Meeker County, petitioner, Respondent, Victoria Lynn Moreno, n/k/a Victoria Lynn Baalson, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1701

Meeker County, petitioner,
Respondent,
Victoria Lynn Moreno, n/k/a Victoria Lynn Baalson, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Kyle Richard Greene,
Appellant.

Filed July 17, 2017
Affirmed
Randall, Judge*

Meeker County District Court
File No. 47-FA-06-1600

Brandi L. Schiefelbein, Meeker County Attorney, Lee R. Martie, Assistant County
Attorney, Litchfield, Minnesota (for respondent Meeker County)

Victoria L. Baalson, Waite Park, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Kyle Richard Greene, Grove City, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Randall, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RANDALL, Judge
In this child-support dispute in which the child-support magistrate (CSM) revoked
appellant-father’s recreational and driver’s licenses because of the amount of father’s
unpaid support, pro se appellant argues that (a) the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to address his support obligation; (b) respondent-county’s child-support officer
(CSO) improperly concealed a prior conviction; (c) the CSM’s order violated appellant’s
right to Free Exercise of Religion; (d) the CSM’s order violated appellant’s right to earn a
living; and (e) the district court failed to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of
law. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Kyle Richard Greene was adjudicated the father of I.E.M. and ordered to
pay $285 per month in child support. In December 2008, appellant’s recreational licenses
were suspended under Minn. Stat. § 518A.68 (2008), because he was “in arrears in an
amount equal to or greater than six times [his] total monthly support payments and [he
failed] to enter into o r remain in compliance with an approved payment agreement.”
Several years later, in October 2014, appellant entered into a payment agreement
(agreement) wherein he agreed to pay $65 per month until his arrears were paid in full.
The agreement initiated the reinstatement of his recreational licenses, but stated that if
appellant failed to make any payment on the date due, respondent Meeker County (county)
“has the legal authority to proceed with suspension of [appellant’s] recreational license.”
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The agreement also did not change appellant’s current child-support obligation. Based on
the agreement, appellant’s recreational privileges were reinstated on January 15, 2015.
In June 2016, the county moved for an order directing the Commissioner of
Department of Natural Resources to suspend or bar receipt of appellant’s recreational
license or licenses because appellant “has defaulted on [his] payment agreement,” and “has
not made a payment on [his] case since November 17, 2015.” The county alleged that
appellant “currently owes arrears in the amount of $18,802.58,” which “are greater than
six times [his] total monthly obligation.” The county also provided appellant with notice
of intent to suspend appellant’s driver’s license due to his failure to pay child support.
Following a hearing, the CSM granted the county’s motion, and under Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.68, ordered the Commissioner of Natural Resources to “bar receipt or suspend”
appellant’s recreational license. The CSM also ordered the Commissioner of Public Safety
to “suspend the driver’s license or operating privileges” of appellant under Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.65(d) (2016). This appeal followed.
After the appeal was filed, the county filed a letter stating that it will not file a brief.
As a result, this court directed the appeal to proceed under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
D E C I S I O N
I.
Appellant claims that the orders suspending his recreational and driver’s licenses
“do not meet the requirements of the jurisdictional statute . . . which the court relies on.”
Whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de
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novo review. Odenthal v. Minn. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426, 434
(Minn. 2002).
The CSM’s orders provide that it had jurisdiction over the matter under Minn. Stat.
§ 484.702, subds. 1, 3 (2016). Subdivision 1(b) provides that “[a]ll proceedings
establishing, modifying, or enforcing support orders . . . must be conducted in the expedited
process if the case is a IV-D case.” 1 Minn. Stat. § 484.702, subd. 1(b). Subdivision 3
provides for the appointment of child-support magistrates to preside over expedited IV- D
cases. Id., subd. 3. The expedited process should “comply with applicable federal law.”
Id., subd. 1(e)(4).
Appellant argues that the district court “issued its order in conflict with federal law,”
thereby acting “outside its jurisdiction.” Appellant failed to articulate any federal law that
conflicts with the CSM’s order. Appellant waived his argument. See State v. Ture, 632
N.W.2d 621, 632 (Minn. 2001); Louden v. Louden, 221 Minn. 338, 339, 22 N.W.2d 164,
166 (1946) (“An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any
argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal
unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.”). The record reflects that I.E.M.’s
mother, respondent Victoria Baalson, applied for child-support enforcement services under
Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. The county determined that the matter was a IV-D
case as defined by Minn. Stat. § 518A.26, subd. 10, and appellant does not dispute that a

1 A IV-D case is one in which a party has applied for child-support services under Title IV-
D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 654(4) (2012). Minn. Stat. § 518A.26, subd. 10
(2016).
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IV-D file was open in the matter at the time of the hearing and the CSM’s order. The CSM
properly exercised jurisdiction over this matter.
II.
Appellant argues that by failing to disclose that she has a prior conviction of theft,
the CSO breached a fiduciary duty she owed to appellant. We generally do not consider
issues not argued to and considered by the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580,
582 (Minn. 1988). The record here reflects that although the issue was raised in his petition
for writ of prohibition filed in this court, the issue pertaining to the CSO’s alleged prior
conviction was not argued to, nor decided by, the district court. Even if we were to consider
the issue on the merits, we conclude that appellant’s argument lacks merit . There is no
record evidence that the CSO failed to disclose a prior conviction.
III.
Next, appellant appears to challenge the constitutionality of Minn. Stat. § 518A.68,
claiming that it infringes upon his right to Free Exercise of Religion. We review
“as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of statutes de novo.” Newstrand v. Arend,
869 N.W.2d 681, 687 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 2015).
Article I, section 16, of the Minnesota Constitutions provides that:
The right of every man to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed; . . . nor
shall any control of or interference with the rights of
conscience be permitted . . .; but the liberty of conscience
hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of
licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace
or safety of the state . . . .

