State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1654

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Han Nicholas Vorwerk,
Appellant.

Filed July 31, 2017
Affirmed
Smith, John, Judge*

Yellow Medicine County District Court
File No. 87-CR-15-143

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Michael T. Everson, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Keith R. Helgeson, Yellow Medicine County Attorney, Granite Falls, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Smith, John,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, JOHN, Judge
We affirm appellant Han Nicholas Vorwerk’s failure-to-register conviction because
the district court’s legal conclusions are sufficient to satisfy the predatory -offender-
registration statute’s mandate that registrants give immediate notice of changes to their
primary address, and because sufficient evidence supports the district court’s finding that
the violation was knowing.
FACTS
Han Vorwerk’s criminal history requires him to register as a predatory offender in
accordance with Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (2014). As of January 5, 2015, Vorwerk’s
registered primary address was an apartment on East Mill Street in Owatonna.
On January 6, Vorwerk entered a residential treatment program at Project
Turnabout. On January 8, he updated his primary address to Project Turnabout’s address
in Granite Falls. He completed the program and was discharged on February 5.
On March 3, Granite Falls Police Chief Brian Struffert completed a predatory -
offender check on the offenders residing in Granite Falls. Vorwerk’s registered primary
address remained at Project Turnabout, so Chief Struffert contacted the program. He
learned that Vorwerk had been discharged on February 5.
On March 20, the state charged Vorwerk with one count of knowingly violating
predatory-offender-registration requirements in violation of Minn. Stat. § 243.166,
subdivision 5(a), and issued a warrant for his arrest.
3
On April 6, Vorwerk registered a new primary address at his girlfriend’s apartment
on East Pearl Street in Owatonna. His registration indicated that he stopped residing at
Project Turnabout and began residing at the Pearl Street apartment on February 5.
Police eventually arrested Vorwerk. Vorwerk claimed that an officer told him he
did not have to re-register if he returned to his Mill Street apartment after staying at Project
Turnabout. The officer denied Vorwerk’s claim. Vorwerk also told police that he returned
to the Mill Street apartment for approximately three weeks after leaving Project Turnabout,
then moved in with his girlfriend at the Pearl Street apartment around March 1.
Vorwerk proceeded to a stipulated-facts bench trial. The stipulated evidence
included police reports, Vorwerk’s registration paperwork, and recorded police interviews.
The state introduced eight annual “Duty to Register” forms bearing Vorwerk’s initials,
indicating he had reviewed the forms, most recently when he updated his address in April
2015. One initialed provision reads, “I understand that I must register all changes to my
primary address, including moving to another state, at least five days prior to moving. I
understand that if I do not have five days advance notice of a change to my primary address,
I must report the change immediately .” A subsequent initialed provision reads, “I
understand that if I do not comply with my registration requirements as outlined above, I
can be charged with a felony.”
The district court found that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
“Vorwerk knowingly violated the requirement to register a new address.” It also stated in
its accompanying memorandum that the state had “proven the element of knowingly failing
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to register his address change.” The district court convicted Vorwerk and sentenced him
to 36 months in prison.1
Vorwerk appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Vorwerk challenges his conviction on two grounds: (1) the district court’s
conclusion of law that the state proved Vorwerk violated a particular registration
requirement is insufficient, and (2) even if the state proved a violation, it did not prove the
violation was knowing.
I
Vorwerk claims that the district court’s conclusion that the state proved he violated
“the requirement to register a new address” is insufficient to support his conviction. We
frame this “sufficiency of the legal conclusion” claim as a purely legal question. We review
questions of law de novo. State v. Dorn, 887 N.W.2d 826, 830 (Minn. 2016).
The state raises the threshold issues of waiver and forfeiture, urging us to dismiss
Vorwerk’s claims because he failed to raise them at the district court, and because he fails
on appeal to adequately brief the issue under a plain-error analysis. We generally do not
consider matters not argued to and considered by the district court. Roby v. State, 547
N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996). And issues inadequately briefed are generally not
considered on appeal. State v. Butcher, 563 N.W.2d 776, 780 (Minn. App. 1997) , review
denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 1977). But after a stipulated-facts bench trial, “the defendant may

