State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1636

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Chue Feng Yang,
Appellant.

Filed September 18, 2017
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-15-5870

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appell ate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cleary, Chief Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Florey, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KIRK, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction for possession of a firearm and ammunition by
an ineligible person, arguing that there was insufficient evidence of constructive possession
to support the conviction. Because the state presented sufficient evidence for the jury to

2
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was in constructive possession of the
firearm and ammunition, we affirm.
FACTS
On September 10, 2015, appellant Chue Feng Yang was charged with possession of
a firearm by an ineligible person, p ossession of ammunition by an ineligible person, and
possession of a silencer.1 At trial, the only contested element of the offenses was whether
appellant possessed the firearm and ammunition. The state proceeded on a theory of
constructive possession. The following evidence was presented to the jury:
J.Y., appellant’s sister, testified that she visited her brother at his mother -in-law’s
house in St. Paul on September 8, 2015. Their friend, Y.X., needed a ride to Lino Lakes.
Sometime between 10:00 p.m. and midnight, Y.X. was dropped off at appellant’s mother-
in-law’s house and J.Y., Y.X., and appellant left right away for Lino Lakes in appellant’s
wife’s car. J.Y. did not remember if she saw Y.X. get dropped off. On the way to Lino
Lakes, they stopped at a gas station to pump gas and also went through a drive -thru. J.Y.
drove the entire time and appellant always rode in the backseat. J.Y., Y.X., and appellant
were the only people in the car that night.
At approximately 1:48 a.m. on September 9, Lino Lakes Police Officer Peter Noll
stopped the car. The car was registered to appellant’s wife. The traffic stop occurred in an
area that was not well-lit and Officer Noll’s ability to see any movement or who was in the
car was limited. J.Y . had two male p assengers, Y.X., who was the front -seat passenger,

1 Appellant was acquitted by the district court of count 3, possession of a silencer.

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and appellant, who was sitting behind Y.X. in the backseat. J.Y. testified that Y.X. started
to act nervous when they got pulled over. He told her that he had an arrest warrant.
Lino Lakes Police Officer Kristen Mobraten responded to the scene of the traffic
stop and helped Officer Noll search the car. Before the search, Officer Noll opened the
back-passenger-side door of the car for appellant to get out and observed two .22 shell
casings on the floor. After appellant got out of the car, Officer Noll observed an additional
shell casing on the seat where appellant had been sitting.
Officer Mobraten started searching on the driver side of the car. Officer Mobraten
moved a brown towel on the floor behind the driver’s seat and exposed a rifle that was
attached to a “suspicious” cut-off baseball bat. The rifle was a .22 with a shortened stock
and “essentially stretched across the entire backseat . . . door to door.” When the rifle was
seized, it was loaded and there were two rounds in the firearm. Appellant denied knowing
anything about the rifle.
The rifle was not listed as stolen in the FBI’s NCIC database. Swabbings were taken
from the rifle’s stock, trigger, and barrel, and from the baseball bat which was believed to
be a homemade silencer. The swabbings were analyzed by Rebecca Dian, a forensic
scientist in the biology section at the Tri County Regional Forensic Laboratory. None of
the swabbings had enough genetic information for her to make a compar ison to a known
DNA profile. There were DNA types present, but she could not render an opinion as to
whether appellant’s DNA was on the rifle.
Dian also received a swabbing from plastic packaging found in the car . The
swabbing came from a large baggie that held methamphetamine and was found in the back

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pocket of the car’s driver seat. Dian was able to determine that the DNA on the plastic
“was a mixture of two or more individuals with a major DNA profile that matched [Y.X.].”
Dian could not make any oth er determinations as to who else contributed to the DNA
profile.
Forensic scientist Erica Henderson of the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension
examined the rifle and the three shell casings recovered from the car. She also discovered
two shell casings inside the bat when she removed it from the barrel of the rifle. Henderson
test fired the rifle to create additional shell casings. She then took the test -fired casings,
which she knew came from the rifle, and compared them with the five unknown shell
casings. Henderson verified that all of the shell casings had been fired from the same rifle.
After being instructed on actual and constructive possession, as well as exclusive
and joint possession, the jury convicted appellant of possession of a firearm and possession
of ammunition by an ineligible person.
D E C I S I O N
In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, this court’s review is limited to a
thorough analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to allow the jurors to reach the verdict
that they did. State v. Webb , 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). The reviewing court
must assume “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the
contrary.” State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). The reviewing court will
not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence
and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that

