State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1730

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Chad Alan Norberg,
Appellant.

Filed August 14, 2017
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Polk County District Court
File No. 60-CR-16-520

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhle r, Assistant County Attorney,
Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and
Connolly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Chad Norberg broke into his girlfriend’s home, threatening to kill
whoever was in the house with her. Norber g challenges his conv iction of first-degree

2
burglary, arguing that the evidence is insuffi cient to show that, when he entered the
dwelling, he intended to comm it a crime because any intent to kill was conditioned on
another person being in the house. We affirm.
FACTS
Norberg and A.L. were in a romantic relationship and began living together in
November 2015. In March 2016, Norberg and A.L. took a break from their relationship.
During this break, Norberg stayed at a friend’s house.
A.L. awoke on March 27 to the sound of Norberg banging on her window. Norberg
said that he would kill whoever was in the house with A.L. A.L. was home alone. Norberg
broke down the door and then searched A.L.’s house for another person. A.L. called 911
and reported, “My ex is over here[.] [H]e just broke into my door.” She explained to the
911 dispatcher, “They’re ba nging on my windows threaten ing to kill somebody who is
in . . . if there was somebody else here. And my door was double locked and he somehow
kicked it in.” Several police o fficers responded to A.L.’s call . A.L. told one officer that
she did not want Norberg in the house. The officers noticed that A.L.’s door was broken.
Norberg was charged with first-degree burglary.1
A court trial took place. A.L. testified that had she stopped taking mental-health
medications prior to the March 27 incident and was not thinking clearly at the time of the
incident. She recanted part of her story, in sisting that she had le t Norberg into her home
and that he had not broken the door. The di strict court did not fi nd A.L.’s recantation

1 Norberg was also charged with and convicted of third-degree test refusal. Norberg does
not challenge his test-refusal conviction on appeal.

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credible. The district court also rejected Norberg’s argument that he entered A.L.’s house
intending to find out whether another person was in the house with A.L. and that only if
someone else was in the house w ould he have had intent to kill. Th e district court found
Norberg guilty of first-degree burglary.
Norberg appeals.
D E C I S I O N
The same standard of review applies in sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims arising
from court trials and jury trials. State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011). We
review the record to determ ine whether the evid ence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the conviction, is suffi cient to support the conviction. State v. Webb , 440
N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). We generall y will not consider matte rs not argued to or
considered by the district court. Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996).
I. Sufficient evidence supports a finding that Norberg had intent to commit a
crime.

The burglary statute provides that “[w]hoever enters a building without consent and
with intent to commit a crim e” commits first-degree burglar y. Minn. Stat. § 609.582,
subd. 1 (2014). Norberg argues that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that
he had intent to commit a crime because his intent was conditioned on someone being in
the house with A.L. The state argues that the statutory definition of “intent” includes
conditional intent and that Norberg’s argument is one of factual impossibility.
Whether a defendant’s conditional intent sati sfies the intent element of burglary is
a question of statutory interpre tation. We review questions of statutory interpretation

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arising out of sufficiency-of-the -evidence claims de novo. State v. Vasko , 889 N.W.2d
551, 556 (Minn. 2017). The goa l of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate
the intent of the legislature. Marks v. Comm’r of Revenue , 875 N.W.2d 321, 324 (Minn.
2016); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2016). We read and interpret the statute as a whole.
Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl , 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000). When the plain
language of the statute is unambiguous, “the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under
the pretext of pursuing the spirit.” State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Minn. 2009). If
the statute is ambiguous, we apply “other canons of construction to discern the legislature’s
intent.” Brua v. Minn. Joint Underwriting Ass’n, 778 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Minn. 2010).
Conditional intent is the principle that th e defendant does not intend to commit an
act unless a condition is satisfied. See 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law
§ 5.2(d), at 350-51 (2d ed. 2003). In Holloway v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that conditional intent sa tisfies the intent element of a statute that criminalizes
carjacking with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm. 526 U.S. 1, 3, 119 S. Ct.
966, 968 (1999). The defendant in Holloway stole several cars and threatened the drivers
with a gun, demanding that they give the defendant their keys or he would shoot. Id. at 4,
119 S. Ct. at 968. The defendant argued that he did not act with the intent to cause death
or serious bodily harm because he intended to steal the cars without harming the victims
and would have shot only if the drivers fought back. Id. at 4-5, 119 S. Ct. at 968. The U.S.
Supreme Court stated that the relevant moment for purposes of intent is “the precise
moment [the defendant] demanded or took cont rol over the car ‘by fo rce and violence or
by intimidation.’” Id. at 8, 119 S. Ct. at 970 (quotation omitted). “If the defendant has the

