In re the Matter of: Emily M. Pederson, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1707

In re the Matter of:
Emily M. Pederson, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Scott H. Meyer,
Appellant.

Filed May 15, 2017
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-FA-14-2050

Jenny L. Nelson, Nelson Peterson Law, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Scott H. Meyer, Gainesville, Florida (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KIRK, Judge
In this child -custody and parenting -time appeal, appellant father argues that the
district court erred by (1) determining that he had not made a prima facie case for
modification of custody based on endangerment; (2) failing to address his motion for a new
trial; (3) reserving respondent mother’s motion to find father a frivolous litigant; (4) failing

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to address father’s motion for a declaratory judgment; (5) denying father’s motion for
permission to obtain a passport for the child; and (6) declining to hold mother in contempt
of court. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Scott H. Meyer and respondent Emily M. Pederson, who never married,
are the parents of a minor chil d born in 2008. Pederson moved with the child to Iowa in
2010 and to Minnesota in 2012. Meyer currently lives in Florida. Since the child’s birth,
the parties have engaged in extensive litigation regarding custody of the child and parenting
time. The Iowa courts had jurisdiction under the Uniform Chil d Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act from February 2010 until March 31, 2015, when a Minnesota district
court determined that Minnesota had jurisdiction.
Meyer’s Motions for Modification of Custody and for a New Trial
In 2010, the parties agreed that they would have joint legal custody of the child and
that Pederson would have sole physical custody, subject to Meyer’s parenting time , and
the Iowa district court filed an order reflecting the parties’ agreement (the initial decree).
In 2012, Pederso n moved that the Iowa district court grant her sole legal custody of the
child, and the court granted her motion . In March 2016, Meyer moved the Minnesota
district court for sole legal and sole physical custody of the child. The district court denied
Meyer’s motion, concluding that Meyer had failed to meet his burden of alleging a prima
facie case to modify custody.

3
Meyer subsequently moved for a new trial regarding the issues of modification of
custody and modification of parenting time. 1 The district court denied Meyer’s motion
without holding a hearing, stating that Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01, which governs motions for
a new trial, was inapplicable.
Pederson’s Motion to Find Meyer a Frivolous Litigant
In late June 2016, Pederson moved for, among other things, the district court to find
Meyer a frivolous litigant. After holding a hearing, the district court reserved the motion,
noting that most of Meyer’s behavior occurred prior to the district court’s recent
modification of parenting time, where the d istrict court imposed a “structured, detailed
parenting time schedule” in place of the initial decree, which the district court stated
contained “vague and confusing language” that had led to many disputes between the
parties.
Meyer’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment
In February 2016, Meyer moved for declaratory judgment, seeking clarification of
his rights and responsibilities during his p arenting time with the child. Meyer failed to
schedule a hearing to correspond with the motion. In October 2016, Meyer sent a letter to
the district court reque sting a ruling on his motion. The district court issued a “judicial

1 The district court addressed Meyer’s motion to modify custody and Pederson’s motion to
modify parenting time in the same order. With regard to parenting time, the district court
modified the existing parenting-time order and provided a detailed schedule of the parties’
parenting time in an attempt t o minimize future litigation. Meyer does not appeal the
district court’s modification of the parties’ parenting time.

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directive,” stating that it had ruled on all motions that were presented at formal motion
hearings and advising Meyer to follow the applicable rules in order to receive a ruling.
Meyer’s Motion for a Passport for the Child
In March 2016, Meyer moved the district court to allow him to obtain a passport for
the child. In September 2016, the district court denied Meyer’s motion, noting that Meyer
had no immediate international travel plans and that the parties were required to address
the issue through their court -ordered alternative dispute resolution ( ADR) process before
bringing a motion to the court.
Meyer’s Motion to Hold Pederson in Contempt
In June 2016, Meyer moved to ha ve Pederson held in contempt. After holding a
hearing, the district court denied the motion, reasoning that Meyer had no court -ordered
right to the parenting time in dispute and that the parties’ failure to enga ge in ADR was
due to Meyer’s unreasonable refusal to attend ADR unless Pederson agreed to submit the
issue of custody to the ADR process.
Meyer appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I.
Meyer argues that the distric t court abused its discretion by denying his motion to
modify custody. Meyer contends that the district court abused its discretion by determining
that he had not made a prima facie case for modification based on endangerment.

