In re the Marriage of: Laurie S. Morris Hiniker a/k/a Laurie Suzette Morris, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1716

In re the Marriage of:
Laurie S. Morris Hiniker a/k/a Laurie Suzette Morris, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Robert Lee Hiniker,
Appellant.

Filed February 4, 2019
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Smith, John, Judge*

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-F1-06-001882

Victoria M.B. Taylor, Crossroads Legal Services, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Brian L. Sobol, McGrann Shea Carnival Straughn & Lamb, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, JOHN, Judge
We reverse and remand the district court’s award of permanent spousal maintenance
to wife and the statutory interest on a marital lien ; and reverse the monetary judgment for
the value of certain personal property because the record does not support these awards.
We affirm the district c ourt’s orders apportioning debt, denying the husband ’s motion to
reopen the dissolution judgment , and awarding wife conduct -based attorney fees and
denying husband’s motion for attorney fees because the district court did not abuse its
discretion with respect to these orders.
FACTS
The district court dissolved the marriage of appellant-husband Robert Lee Hiniker
and respondent-wife Laurie S. Morris Hiniker a/k/a Laurie Suzette Morris pursuant to an
amended judgment and decree on August 26, 2008.
The judgment and decree addressed wife’s request for an award of spousal
maintenance. Wife was employed as a waitress during the marriage, but was unemployed
at the time of the divorce and did not have an income. The district court found that wife
was voluntarily unemployed and capable of earning a gr oss monthly income of $1,725.
Husband was employed as a chef and a hardwood floor sander and installer. Husband was
self-employed for three years before the divorce and worked with wife’s brother. Husband
and wife’s brother ceased operating their business in December 2007, and husband
continued to work in the flooring industry. The district court found that husband was
voluntarily underemployed and had the experience and capacity to earn $40,00 0 per year.

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Based upon the parties’ financial circumstances, t he district court found that husband did
not have the ability to pay spousal maintenance and meet his own needs. The district court
therefore reserved the issue of spousal maintenance based up on its finding that husband
lacked the ability to pay spousal maintenance.
The parties owned a home in Roseville. Husband claimed a non-marital interest in
the homestead, but the court found that he failed to trace his non -marital interest by a fair
preponderance of the evidence. The court found that husband lacked the ability to satisfy
a lien on the property at the time of the di vorce without jeopardizing the minor child’s
homestead. The court noted that the child was 14 years old at the time of the divorce, and
that the lien would be satisfied “within a reasonable period of time.” The court awarded
all of the parties’ right, title, interest, and equity in the homestead to husband. The
homestead award was subject to a lien in favor of wife, which was to come due “at such
time as the homestead is sold, refinanced, or the parties’ minor child is emancipated,
whichever shall occur first.” Wife was awarded a marital lien against the real property,
representing her interest in that real property, in the amount of $56,576. A Summary Real
Estate Disposition Judgment was entered on March 5, 2009. The minor child was born in
1993 and reached the age of majority in 2011, although it is not clear from the record when
he became emancipated.
The court also addressed the personal property and debts of the parties. The court
awarded each party his or her personal property, except for certain items set forth i n a list
signed by the parties. The court found that the parties accumulated debts and obligations
during their marriage, including the following credit card balances: $10,800 on BOA Visa,

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$23,000 on AAA Visa, and $6,500 on AT&T. The court held that husband and wife were
equally liable for one-half of the total sum of $40,300.
In 2009, wife moved for judgment against husband for $13,650, asserting that
husband failed to pay his share of the marital debt. The district court denied the request on
June 1, 2009, noting that:
[t]he BOA and AAA Visa accounts are in [wife’s] name only.
The AT&T debt is in [husband’s] name only. [Wife] is paying
on the two Visa accounts but [husband] is not contributing at
all. If [husband] is solely responsible for the AT&T debt, then
he should pay at least $13,650 on the Visa accounts.
However, the court held that there was “insufficient evidence to conclude that [wife] has
made any or all of the payments due on these accounts. [Husband] is correct that the Court
cannot grant a judgment of $13,650 as a matter of law.”
In March 2016, wife moved to enforce and satisf y the terms of the judgment and
decree. Wife sought (1) judgment of $56,576 plus interest, (2) the release of personal
property in husband’s possession, (3) an award of $3,500 a month in spousal maintenance,
and (4) conduct-based attorney fees. Husband filed a responsive motion seeking to reopen
the property division of the judgment and decree and asking for an attorney-fee award. The
court issued an order on August 31, 2016, denying husband’s request to reopen the property
division and partially granting wife’s request ed relief. Specifically, the district court
granted wife’s motion to order husband to satisfy the lien on the marital homestead,
partially granted wife’s motion for a money judgment for the value of personal property
awarded to her in the judgment and decree, and ordered husband to pay wife spousal
maintenance and attorney fees.

