State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1709

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Sean Fitzgerald Pozzi,
Appellant.

Filed July 24, 2017
Reversed and remanded
Larkin, Judge

Redwood County District Court
File No. 64-CR-15-265

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Steven S. Collins, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Kalitowski, Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of fail ure to register as a predatory offender,
arguing that the district court committed reversible plain error by admitting evidence
regarding his prior criminal-sexual-conduct and failure-to-register convictions even though
he stipulated that he was required to register based on th ese convictions. We reverse and
remand for a new trial.
FACTS
In April 2015, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Sean F. Pozzi with
failing to register as a predatory offender. Pozzi is required to register as a predatory
offender because he was convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct in 1994 and
failure to register as a predatory offender in 2004. The complaint alleged that Pozzi “failed
to register his primary address as 703 Meadow Lane in Redwood Falls, Minnesota, when
he moved there in March 2015” and “failed to register [h]is employment information after
becoming employed at the Redwood Falls Nursery on or about March 18, 2015.”
The case was tried to a jury. Prior to opening statements, Pozzi’s counsel informed
the district court that “there would be a stipulation as to . . . the requirement that Mr. Pozzi
. . . is required to register . . . as a predatory offender.” The district court asked the parties
if the stipulation was to “exhibits [regarding Pozzi’s prior convictions] . . . without . . . the
underlying testimony concerning the nature [of] the conviction [s], . . . and that those
[exhibits] can be used a s substantive evidence for the jury to . . . evaluate whether the
State’s made its burden of proof on the first element.”
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The prosecutor agreed that the district court’s description of the stipulation was
accurate. The district court asked defense coun sel if “those exhibits would come in and
the jury would have those?” Defense counsel replied “Yes.” The district court reviewed
the proposed stipulation with Pozzi as follows:
THE COURT: . . . You understand that the first element of the
charge . . . is that the State has the burden of proving that
you’ve been convicted of . . . an offense that requires
registration?
POZZI: Correct.
THE COURT: And [in] many cases what the State does is they
bring an officer in from that offense, they testify as to t he
nature of the offense, the criminal process that was gone
through, the charge and then they admit evidence that way [s]o
the jury can evaluate whether or not there’s a predicate
offense?
POZZI: Correct.
THE COURT: You understand that by stipulating to those
prior offenses you’re taking that determination away from the
jury, you’re saying, “you know what, on the first element, I’m
going to admit, I’m going to acknowledge that I was supposed
to register.” Now, there’s benefits and there’s drawbacks of
doing that. One of the benefits, from your perspective, is the
jury is not going to hear about all the details of the prior
offenses. The drawback is that the State no longer has to prove
that element of that offense. Do you understand the, the nature
of your decision?

(Emphasis added.)
Pozzi asked the district court for clarification, and the district court responded as
follows:
THE COURT: If I can, I certainly will clarify it. You
understand that the State has . . . four (4) elements to prove in
this case. One (1) is that you’re required to register, two (2) is
that you knowingly violated that requirement, . . . the third is
that you’re still required to register, and the fourth is that it
occurred here in Redwood Co unty, between February and
4
April. So, the State . . . needs to prove those four (4) elements
to the jury. Following me so far?
POZZI: Yes, I am following.
THE COURT: Okay. You . . . and your attorney have indicated
that you want to stipulate to that first element.

Next, the district court asked Pozzi if he was “willing to stipulate” to the existence
of his 1994 second -degree criminal -sexual-conduct and 2004 predatory -registration
convictions, and Pozzi answered, “Correct.” The district court then stated, “Okay and that
. . . takes that away from the jury, the jury doesn’t need to make that decision anymore,
that you have those prior convictions, because you’re telling the jury with the stipulation
that, you know what, I have those prior convictions.” The district court again asked Pozzi
if he understood, and Pozzi answered “Yes, I understand.” After additional discussion, the
district court asked Pozzi, “And would you like to forego all the testimony about 1994 and
about 2004 and stipulate that you h ave those convictions?” Pozzi stated that he agreed to
stipulate to the 1994 and 2004 convictions.
During opening statements, the prosecutor told the jury that “Pozzi was convicted
of crimes in t he State of Minnesota that make[] him a predatory offender ,” specifically,
“[Pozzi] was convicted of Criminal Sexual Conduct in the Second Degree in 1994 and
Failure to Register as a Predatory Offender in 2004.”
