State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1672

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Abraham Alexander Houle,
Appellant.

Filed September 5, 2017
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-15-9169

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, A ssistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Abraham Houle was convicted of aggravated stalking, violating an order
for protection (OFP), and violating domestic abuse no-contact orders (DANCOs). He

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argues on appeal that the district cour t committed plain error by admitting at trial
relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634. 20 (2014) and Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). We
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant was charged with aggravated stal king, two counts of violating an OFP,
and four counts of violating D ANCOs, after he cut in front of a vehicle driven by his ex-
girlfriend, S.K., causing a collision. S.K. informed police that appellant had also recently
asked about S.K. and “investig ation revealed” that appellant was outside of her home on
Halloween. At the time of these incidents, an OFP and two DANCOs prohibited appellant
from having contact with S.K., and prohibited him from being at either her residence or
her workplace.
Before trial, the state filed a notice of in tent to introduce evidence of seven other
incidents under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 and Minn. R. Evid. 404( b). The seven incidents all
involved behavior directed at S.K., includ ing physical and fear-b ased assaults, text
messages and phone calls, and unwelcome visits to S.K.’s home, some of which occurred
after the OFP and DANCOs were issued. A ppellant objected to the introduction of
evidence concerning an August 2014 assau lt at S.K.’s workplace, arguing that it was
prejudicial, cumulative, and had the potential to confuse the jury. The district court ruled
that S.K. could testify about the incident under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 because, “[i]t is clearly
part of the history of the relationship. It’s the impetus for the first order for protection.”
Appellant did not object to the admission of the other six incidents from 2014. The
district court admitted the seven incident s in evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 as

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evidence of the relationship between S.K. and appellant, and under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)
because the incidents showed a common scheme, plan, and lack of mistake.
At trial, S.K. testified about the seven incidents introduced as relationship evidence.
The district court provided a limiting instruction to the jury before testimony was presented
concerning each incident. The district court also provided a limiting instruction during its
final charge to the jury. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the seven incidents from 2014 should not have been admitted
under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 because the evidence was cumulative, it was unnecessary, and
any probative value of the evidence was subs tantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. He also argues that the evid ence was not admissible under Minn. R. Evid.
404(b).
Evidentiary rulings generally rest within the district court’s discretion, and we will
not reverse a district court’s decision on the admission of evidence absent an abuse of that
discretion. State v. Washington-Davis , 867 N.W.2d 222, 237 (Minn. App. 2015), aff’d,
881 N.W.2d 531 (Minn. 2016). If the distri ct court erroneously admits evidence, an
appellate court will nonetheless affirm unless the appellant establishes that the admission
was prejudicial. State v. Welle , 870 N.W.2d 360, 366 (Minn. 2015). An appellant
establishes prejudice if “there is a reasona ble possibility that th e wrongfully admitted
evidence significantly affected the verdict.” State v. Thao, 875 N.W.2d 834, 839 (Minn.
2016) (quotation omitted).

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But where, as with most of the challenged evidence here, a defendant has not
objected to the evidence at the district court, we review only for plain error. State v. Word,
755 N.W.2d 776, 781 (Minn. App. 2008). We consider if th ere was an error, if that error
was plain or obvious, and if the error aff ected the appellant’s substantial rights. State v.
Reed, 737 N.W.2d 572, 583 (Minn. 2007). “[A] n error affects a defendant’s substantial
rights if there is a reasonable likelihood that the error had a ‘significant effect’ on the
verdict.” State v. Finch, 865 N.W.2d 696, 703 (Minn. 2015) (quoting State v. Sontoya, 788
N.W.2d 868, 873 (Minn. 2010)). If all three elements of plain-error review are satisfied, a
reviewing court may decide whether to addr ess the error to ensu re “fairness and the
integrity of the judicial proceedings.” State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 805 (Minn. 2012)
(quotation omitted).
“Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). But
such evidence may be admitted “for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Id. The
evidence is admissible only if
(1) the prosecutor gives notice of its intent to admit the
evidence . . . ; (2) the prosecut or clearly indicates what the
evidence will be offered to prove ; (3) the other crime, wrong,
or act and the participation in it by a relevant person are proven
by clear and convincing evidence; (4) the evidence is relevant
to the prosecutor’s case; and (5) the probative value of the
evidence is not outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice
to the defendant.

Id.