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With respect to enforcement of the marital lien, the district court determined that it
was fair and equitable for husband to immediately refinance the home or otherwise fully
satisfy the amount owed to wife in the amount of $56,576, plus ten percent per annum
statutory interest from October 30, 2011 —the date the chil d turned eighteen —until
satisfaction of the lien. The court also awarded permanent spousal maintenance to wife in
the amount of $2,500 per month. The court ordered husband to satisfy the parties’
consumer debt, including $5,400 to BOA Visa, $11,500 to AA A Visa, and $3,250 to
AT&T.
Husband appealed the August 31, 2016 entry of judgment regarding the marital lien,
the award of spousal maintenance, and the denial of his request to reopen the June 2008
property division. We questioned whether the August 31 , 2016 order was appealable, as
the district court administrator’s register of actions did not reflect entry of judgment . On
November 9, 2016, the district court filed Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
Order for Judgment, and Judgment, ordering that judgment be entered immediately. We
subsequently allowed the appeal to proceed and construed the appeal as taken from the
August 31, 2016 order and the judgment entered November 9, 2016. Husband appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The District Court’s Spo usal-Maintenance Award Is Reversed and
Remanded.
Husband challenges the district court’s permanent spousal -maintenance award of
$2,500 per month to wife. We review a district court’s spousal-maintenance award for an
abuse of discretion. Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn. 1982). A district

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court abuses its discretion when its resolution of the matter is “against logic and the facts
on record.” Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984). We review a district court’s
factual findings r egarding spousal maintenance for clear error. Maiers v. Maiers , 775
N.W.2d 666, 668 (Minn. App. 2009). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous where an
appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”
Goldman v. Greenwood , 748 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). In
determining whether findings are clearly erroneous , we view the record in the light most
favorable to the district court’s findings. Vangsness v. Vangsness , 607 N.W.2d 468, 472
(Minn. App. 2000).
Spousal maintenance is “an award made in a dissolution . . . proceeding of payments
from the future income or earnings of one spouse for the support and maintenance of the
other.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3a ( 2018). A district court may award spousal
maintenance if it finds that the party seeking maintenance “lacks sufficient property,
including marital property apportioned to the spouse, to provide for [the] reasonable needs
of the spouse” or “is unable to provide ad equate self -support . . . through appropriate
employment.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1(a), (b) (201 8); Lyon v. Lyon , 439 N.W.2d
18, 22 (Minn. 1989) (noting that “[m]aintenance depends on a showing of need”). The
district court considers “all relevant factors” in arriving at a spousal -maintenance award,
including (1) “the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance” and that party’s
ability to meet his or her needs independently; (2) the time required for the party seeking
maintenance to acquir e sufficient education or training to find appropriate employment;
(3) the marital standard of living; (4) the length of the marriage and, “in the case of a

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homemaker, the length of absence from employment and the extent to which any education,
skills, or experience have become outmoded and earning capacity has become permanently
diminished”; (5) the loss of employment opportunities and benefits foregone by the party
seeking maintenance; (6) the age and health of the party seeking maintenance; (7) the
ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his or her own needs while
meeting the needs of the spouse requesting maintenance; and (8) the contribution of each
party to the acquisition and preservation of the marital property, “as well as the contribution
of a spouse as a homemaker.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2018). “No single factor is
dispositive.” Maiers, 775 N.W.2d at 668. The district court must balance the financial
needs of the spouse seeking maintenance and his/her ability to meet those needs against
the financial condition of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought. See Erlandson,
318 N.W.2d at 39-40.
The 2008 judgment and decree reserved the issue of spousal maintenance. The
district court revisited the question of spousal maintenance in its August 2016 order and
began its analysis by calculating the gross income of the parties. Gross income includes
self-employment income. Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a) (201 8). Self-employment income is
defined as “gross receipts minus costs of goods sold minus ordinary and necessary
expenses required for self -employment or business operation.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.30
(2018). This definition “does not turn on whether the corporation has ‘distributed’ the
funds, or whether the funds are ‘available’” to the individual. Haefele v. Haefele , 837
N.W.2d 703, 712 (Minn. 2013) (making this statement in a child-support dispute).

