A16-1667 Precedential Affirmed Processed

State of Minnesota, Respondent,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed September 5, 2017

Authorities cited

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Opinion text

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1667

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Recardo Daryl Meeks,
Appellant.

Filed September 5, 2017
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CR-14-3918

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Annie P. Claesson -Huseby, Beltrami County Attorney, David P. Frank, Chief Assistant
County Attorney, Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his suppression motion ,
contending that police did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion to continue to detain
him after the initial traffic stop and questioning. We affirm.
FACTS
On December 11, 2014, a police officer , while driving in Beltrami County outside
of his jurisdiction, stopped appellant Recardo Daryl Meeks after observing Meeks driving
his vehicle at varying speeds, crossing the center and fog lines, and tapping his brakes. The
police officer initiated the stop after he ra dioed dispatch to notify the Beltrami County
Sheriff’s Office and the Minnesota State Patrol.
Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer noticed a strong odor of air freshener
coming from the vehicle and suspected that it might be masking the smell of drugs or
alcohol. The officer also observed multiple toggle switches and testified that from his
training and experience he knows toggle switches are sometimes used to access hidden
compartments used for drug trafficking. When questioned about his driving, Meeks
responded that he was trying to read his GPS , which told him he had made a wrong turn.
The officer testified that Meeks appeared confused and that his driving was not consistent
with a motorist who had made a wrong turn.
At this point, a Beltrami County sheriff’s deputy responded to the stop. The officer
ceded control of the stop to the Beltrami County sheriff’s deputy, who testified that based
on the officer’s description of Meeks’ driving conduct, he decided to conduct field sobriety
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tests on Meek s to “expl ore the possibility that [Meeks was] under the influence of a
controlled substance.” Upon exiting the vehicle, Meeks was given a pat-down search that
revealed he was carrying a large amount of cash.
The deputy had Meeks perform a field sobriety test twice, which Meeks failed both
times in a manner indicating that Meeks might be under the influence of a controlled
substance. While the deputy was performing the fie ld sobriety tests, a Minnesota s tate
trooper and another Beltrami County sheriff’s deputy with a K-9 unit also responded to the
stop. The deputy who had performed the field sobriety tests then instructed the K-9 unit to
conduct a sniff of Meek’s vehicle.
While Meeks was performing further field sobriety tests under direction of the
trooper, the K-9 alerted to the presence of controlled substances behind the driver’s door.
Based on Meeks’ driving, confused appearance, and failure to successfully perform field
sobriety tests, Meeks was arrested.
After Meeks was arrested, law enforcement obtained a search warrant and searched
the vehicle, finding approximately 50 grams of methamphetamine and 4 grams of heroin
behind the driver’s seat. Meeks was charged with first -degree possession of a controlled
substance and third-degree test refusal. The test refusal charge was later dismissed.
Meeks moved for all evidence gathered at the stop to be suppressed. The district
court denied his motion, and pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, Meeks waived
his right to trial and st ipulated to the state’s case in order to obtain review of the district
court’s pretrial evidentiary ruling. Meeks was convicted of first -degree possession of a
controlled substance and sentenced to 120 months. Meeks appeals.
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D E C I S I O N
Meeks argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the
evidence gathered during the stop because law enforcement unlawfully expanded the scope
and duration of the stop by conducting field sobriety tests on him. This argument is without
merit.
“When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, [appellate
courts] may independently review the facts and determine whether, as a matter of law, the
district court erred in suppressing or not suppressing the evidence.” State v. Askero oth,
681 N.W.2d 353, 359 (Minn. 2004). Appellate courts review the district court’s f actual
findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d
496
, 502 (Minn. 2008).
Meeks does not dispute that the police officer had reasonable suspicion for stopping
his car when he observed Meeks’ vehicle varying its speed, crossing the center and fog
lines, and tapping its brakes. Meeks contends that the officers should have taken him at
his word that he was having issues with his GPS and did not have reasonable suspicion to
conduct field sobriety testing.
First, it must be noted that “[t]he fact that there might have been an inno cent
explanation for [appellant’ s] conduct does not demonstrate that the officers could not
reasonably believe that [he] had committed a crime.” State v. Hawkins, 622 N.W.2d 576,
580 (Minn. App. 2001). Nevertheless, “[a]n initially valid stop may become invalid if it
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becomes intolerable in its intensity or scope.” Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 364 (quotation
omitted).
Askerooth instructs that we employ a two -part test to determine whether an
unreasonable seizure has taken place. Id. First, we must determine “whether the stop was
justified at its inception.” Id. Second, we must determine “wheth er the actions of the
police during the stop were reasonably related to and justified by the circumstances that
gave rise to the stop in the first place.” Id. In other words, “each incremental intrusion
during a stop must be ‘strictly tied to and justifi ed by the circumstances which rendered
the initiation of the stop permissible.’” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 19
, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1878 (1968) (quotation omitted)).
Therefore, incremental intrusions during a traffic stop must be “tied to and justified
by” at least one of the following : “(1) the original legi timate purpose of the stop,
(2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness as defined in Terry.” Id. at 364
(quotation omitted). Here, the original legitimate purpose of the traffic stop justifies law
enforcement’s decision to expand the stop to include field sobriety testing.
The original and undisputed purpose of the traffic stop was to investigate a vehicle
varying its speed, crossing the center and fog lines , and tapping its brakes. There is no
mechanical rule for determining what an officer must observe before forming a reasonable
suspicion that a driver is intoxicated or impaired. See State v. Hicks, 222 N.W.2d 345, 348
(Minn. 1974). Generally, an officer must observe “one or more objective indicators of
intoxication or of being under the influence” to adequately form the foundation for an
opinion that a driver is impaired. State v. Schneider, 249 N.W.2d 720, 721 (Minn. 1977).
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This court has stated that in some circumstances, “even a single objective indication of
intoxication may be sufficient” for an officer to suspect a driver is under the influence.
Martin v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 353 N.W.2d 202, 204 (Minn. App. 1984).
Here, we have several indications of impairment. Meeks was driving erratically and
varying his speed, his vehicle crossed the center and fog lines without identifiable cause,
and he was tapping his brakes unnecessarily. Further, law enforcement observed several
other indications of suspected drug trafficking in Meeks’ car, including a strong odor of air
fresheners and multiple toggle switches. Under Hicks and Schneider, this combination of
factors, which Meeks does not dispute, justified officers expanding the scope of the traffic
stop to conduct field sobriety tests on Meeks.
Affirmed.