During trial, the district court instructed the jury as follows, without objection:
Ladies and gentle men I’m going to read a stipulation or an
agreement into the record . . . for you. The Defendant has
stipulated or agreed . . . that he has a prior conviction for
Criminal Sexual Conduct in the Second Degree and a prior
conviction for Failure to Register as a Predatory Offender.
Exhibit Six (6) and Exhibit Seven (7) pursuant to stipulation
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are admitted as evidence in this matter and you will have those
exhibits during your deliberations.

Exhibit six was composed of a sentencing order and warrant of commitment for the
2004 registration offense and the complaint for the 1994 criminal-sexual-conduct offense.
Exhibit seven was composed of the complaint for the 2004 registration offense and Pozzi’s
plea petition for the 1994 criminal-sexual-conduct offense.
In closing arguments, the prosecutor again told the jury that Pozzi had convictions
of second-degree criminal sexual conduct and failure to register as a predatory offender,
which required him to register as a predatory offender. In its final instructions, the district
court instructed the jury that “‘[a] person required to register as a predatory offender’
includes a person who has been charged with and convicted of the offense of Criminal
Sexual Conduct in the 2nd Degree and Failure to Register as a Predatory Offender.”
The jury found Pozzi guilty as charged, and the district court sentenced him to serve
43 months in prison. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Minnesota’s predatory-offender-registration statute requires a person who has been
convicted of certain offenses to register as a predatory offender. Minn. Stat. § 243.166,
subd. 1b(a)(1)(iii) (2014). Pozzi was alleged to have violated Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd.
3(b) (2014), which provides that at least five days before living at a new primary address,
a person required to register must give “written notice of the new primary address to the
[person’s] assigned corrections agent or to the law enforcement authority w ith which the
person currently is registered.” Pozzi also was alleged to have violated Minn. Stat.
6
§ 243.166, subd. 3(c) (2014), which provides that a person required to register must provide
law enforcement with the address of the location where the person is employed within five
days of beginning employment.
We are asked to decide whether the district court commit ted reversible plain error
by admitting evidence regarding Pozzi’s prior convictions, which triggered his registration
obligation, even though Pozzi agreed to stipulate to the existence of those convictions .
Pozzi argues that because he stipulated that he had “prior convictions for criminal sexual
conduct and failure to register as a predatory offender that gave rise to his duty to register,
admission of evidence about these convictions, including a complaint and a sentencing
order admitted as trial exhibits in support of the stipulation, constituted prejudicial plain
error.” Pozzi contends that the district court “should have instructed the jury that [he] had
stipulated that he was a person who was required to register, which would have removed
the inherent prejudice of his prior convictions from the jury.”
The state counters that “the jury was presented a significant amount of evidence
regarding [Pozzi’s] failure to obey the predatory offender registration law” and that it is
“unlikely the exhibits, which [Pozzi] stipulated to, would have impacted the verdict.” The
state emphasizes that Pozzi agreed that exhibits six and seven would be admitt ed as
evidence. But the state concedes that this court may nonetheless review the admission of
these exhibits for plain error. See State v. Goelz , 743 N.W.2d 249, 258 (Minn. 2007)
(stating that the invited-error doctrine does not apply to plain errors).
Under the plain-error test, this court will not grant relief unless (1) there is an error,
(2) the error is plain, and (3) the error affected substantial rights. State v. Griller , 583
7
N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998 ). If these three prongs of the plain -error test are met, this
court may correct the error only if it is necessary to “ensure fairness and the integrity of
judicial proceedings.” Id. at 742.
The Stipulation
Before we begin our plain -error analysis, we must answer the following question:
what was the stipulation? The record on this point is somewhat ambiguous. On one hand,
the colloquy between the district court and the attorneys indicates that the parties agreed to
stipulate to the admission of certain exhibits, which could “be used as substantive evidence
for the jury to . . . evaluate whether the State’s made its burden of proof on the first
element.” On the other hand, the colloquy between the district court and Pozzi indicates
that Pozzi agreed to stipulate to the existence of his 19 94 second-degree criminal-sexual-
conduct and 2004 predatory-registration convictions and his resulting obligation to register
as a predatory offender. If so, Pozzi agreed to a stipulation that relieve d the state of its
burden of proof on an element of the charged offenses.
