In re the Matter of: Jessica Leah Weiss, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1632

In re the Matter of: Jessica Leah Weiss, petitioner,
Respondent,

Hennepin County, intervenor,
Respondent,

vs.

Alfred Aaron Griffin,
Appellant

Filed April 17, 2017
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-PA-FA-08-558

Sonja M. Nyberg, Metzger & Nyberg, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Michael O . Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Theresa Farrell-Strauss, Assistant
County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Damon L. Ward, Ward Law Group, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
In this contempt dispute arising out of appellant’s failure to pay child support ,
appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by modifying his purge
conditions and partially revoking the stay of execution of his contempt sentence. We
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Alfred Aaron Griffin and respondent Jessica Leah Weiss are the parents
of one minor child. Griffin was ordered to pay child support to Weiss . In an order filed
on February 8, 2013, the district court found Griffin in constructive civil contempt of court
for failing to pay child support. The district court sentenced Griffin to serve 90 days in
jail, but stayed execution of the sentence provided that Griffin “com plies with purge
conditions that will be set by the [district ] [c]ourt from time to time.” The initial purge
conditions set by the district court required Griffin to pay $900 per month toward his child
support obligation.1
At a review hearing held on November 2, 2015, the county sought revocation of the
stay of execution of the jail sentence. At the hearing, the county and Griffin agreed that
Griffin was $9,400 behind in purge payments. Because Griffin argued that he had a good
faith basis for nonpayment of the purge payments, the district court scheduled a hearing to
determine if Griffin’s nonperformance was excusable. The district court also ordered

1 Because the purge payments of $900 were less than Griffin’s monthly child support
obligation, his arrears increased during the time when he was paying $900 monthly.
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Griffin to disclose to the county and Weiss’ counsel financial details relating to the estate
of Griffin’s recently deceased father.
On December 10, 2015, the county moved for a restraining order preventing Griffin
from “spending, transferring, or dissipat[ing] . . . the $100,000 distributed to him” from his
father’s trust.2 The hearing was held the following day, and the county served its motion
for the restraining order on Griffin at the beginning of the hearing. At the hearing, the
county noted that Griffin had paid $11,200 the previous day, bringing him current with his
purge payments through Dec ember 2015. The county therefore withdrew its request for
revocation of the stay of execution, but suggested that the district court increase the amount
of Grif fin’s monthly purge payments. Because the county was no longer seeking
revocation of the stay, instead of focusing on whether Griffin’s nonperformance was
excusable, the hearing focused on two issues: (1) whether it was appropriate to modify the
purge condition in the contempt order by increasing the amount of Griffin’s purge
payments and (2) whether the district court should grant the county’s motion for the
restraining order preventing Griffin from spending or dissipating his inheritance.
At the hearing, Griffin testified that he had esche wed the $100,000 received from
his father’s estate in favor of the child. Griffin stated that he put the entire $100,000 in

