Kamal Elyas Maqadin, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1625

Kamal Elyas Maqadin, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed April 24, 2017
Affirmed
Cleary, Chief Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-14-6551

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth R. Johnston, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Pr esiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Peterson, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CLEARY, Chief Judge
The district court found appellant guilty of aiding and abetting aggravated robbery
in the first degree. Appellant argues that the evidence is insuffi cient to support the
conviction. We affirm.
FACTS
On March 9, 2014, appellant Kamal Elyas Maqadin and his cousin, Dalal Idd, went
to Lifetime Fitness (Lifetime) in Eden Prairie. J.C. was ex ercising at Lifetime, and when
he returned to the locker room, Idd beat him to the point of unconsciousness, and stole his
cell phone and wallet, which contained about $200. A Li fetime instructor witnessed the
assault perpetrated by Idd, and testified th at Maqadin stood by and watched while Idd
punched J.C. at least three times. According to the instructor, Maqadin did not try to stop
the assault or otherwise intervene.
Maqadin and Idd then sprinted out of Li fetime and drove away in a minivan driven
by Maqadin. Using the license-plate informati on that a witness was ab le to recall, police
officers located the minivan at a townhome co mplex. Police located Idd inside of an
apartment and arrested him. While searchi ng Idd, police located J.C.’s wallet, which
contained his driver’s license and credit cards but no cash. Police then located Maqadin,
who was lying on a bed covered with a blanket. Maqadin was arrested, and while searching
him as part of the booking process, an o fficer heard a “crumpling noise” when Maqadin
removed his socks and noticed Maqadin was trying to conceal something. The officer was
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able to obtain the item that Maqadin had re moved from his sock—a wad of $20 bills,
totaling $280.
When questioned by police, Maqadin initially denied being at Lifetime or being
involved in the incident. However, Maqadin later acknowledged driving Idd to Lifetime
and going into the locker room, but claimed that he did not witness the assault. Maqadin
stated he received the cash from Idd and drove them away from Lifetime.
At trial, Maqadin testified that he and Idd went to Lifetime on March 9, 2014, to
play basketball, like they had done in the past. He stated that they went to the locker room,
and while Maqadin looked for a locker where he could put his jacket away, he heard “some
noises.” He testified that, after he heard th e noises, he went to see what was happening
and saw Idd standing over a man, who was lying on the ground covered in blood. He stated
that they ran from Lifetime, he drove them to the apartment complex, and Idd gave him
money although Idd did not say where he ha d obtained it. However, Maqadin did admit
that when he was driving out of Lifetime’s parking lot, he “figured out what [Idd] had
done.”
On August 7, 2014, the district court issued an order finding Maqadin guilty of
aiding and abetting first-degree aggravated robbery. The district court stated that Maqadin
assisted in the crime in an appreciable way when he “re ceived money from Mr. Idd and
knew it was stolen from [J.C.]” and when he , “knowing what Mr. Idd had done, . . .
willingly drove Mr. Idd away from the scene of the crime.”
On September 11, 2014, the district c ourt sentenced Maqadin to 57 months in
prison, stayed for five years. Maqadin later violated the terms of his probation, and his
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prison sentence was executed. This court affirmed the order revoking probation. State v.
Maqadin, No. 16-0159, 2016 WL 5640774 (Minn. App. Oct. 3, 2016).
On May 12, 2016, Maqadin filed a petition for postconviction relief on the grounds
that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of aiding and abetting aggravated robbery.
The district court denied Maqadin’s motion to vacate his conviction. Maqadin appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Maqadin argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove he aided in the robbery
because the state failed to prove Maqadin knew Idd was going to commit an offense or that
Maqadin intended to aid in the commission of the crime.
In considering a claim of insufficient evid ence, this court’s review is “limited to a
painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the conviction,” is sufficient to allow the court to reach the decision
that it did. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1 989). The reviewing court will
not disturb the verdict if the fact finder, ac ting with due regard for the presumption of
innocence and the requirement of proof bey ond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably
conclude the defendant was guilty of the charged offense. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d
465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004). A defendant is liable for a crime committed by someone else
“if the person intentionally aids, advises, hire s, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise
procures the other to commit th e crime.” Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2014). “[T]o be
criminally liable for the crimes of another, the State must prove that the defendant knew
his alleged accomplice was going to commit a crime and the defe ndant intended his
presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” State v. Huber, 877 N.W.2d
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519, 524 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). “M ere presence at the scene of a crime does
not alone prove that a pe rson aided or abetted.” State v. Ostrem , 535 N.W.2d 916, 924
(Minn. 1995). But, “[w]he re the accused plays at leas t some knowing role in the
commission of the crime and takes no steps to thwart its completion,” aiding and abetting
may be inferred. State v. Strimling , 265 N.W.2d 423, 429 (Minn. 1978). “[A]ctive
participation in the overt act which constitutes the substantive offense is not required, and
a person’s presence, companionship, and conduct before and after an offense are relevant
circumstances from which a person’s cr iminal intent may be inferred.” Ostrem, 535
N.W.2d at 924. Whether a defendant intend ed to aid and abet may be inferred “from a
variety of facts, including presen ce at the scene of the crime, a close association with the
principal offender before and after the crime, a lack of objection or surprise under the
circumstances, and flight from the scene of the crime with the principal offender.” State v.
Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d 804, 810 (Minn. 2013).
Maqadin argues that receiving stolen propert y or aiding an offender after the fact
was a more appropriate charge because his incriminating actions took place after the
commission of the robbery. However, Maqadi n was present during the robbery and did
not act only after the robber y occurred. While it is possi ble that Maqadin could have
arrived at Lifetime intending to play basketball, his actions show that his intent shifted.
Even if he was not aware that Idd was planning to rob someone, Idd’s intent became clear
when the first punch was thrown. Maqadin did not withdraw or intervene. In fact, he stood
by as the victim was beaten and his proper ty taken. Maqadin and Idd fled Lifetime
together, exchanged the victim’s cash, and drove away in a car driven by Maqadin. After
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being arrested, Maqadin attempted to conceal the stolen cash that Idd gave him. Although
Maqadin may have been merely present at the scene of the assault, he did nothing to thwart
the assault and in fact took steps to further the robbery, including driving the getaway car
and receiving the stolen cash. The district court did not err by denying Maqadin’s motion
to vacate his conviction for aiding and abetting aggravated robbery.
Affirmed.