A defendant has “the right to a ‘jury determination that [he] is guilty of every
element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v.
Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d 844, 848 (Minn. 2011) (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S.
506, 510, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2313 (1995)). But a defendant may waive his right to a jury
trial, including a jury trial on an element of an offense , so long as his waiver is knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary. Id. In addition, the defendant must waive his right to a jury trial
personally. Id. The relevant procedural rule provides that
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[t]he defendant, with the approval of the court, may waive a
jury trial on the issue of guilt provided the defendant does so
personally, in writing or on the record in open court, after being
advised by the court of the right to trial by jury, and after
having had an opportunity to consult with counsel.

Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 1(2)a.
The district court’s colloquy with Pozzi sugge sts an attempt to comply with the
waiver requirements set forth above. The district court advised Pozzi that the state had the
burden to prove all of the elements of the charged offenses and informed Pozzi that his
stipulation would relieve the state of i ts burden of proof on one of the elements. In
response, Pozzi informed the district court that he would stipulate to the existence of his
1994 and 2004 convictions and his attendant obligation to register as a predatory offender.
The description of the proposed stipulation in the colloquy between the district court
and the attorneys was more limited, indicating that the parties merely intended to stipulate
to the admission of evidence that could be used to satisfy the state’s burden of proof.
However, that more limited stipulation would have been less beneficial to Pozzi, because
it would have allowed the jury to receive inherently prejudicial information regarding
Pozzi’s criminal history. As the supreme court has explained,
[A d efendant’s] stipulation to the previous -conviction
elements had the effect of protecting [ the defendant] from the
possibility that the jury might improperly use his previous
convictions as evidence that he committed the current offenses.
The stipulation prevented evidence of his criminal history from
being presented to the jury. . . As such, [ the defendant]
benefitted from the stipulation and was able to receive a fair
trial.

Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d at 853.
9
We believe Pozzi should receive the benefit of the stipulation that the district court
described to him and to which he personally agreed. We therefore treat the description of
the stipulation in the colloquy between the district court and Pozzi as controlling , and we
construe the stipulation as establishing the existence of Pozzi’s 1994 and 2004 convictions,
as well as his resulting obligation to register as a predatory offender . Th is stipulation
relieved the state of its burden of proof on the registration-requirement element of the
charged offense. Having determined the nature of Pozzi’s stipulation, w e now turn to the
plain-error analysis.
Error That Is Plain
The first two prongs of the plain -error test require error that is plain. Griller, 583
N.W.2d at 740. “An error is plain if it was clear or obvious. Usually this is shown if the
error contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d
294, 302 (Minn. 2006) (citations and quotations omitted).
Generally, a criminal defendant’s judicial adm ission or offer to stipulate does not
take away the state’s right to offer evidence regarding a point. See, e.g., State v. Wiley, 295
Minn. 411, 421, 205 N.W.2d 667, 675 (1973) (allowing evidence of quantity of seized
marijuana even where defendant offere d to stipulate to the quantity element) . However,
“[c]ases may arise where unduly prejudicial evidence, which is without relevance beyond
the defendant’s judicial admissions, should not be received.” Id. The reason for the general
rule “is that a defendant should not be able to unilaterally control . . . the need for relevant
evidence by offering to stipulate, particularly where the evidence sought to be excluded
10
would bear in any way upon any other issues not covered by th e stipulation.” State v.
Davidson, 351 N.W.2d 8, 10 (Minn. 1984) (quotation omitted).
An exception to the general rule arises if one of the elements of a charged offense
is the existence of a necessary predicate conviction. In such circumstances, the defendant
may want to stipulate to the existence of his prior conviction because the “ stipulation to
the previous-conviction elements [has] the effect of protecting [ the defendant] from the
possibility that the jury might improperly use his previous convic tions as evidence that he
committed the current offenses.” See Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d at 853.
For example, “in a prosecution for being a felon in possession of a weapon the
defendant should be permitted to remove the issue of whether he is a convicted fel on by
stipulating to that fact.” Davidson, 351 N.W.2d at 11. “In the vast majority of such cases
the potential of the evidence for unfair prejudice clearly outweighs its probative value.”
