a)-(b) (2013). An administrative hearing officer is authorized to determine
whether a violation has occurred and to impose, reduce, stay, or waive a fine. MCO
§ 2.100(h) (2010). When imposing a fine for a violation, the hearing officer may consider
6
several factors, including the duration of the violation, the seriousness of the violation, the
history of the violation, the good faith effort by the violator to comply, the economic impact
of the fine on the violator, and the impact of the violation upon the community. Id.
At Shields’s request, we have carefully reviewed the record of the August 1, 2016
hearing. The city offered evidence that Shields had made no progress in repairing her home
exterior despite multiple citations and numerous extensions. The hearing officer reviewed
photographs of the property and heard testimony from both sides. In his testimony, Bennett
admitted that the siding had been removed and had never been replaced. Bennett testified,
as follows:
The shakes were removed to repair rotted wood
underneath. . . . [O]riginally, the project started out as a
painting project. . . . And then . . . there was some hornets nests
that were found in the wall. They were quite large. . . . It may
not look like much has been done, but the wood has been
removed. The hornet nests have been removed. . . . I think there
were some chipmunks that did some stuff. Those were gotten
out of there and repaired. . . . The tar paper h as been exposed
to the weather, . . . . So that has to be replaced, siding and then
paint.
While testifying, city officials expressed understanding for Shields’s situation, but
also explained that Shields had received additional time to do the work. A housing
inspector testified that he had stopped by the home and reinspected it on the day of the
hearing; he found that there had been “no change at all.” Shields of fered Bennett’s
testimony that she had hired a contractor to replace the siding. The city ’s witnesses,
however, noted that no one had obtained a permit for the work, Shields did not notify the
city of any progress, and Shields did not make a timely request for more time.
7
We conclude that the hearing officer’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.
The officer ordered Shields pay a $500 fine, staying a significant portion on reasonable
conditions, and provided Shields with a four-month window in which to complete the
repairs. The officer also stayed a $1,000 fine on the condition that Shields have no further
violations for one year. Because the hearing officer’s decision demonstrates consideration
of the duration of the violation, Shields’s conduct after multiple notices, and Shields’s
financial situation, the decision is not oppressive, arbitrary, or capricious.
II. Relator forfeited her constitutional argument.
Shields argues that the fines violate article I, section 5 of the Minnesota
Constitution, which prohibits excessive fines. Shields does not provide any argument or
legal authority. Because her assertion is unsupported by argument or legal authority, it
“need not be considered unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” Scheffler
v. City of Anoka, 890 N.W.2d 437, 451 (Minn. App. 2017) (citing Schoepke v. Alexander
Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 290 Minn. 518, 519-20, 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (1971), review
denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 2017)). We discern no obvious error, and therefore deem this issue
forfeited. See Scheffler, 890 N.W.2d at 451.
Affirmed.