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proscribed state of mind at that moment, th e statute’s scienter element is satisfied.” Id.
Examining state court cases and the Model Penal Code, the Supreme Court decided that “a
defendant may not negate a proscribed intent by requiring the victim to comply with a
condition the defendant has no right to impose.” Id. at 11, 119 S. Ct. at 971.
Our reading of Minnesota’s burglary statut e is consistent with the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Holloway. The burglary stat ute provides that “[w]hoever enters a
building without consent and with intent to commit a crime” commits first-degree burglary.
Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1. Minnesota law defines “with in tent to” to mean “that the
actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the
act, if successful, will cause th at result.” Minn. Stat. § 6 09.02, subd. 9(4) (2014). For
purposes of burglary, the defendant must possess the requisite intent at the time of entry.
See State v. Davis, 864 N.W.2d 171, 178 (Minn. 2015). A defendant who enters a building
intending to commit a crime if a condition is met still enters a building with the purpose of
committing a crime. See Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1. The plain language of the burglary
statute compels the conclusion that the intent element is satisfied even when the defendant
has only conditional intent to commit a crime.2
Moreover, we are persuaded that Norberg’s conditional-intent argument is actually
an argument that it was factually impossible for him to commit the intended crime because
no one else was in the house with A.L. Fa ctual impossibility does not negate criminal

2 Norberg argues that the rule of lenity requir es this court to construe the statute in his
favor. The rule of lenity applies in cases of statutory ambiguity. State v. Rick, 835 N.W.2d
478, 485 (Minn. 2013). Because the plain language of the burglary statute is clear, we do
not apply the rule of lenity here.

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intent and thus is not a defense. See State v. Bird, 285 N.W.2d 481, 482 (Minn. 1979). In
State v. Golden, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the defendant had intent to commit
larceny for purposes of burglary even if there were no goods to be stolen from the building.
86 Minn. 206, 209, 90 N.W. 398, 400 (1902). The court stated, “If the defendant supposed
that there were goods in the warehouse, and br oke and entered it with the intent to steal
them, the fact that he was mi staken in his belief does not le ssen the criminal intent with
which he did the act.” Id. Similarly, if Norberg believe d that there was someone in the
house with A.L., and broke into the house with intent to kill that other person, the fact that
he was mistaken in his belief does not lessen his criminal intent.
Because Norberg had intent to kill or harm someone when he entered A.L.’s house,
we conclude that sufficient evidence supports Norberg’s conviction.
II. Norberg’s pro se arguments are meritless.

Norberg raises several additional arguments in his pro se supplemental brief.
First, Norberg argues that the district court erred in summarily denying his petition
for postconviction relief. There is no evidence that Norberg filed a postconviction petition,
and therefore we cannot consider whether the district court erred in denying such a petition.
Roby, 547 N.W.2d at 357.
Second, Norberg argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction
because A.L. recanted her statement and, ther efore her original statements to the police
were not credible.3 The district court found that A.L.’s testimony recanting her story was

3 The state interprets Norberg’s argument as a request for a pr etrial dismissal of the first-
degree-burglary charge. If this is indeed Norberg’s ar gument, we do not consider it

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not credible because she told the 911 operator that her “ex” had broken down the door, she
told the police that Norberg had broken down the door, and the po lice observed that the
door was in fact broken. Moreover, A.L. tes tified that Norberg said he was going to kill
whoever was in the house with A. L. We defer to the district court’s credibility findings.
State v. Kramer, 668 N.W.2d 32, 38 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. Nov. 18,
2003).
Finally, Norberg argues that the prosecut ion failed to disclose A.L.’s criminal
history and mental-health problems. “[T]he suppression by the pr osecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196-97 (1963). A
Brady violation requires the evidence to have been willfully or inadvertently suppressed
by the state. Pederson v. State, 692 N.W.2d 452, 459 (Minn. 2005). The Minnesota Rules
of Criminal Procedure require the prosecuti on to disclose the criminal convictions of
witnesses who may be called at trial. Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1(1)(a).
The state did not suppress either A.L.’s past convictions or her mental-health
problems, and Norberg was aware of both at th e time of trial. With respect to A.L.’s
criminal record, the state disclosed her past convictions to No rberg pursuant to rule 9.01.
A.L.’s criminal record was not suppressed by the state. Pederson, 692 N.W.2d at 459.
With respect to A.L.’s mental-health problems, A.L. told the p ublic defender at a pretrial

because Norberg did not move to dism iss the first-degree-burglary charge. Roby, 547
N.W.2d at 357.

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interview and testified at trial that she had been off her mental-health medications at the
time of the incident. A.L.’s mental-health problems were not suppressed by the state. Id.
Because we conclude that sufficient evidence supported a finding that Norberg had
intent to commit a crime when he entered A.L.’s house, a nd because Norberg’s pro se
arguments are meritless, we affirm.
Affirmed.