Id. Thus, the district court in Davidson erred by refusing to ac cept the defendant’s
stipulation that he had a prior felony conviction , which would have removed that element
of the offense from the jury’s consideration. Id. at 10-12. The district court had reasoned
that it lacked authority to allow the stipulation. Id. at 11. The supreme court disagreed and
explained that in such situations, “the correct approach under the Rules of Evidence . . . is
to compare the potential of the evidence for unfair prejudice with the relevance of the
evidence to issues other than the issue to which the stipulation relates.” Id. at 11-12; see
Minn. R. Evid. 403 (stating that relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice”). The supreme court held
that the district court should have allowed the proffered stipulation and should have
11
instructed the jury “to the effect that [the] defendant had stipulated that under Minnesota
law he was not entitled to possess a pistol and that therefore the jury shoul d direct its
attention to the issue of whether or not the state had established beyond a reasonable doubt
that he possessed the pistol.” Id. at 12.
The supreme court relied on the reasoning of Davidson in State v. Berkelman, an
aggravated driving-while-impaired case, and held that the district court erred by refusing
to let the defendant use a stipulation to remove the prior-conviction element of the offense
from the jury’s consideration. 355 N.W.2d 394, 395, 397 (Minn. 1984). The supreme
court explained that “[w]hen the jury is told that a defendant charged with [aggravated]
driving while under the influence has a prior conviction for driving while under the
influence, the risk is considerable that the jury will use the evidence in determining whether
the defendant is guilty.” Id. at 397 n.2.
This court applied the reasoning of Davidson and Berkelman in State v. Wemyss ,
stating, “[a] criminal defendant has a right to keep potentially prejudicial evidence of [a]
prior conviction from the jury, even when that conviction is an element of the offense, by
stipulating to the prior conviction and removing the issue from the case.” 696 N.W.2d 802,
808 (Minn. App. 2005) (quotation omitted), rev’d on other grounds, No. A04-1001 (Minn.
Aug. 16, 2005) (mem.). This court held that “[a] defendant charged with failing to register
as a predatory offender has a right to stipulate to the prior conviction(s) creating a duty for
him to register.” Id. at 805. This court noted that “‘[i]n the vast majority of . . . cases the
potential of . . . evidence [of a prior felony conviction ] for unfair prejudice clearly
outweighs its probative value.’” Id. at 808 (quoting Davidson, 351 N.W.2d at 11). “The
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same may be said with even greater force of evidence of a prior conviction for a sex offense
or ‘predatory offense.’” Id.
Wemyss is analogous to this case because Wemyss was charged with failing to
register as a predatory offender and he stipulated that he was required to register. Id. at
806. On appeal from his conviction, Wemyss argued that the district court erred by
admitting certain exhibits that included the labels “sex offender” and “predatory offender”
because the exhibits undermined his stipulation. Id. at 807. This court concluded that “the
district court abused its discretion in admitting the exhibits without redacting [the sex -
offender and predatory-offender] references,” reasoning that “the purpose of the stipulation
was to keep from the j ury Wemyss’s prior conviction. Consequently, to label him a
‘predatory offender’ or ‘sex offender’ undermined that stipulation.” Id. at 809.
Wemyss also argued that one of the exhibits violated his stipulation because it
explained “the details of [his] underlying conviction, sexual penetration with a 14-year-old
neighborhood girl.” Id. This court agreed stating, “[t]he exhibit violated the stipulation by
going into the details of [Wemyss’s] conviction and was not relevant to the element of the
offense that Wemyss did not stipulate to.” Id. This court therefore concluded that “the
district court abused its discretion by admitting [the challenged exhibit] without redacting
the offending language.” Id.
Although this court concluded that the district court erred by admitting evidence
that undermined Wemyss’s stipulation, it ultimately affirmed his conviction, reasoning that
“the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 810. The supreme court
reversed and remanded this court’s decision in Wemyss for application of the correct
13
harmless-error standard. State v. Wemyss, No. A04 -1001, 2006 WL 9518, at *1 (Minn.
App. Jan. 3, 2006), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2006). In doing so, the supreme court
did not consider or disturb this court’s conclusion that the district court erred by failing to
redact the “sex offender” and “predatory offender” language from certain exhibits or by
failing to redact the description of Wemy ss’s prior offense from another exhibit. State v.