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“Appellate review of custody modification . . . cases is limited to considering
whether the [district] court abused its discretion by making findings unsupported by the
evidence or by improperly applying the law.” Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279,
284 (Minn. 2008) (quotations omitted). An appellate court reviews a district court’s factual
findings for clear error, deferring to the district court’s opportunity to evaluate witness
credibility. Id. “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous where an appellate court is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d) (2016) provides that a district court shall not modify a
custody order unless it finds “that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child
or the parties and that the modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child.”
In applying these standards, the district court must retain the custody arrangement unless
one of a number of enumerated circumstances are met. Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d). The only
circumstance that is relevant here is Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv), which provides for
modification of custody if “the child’s present environment endangers the child’s physical
or emotional health or impairs the child’s emotional development a nd the harm likely to
be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change to the
child.”
“A district court is required under section 518.18(d) to conduct an evidentiary
hearing only if the party seeking to modify a custody order makes a prima facie case for
modification.” Goldman, 748 N.W.2d at 284. Deciding whether a party made a prima
facie case is within the discretion of the district court. Szarzynski v. Szarzynski, 732

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N.W.2d 285, 292 (Minn. App. 2007). In considering whether a party moving for
modification of custody made a prima facie case, “the district court must accept the facts
in the moving party’s affidavits as true, disregard the contrary allegations in the nonmoving
party’s affidavits, and consider the allegations in the nonmoving party’s affidavits only to
the extent they explain or contextualize the allegations contained in the moving party’s
affidavits.” Boland v. Murtha, 800 N.W.2d 179, 183 (Minn. App. 2011). “[T]he district
court must bear in mind that the concept of endangerment is unusually imprecise and any
threat of harm to a child might arguably constitute endangerment, but the legislature likely
intended to demand a showing of a significant degree of danger.” Id. at 186 (alterations
omitted) (quotations omitted).
In his 85-page affidavit submitted in connection with his motion to modify custody,
Meyer made many arguments regarding how the child is allegedly endangered in
Pederson’s home. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that Meyer failed to allege a prima facie case for modification based on
endangerment.
With regard to a number of Meyer’s allegations, Meyer’s own affidavit belies his
contention that the allegations constitute a change in circumstances. Meyer argues that
Pederson is an inflexible and controlling parent, but cites events occurring as early as 2009
in his affidavit. Similarly, Meyer’s allegations of Pederson’s lying and manipulative
behavior span from 2008 to the present. Thus, there has been no change in circumstances
since the previous custody orders.

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The majority of Meyer’s allegations regarding endangerment stem from his
contention that Pederson is limiting his parentin g time. With regard to these allegations,
the district court correctly stated that “[t]he majority of [Meyer’s] complaints concerning
parenting time arise from the parties’ inability to communicate when it comes to the child.
Even the most simple of changes to the parenting time schedule are impossible to
accomplish without a series of unpleasa nt text and email exchanges.” The district court
accurately noted that the communication issues surrounding paren ting time are not new
issues. Indeed, the Iowa district court noted the parties’ severe communication issues in
its 2012 modification order. That court decided to modify the parties’ initial decree and
award Pederson sole legal custody due to “the parties’ inability to communicate
appropriately and effectively on matters related to raising [the child.]”
Moreover, it is clear that many of Meyer’s allegations of parental interference stem
from the parties’ disagreement regarding the correct interpretation of the initial decree. The
initial decree, which is based on a transcript of the parties’ agreement that was entered into
the record on the day of trial, provided that Meyer would have ten overnights each month
with the child and that the ten days would be the first ten days of the month unless the
parties specifically agreed otherwise. The parenting-time order also stated:
Provided further, that with respect to those ten days each
month, the parties will endeavor to mutually agree upon the
time but that [Meyer] may notify [Pederson] in writing or by
electronic communication at least 30 days in advance of that
particular month of his intention to exercise visitation other
than the first ten days of the month, and if he so gives that
election, that’s when the [parenting] time will take place.

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The parties have interpreted this language differently in the years following the initial
decree, leading to many disputes between the parties. To the extent that the parenting-time
conflicts that Meyer points to as interference by Pederson stem from differing
interpretations of the initial decree, these conflicts are not a change in circumstances.
In his affidavit, Meyer argues that Pederson deprived him of parenting time by
insisting that he bring the child to medical appointments and various activities d uring
Meyer’s parenting time. Meyer objects to Pederson denying his parenting -time requests
that would require the child to miss additional school. Meyer also argues that Pederson
unreasonably rejected his requests for additional parenting time when he or the child’ s
siblings were in Minnesota.
“Denial of access to a parent and efforts to paint a parent in a poor light have the
potential to endanger a child’s emotional h ealth or impair his emotional development.”
Newstrand v. Arend, 869 N.W.2d 681, 691 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Dec.
15, 2015). However, while a custodial parent’s interference with a noncustodial parent’s
parenting time is relevant to modifi cation of custody, it is not an independently sufficient
basis to modify custody. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d at 293.
Given that Meyer has parenting time with the child ten days per month, we cannot
say that the district court abused its discretion in ruling that Pederson’s insistence that
Meyer take the child to medical appointments or the child’s activities does not constitute a
significant interference with his parenting time that would endanger the child. Likewise,
Pederson’s alleged refusal to allow Mey er to take the child across the country does not

