State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1683

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,
Respondent,

vs.

American Country Insurance Company,
Appellant.

Filed May 8, 2017
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-15-19449

Suzanne Wolbeck Kvas, Lutter, Gilbert & Kvas, LLC, Eagan, Minnesota (for respondent)

Daniel J. Stahley, Provo -Peterson & Associates, P.A., Lake Elmo, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Kalitowski,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
In this insurance priority dispute, appellant insurance company challenges the
district court’s dismissal of its complaint on summary judgment, arguing that the district

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
court erred by concluding that its coverage for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits had
priority over that of respondent insurance company under Minn. Stat. § 65B.47, subd. 4
(2016). We affirm.
FACTS
This insurance priority dispute stems from an auto accident that occurred in January
2013, involving Abdullahi Hussein, who was driving a van registered to Nura Mohamud.1
The van was insured in Mohamud’s name by respondent State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company. At the time of the accident, Hussein held a commercial auto p olicy
with appellant American Country Insurance Company. The American Country policy
covered Hussein’s taxi cab.
As a result of the accident, Hussein suffered injuries and incurred medical expenses
totaling approximately $7,500. Hussein submitted a cla im to American Country, which
was denied. Hussein then filled out two affidavits of no insurance and submitted his claim
to State Farm, which was paid.
In October 2015, State Farm brought a declaratory judgment action, seeking a
judicial determination that American Country had priority for the payment of PIP benefits
to Hussein. American Country brought a cross-claim, seeking a judicial determination that
State Farm had priority. In June 2016, after cross -motions for summary judgment, the

1 There is a lack of clarity regarding Mohamud’s name and gender. In communication
between counsel, State Farm refers to Mohamud as “her” and both parties refer to
Mohamud as “Ms. Nura Mohamud” or “Ms. Mohamud” throughout their briefs. However,
the vehicle registration information identifies the registrant of the van to be Ahmed
Mohomud Nura, a male.
3
district court granted State Farm’s motion for summary judgment, declared that American
Country had statutory priority for the PIP benefits, and determined that there were no
disputes of material fact to warrant trial. American Country now appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I.
American Country first argues that factual disputes exist that make summary
judgment inappropriate in this case. The district court determined that summary judgment
was appropriate because American Country failed to provide specific evidence of a genuine
issue of material fact.
Summary judgment is only appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute regarding
the material facts, and a party is entitled to judgment under the law applicable to such
facts.” DLH, Inc. v. Russ , 566 N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn. 1997); see also Minn. R. Civ. P.
56.03. We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, accepting all
undisputed facts as true and construing any disputed facts in the light most favorable to the
party against whom summary judgment was granted. Commerce Bank v. W. Bend Mut.
Ins. Co., 870 N.W.2d 770, 773 (Minn. 2015).
Once a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, the burden is on the
nonmoving party to “present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.05. Those facts must raise more than a “metaphysical doubt as to a
factual issue,” but instead must be “sufficiently probative with respect to an essential
element of the nonmoving party’s case to permit reasonable persons to draw different
conclusions.” DLH, Inc., 566 N.W.2d at 71.
4
Persons injured in an auto accident in the state of Minnesota have “a right to no -
fault benefits for their economic loss.” Amco Ins. Co. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 622 , 627
N.W.2d 683, 685 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 2001); see Minn. Stat.
§ 65B.46 (2016). This type of statutorily mandated coverage is commonly known as PIP
coverage. See Wakefield v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. , 344 N.W.2d 849, 851 (Minn. 1984).
In situations where the person inju red in the accident was not driving a busin ess vehicle,
the statute provides a priority scheme for PIP benefit payments. See Minn. Stat. § 65B.47,
subd. 4.
The statute assigns the primary-level priority to the issuer of the policy “under which
the injured person is an insured.” Id., subd. 4(a). The statute defines an “insured” as both
the person named in the policy, as well as relatives of the person named in the policy,
provided that the relative lives with the person named in the policy and the rela tive does
not have insurance in his or her own name. Minn. Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 5 (2016). If the
injured person is not “an insured” for purposes of the highest level of priority, the statute
assigns second-level priority to the policy covering the vehic le involved in the accident.
Minn. Stat. § 65B.47, subd. 4(b).2 A second-level priority policy issuer that reimburses an
injured person has a statutorily granted subrogation right to recover those payments from
a higher priority policy issuer. Id., subd. 6.
American Country claims that there is a dispute as to whether Hussein and
Mohamud were cohabitating relatives. Even if American Country’s allegations that