Wemyss, A04-1001 (Minn. Aug. 16, 2005) (mem.). On remand, this court again concluded
that the evidentiary errors were harmless and affirmed Wemyss’s conviction, but we did
so in an unpublished opinion. Wemyss, 2006 WL 9518, at *4.
The rule from these cases is clear: If a defendant charged with failing to register as
a predatory offender stipulates to the existence of the prior conviction(s) creating his duty
to register, evidence regarding the convicti on(s) is not admissible unless it is relevant to
some other disputed issue and the probative value of the evidence is not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. It is a question of admissibility under Minn.
R. Evid. 403, which provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Davidson, 351 N.W.2d at
11-12 (stating that the correct approach “is to compare the potential of the evidence for
unfair prejudice with the relevance of the evidence to issues other than the issue to which
the stipulation relates ”); see Berkelman, 355 N.W.2d at 397 (relying on the reasoning of
Davidson); Wemyss, 696 N.W.2d 808 (stating that the issue was “whether the value of the
exhibits was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice”).
Pozzi stipulated that he has the predicate convictions that established his obligation
to register. The state does not argue that exhibits six and seven were relevant to any issue
14
other than Pozzi’s obligation to register based on his prior convictions. However, the risk
of unfair prejudice from the evidence was significant. See Berkelman, 355 N.W.2d at 397
n.2 (noting that “the risk is considerable” that the jury will use the pr edicate-conviction
evidence in determining whether the defendant is guilty of the charged crime); Davidson,
351 N.W.2d at 11 (stating that in the “vast majority of such cases” the potential for unfair
prejudice clearly outweighs the probative value of predicate-conviction evidence ). The
risk of unfair prejudice was even greater because the evidence regarded “a prior conviction
for a sex offense or ‘predatory offense.’” Wemyss, 696 N.W.2d at 808.
We note that the state limits its plain-error argument to the third prong of the plain-
error test, seemingly conceding that admission of exhibits six and seven constitutes error
that is plain. We agree. Given Pozzi’s stipulation to the existence of his prior convictions,
the probative value of exhibits six and seven is not apparent and was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The district court plainly erred by admitting
these exhibits at trial.
Effect of Error on Substantial Rights
Having determined that the admission of exhibits six and seven constitutes plain
error, we must next determine whether the error affected Pozzi’s substantial rights. “An
error affects substantial rights if the error is prejudicial —that is, if there is a reasonable
likelihood that the error substantially affected the verdict.” State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d
681, 688 (Minn. 2002) . The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that the third prong of
15
the plain-error test is satisfied “if [the error] had the effect of depriving the defendant of a
fair trial.” State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 863 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
Pozzi argues that “[t]he jury heard repeatedly that [he] was a convicted sex offender
and a predatory offender who had been convicted once already of failure to register — the
exact same offense for which he was on trial.” Pozzi argues that the “danger of such
evidence is that the jury will use it as propensity evidence when deciding whether [he] was
guilty of the charged offense.” See Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d at 8 53. Pozzi contends th at
“[g]iven that the trial court did not caution the jury against using the improperly -admitted
evidence for this purpose, it is reasonable to assume this evidence also substantially
influenced the jury’s verdict.” Cf. State v. Scruggs , 822 N.W.2d 631, 64 5 (Minn. 2012)
(noting that cautionary instructions reduced the risk of unfair prejudice resulting from
admission of evidence regarding defendant’s prior assault convictions).
Pozzi persuasively argues that exhibits six and seven “contained highly preju dicial
facts.” For example, the complaint regarding the criminal-sexual-conduct offense alleged
that Pozzi repeatedly engaged in sexual contact with three different minors with whom he
lived, Pozzi repeatedly “expose[d] his penis” to at least two of those minors, police stopped
Pozzi in a stolen car, and Pozzi admitted he had engaged in some of the alleged sexual
contact. The district court did not provide any limiting or cautionary instruction to mitigate
the prejudicial impact of the exhibits. Instead, the district court emphasized the prejudicial
evidence, instructing the jury that it could consider exhibits six and seven , as well as
Pozzi’s prior convictions, in deciding whether he was guilty.