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Within the class of evidence covered by Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) is a distinct kind of
other-act evidence, known as relationship evidence. State v. Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d 609,
615 (Minn. 2014). Relationship evidence is “any evidence offered to illuminate the
relationship between the accused and the alleged victim.” State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635,
638 n.4 (Minn. 2006). Relationship eviden ce is admissible to show the “strained
relationship between the accused and the victim,” and may be relevant to prove motive and
intent. State v. Bauer , 598 N.W.2d 352, 364 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted). The
Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized the “i nherent value of evidence of past acts of
violence committed by the defendan t against the same victim.” State v. Williams , 593
N.W.2d 227, 236 (Minn. 1999).
A distinct type of relations hip evidence, evidence of domestic conduct against a
victim is admissible under Minn. Stat. § 634. 20 in order “to illuminate the relationship
between the defendant and the alleged victim and to put the alleged crime in the context of
that relationship.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20; State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Minn.
App. 2010) (citing State v. McCoy , 682 N.W.2d 153, 15 9 (Minn. 2004)), review denied
(Minn. Nov. 16, 2010); Word, 755 N.W.2d at 784. Such evidence may aid the jury in
considering “the credibility of the principals in the relationship.” McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at
161; see State v. Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d 752, 757 (Minn. App. 2008) (noting that relationship
evidence has “significant probative value in assisting the jury to judge witness credibility”),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2008). Under section 634.20, “domestic conduct” includes,
but is not limited to, domestic abuse, violation of an OFP or harassment restraining order,
stalking, or obscene or harassing telephone calls. Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (referencing statutes

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criminalizing stalking, Minn. Stat. § 609.749 (2014), obscene or harassing telephone calls,
Minn. Stat. § 609.79, subd. 1 (2014), violation of a harassm ent restraining order, Minn.
Stat. § 609.748, subd. 6 (2014), and violation of an OFP, Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14
(2014)).
Section 634.20 does not entail the same procedural requirements as Minn. R. Evid.
404(b). Word, 755 N.W.2d at 784. Evid ence of domestic conduc t “is admissible unless
the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issue, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20.
Appellant argues that the evidence of th e seven incidents admitted under section
634.20 should have been excl uded because the evidence was unnecessary to the state’s
case, cumulative, and highly prejudicial.
As an initial matter, the district court wa s not required to separately analyze the
state’s need for the evidence ap art from the analysis of probative value versus prejudicial
effect. Bell, 719 N.W.2d at 639. The state charged appellant with aggravated stalking
under Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 4(b) (2014). The stat e was required to prove that
appellant engaged in conduct which he knew or had reason to know would cause S.K. to
feel frightened or intimidated, and which did ca use S.K. to feel frightened or intimidated.
Id., subd. 1 (2014). Contrary to appellant’s assertion that the OFP and DANCOs
themselves were instructive enough, evidence of appellant’s conduct tended to prove that
S.K. was fearful of appellant. The documents would not establish that S.K. felt intimidated
or frightened by appellant’s conduct. See State v. Hormann, 805 N.W.2d 883, 891 (Minn.

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App. 2011) (concluding, in stalking case, that relationship evidence placed the relationship
in context where “the state needed to establish that appellant had given her reason to fear
[his] repeated confrontationa l and intimidating conduct”), review denied (Minn. Jan. 17,
2012). The seven incidents placed the relationship between S.K. and appellant in context
and aided the jury in consider ing the credibility of the witnesses, especially considering
appellant’s denial that he knew the identity of the other driver involved in the crash. The
evidence was relevant and had significant probative value.
Appellant argues that th e introduction of seven in cidents was unnecessarily
cumulative. Rulings on “whe ther evidence is improperly cumulative[] are committed to
the sound discretion of the district court.” State v. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d 474, 479 (Minn.
2005). A district court should exclude other-act evidence if “it is merely cumulative and a
subterfuge for impugning a defendant’s character.” State v. Washington, 693 N.W.2d 195,
203 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted). The amount of other-act evidence should be limited
if it is unnecessary to the prosecution, risks fixating the jury on prior incidents, or if it treads
the line between its stated purpose and impugning a defendant’s character. Id. A s
discussed above, the incidents were relevant and important to the state’s case. The district
court acted within its discretion in implicitl y concluding that the probative value of the
seven incidents, both in establishing the natu re and context of the relationships and in
establishing witness credibility , outweighed the da nger posed by the introduction of
testimony concerning all seven incidents.
Finally, appellant argues that the dang er of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighed any probative value of the eviden ce. He argues the relationship evidence

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permitted the jury to convict him on the basi s of a propensity to commit the crime or
because the jury believed he was a bad person. Unfair prejudice “is not merely damaging
evidence, even severe ly damaging evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is evidence that
persuades by illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair advantage.” Bell, 719 N.W.2d
at 641 (quotation omitted). Although the evid ence was damaging to appellant’s case, we
cannot say on this record that the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the high
probative value of the eviden ce. Moreover, that risk was decreased by the limiting
instructions appropriately provided by the dist rict court. “A dist rict court’s limiting
instruction lessens the probability of undue weight being given by the jury to [relationship]
evidence.” State v. Ware, 856 N.W.2d 719, 729 (Minn. App. 2014) (quotation omitted).
We presume that a jury follows the district court’s instructions. State v. Miller, 573 N.W.2d
661, 675 (Minn. 1998).
The district court acted within its discre tion in admitting the seven incidents as
relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 6 34.20. Because the evidence was admissible
under section 634.20, we need not separately consider whether the district court should
have excluded the incidents und er Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). See State v. Barnslater , 786
N.W.2d 646, 653 n.3 (Minn. App. 2010) (concluding that an analysis under Minn. R. Evid.
404(b) was unnecessary because the evidence was properly admitted under section 634.20),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 2010).
Affirmed.