9
constitute a significant change in circumstances endangering to the child, especially as
Meyer does not allege that Pederson does not allow him to exercise his parenting time.
Finally, Pederson did not inte rfere with Meyer’s parenting time by refusing Meyer’s
requests for additional parenting time.
Meyer makes a few veiled allegations of sexual misconduct in Pederson’s
household. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
hold an evidentiary hearing on this basis. Meyer’s allegations are conclusory and vague
and therefore insufficient to support a finding of endangerment. See Axford v. Axford, 402
N.W.2d 143, 145 (Minn. App. 1987) (affirming denial of custody -modification motion
without an evidentiary hearing where movant’s affidavit “was devoid of allegations
supported by any specific, credible evidence”).
Meyer makes many other allegations related to a variety of issues, spanning from
the child’s personal hygiene t o the child’s relationship with Pederson’s family . As the
district court observed, Meyer’s voluminous allegations reflect that he has objections with
virtually every aspect of how the child is raised in Pederson’s household. However, after
a thorough review of the record, we agree with the district court that while Meyer’s
allegations show that the child is not being raise d in the manner that Meyer believes is in
the best interests of the child, they are not enough to show that the child is in “a significant
degree of danger” based on Pederson’s conduct and choices on behalf of the child. See
Boland, 800 N.W.2d at 186. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse

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its discretion in determining that Meyer failed to present a prima facie case for modification
based on endangerment.
Meyer contends that the district court abused its discretion in ordering that he “be
exclusively responsible for all transportation, accommodations, and other expenses for
himself and t he child when exercising parenting time.” In 2010, the parties agreed that
Meyer would be responsible for “[t]he cost of the transportation and the matter of
accompanying [the child] for purposes of facilitating continuing contact” except for during
April and December. Meyer has apparently never requested that the district court modify
the share of transportation costs that he was responsible for paying, although he has stated
that he incurs significant costs in connection with exercising parenting time with the child.
Given that Meyer did not request a reduction of the transportation costs he was ordered to
pay, Meyer appears to be the party seeking that the child travel nationally to visit Meyer’s
family and internationally to go on vacation, and the pa rties’ complete inability to
cooperate, the district court’s allocation of the costs Meyer incurs in connection with his
exercise of parenting time is not an abuse of discretion.
II.
Meyer argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for
a new trial on the issues of custody and parenting time . However, proceedings regarding
a party’s motion to modify custody or parenting time are “special proceedings,” under
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(g), not trials. Huso v. Huso, 465 N.W.2d 719, 720 (Minn.
App. 1991). As such, a motion for a new trial in a custody or parenting-time modification

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proceeding is “not authorized” and “unnecessary to preserve issues for appeal,” and an
order denying such a motion is not appealabl e. Id. at 721. The district court cannot have
abused its discretion by denying an unauthorized motion.
III.
Meyer argues that the district court erred by reserving Pederson’s motion to find
Meyer a frivolous litigant. Meyer contends that the district court only had the authority to
grant or deny Pederson’s motion and could not reserve ruling on the motion. 2 Because
Meyer points to no authority for his assertion that a district court cann ot reserve ruling on
an issue, we decline to address the issue. See Ganguli v. Univ. of Minn., 512 N.W.2d 918,
919 n.1 (Minn. App. 1994) (declining to address issue in absence of legal analysis or
citation). Moreover, even if the district court erred by reserving the issue, Meyer can show
no prejudice because he had the c hance to respond to Pederson’s motion and the district
court did not make an adverse ruling against him. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (stating that
harmless error is disregarded).
IV.
Meyer argues that the district court erred by finding that his motion for decla ratory
relief was not properly before the court and contends that his motion was heard by the
district court at a July 8, 2016 hearing.

2 Meyer also argues that he should not be foun d to be a frivolous litigant. Because the
district court did not make a dispositive ruling on Pederson’s motion, this argument is not
relevant to this appeal. See Jorgensen v. Knutson , 662 N.W.2d 893, 904 (Minn. 2003)
(“[Appellate court] review is limited to those issues decided by the lower court.”).