2 An investigator employed by the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office obtained a
December 1, 2015 order from a Nebraska state district court that ordered U.S. Bank to
disburse $100,000 to Griffin and an additional $50,000 to Griffin as custodian of the child.
The investigator stated in her affidavit that she verified with U.S. Bank that it had dispersed
the funds of the trust of Griffin’s father and that Griffin had received $100,000.
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three separate educational accounts for the child, but was unable to provide any
documentation regarding the accounts.
Following the hearing, the district court increased Griffi n’s purge payment to
$1,611.60 per month, 120% of Griffin’s child support obligation at that time. The district
court ordered that Griffin provide the county and Weiss’ attorney with documentation
regarding the funds Griffin received related to his father ’s death and ordered that Griffin
was restrained from spending, transferring, or dissipating any of the funds he had or would
in the future receive related to his father’s death.
On February 17, 2016, the county again moved to revoke the stay of execut ion and
moved for an order requiring Griffin to pay the arrearages “in full by a date certain within
a reasonable time subsequent to the hearing” or , in the alternative, to place the $100,000
that he received from his father’s estate into escrow in order t o ensure timely payment of
child support. In an affidavit attached to the motion, the attorney representing the county
stated that the county had obtained copies of two checks totaling $100,000 that U.S. Bank
had issued to Griffin on December 2, 2015, and that Griffin had failed to provide any
information or documentation regarding his receipt of the $100,000 . In an affidavit
submitted in connection with his memorandum in opposition to the county’s motion,
Griffin represented that he had spent $99,216.80 of the money that he received from his
father’s estate, including $50,000 that he placed in five educational accounts for the child.
After a hearing on April 11, 2016, the district court issued an order finding that
Griffin had “been given ample opport unities to provide credible documentation regarding
his income, his ability to pay, and his inheritan ce” from his father’s estate. The district
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court determined that Griffin lives in a residence that is owned or paid for by a trust, his
living expenses are paid for by a trust, and he is not disabled from working. Based on these
findings, along with Griffin’s unwillingness to provide information regarding his income
and assets, the district court ordered Griffin to pay $50,000 towards his arrears by May 11,
2016 and to continue to pay $1,611.60 per month as a purge condition.
Griffin failed to pay $50,000 toward his arrears by the due date. In an affidavit filed
June 23, 2016, Griffin stated that he had spent $118,942 of the money that he had received
from his father’ s estate on various expenses. A hearing regarding Griffin’s failure to
comply with the purge conditions was held on June 28, 2016, and the district court
subsequently issued an order on August 24, 2016 , finding that Griffin was not in full
compliance with his purge conditions and that he had failed to show a good faith effort to
comply with such conditions. The district court found that Griffin “had between $150,000
and $200,000 available to him and it is unclear where all of those funds have gone.” The
district court found that it was more likely than not that incarceration would compel
compliance, ordered revocation of 30 days of Griffin’s 90 -day contempt sentence, and
stated that Griffin could obtain release by paying $10,000. Griffin appealed from the April
11, 2016 and August 24, 2016 orders.
D E C I S I O N
The district court has broad discretion to hold a party in civil contempt, and we
review the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Crockarell v. Crockarell ,
631 N.W.2d 829, 833 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 2001). “Factual
findings of a contempt order will be reversed only if they are clearly erroneous.” Id.
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I. The district court had authority to enforce Griffin’s child support
obligation.

Griffin argues that the county lacked authority to seek and enforce child support
under Minn. Stat. § 393.07, subd. 9 (2016), because Weiss is not receiving public
assistance and such statutory authority is only available in cases where a party is receiving
public assistance. This argument is without merit.
“[T]he state has a compelling interest in assuring parents provide primary support
for their children.” Murphy v. Murphy, 574 N.W.2d 77, 82 (Minn. App. 1998). Because
of this interest, the legislature gave the county the right to intervene as a matter of right “to
ensure that child support orders are obtained and enforced which provide for an appropriate
and accurate level of child, medical, and child care support.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.49(b)
(2016).3 Moreover, Minn. Stat. § 393.07, subd. 9, provides that if an individual is in default
on child support payments, “the local social services agency shall take such steps as may
be necessary to compel the person in default on such payments to make them.” Such steps
may include contempt proceedings. Minn. Stat. § 393.07, subd. 9.
Griffin’s argument stems from a misreading of the statute. In relevant part, Minn.
Stat. § 393.07, subd. 9, provides:
The county attorney in . . . contempt proceedings or upon a
separate motion supported by order to show cause and
affidavits may move the court that any defaults or delinquent
payments under such order of support be reduced to a judgment
against the defaulting party, and where the local social services

3 Minn. Stat. § 518A.49(b) addresses IV-D cases. “‘IV-D case’ means a case where a party
. . . has applied for child support services under title IV-D of the Social Security Act, United
States Code, title 42, section 654(4).” Minn. Stat. § 518A.26, subd. 10 (2016). The record
reflects that the county was providing IV-D services in this case.
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agency or any other public agency has advanced and expended
funds to supply the unmet needs of such children because of
such default by failure to pay the court order, such local social
services agency or other public agency shall be subrogated and
may recover under such judgment.

