State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1651

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Grant Lloyd Greenwood,
Appellant.

Filed September 5, 2017
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-15-7596

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Anothony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Atto rney, Blair Buccione, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
On appeal from his conviction of first-de gree criminal sexual conduct, appellant
argues that the evidence was insu fficient to sustain the jury’s finding of guilt. Appellant
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also filed a pro se supplemental brief argui ng that there were deficiencies in the
investigation by law enforcement and th at the prosecutor committed prejudicial
misconduct during closing arguments. We affirm.
FACTS
In early 2009, appellant Gr ant Lloyd Greenwood began a romantic relationship with
R.M. Shortly thereafter, appellant moved in with R.M., her two sons, and her nine-year-
old daughter, V.M. After m oving in with the family, appellant felt that it was his
responsibility “to assume a role of a father.” And when R.M. was required to travel for
work, which was frequently, appellant supervised the children in her absence.
Shortly after appellant moved in with R. M., V.M. complained to her mother that
appellant “put her foot on his penis.” R.M. discussed the issue with appellant and V.M.,
and appellant told R.M. that “he would never do anything like that because he . . . had been
a police officer.” According to R.M., she “d id not do anything” because she “believed”
appellant and “trusted and loved” him.
Several years later, on November 17, 20 15, an argument occurred between appellant
and V.M. The argument culminated with appellant grounding V.M. from going to soccer
practice that night, which greatly upset V.M. According to V.M., she then tried to leave,
but appellant continued to yell at her, and would “propel his body forward so his stomach
was - - would push [her] back.”
V.M. told appellant that she was “going to call the police,” and then left and went
next door to her friend’s house. V.M. was “hysterical,” and told her friend’s mother, H.H.,
that appellant had “bumped” her with his body. According to H.H., V.M. continued to be
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“very hysterical,” and repeatedly said that she “can’t do this anymore,” and that she did not
“want to go home.” H.H., wh o is a police officer, eventua lly asked V.M. if anything
“sexual” happened. When V.M. was finally able to compose herself, she told H.H. that
“[i]t happened in middle school.”
H.H. contacted R.M., who arrived at H.H.’s house, where V.M., told her mother that
she had been sexually abused by appellant. R.M. then called the police and, shortly
thereafter, V.M. told Detective Thomas Stru sinski during a videotaped interview that
appellant had sexually abused her from shortly after he moved in until she was in middle
school. Appellant was subsequently charged with one count of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) (2012) (sexual contact with a person under
the age of 13); one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342, subd. 1(h)(iii) (2012) (sexual penetration with a person under the age of 16 and
the sexual abuse included multip le acts over an ex tended period of time by an individual
with a significant relationship); and one coun t of second-degree criminal sexual conduct
under Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(h)(iii) (2012) (sexual contact with a person under the
age of 16 and the sexual abuse included multip le acts over an extended period of time by
an individual with a significant relationshi p). Appellant was also charged by separate
complaint with misdemeanor dom estic assault. The domestic assault charge was then
joined for trial with the sexual-assault charges.
At trial, V.M.’s videotaped interview with Detective Strusinski was played for the
jury. The videotaped statement, along with V.M.’s testimony, established that shortly after
appellant moved in, he would rub V.M.’s feet against his crotch while they watched
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television. According to V.M., appellant “g radually” began “doing more stuff,” such as
taking off her shirt and bra to “feel” and “lick” her breasts. V.M. claimed that the sexual
abuse progressed to where appellant would di gitally penetrate her vagina and put “his
mouth on [her] vagina.” V.M. further stated that because she did not want to touch
appellant’s penis, appellant “would want [her] to kiss his neck while” he masturbated.
V.M. reported that the abuse stopped when she was in the eighth grade after appellant
“made [her] touch his penis” and she told him that the sexual abuse was “wrong.”
Appellant testified at trial and acknowle dged the confronta tion with V.M. on
November 17. But appellant denied pushing V.M.; instead, he claimed that V.M. pushed
him. Appellant also denied having any sexual contact with V.M.
The jury found appellant not guilty of misdemeanor domestic assault, and could not
reach a verdict on the charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct—sexual contact with
a person under the age of 13. But the jury found appellant guilty of second-degree criminal
sexual conduct, and first-degree criminal sexual conduct—sexual penetration with a person
under the age of 16 and the sexual abuse included multiple acts over an extended period of
time by an individual with a significant relationship. Appellant was then sentenced to 172
months in prison. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
I.
When considering a claim of insuffici ent evidence, this court conducts “a
painstaking analysis of the record to determ ine whether the evidence , when viewed in a
light most favorable to the conviction,” was sufficient to allow the jury to reach the verdict
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that it reached. State v. Caine , 746 N.W.2d 339, 356 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
We assume that the jury be lieved the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any contrary
evidence. State v. Porte, 832 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. App. 2013). We will not disturb
the verdict if the jury, acting with due rega rd for the presumption of innocence and the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the
defendant was guilty of the crime charged. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77
(Minn. 2004).
Appellant was convicted of first-degree cr iminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342, subd. 1(h)(iii). To support a conviction under this statute, the state had to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had a significant re lationship with V.M., that
V.M. was under the age of 16 years old at th e time of the sexual penetration, and that the
“sexual abuse involved multiple acts committed over an extended period of time.” Id.