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Here, husband is self -employed in the flooring industry. The district court found
that husband had a net income of $4,745 per month. But this award is not supported by tax
returns or other documentary evidence of husband’s income or expenses. Husband’s 2015
tax records reflected that husband only had a reported net income of $28,470 per year , or
$2,372.50 per month. The court noted that husband’s 2015 Federal Tax Return, Schedule
K-1 Form, showed $64,750 in gross receipts or sales and further showed that husband held
a 100-percent stock ownership in his hardwood flooring company . The court f ound that
some of husband’s jobs were performed for cash . The court based this finding on an
affidavit submitted by wife and created by her brother —husband’s former business
partner—stating that husband had a history of performing jobs for unreported cash. Based
upon this affidavit, the court found that husband had a net monthly income of $4,745 and
had the ability to pay wife spousal maintenance of $2,500 per month.
The court’s factual findings are unsupported by the record. “A district court’s
determination of income for maintenance purposes is a finding of fact and is not set aside
unless clearly erroneous.” Peterka v. Peterka, 675 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Minn. App. 2004).
The district court’s factual findings related to husband’s income are clearly erroneous here.
The district court’s determination that husband earned a monthly income of $4,7 45 was
not substantiated by tax returns or other documentary evidence of his income or expenses.
And the court does not explain how it arrived at this number. The court seems to have
relied solely on an affidavit from husband’s former brother-in-law and business partner .
The court did not give husband the opportunity to respond to the assertions raised in the
affidavit. “Due process requires that a hearing be ‘fair, practicable, and reasonable. ’”

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Ertl v. Ertl, 871 N.W.2d 410, 417 (Minn. App. 2015) ( quoting Haefele, 621 N.W.2d at
764). Husband was prejudiced by the court’s reliance on the affidavit, which he had no
opportunity to meaningfully respond to, and “[ n]otice and hearing are the fundamental
aspects of due process.” Id. (quotation omitted). The district court’s findings related to
husband’s income and expenses are clearly erroneous.
The court’s spousal-maintenance award is also erroneous. The court found that wife
worked full -time as a waitress and had a monthly net t ake-home income of $1,697.69.
However, the court found that wife was subject to a judgment lien garnishment equal to
25% of her monthly paychecks. Wife submitted a garnishment summon s and a notice of
levy of earnings and disclosure, showing unpaid judgment balances on two credit cards.
The district court awarded wife $2,500 per month in spousal maintenance to meet her basic
needs and satisfy these debt obligations. We determine thes e findings are erroneous
because there was no basis in the record to grant wife $2,500 per month i n permanent
spousal maintenance.
We determine that the district court erred by improperly considering wife’s
brother’s affidavit without giving husband the opportunity to respond. Husband’s affidavit
should be reviewed for a determination of whether the proper amount of income was
considered, and whether husband has the ability to contribute to wife’s support. We
therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
II. The District Court’s Statutory-Interest Award Is Reversed and Remanded.
Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion by entering judgment
against husband for the marital lien against the homestead, plus ten-percent interest