(Emphasis added). While Griffin reads the emphasized portion of the statute to suggest
that the statute only applies to cases involving participants in a public welfare program, the
emphasized part of the sentence merely provides a right of subrogation when a child
support obligee received public assistance because of the obligor’s failure to make support
payments. Further, this court has previously held that a “county attorney is authorized to
represent a custodial parent in support of [child support] matters even if the parent is not a
recipient of public assistance.” Krogstad v. Krogstad, 388 N.W.2d 376, 384 (Minn. App.
1986) (citing Minn. Stat. § 393.07, subd. 9 (1984)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 654(4)(A)(ii)
(2012) (requiring that states provide services relating to establishment and enforcement of
child support obligations to “any other child, if an individual applies for such services with
respect to the child”).
Griffin also argues that the county lacked authority to ask for the relief it sought,
namely, an order requiring Griffin to either pay the full amount of his arrears as calculated
by the county or place $100,000 in escrow. Griffin notes that Minn. Stat. § 393.07, subd.
9, states that the county may move the court to reduce delinquent child support payments
to a judgment against the defaulting party in contempt proceedings. We reject this
argument. Minnesota law specifically provides that a district court may require an obligor
to post security for his obligations.
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In all cases when maintenance or support payments are
ordered, the court may require sufficient security to be given
for the payment of them according to the terms of the order.
Upon neglect or refusal to give security, or upon failure to pay
the mai ntenance or support, the court may sequester the
obligor’s personal estate and the rents and profits of real estate
of the obligor, and appoint a receiver of them.

Minn. Stat. § 518A.71 (2016). Therefore, the district court could have required Griffin to
post security for his obligations even before he failed to make a payment. Moreover,
Griffin’s argument ignores the fact that it is permissive for the county to seek a judgment
under Minn. Stat. § 393.07, subd. 9, as the statute only provides that the co unty may seek
the default payments be reduced to a judgment. See Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15 (2016)
(“‘May’ is permissive.”).
II. This court can review the December 11, 2015 order.
Griffin makes a number of procedural and substantive arguments regard ing the
district court’s orders pertaining to his contempt proceedings. Some of Griffin’s arguments
pertain to events that occurred at the December 11, 2015 hearing and the order issued by
the district court following that hearing. While t he county and W eiss contend that this
court cannot review the December 11, 2015 order, Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04 provides
that an appellate court “may review any order affecting the order from which the appeal is
taken and on appeal from a judgment may review any orde r involving the merits or
affecting the judgment.” The December 11, 2015 order affects the April 11, 2016 and
August 24, 2016 orders because it provides the increase in the purge payments , which
contributed to the eventual revocation of the stay of execut ion. Therefore, we conclude
that we can address Griffin’s arguments regarding the December 11, 2015 order.
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III. We need not address Griffin’s arguments relating to the ex parte motion
for a temporary restraining order.

Griffin argues that he received insufficient notice of the ex parte motion seeking to
restrain him from using or transferring the funds received from his father’s estate and that
the district court granted the motion in violation of the factors provided by Dahlberg Bros.,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 272 Minn. 264, 137 N.W.2d 314 (1965) , for determining whether
to grant a temporary restraining order.4
The district court did not cite Griffin’s expenditure of the funds in violation of the
order as a basis for imposing the purge condition that Griffin must pay $50,000 toward his
arrears or for partially revoking the stay of execution. Therefore, the temporary restraining
order had no effect on the contempt order from which Griffin appeals. Moreover, affidavit
evidence submitted by Griffin indi cated that he violated the district court’s order by
spending at least $118,942 of the funds he received in rel ation to his father’s estate.
Because Griffin failed to abide by the restraining order, he cannot argue that the restraining
order affected his rights in any way. Therefore, we need not decide any issues relating to
the ex parte motion.