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Minnesota Rule of General Practice 303.01(b) provides that in family court “[a]ll
motions shall be accompanied by either an order to show cause . . . or by a notice of motion
which shall state, with particularity, the date, time, and place of the hearing.” Meyer failed
to schedule his motion for declaratory judgment to be heard at the July 8, 2016 hearing
where his contempt motion was heard. Though Meyer’s affidavit of e -filing and service
states that he served an amended notice of motion scheduling for a number of motions,
including the declaratory-judgment motion, the amended notice of motion scheduling only
lists the contempt motion.
Meyer notes that he briefly referred to his motion for declaratory jud gment at the
July 8 hearing. The fact that Meyer briefly referred to the motion for declaratory judgment
at that hearing does not necessarily mean it was heard at th at time or that it was properly
presented to the district court. Indeed, Pederson’s attorney did not make any argument at
the July 8 hearing regarding Meyer’s declaratory-judgment motion. Given the record, we
conclude that the district court did not err by determining that Meyer’s motion was not
properly before it.
V.
Meyer argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for permission to
obtain a passport for the child. However, the district court correctly noted that it had
previously ordered the parties to engage in mediation before bringi ng a motion before the
court. Because the parties did not attempt to resolve the passport dispute through ADR

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before Meyer moved for an order granting him permission to obtain a passport for the child,
we conclude that the district court did not err by denying his motion.
VI.
Meyer argues that the district court abused its discretion by declining to hold
Pederson in contempt for interfering with Meyer’s parenting time and not agr eeing to
attend ADR. We disagree.
The district court has broad discretion to hold a party in civil contempt, and we
review the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Crockarell v. Crockarell ,
631 N.W.2d 829, 833 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 200 1). In order
to hold an individual in contempt, the district court must find that the individual “acted
contumaciously, in bad faith, and out of disrespect for the judicial process.” Newstrand,
869 N.W.2d at 692 (quotations omitted). The purpose of holding a party in contempt is to
secure compliance with a court order, not to punish a party for failing to perform in the
past. Id.
First, Meyer contends that the district court should have held Pederson in contempt
for unreasonably denying him parenting time on two occasions. As stated above, the initial
decree provided that Meyer would have ten overnights each month with the child and that
Meyer would notify Pederson of his intention to exercise visitation other than the first ten
days of the month.
In late October 2015, Meyer informed Pederson that he wanted to exercise parenting
time from December 26, 2015, to January 3, 2016. Pederson stated that the child would

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not be available until December 28, 2015, due to the fact that she had made previous plans
for the child. In early April 2016, Meyer asked to exercise parenting time with the child
during the last weekend of April so that the child could attend a family event. Pederson
agreed that Meyer could exercise parenting time and pick up the child on that Saturday .
Meyer asked to exercise parenting time starting on Friday instead of Saturday, but Pederson
refused the request.
In declining to hold Pederson in contempt, the district court reasoned that Meyer
had no court-ordered right to the parenting time that he requested, that Pederson had made
some concessions to Meyer’s requests, and that Pederson had plans with the child pr ior to
Meyer’s request for parenting time.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to hold
Pederson in contempt. The disputes regarding parenting time that Meyer refer to arose due
to disagreements regarding the initial decree, which was described by the district court as
“ambiguous and the subject of much litigation.” Because Meyer had no court-ordered right
to the parenting time, the ambiguous initial decree has been replaced , and the purpose of
contempt is to se cure a party’s compliance with a court order, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in declining to hold Pederson in contempt for depriving him of
parenting time.
Meyer also argues that the district court should have held Pederson in contempt for
failing to comply with the ADR requirement, alleging that she refused to attend ADR
unless custody was excluded as an issue to mediate. In declining to hold Pederson in

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contempt, the district court reasoned that it was Meyer who was unwilling to attend
mediation unless Pederson agreed to submit the issues of legal and physical custody to the
process.
Evidently, Meyer’s position is that the language in the district court order providing
that “[a]ny future claim or controversy under this order regardin g custody, parenting time
or any other issue which cannot be resolved between the parties through direct
communication, shall be promptly submitted to an alternative dispute resolution process”
requires that all issues, even those previously determined by the district court, be submitted
to ADR whenever the parties have a dispute on any issue. As the district court stated, it is
not Pederson’s failure to agree to submit the district court’s custody determination to ADR
that is unreasonable; rather, it is Meyer’s demand that all issues be submitted to ADR that
is unreasonable. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining
to find Pederson in contempt.
Affirmed.