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retroactive to October 30, 2011, the date the marital lien was due . Marital liens are a
method of distributing property in a dissolution proceeding. Bakken v. Helgeson , 785
N.W.2d 791, 794 (Minn. App. 2010). As such, liens are not an interest in real property,
but rather are personal property in and of themselves. Id. at 795. “Generally, a lien secures
an underlying obligation.” See Nelson v. Nelson, 806 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Minn. App. 2011);
see also Minn. Stat. § 514.99, subd. 1(b) (2018) (defining a lien as “an encumbrance on
property as security for the payment of debt”). Whether to grant a personal judgment
following the extinguishment of a lien is discretionary with the district court. See Nelson
806 N.W.2d at 871.
“The application and interpretation of a statute are questions of law which we review
de novo.” Redleaf v. Redleaf , 807 N.W.2d 731, 733 (Minn. App. 2011). The object of
statutory construction is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn.
Stat. § 645.16 (2018). “If the Legislature’s intent is discernible from the statute’s plain and
unambiguous language, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of
pursuing its spirit.” State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn. 2015).
The 2008 judgment and decree awarded wife a marital lien against the parties’
homestead in the amount of $56,576, representing her interest in the real property. The
lien came due “at such time as the homestead is sold, refinanced, or the parties’ minor child
is emancipated, whichever shall occur first.” In March 2016, wife sought an order for the
home to be sold or refinanced to satisfy the lien, which remained unpaid. In August 2016,
the court ordered husband to immediately refinance the home or otherwise fully satisfy the
amount owed to wife in the amount of $56,576, plus ten-percent interest from October 30,

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2011—the date the marital lien was due —and until the lien was satisfied. Judgment was
entered on November 9, 2016.
Husband argu es that the district court erred by applying the pre -2015 judgment
interest rate retroactively to October 2011, because the marital lien was not an interest in
real property and judgment was not entered until November 2016 . We agree. Interest on
the debt secured by a marital lien is an important component of an award. See Bakken, 785
N.W.2d at 795. In 2011, Minnesota Statutes section 549.09 provided that “[f]or a judgment
or award over $50,000 . . . the interest rate shall be ten percent per year until paid.” Id.,
subd. 1(c)(2) (2010). The statute was amended in 2015 , and now provides that for “ a
judgment or award in a family court action, regardless of the amount, the interest shall be
computed as simple interest per annum.” Id., subd. 1(c)(1)(i) (2018).
Wife argues that the ten-percent interest award was appropriate under Redleaf. But
wife ignores Redleaf’s instruction that post-judgment interest at the statutory rate does not
begin to accrue un til the payor spouse’s “overdue obligation” is reduced to a money
judgment. 807 N.W.2d at 735. And Minnesota law is clear that a marital lien is not a
judgment lien. Bakken, 785 N.W.2d at 794. Thus, the marital lien awarded in the 2008
judgment and decree did not automatically become a judgment in October 2011, as wife
contends. It is uncontested that husband’s obligation was not reduced to a judgment until
November 9, 2016.
Once a judgment is entered for the recovery of money, Minnesota law provides that
“interest shall accrue on the unpaid balance of the judgment or award from the time that it
is entered or made until it is paid, ” consistent with subdivision 1. Minn. Stat. § 549.09,

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subd. 2 (2018). Thus, the judgment entered November 9, 2016, was subject to the interest
rate governed by Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(c)(i) which, as of 2015, was computed as
simple interest per annum. “The district court d oes not have the discretion to ignore the
unambiguous statutory mandate of Minn. Stat. § 549.09 ,” and award a higher rate of
interest. See Redleaf, 807 N.W.2d at 735. By awarding wife a higher rate of interest than
contemplated by the statute as written in 2015 , and by awarding interest retroactive to
October 2011, the district court impermissibly modified husband’s substantive rights. See
Ulrich v. Ulrich , 400 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Minn. App. 1987) (determining that
implementation or enforcement of original provisions of a divorce judgment is allowable
“so long as it does not change the parties’ substantive rights”). Accordingly, we determine
that the district court erred by awarding a higher rate of interest than permitted under the
statute in effect at the time judgment was entered in 2016, and we reverse and remand for
recalculation of interest, calculated as simple interest per annum from November 9, 2016.
III. The District Court’s Personal Property Award Is Reversed.
Husband argues that the district court erred by awarding wife a monetary judgment
for the value of personal property awarded to wife in the judgment and decree. Generally,
a district court “may not modify a division of property after the original judgment has been
entered and the time for appeal has expired.” Erickson v. Erickson, 452 N.W.2d 253, 255
(Minn. App. 1990) . But a district c ourt may issue appropriate orders to implement or
enforce specific provisions of the dissolution decree, provided the district court does not
change the parties’ substantive rights . Id.; see also Hanson v. Hanson, 379 N.W.2d 230,
233 (Minn. App. 1985). This includes the district court’s ability to convert an interest from