16
When a defendant stipulates to an element of an offense requiring the existence of
a predicate conviction, the district court should simply instruct the jury that the defendant
has stipulated that the element has been established. See, e.g., State v. Harris, ___ N.W.2d
___, ___, No. A15 -0711, slip op. at 4 (Minn. May 24, 2017) (“At trial [on a charge of
possession of a firearm by an ineligible person ], the parties stipulated that [the defendant]
was ineligible to possess a firearm, so the only issue the jury considered was whether [the
defendant] possessed t he firearm.”); Davidson, 351 N.W.2d at 12 (stating that when a
defendant stipulates that he is ineligible to possess a pistol, the district court should instruct
“the jury to the effect that [the] defendant had stipulated that under Minnesota law he was
not entitled to possess a pistol”).
Instead of simply instructing the jury that Pozzi had stipulated that he was required
to register, the district court instructed the jury that it should consider evidence regarding
Pozzi’s prior convictions in deciding w hether Pozzi was guilty , undermining the purpose
of the stipulation. In doing so, the district court exacerbated the prejudice resulting from
the erroneous admission of exhibits six and seven. In addition, the prosecutor mentioned
that Pozzi was convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct and failure to register
as a predatory offender during his opening statement and closing argument, further
exacerbating the prejudicial effect of the evidentiary error.
The state counters that the “evidence against [Pozzi] was strong” and argues that it
is unlikely that the evidence regarding Pozzi’s prior con viction impacted the verdict. We
acknowledge that the state presented strong evidence of Pozzi’s guilt. However, strong
evidence of guilt will not always defeat a defendant’s attempt to satisfy the third prong of
17
the plain-error test. For example, i n Strommen, the supreme court reversed this court’s
refusal to find plain error where the evidence of guilt “was ‘so strong’ that the error would
not have affected the outcome of the case.” 648 N.W.2d at 686. In doing so, the supreme
court held that “[t]he admission of irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence of other bad
acts by the [defendant] denied the [defendant] a fair trial and constituted plain e rror that
affected the [defendant’s] substantial rights.” Id. at 682. The supreme court explained that
the evidence regarding the defendant’s involvement in other crimes was “highly
prejudicial” because it portrayed the defendant “as a person of bad char acter and the jury
may have been motivated to punish [the defendant] for his other bad acts.” Id. at 6 87.
Exhibits six and seven have the same effect in this case.
Despite the strong evidence of guilt, we cannot overlook the significant evidentiary
error in this case and the improper prejudicial effect it inevitably had on the jury’s
determination of guilt. We fail to see how the jury could have objectivel y assessed and
weighed the state’s evidence without being influenced by the highly prejudicial
information in exhibits six and seven, which was highlighted by the district court and
prosecutor throughout the trial. Under the circumstances of this case, the admission of
irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence regarding Pozzi’s criminal history denied him a
fair trial and constituted plain error that affected his substantial rights.
Fairness and Integrity of the Judicial Proceedings
We last consider whether we should correct the error because it seriously affects the
“fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings.” Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 742. We conclude
that it does.
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Pozzi stipulated that he was required to register as a predatory offender based on his
prior convictions to keep evidence regarding the convictions from the jury. There is a
significant disconnect between the district court advisory that supported Pozzi’s decision
to stipulate and the introduction of exhibits six and seven at trial. The district court
informed Pozzi that the proposed stipulation would take the registration -requirement
element away from the jury and that the “jury is not going to hear about all the details of
the prior offenses.” The district court nonetheless admitted exhibits six and seven, which
contained highly prejudicial details regarding the prior offenses . The district court also
instructed the jury that it could consider Pozzi’s “prior conviction for Criminal Sexual
Conduct in the Second Degree and a prior conviction for Failure to Register as a Predatory
Offender,” as well as exhibits six and seven, in det ermining Pozzi’s guilt. These actions
were inconsistent with the district court’s advisory to Pozzi, and they rendered Pozzi’s
stipulation meaningless. Under the circumstances, the evidentiary error seriously affect s
the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings, and it should be corrected.
Conclusion
Because Pozzi stipulated to the existence of his 1994 and 2004 convictions and his
resulting obligation to register as a predatory offender, t he admission of irrelevant and
highly prejudicial evidence regarding these convictions is plain error that affected Pozzi’s
substantial rights. And because the error seriously affect s the fairness and integrity of the
judicial proceedings, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.