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“In evaluating the constitutionality of statutes that are challenged based on violations of
freedom of conscience, the supreme court has retained the compelling state interest
balancing test.” Newstrand, 869 N.W.2d at 687 (quotation omitted). “This test has f our
prongs: whether the objector’s belief is sincerely held; whether the state regulation burdens
the exercise of religious beliefs; whether the state interest in the regulation is overriding or
compelling; and whether the state regulation uses the least restrictive means.” Hill-Murray
Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857, 865 (Minn. 1992).
Here, we have considered appellant’s argument that section 518A.68 violates his
right to religious freedom and conclude that it is without merit. Even assuming that
appellant’s beliefs are sincerely held, an application of the remaining three prongs
articulated in Hill-Murray indicate no impermissible constitutional intrusion. S ection
518A.68 does not violate article I, section 16 of the Minnesota Constitution.
IV.
Appellant claims that because he earns a living by hunting and trapping, the district
court’s order suspending his recreational licenses violates his right to earn a living.
The United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution afford identical due
process protections. Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. 1999). Both provide
that government cannot act to deprive a person of “life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.” U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. “[S]ubstantive due
process protects individuals from ‘certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions
regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.’” In re Linehan, 594
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N.W.2d 867, 872 (Minn. 1999) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S. Ct.
975, 983 (1990)).
The right to work is important. But, importantly, Minnesota law does allow for the
suspension of various licenses in certain instances. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 245A.07,
subd. 1 (2016) (allowing the Commissioner of Human Services to suspend a family
childcare license for failure to comply with “applicable law or rule”); Minn. R. Prof. Cond.
15(a)(2) (allowing the Lawyers Board of Professional Responsibility to suspend an
individual’s license to practice law for disciplinary reasons); Minn. Stat. § 214.077(a)
(2016) (allowing the Board of Chiropractic Examiners to suspend an individual’s
chiropractic license for violation of statute or rule that presents an imminent risk of serious
harm). T he United States Supreme Court has never held that the right to pursue a
specialized profession is a fundamental right. See Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291-92,
119 S. Ct. 1292, 1295-96 (1999) (“[T]he liberty component of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause includes some generalized due process right to choose
one’s field of private employment . . . subject to reasonable government regulation”);
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 527-28, 54 S. Ct. 505, 512 (1934) (holding that the
right to pursue a particular profession or “calling” is a protected right conditioned upon,
and subject to, reasonable government regulation). “[I]nstead, the right to employment is
a protected interest subject to rational basis review.” State ex rel. Comm’r of Human Servs.
v. Buchmann, 830 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn. July 16,
2013). The rational basis test requires that (1) the statute promote a public purpose, (2) the
statute not be an unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious interference with a private interest,
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and (3) the means chosen by the legislature bear a rational relation to the public purpose
sought to be served. Boutin, 591 N.W.2d at 718. “[I]f the record indicates that the [statute]
is rationally related to achievement of a legitimate governmental purpose, [its application]
should be upheld.” Essling v. Markman, 335 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn. 1983).
Section 518A.68 promotes a public purpose by attempting to ensure adequate and
timely payment of child support. See Schaefer v. Weber, 567 N.W.2d 29, 33 (Minn. 1997)
(noting strong state policy of assuring that children have adequate and timely economic
support from their parents). The statute does not unreasonably burden or interfere with
appellant’s right to employment because he has the option to enter into and make payments
on a payment agreement, and compliance with that payment agreement would provide
appellant an avenue to have his recreational licenses fully reinstated. See Buchmann, 830
N.W.2d at 902 (holding that a statute permitting suspension of an obligor’s commercial
driver’s license for failure to pay child support did not unduly burden obligor’s ability to
earn a living because as soon as obligor enters into a payment agreement, the state must
reinstate the obligor’s license). Appellant has options to change his circumstances and get
his recreational licenses reinstated. Thus, the statute provides a rational connection
between the prohibition on limited recreational licenses and the public’s interest in having
appellant support his children’s well- being through child-support payments. See id. at
902-03. Section 518A.68 does not violate appellant’s right to earn a living.

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V.
Appellant argues that the district court failed to make adequate findings of fact and
conclusions of law as required by Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. Appellant failed to articulate
what is lacking from the district court’s orders. The orders suspending appellant’s
recreational license and driver’s license both establish that appellant’s monthly child-
support obligation is $285 per month, and that appellant “has an arrearage of court-ordered
child support payments in an amount equal to or greater than six times [his] total monthly
payments.” Both orders then conclude that the relevant facts establish that appellant
violated the applicable statutes. The district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law
are adequate.
Affirmed.