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goods to cash in order to fairly implement a dissolution judgment. Hanson, 379 N.W.2d
at 233 (affirming district court ’s conversion of one party ’s share of marital property to a
cash award after parties were unable to divide property).
The judgment and decree awarded personal property to each party, including items
of personal property identified in a list created by the parties. Wife maintained that she did
not receive severa l personal items in husband’s possession, which were inadvertently
destroyed, and requested $5,190. The district court found that wife did not provide credible
documentary support for this request. The district court determined that wife’s interest in
the goods should be converted to the monetary value of the property. The court found it
difficult to ascertain the value of wife’s property, given the passage of time and wife’s
inability to ascribe precise values to the items, and awarded wife $1,000.
A district court’s valuation of an asset is a finding of fact and will not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous. Hertz v. Hertz, 229 N.W.2d 42, 44 (Minn. 1975). “A finding is
clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conv iction that a
mistake has been made.” Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 472 (quotation omitted). “[V]aluation
is necessarily an approximation in many cases, and it is only necessary that the value
arrived at lies within a reasonable range of figures.” Hertz, 229 N.W.2d at 44. “Thus, the
market valuation determined by the trier of fact should be sustained if it falls within the
limits of credible estimates made by competent witnesses even if it does not coincide
exactly with the estimate of any one of them.” Id.
We have reviewed the record and determine that the district court’s monetary award
was erroneous because it is not supported by the evidence in the record . Although wife

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requested $5,190 for the destroyed items, she failed to introduce evidence support ing this
request. The district court awarded wife $1,000, but failed to provide any explanation as
to how it arrived at this number. Because the factual findings do not contain “the requisite
degree of competent evidentiary support” of valuation, we determine that the district court
erred and we reverse. Hertz, 229 N.W.2d at 44.
IV. The District Court’s Order Regarding the Division of Debt Is Affirmed.
Husband challenges the district court’s division of debt ordered in the judgment and
decree. The time to appeal the amended judgment and decree has long expired. See Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 104.01, subd. 1 (“Unless a different time is provided by statute, an appeal
may be taken from a judgment within 60 days after its entry.”).
Husband’s claim is also meritles s. “District courts have broad discretion over the
division of marital property and appellate courts will not alter a district court’s property
division absent a clear abuse of discretion or an erroneous application of the law.” Sirek v.
Sirek, 693 N.W.2d 896, 898 (Minn. App. 2005). In dividing marital debts, the district court
follows the same principles that it follows when dividing marital property. Dahlberg v.
Dahlberg, 358 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. App. 1984). We review the district court’s
assignment of marital debt for an abuse of discretion. Antone v. Antone, 645 N.W.2d 96,
100 (Minn. 2002).
In the 2008 judgment and decree, the district court found that the parties had
“accumulated various debts and obligations du ring the term of their marriage ” and
determined that each party was “equally liable for one half of the total sum” of $40,300, or
$20,150 each. In 2016, the court reaffirmed that each party was responsible for one-half

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of the marital debt under the terms of the judgment and decree. The court ordered husband
to “immediately comply” with the 2008 judgment and decree and “begin to make
payments” on his one-half of the marital debt.
Husband argues that the district court’s determination is erroneous because a portion
of the credit card debt may have been partially resolved during the course of wife’s
bankruptcy proceeding, and because he made payments toward some of the debt. We do
not find this argument persuasive. The court noted that husband “testified that he has not
paid any portion of the marital debt ” on the BOA and AAA accounts , and husband does
not contest this finding. Husband’s responsibility remains the same as it did under the 2008
judgment and decree, and the district court acted within its discretion by enforcing specific
provisions of the 2008 judgment and decree. See Erickson 452 N.W.2d at 255-56
(observing that district court may, in its discretion, issue an order that enforces specific
provisions of the judgment and decree as long as the order does not alter the terms of the
original judgment and decree or affect the parties’ substantive rights).
Because husband’s challenge is untimely and the district court’s 2016 order
regarding the division of marital debt did not alter the parties’ substantive rights under the
2008 judgment and decree, we conclude that the district court’s order constituted a proper
enforcement of the original order, and we affirm.
V. The District Court’s Denial of Husband’s Motion to Reopen the Judgment
and Decree Is Affirmed.
Husband challenges the district court’s order denying his request to reopen the
judgment and decree and recalculate the lien. “Subject to the right of appeal, a dissolution