5
the defendant was guilty of the charged offense. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-
77 (Minn. 2004).
“Direct evidence is evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation
and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” Id. at 477 n.11 (quotation
omitted). “[A] conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence merits stricter scrutiny
than convictions based in part on direct evidence.” State v. Jones, 516 N.W.2d 545, 549
(Minn. 1994). “While it warrants stricter s crutiny, circumstantial evidence is entitled to
the same weight as direct evidence.” State v. Bauer, 598 N.W.2d 352, 370 (Minn. 1999).
The circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a
whole, leads so directly to t he guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable
doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt. Jones, 516 N.W.2d at 549. A jury,
however, is in the best position to evaluate circumstantial evidence, and its verdict is
entitled to due deference. Webb, 440 N.W.2d at 430.
In applying the circumstantial -evidence standard, the reviewing court uses a two -
step analysis. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 600-01 (Minn. 2017); State v. Silvernail,
831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). “The first step is to identify the circumstances proved.
In identifying the circumstances proved, we defer to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of
these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that confl icted with the
circumstances proved by the [s]tate.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 598 -99 (quotation
omitted). The reviewing court “construe[s] conflicting evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict and assume[s] that the jury believed the [s]tate’s witnesses and disbelieved
the defense witnesses.” Id. at 599 (quotation omitted).

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“The second step is to determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent
with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (quotation
omitted). No deference is given to “the fact finder’s choice between reasonable
inferences.” State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329 -30 (Minn. 2010). “[I]f any one or
more circumstances found proved are inconsistent with guilt, or consistent with innocence,
then a reasonable doubt as to guilt arises.” State v. Al -Nasseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 474
(Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).
Appellant was convicted of possession of a firearm and possession of ammunition
by an ineligible person, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) ( Supp. 2015),
which provides that a person who has been convicted of a crime of violence “shall not be
entitled to possess ammunition or a pistol or semiautomatic military -style assault weapon
or . . . any other firearm.” “Possess” is not defined within the statute, but caselaw dictates
that the state may prove possession by either actual or constructive possession. State v.
Salyers, 858 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn. 2015) . Because the firearm was not found on
appellant’s person, the state’s evidence of possession was circumstantial.
In order to prove constructive possession, the state must show that there is a strong
probability, inferable from the evidence, that the defendant consciously exercised
dominion and control over the fi rearm and ammunition at the time. State v. Florine, 303
Minn. 103, 105, 226 N.W.2d 609, 611 (1975); see also Salyers, 858 N.W.2d at 159 (noting
that Minnesota courts “have consistently applied Florine’s analysis as the test for
constructive possession”). The constructive-possession doctrine allows a conviction where
the state cannot prove actual possession, but where “the inference is strong that the

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defendant physically possessed the item at one time and did not abandon his possessory
interest in it.” State v. Smith , 619 N.W.2d 766, 770 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied
(Minn. Jan. 16, 2001). Constructive possession means that either: (1) the items were found
in a place under the defendant’s exclusive control that other people did not normally have
access to, or (2) if the items were found in a place that others had access to, there is a strong
probability, inferable from the evidence, that the defendant was, at the time, consciously
exercising dominion and control over them. State v. Porter, 674 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Minn.
App. 2004). “Proximity is an important factor in establishing constructive possession.”
State v. Porte , 832 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. App. 2013) (quoting State v. Breaux , 620
N.W.2d 326, 334 (Minn. App. 2001)). Constructive possession may be exclusive or joint.
See State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 150 (Minn. 2009).
Appellant argues that his convictions must be reversed because the state failed to
present sufficient evidence that he was in constructive possession of the firearm and
ammunition. Appellant asserts that the state’s circumstantial evidence did not form the
“complete chain” necessary to support his convictions. Appellant notes that, although
proximity is an important factor in establishing constructive possession, proximity itself is
not sufficient. See State v. Sam, 859 N.W.2d 825, 834 (Minn. App. 2015) (noting that ,
where appellant did not have exclusive possession of the vehicle, the presence of
contraband alone was not sufficient to establish appellant possessed it).
Appellant argues that the state failed to present evidence tying him directly to the
illegal items. See id. at 835. He asserts that there was no evidence presented that he was
aware the firearm and ammunition were in the car, and that even if he was awar e of their