1 The district court later modified Vorwerk’s prison term to 30 months on his motion to
correct his sentence.
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appeal from the judgment of conviction and raise issues on appeal as from any trial to the
court.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3(e). We frame the issue as a legal question
warranting de novo review, and so we decline the state’s invitation to deem Vorwerk’s
argument forfeited. And Vorwerk’s briefing is only inadequate if we frame the issue as
requiring plain-error review, which we do not. We therefore reject the state’s argument to
dismiss Vorwerk’s claim as inadequately briefed.
The state charged Vorwerk with violating Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a), which
states, “A person required to register under this section who knowingly violates any of its
provisions . . . is guilty of a felony.” (Emphasis added.) In order to convict an offender of
failing to register, the state is required to prove that: (1) the defendant is required to register
as a predatory offender, (2) the defendant knowingly violated a registration requirement,
(3) the time period within which the defendant is required to register has not lapsed, and
(4) the failure to register occurred within the time period in the complaint and in the
appropriate county. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subds. 1b, 3–6.
Vorwerk’s narrow claim is that the district court’s conclusion of law as to the second
element is insufficient to support his conviction. Vorwerk contends that, even though a
registrant has many obligations, the district court found him guilty of violating a specific
one: “the requirement to register a new address.” He argues that “the requirement to
register a new address” can only refer to the requirement for registrants to notify authorities
of a new primary address at least five days before moving to the new primary address. See
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3(b). The state counters that the evidence shows that Vorwerk
also failed to comply with the duty to immediately inform authorities when he no longer
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resided at his registered primary address, see Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3(b), and the
duty to immediately inform authorities when his primary address was no longer valid, see
id., subd. 4a(a)(1), (b).
Vorwerk argues that the state did not charge him with, and the district court did not
find him guilty of, violating these other requirements. But he does not pursue further any
due-process or insufficient-notice arguments. Generally, the complaint is sufficient to
notify Vorwerk that he is charged with violating his registration requirements, including
his failure to notify authorities immediately that his primary address is no longer valid. See
State v. Levie, 695 N.W.2d 619, 628–29 (Minn. App. 2005) (rejecting due-process claim
because complaint put defendant on notice that he would have to defend allegation that he
attempted to engage minor in sexual performance, and because complaint “made plain what
the state basically contended had happened”).
We agree with Vorwerk that the stipulated evidence does not establish that he knew
where he would be moving five or more days before he left Project Turnabout. Without
evidence that he was aware of his new primary address, the district court could not conclude
that he knowingly failed to report a new primary address in accordance with the five-day
rule. But Vorwerk appears to overlook the district court’s accompanying memorandum,
which states, “The state has proven the element of knowingly failing to register his address
change.” An “address change” can reasonably include both a failure to register a new
address and a failure to notify authorities that a primary address is no longer valid.
Furthermore, the district court’s conclusions that Vorwerk “knowingly violated the
requirement to register a new address” and “knowingly fail[ed] to register his address
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change” necessarily implicate subdivision 3(b)’s mandate that Vorwerk must give written
notice “that [he was] no longer living . . . at [that] address, immediately after [Vorwerk
was] no longer living . . . at that address.” See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3(b) (emphasis
added). Vorwerk registered Project Turnabout as his primary address, which is statutorily
defined as a dwelling, which is in turn defined as the “building where the person lives.”
See id., subd. 1a(c), (g). Vorwerk claimed a new primary address as of February 5, 2015,
necessitating that Vorwerk: (1) ceased “living” at Project Turnabout on February 5; and
(2) began “living” at a new address on February 5. Given these facts, the district court’s
finding is, m ore accurately (and necessarily), that Vorwerk knowingly violated the
requirement to register a new primary address. But by not registering the actual change in
primary address until April 6, Vorwerk failed to comply with subdivision 3(b)’s mandate
that he provide notice that he was “no longer living” at Project Turnabout “immediately
after” he ceased living there.
2
The district court’s conclusions necessarily contemplate more than just the five-day
rule. The conclusions also contemplate the immediate requirements for Vorwerk to notify
authorities that he was no longer staying at Project Turnabout. Vorwerk failed to comply
with those requirements. The conclusions are therefore sufficient to uphold his conviction.

2 This reasoning applies equally to subdivision 4a, which similarly requires registrants to
provide immediate notice when circumstances invalidate their registered primary address.
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 4a(b). That is, when it ceases to be their primary address.
8
II
Vorwerk argues that even if the state proved he “technically violated the
requirement that he register a new primary address,” the state failed to prove that he did so
knowingly. We apply the same standard of review to bench trials and jury trials when
evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn.
2011). Under that standard, we “carefully examine the record to determine whether the
facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the [fact- finder] to
reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense
of which he was convicted.” State v. Fox, 868 N.W.2d 206, 223 (Minn. 2015). “We view
the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the verdict, and assume that the fact -
finder disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with the verdict.” Id. We will not overturn
a verdict if the fact-finder, “upon application of the presumption of innocence and the
[s]tate’s burden of proving an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably have
found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.” Id.
In State v. Watkins, 840 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 2013), the Minnesota Supreme Court
considered the meaning of the term “knowingly violates” in the context of the domestic-
abuse-no-contact-order (DANCO) statute. The supreme court held that a knowing
violation “require[s] the defendant to perceive directly that [his conduct] violated the
DANCO statute.” Id. at 29–30. Here, a knowing violation requires that Vorwerk perceived
directly that his conduct violated the offender-registration statute.
The record contains offender-registration forms in which Vorwerk acknowledges
his understanding of the five-day rule and the general requirement to immediately report a
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change to his primary address. He initialed next to the provision that reads, “I understand
that I must register all changes to my primary address, including moving to another state,
at least five days prior to moving. I understand that if I do not have five days[’] advance
notice of a change to my primary address, I must report the change immediately .” The
record specifically includes initialed forms from April 2014 and April 2015. This proves
that Vorwerk was aware, both before and after he moved out of Project Turnabout, that he
must register all changes to his primary address, either five days before moving or
immediately. Vorwerk also initialed next to the provision that reads, “I understand that if
I do not comply with my registration requirements as outlined above, I can be charged with
a felony.” The state may not have proved that Vorwerk knew his new primary address five
days before leaving Project Turnabout, but it certainly proved that he failed to notify
authorities that he was no longer residing at Project Turnabout, and that he knew his
primary address when he returned to Owatonna and failed to immediately update his
primary address. Knowing that he had to register any changes to his address, and that
failing to do so could result in a criminal charge, Vorwerk knew his conduct would violate
the statute.
Affirmed.