4 Griffin argues that the county’s request for revocation was moot at the time that the district
court partially revoked the stay of execution because he was current on his purge conditions
at that time. Even if Griffin was current on his monthly purge paymen t, it is undisputed
that he failed to pay $50,000 toward his arrears, as required by the district court’s April 11,
2016 order.
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IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion by increasing Griffin’s
purge condition.

Griffin raises a number of arguments challenging the district court’s increase of his
monthly purge condition from $900 to $1,611.60. None of these arguments has merit.
First, Griffin argues that he received no notice that the county was going to attempt
to increase the amount of his monthly purge payments at the December 11, 2015 hearing.
However, the initial contempt order stated that the execution of Griffin’s sentence was
stayed provided that Griffin complied with the purge conditions the district court would set
“from time to time.” The order then specified that it was setting “[t]he present purge
conditions.” (Emphasis added). Griffin was on notice from the district court’s original
order that Griffin’s purge conditions could be modified at any time.
Griffin next argues that the district court made insufficient findings in increasing his
purge payments. When holding an individual in contempt, a district court must satisfy
certain procedural requirements, including that the district court may not compel a person
to do something he is wholly unable to do, but t he contemnor has the burden of proving
inability.5 Hopp v. Hopp, 279 Minn. 170, 174–75, 156 N.W.2d 212, 216–17 (1968).
At the December 11, 2015 hearing, the district court heard testimony regarding
Griffin’s in come, assets, and employment. Following th e hearing, the district court

5 Griffin also contends that some of the other Hopp factors were not met with regard to the
December 11, 2015 hearing and order, but the Hopp factors largely apply to the initial
determination of whether an individual is in civil contempt and were fulfilled when the
district court issued its initial contempt order in February 2013. The only factor at issue at
the December 11, 2015 hearing was whether Griffin had the ability to pay an increased
monthly purge condition.
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determined that, based on testimony indicating that Griffin lives in a house that is owned
or paid for by a trust, that Griffin’s living expenses are paid for by a trust, and that Griffin
is not disabled from working, Griffin was able to pay 120% of his child support obligation.
Given Griffin’s lack of expenses and ability to work, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in increasing Griffin’s monthly purge obligation.
V. Griffin failed to show that the referee was biased.
Griffin contends that the referee who presided over the December 11, 2015 hearing
was biased and that the referee’s bias taints the referee’s December 11, 2015 order
increasing the amount of Griffin’s monthly purge condition. Griffin argues that the referee
improperly interfered with the county attorney’s questioning of him and stated a number
of times on the record that he did not believe Griffin’s testimony.
We presume that a district court judge or referee discharged his or her du ties
properly and without bias. Hannon v. State , 752 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2008). An
allegation of judicial bias “must be proved in light of the record as a whole.” Id. Notably,
in this case Griffin only provided the transcript of the December 11, 2015 hearing, not any
of the previous hearings that the referee presided over. See In re Bender, 671 N.W.2d 602,
605 (Minn. App. 2003) (“On appeal, the duty to provide a transcript is on the party seeking
review of the rulings being challenged.”).
Nevertheless, the transcript shows that Griffin repeatedly interrupted the referee
during the December 11, 2015 hearing, was evasive in testifying, and provided incomplete
or nonresponsive answers to the questions of the county attorney and the referee. T he
referee’s comments reflect that he was frustrated by Griffin’s evasive behavior, but do not
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indicate that he was biased against Griffin. Griffin’s assertions of bias are not supported
by the record, and he fails to overcome the presumption that the ref eree discharged his
duties properly.
VI. The district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that Griffin
pay $50,000 toward his arrears.