8
presence, that there was no evidence presented that he “exercised dominion and control”
over them. See State v. Smith, 749 N.W.2d 88, 96 (Minn. App. 2008) (noting that “it is not
illegal for [an ineligible person] to be in the presence of firea rms—as long as he does not
possess them”); see also Florine, 303 Minn. at 105, 226 N.W.2d at 611 ( noting that “one
could not automatically infer from the mere fact that cocaine was found in the automobile
that the cocaine belonged to defendant ” where posse ssion of the automobile was non -
exclusive).
The state argues that appellant’s position that he may not have known the items were
in the car is not enough to overturn his conviction because this court “will not overturn a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence on the basis of mere conjecture.” State v.
Stein, 776 N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). The state also notes that
even if the other occupants of the car possessed the firearm and ammunition, appellant is
not precluded from having joint constructive possession of them. The state asserts that the
only rational hypothesis here is appellant’s guilt and concludes that “it is unreasonable to
infer from these facts that [appellant] was unaware of the presence of the rifle or
ammunition in the backseat with him.” The state asks this court to affirm appellant’s
convictions.
Here, the circumstances proved at trial are: Appellant was a backseat passenger in
the car from 10:00 p.m. on September 8, through the traffic stop on September 9. The car
was registered to appellant’s wife . Appellant, J.Y., and Y.X. left appellant’s mother -in-
law’s house together to drive Y.X. to Lino Lakes right after Y.X. arrived at the house. Y.X.
was nervous at the time of the traffic stop and said it was because he had an arrest warrant.

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Y.X.’s DNA was found on a plastic baggie containing methamphetamine in the back
pocket of the car’s driver seat. A .22 rifle with two active rounds of ammunition and five
spent shell casings were found in the car. The rifle was found on the floor in the backseat
and stretched the full width of the backseat. The spent shell casings had been fired out of
the rifle. There was not enough DNA on the rifle to run a DNA comparison.
In this case, there is no evidence that the car was under appellant’s exclusive control
or that other people did not normally have access to it. The car was registered to appellant’s
wife, and although appellant was a backseat passenger throughout the relevant time period,
J.Y. and Y.X. also could hav e accessed the backseat. Neither J.Y. nor Y.X. could likely
have moved the rifle from their seats in the car due to its length, but they could have placed
it in the car or accessed it at the gas station or any time the car stopped. Because appellant
did not have exclusive control over the backseat, the state was required to prove that there
was a strong probability, inferable from the evidence, that appellant consciously exercised
dominion and control over the firearm at the time.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction, the jury could
have reasonably concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant consciously
exercised dominion and control over the loaded rifle. Here, appellant was closest to the
rifle and was the only person who could manipulate it from where he was seated in the car.
The car also belonged to his wife, and he sat in its backseat throughout the relevant time
period. At the very least, sufficient evidence was presented for the jury to conclude that
appellant was in joint constructive possession of the loaded rifle.

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Here, because of its location, and because of appellant’s relationship to the car’s
owner, it is not rational to conclude that appellant was not aware of the loaded firearm and
that he was not exercising dominion and control over it. Any hypothesis other than guilt
would have required the jury to conclude that appellant, despite having the closest ties to
the car and being its backseat passenger, was unaware of the presence of a firearm spanning
the entire width of the backseat. That hypothesis is not rational on this evidence. The state
presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
appellant had joint constructive possession of the firearm and ammunition.
Affirmed.