Appellant argues that “V.M.’s uncorroborat ed testimony fails to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that [he] committed criminal sexual conduct.” To support his claim, he
cites State v. Foreman, in which the supreme court clarified that the lack of corroboration
of a victim’s testimony may require reversal if there are additional reasons to question the
victim’s credibility. 680 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. 2004). Appellant contends that there
are “many reasons” to doubt V.M.’s accusati ons, including (1) her hatred of appellant;
(2) her delay in reporting the alleged abuse; (3 ) the lack of physical or medical evidence
corroborating the allegations; and (4) the “vagueness and uncertainty” of V.M.’s testimony.
Appellant argues that in light of these “additional reasons” to question V.M.’s credibility,
his conviction must be reversed.
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We disagree. In Foreman, the supreme court reiterated that “a conviction can rest
on the uncorroborated testimony of a single credible witness.” 680 N.W.2d at 539 (quoting
State v. Hill, 285 Minn. 518, 518, 172 N.W.2d 406, 407 (1969)). Alth ough the supreme
court acknowledged that reversal of a convic tion may be warranted in situations where
there are “additional reasons to question the victim’s credibility,” the court stated that “[a]s
long as the evidence [is] sufficient to reasonably support the jury’s finding, the credibility
of a witness [is] for th e jury to determine.” Id. The supreme court then affirmed the
defendant’s conviction, concluding that “the re were no other reasons to question [the
victim’s] credibility and her testimony at trial was not contradicted.” Id.
Here, V.M. reported to Detec tive Strusinski that shortly after moving in with R.M.,
appellant began rubbing V.M.’s feet against his crotch while they watched television. V.M.
also reported that appellant “g radually” began “doing more st uff,” such as removing her
shirt to “lick” and “feel” he r breasts, and that the sexua l abuse progressed to where
appellant digitally penetrated her vagina an d put “his mouth on [her] vagina.” V.M.’s
testimony at trial was consistent with her videotaped statement to Detective Strusinski that
was played for the jury. More over, R.M. testified that shortly after appellant moved in,
V.M. “complained that [appellant] put her foot on his penis.” R.M.’s testimony tends to
corroborate V.M.’s testimony concerning the sexual abuse. In addition, the record reflects
that V.M. was extremely emotional at the time she reported the abuse, which further tends
to corroborate her testimony. See State v. Reinke , 343 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Minn. 1984)
(stating that evidence of the victim’s emotional condition at the time she complained to
others is corroborating evidence of a victim’s testimony). V.M.’s testimony, if believed,
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was sufficient to establish appellant’s guilt of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under
section 609.342, subd. 1(h)(iii). Although V.M.’s testimony could have been more
specific, and she clearly expressed her disdain for appellant, giving her a motive to fabricate
the alleged events, appellant’s attorney cros s-examined the state’s witnesses about these
issues and discussed them in closing argument. The jury’s verdict reflects its rejection of
those arguments in favor of the state’s witn esses and evidence, and it is well settled that
we defer to the jury’s assessment of witness credibility. State v. Green, 719 N.W.2d 664,
673-74 (Minn. 2006). Therefore, in light of the defere nce owed to the jury’s credibility
determinations, the evidence was sufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct.
II.
Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brie f arguing that (1) there were deficiencies
in the investigation that rendered his convic tion unfair and (2) the prosecutor engaged in
prejudicial misconduct during closing argument.
A. Investigation
“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment
. . . .” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196-97 (1963). “To establish
a Brady violation, it must be true that: (1) the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused,
either because it is exculpator y or it is impeaching; (2) th e evidence was willfully or
inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) prejudice to the accused resulted.” State v.
Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 622 (Minn. 2012).
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Appellant argues that the investigation was insufficient because it should have
included an examination of his criminal hist ory, his computer, and V.M.’s cell phone.
Appellant contends that “[i]f [law enforcem ent] did conduct any in vestigation following
[his] arrest, and found absolute ly nothing, which is exactly what [appellant] is confident
has occurred,” then “there is a very clear Brady violation in this case.” But appellant fails
to establish any of the elements necessary to demonstrate that a Brady violation occurred.
Moreover, appellant fails to support his argument with legal authority or arguments beyond
mere speculation. Therefore, no further cons ideration of his argument is necessary. See
State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22 (Minn. 2008) (“We will not consider pro se claims on
appeal that are unsupported by either argum ents or citations to legal authority.”), cert
denied, 556 U.S. 1134 (2009).
B. Prosecutorial misconduct
Appellant claims that the prosecut or committed misconduct during closing
argument by using the term “illiosyncratic responses.” But appellant did not object to the
alleged misconduct during closing argument. Therefore, the issue is reviewed under a
modified plain-error test. State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 146 (Minn. 2012). Under
this standard, the defendant mu st first establish that the misconduct constitutes error and
that the error was plain. Id. If prosecutorial misconduct amounts to plain or obvious error,
the burden shifts to the state to demonstr ate that its misconduct did not prejudice the
defendant’s substantial rights. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Minn. 2006).
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Here, as the state points out, the prosec utor did not use the term “illiosyncratic
responses”1 in her closing argument; she used th e term “idiosyncratic details.” The
prosecutor then defined the te rm as “details - - sensing details, descriptions.” The
prosecutor’s definition of the term is a ccurate, as was her use of the term. See The
American Heritage Dictionar y of the English Language 897 (3rd ed. 1992 ). Therefore,
appellant is unable to demonstrate that the prosecutor committed misconduct during
closing argument.
Affirmed.

1 “Illiosyncratic” does not appear to be a recognized word in the English language.