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judgment and decree is final when entered, unl ess in a timely motion a party establishes a
statutory basis for reopening the judgment and decree.” Knapp v. Knapp, 883 N.W.2d 833,
835 (Minn. App. 2016) (quotation and citation omitted). We apply an abuse-of-discretion
standard of review to a district court’s decision not to reopen a judgement and decree.
Kornberg v. Kornberg, 542 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Minn. 1996).
“The sole relief from [a dissolution] judgment and decree lies in meeting the
requirements of Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2.” Knapp, 803 N.W.2d at 835 (quoting Shirk
v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn. 1997)). On motion, Minnesota Statutes section
518.145 permits a district court to relieve a party from a dissolution judgment based on
“mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” or if it is “no longer equitable” that
the judgment “should have prospective application.” Id., subd s. 2 (1), (5) ( 2018).
Subdivision 2(5) applies “when injustice in the prospective application of a divorce decree
is due to the development of circumstances substantially altering the information on a topic
that was accepted earlier, when the subject was addressed in a marital -termination
agreement and in an ensuing judgment.” Harding v. Harding, 620 N.W.2d 920, 924 (Minn.
App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2001).
The district court denied husband’s request to reopen the judgment and decree under
section 518.145, subdivision 2(5), to recalculate the homestead lien in light of the purported
decline in the value of the home. Section 518.145, subdivis ion 2(5) , “is not a catchall
provision.” Id. Instead, the party seeking to reopen a dissolution judgment “must present
more than merely a new set of circumstances or an unforeseen change of a known

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circumstance to reopen a judgment and decree.” Thompson v. Thompson, 739 N.W.2d 424,
430-31 (Minn. App. 2007).
Here, husband argues that the home declined 11% in value since the 2008 judgment
and decree, and that such diminution constitutes an unforeseen change. Husband relied on
a real estate appraisal from 2011, but did not provide a current appraisal of the home.
Absent a showing of circumstances altering the information known to the parties at the
time of the judgment and decree, the district court did not have evidence satisfying the
requirements of sub division 2(5). Cf. Harding, 620 N.W.2d at 924 (instructing district
court to reopen dissolution judgment under subdivision 2(5) to determine fair and equitable
distribution of corporate stock where it was “evident” that wife “presented a change in
circumstances that is not merely a new set of circumstances or an unforeseen change of a
known circumstance”).
Accordingly, we determine that t he district court did not abuse its discretion by
determining that husband failed to present sufficient evidence demon strating that he was
entitled to relief from the judgment and decree under subdivision 2(5).
VI. The District Court’s Attorney-Fee Award Is Affirmed.
Husband challenges the district court’s award of conduct -based attorney fees to
wife. A district court may levy conduct -based attorney fees “against a party who
unreasonably contributes to the length or expense of the proceeding.” Minn. Stat. § 518.14,
subd. 1 (2018). The requesting party bears the burden of establishing that the other party’s
conduct unreasonably contributed to the length or expense of the proceeding. Geske v.
Marcolina, 624 N.W.2d 813, 818 (Minn. App. 2001). The district court must m ake

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findings explaining the basis for the award. Brodsky v. Brodsky , 733 N.W.2d 471, 477
(Minn. App. 2007). A district court’s award of attorney fees will not be reversed absent an
abuse of discretion. Haefele, 621 N.W.2d at 767.
The district court made specific factual findings that husband’s conduct contributed
to the lengt h and expense of the proceedings , and those findings are supported by the
record. Specifically, the court identified husband’s failure to satisfy the marital lien, to
return wife’s personal property, to pay any portion of the marital debt, and to adequately
provide reports to the court, as justifications for the award. The district court found that
husband’s “willful and intentional failure ” to abide by the judgment and decree
“unreasonably contributed to the length and expense of this proceeding” and awarded wife
conduct-based attorney fees. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion, and we affirm the award.
Husband also argues that the district court erred by declining his request for attorney
fees. This court “will rarely reverse” a district court’s decision to deny attorney fees.
Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 379 N.W.2d 580, 587 (Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn.
Feb. 19, 1986). This is not the rare case requiring reversal. We therefore determine that
the district court acted within its discretion by denying’s husband’s request, and we affirm.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.