Griffin argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay
$50,000 toward his arrears within 30 days while knowing that Griffin did not have the
ability to make such a payment. In its order, the district court found that Griffin had
recently received $100,000, was evasive regarding his income, had no living expenses, and
was not disabled f rom working. Given these findings, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in ordering that Griffin pay $50,000 toward his arrears.
VII. The district court did not err in ordering that Griffin could effectuate
his release by making a $10,000 payment.

Next, Griffin argues that in its August 24, 2016 order partially revoking the stay of
execution of Griffin’s contempt sentence, the district court failed to find that he was able
to make a $10,000 payment to effectuate his release. However, the district court found that
Griffin “had between $150,000 and $200,000 available to him and it is unclear where all
of those funds have gone.”6 It is clear that the district court determined that Griffin had the

6 At oral argument, Griffin argued that the district court’s findin g that he had between
$150,000 to $200,000 in his control was not supported by the record, pointing to his
testimony at the December 11, 2015 hearing regarding $100,000 he recei ved from his
father’s estate. However, Griffin only ordered transcripts from t he December 11, 2015
hearing. In the absence of transcripts of the other hearings, including the June 28, 2016
hearing, “[w]e are limited to determining whether the trial court’s findings of fact support
its conclusions of law.” Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Noruk, 528 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Minn.
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ability to make the $10,000 payment based on his control of between $150,000 and
$200,000. Moreover, Griffin had the burden of proving his inability to pay, which he did
not meet. Hopp, 279 Minn. at 175, 156 N.W.2d at 217. Additionally, while Griffin argues
that the district court failed to find how he can pay $10,000 to secure his release, “there is
no statutory requirement that the court determine how an obligor access the money
necessary to meet the purge conditions, only that it determine the obligor is able to meet
them.” Crockarell, 631 N.W.2d at 837.
VIII. The district court’s failure to determine the amount of arrears does not
invalidate the district court’s order.

Griffin mentions several times in his brief th at the district court never determined
the amount of his arrears and suggests that the lack of a determination as to the amount of
arrears invalidates the district court’s orders. The amount of arrears has been in dispute
since the initial contempt order. At that time, the district court noted that while the county
claimed that Griffin was in arrears in the amount of $50,673.53, Griffin contended that he
had made payments that the county had failed to record and the amount of arrears were
somewhere between $30,000 and $40,000. The district court did not determine the amount
of arrears at that time. In its July 11, 2014 order, the district noted that it had previously
directed Griffin’s counsel to bring a formal motion to address the amount of arrears, but
Griffin’s counsel failed to do so. The district court then ordered that Griffin file a motion
if he wanted to challenge the co unty’s accounting of arrears. In its December 11, 2015

App. 1995), review denied (Minn. Apr. 27, 1995). Moreover, Griffin’s June 2016 affidavit
stated that he had spent almost $119,000 that he had received from his father’s estate.
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order, the district court ordered that the county “serve and file a m otion for a final
determination of existing arrears,” but the county never made such a motion and the district
court never determined the amount of arrears.
However, the fact that the district court did not determine the amount of arrears
does not a ffect the validity of the contempt orders. First, Griffin failed to file a motion
challenging the county’s calculation of arrears. And, at the time that the county moved
that the district court require Griffin to pay his arrears, in February 2016, the co unty
presented affidavit evidence of a child support officer indicating that the total arrears at
that time were $75,417.61. Moreover, the district court only ordered that Griffin pay
$50,000 toward his arrears, not the $75,417.61 that the county alleged he owed. Given that
Griffin had admitted over three years earlier that he was in arrears in the amount of $30,000
to $40,000 and made no arguments regarding erroneous calculations of the county with
regard to arrears accrued after the initial contempt hea ring, the district court did not err in
ordering that Griffin pay $50,000 toward his arrears without determining the exact amount
of the arrears.
In conclusion, because Griffin has failed to show that the district court erred in
increasing the amount of his monthly purge payments or in requiring him to make a
payment of $50,000 toward his arrears, we affirm the district court’s partial revocation of
the stay of Griffin’s contempt sentence.
Affirmed.