2 The statute delineates three priority levels, but the third priority level is not implicated in
this dispute. See Minn. Stat. § 65B.47, subd. 4.
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Hussein and Mohamud are related are true, it points to no probative evidence that Hussein
and Mohamud resided in the same household at the time of the accident. See Minn. Stat.
§ 65B.43, subd. 5 (defining “insured” as including relatives who reside with named
insured). The accident report lists Hussein as having a Minneapolis address, and Mohamud
as having an Eagan address. American Country’s policy with Hussein and both affidavits
of no insurance list Hussein as having the Minneapolis address. State Farm’s policy with
Mohamud lists Mohamud’s address as the Eagan address, and Mohamud’s van is registered
to the Eagan address as well.
The only evidence in the record that Hussein and Mohamud might reside together
is found in Hussein’s first, handwritten affidavit of no insurance, which lists “Max Nurd
Mohamud” or “Max Mud Mohamud” as a cohabitating “friend.” However, American
Country provides no evidence that either “Max Nurd Mohamud” or “Max Mud Mohamud”
is the same person as Nura Mohamud, instead stating that “[i]t is possible that this
individual is Nura Mohamud.” This evidence does not rise above the level of
“metaphysical doubt” as to whether Hussein and Mohamud reside together.
American Country also asserts that Hussein might have been operating Mohamud’s
van as a taxi at the time of the accident because he owns a taxi, and the van was formerly
registered as a taxi in 2012. If true, this would exempt the van from the PIP priority scheme
of section 65B.47, subd. 4 . However, there is no evidence in the record to support this
assertion, which also does not rise above the level of “metaphysical doubt” as to whether
Hussein was operating the van in a business capacity.
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In sum, American Country has failed to present sufficient probative facts that
demonstrate there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial , and therefore summary
judgment was appropriate in this case.
II.
American Country argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment
in favor of State Farm because, based on the language of its policy with Hussein, American
Country is not a provider of PIP coverage as Hussein is only covered by his Americ an
Country policy when operating the taxi. The district court determined that American
Country is the primary-level priority insurer for purposes of section 65B.47, subdivision 4,
and has priority over State Farm, which is the second-level priority insurer. Our review of
the language of the American Country policy leads us to the same conclusion.
“The interpretation of an insurance policy’s language is a question of law that a
reviewing court determines de novo.” Bemboom v. Dairyland Ins. Co. , 529 N.W.2d 467,
469 (Minn. App. 1995). Where an insurance contract includes endorsements, as the
American Country policy does here, we examine the policy as a whole including all
endorsements. Steele v. Great W. Cas. Co. , 540 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. App. 1995),
review denied (Minn. Feb. 9, 1996). Although we endeavor to “ construe a policy so as to
give effect to all provisions ,” if there is a conflict between the endorsement and policy,
“the provisions of the endorsement govern.” Id.
American Country is correct that the language of its policy with Hussein
specifically limits PIP coverage to accidents involving the taxi. However, the Minnesota
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PIP endorsement to that policy expands its coverage to include coverage for the injuries
sustained by Hussein here.
The endorsement states, at the top of the page, in bold block lettering, “This
endorsement changes the policy.” The endorsement then states that American Country will
pay “in accordance with the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, [PIP] benefits
incurred with respect to ‘bodily injury’ sustained by an ‘insured’ caused by an ‘accident’
arising out of the maintenance or use of a ‘motor vehicle’ as a vehicle.”
In defining who qualifies as an “insured” for purposes of PIP coverage, the
endorsement includes coverage for both:
1. The Named Insured or any “family member” who
sustains “bodily injury” while “occupying” a “motor vehicle,”
. . . .
2. Any other person who sustains “bodily injury” while
“occupying” the “insured motor vehicle,”

(Emphasis added.)
As the named insured, Hussein qualifies as an insured under the first part of the
definition, and is therefore entitled to PIP coverage whenever he sustains bodily injury
when occupying “a motor vehicle.” In comparison, other persons are entitled t o PIP
coverage only when they sustain bodily injury while occupying “the insured motor
vehicle,” which is the taxi. To read the endorsement as limiting Hussein’s PIP coverage to
only injuries sustained while occupying the taxi, as American Country suggest s, would
render this distinction in the definition of “insured” meaningless.
As primary priority under Minn. Stat. § 65B.47, subd. 4, is assigned to the policy
under which the “injured person is an insured,” American Country has priority over State
8
Farm for the payment of PIP benefits. Because State Farm has already paid Hussein PIP
benefits, State Farm is entitled to subrogation to recover those payments from American
Country.3 See Minn. Stat. § 65B.47, subd. 6.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
State Farm.
Affirmed.

3 American Country also makes a series of challenges to State Farm’s right to subrogation,
all of which are premised on an argument that even if Husse in is “an insured” under
American Country’s policy, he is “an insured” under State Farm’s policy as well, due to
language in State Farm’s policy which covers “any other person” who occupies
Mohamud’s van. However, the statute forecloses this argument, as the statutory definition
of “insured” includes only the named insured and certain resident relatives. See Minn. Stat.
§ 65B.43, subd. 5. As discussed above, American Country offers no probative evidence
that Hussein and Mohamud are resident relatives.