State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1732

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Steven Ken Le Walton,
Appellant.

Filed September 11, 2017
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CR-16-126

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, Kevin A. Hill, Assistant County Attorney, Chaska,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jodi Lynn Proulx, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Kalitowski, Judge.

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
The Carver County District Court found Steven Ken Le Walton guilty of a first-
degree controlled-substance crime based on evidence that he possessed methamphetamine
in his car. Before trial, the district court denied Walton’s motion to suppress the evidence
of the methamphetamine in his car. We conclude that the evidence is admissible on the
ground that the methamphetamine in his car inevitably would have been discovered in an
inventory search after an impoundment. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In January 2016, the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) and the Southwest
Metro Drug Task Force contacted the Chaska Police Department concerning an ongoing
drug investigation involving Walton. In an initial conversation, the BCA and the task force
told Officer Moore that Walton’s driv er’s license had been revoked. In a subsequent
conversation on January 28, the BCA and the task force told the Chaska Police Department
that a confidential informant had said that Walton would drive to his residence that day
after purchasing a large quantity of methamphetamine. Based on that information, Officer
Moore and three other officers watched for Walton near Walton’s residence.
At approximately 11:00 p.m., Officer Moore saw a car that was the same model and
color as Walton’s car. Officer Moore stop ped Walton’s car based on his suspicion that
Walton was driving after his license had been revoked. As Officer Moore approached
Walton’s car, he drew his service weapon because he was concerned for his safety due to
the large quantity of drugs potentially in Walton’s possession and the officer’s knowledge
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that Walton used drugs and had been verbally aggressive toward police officers in the past.
When Officer Moore asked Walton for his driver ’s license, Walton gave him a clipped
Wisconsin license card and some papers relating to a Minnesota license . Officer Moore
returned to his squad car to determine whether Walton had a valid driver’s license and
confirmed that he did not. Officer Moore returned to Walton’s car and informed him that
he would be cited for driving after revocation and that his car would be towed away and
impounded.
Officer Moore then asked Walton to step out of the car. Officer Moore handcuffed
Walton and informed him that he was being detaine d but not arrest ed. Officer Moore
conducted a pat search of Walton and found two pipes in Walton’s pockets : one that
smelled of burnt marijuana and one that was covered in white residue. Officer Moore field-
tested the second pipe, which tested positive f or methamphetamine. Officer Moore
arrested Walton for possession of methamphetamine and placed him in the back of the
squad car. Officer Moore then search ed Walton’s car and found a large plastic bag under
the driver’s seat, which contained 115 grams of methamphetamine.
The next day, the state charged Walton with one count of a first-degree controlled-
substance crime, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1) (2014) , based on the
allegation that he possessed 115 grams of methamphetamine in his car. In February 2016,
Walton moved to suppress the evidence of the methamphetamine in his car and to dismiss
the charges. In March 2016, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which
Officer Moore was the sole witness.
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In April 2016, the district court issued an order in which it denied Walton’s motion
to suppress evidence. The district court determined that (1) Officer Moore conducted a
lawful investigatory stop of Walton’s car based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
he was driving after a license revocation; (2) Officer Moore did not unlawfully expand the
scope of the investigatory stop; (3) Officer Moore conducted a valid pat search of Walton’s
person because he had a reasonable belief that Walton was armed and dangerous;
(4) Officer Moore lawfully discovered drug paraphernalia on Walton’s person based on the
plain-feel exception to the warrant requirement, which justified Walton’s arrest; (5) Officer
Moore lawfully searched Walton’s car incident to his arrest; and (6) the methamphetamine
in Walton’s car also should not be suppressed because it inevitably would have been
discovered in an inventory search after the car was towed and impounded.
In May 2016, Walton waived his right to a trial by jury and stipulated to the
prosecution’s case, and the parties agreed that the district court’s ruling on the pre-trial
motion would be dispositive. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. The district court
found Walton guilty and sentenced him to 65 months of imprisonment. Walton appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Walton argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the “right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures” and states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
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the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Minn. Const. art. I,
§ 10. A warrantless search is presumed to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment, which
requires that any evidence obtained in the search be excluded from evidence at trial.
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013); State v. Rhode, 852
N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn. 2014). But evidence discovered in a warrantless search may be
admissible if there is a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement or to the exclusionary rule. See Rohde, 852 N.W.2d at 263..
On appeal, Walton contends that Officer Moore’ s pat search of his person was
unlawful on the ground that the officer did not have a reasonable belief that he was armed
and dangerous. He contends that Officer Moore did not have probable cause to arrest him
because the pat search was unlawful. He cont ends that Officer Moore’s search of his car
was unlawful because the automobile exception to the warrant requirement does not apply
(although the district court reasoned that the search of the car was a valid search incident
to arrest). And he contends that the inevitable-discovery doctrine does not apply because
Officer Moore would have performed an inventory search for purposes of gathering
evidence, not to safeguard the car and its contents.
We first consider Walton’s contention concerning the inevitable-discovery doctrine
and the inventory search. The United States Supreme Court adopted the inevitable -
discovery doctrine as an exception to the exclusionary rule to ensure that the “exclusion of
evidence that would inevitably have been discovered ” does not “put the government in a
worse position, because the police would have obtained that evidence if no misconduct had
taken place.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S . Ct. 2501, 2509 (1984). If “the
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fruits of a challenged search ‘ultimatel y or inevitably would have been discovered by
lawful means,’ then the seized evidence is admissible even if the search vio lated the
warrant requirement.” State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 254 (Minn. 2003) ( quoting Nix,
467 U.S. at 444, 104 S . Ct. at 2509). The state bears the burden of establishing the
exception by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The state may not rely on speculation
but, rather, must base the exception “on demonstrated historical facts capable of read y
verification or impeachment.” Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5, 104 S. Ct. at 2509 n.5. This court
applies a clear -error standard of review to findings of fact relevant to the inevitable -
discovery doctrine and a de novo standard of review to the legal analysis based on those
facts. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 849 (Minn. 2011).
In this case, t he district court reasoned that the methamphetamine in Walton’s car
inevitably would have been discovered by an inventory search. In appropriate
circumstances, a law -enforcement offi cer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment,
impound a vehicle and perform an inventory search of the vehicle without obtaining a
warrant. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371, 107 S. Ct. 738, 741 (1987); South Dakota
v. Opperman , 428 U.S. 364, 373, 9 6 S. Ct. 3092, 3099 (1976); State v. Gauster , 752
N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008); State v. Goodrich, 256 N.W.2d 506, 509-10 (Minn. 1977).
An impoundment and inventory search may satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness requirement if a law -enforcement officer “remove[s] from the streets
vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience.” Opperman, 428
U.S. at 369, 96 S. Ct. at 3097. An inventory search also may satisfy the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement if it “serve[s] to protect an owner’ s property
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while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized
property.” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372, 107 S. Ct. at 741 . But an inventory search is not
permissible if a law -enforcement officer acts “in bad faith or for the sole purpose of
investigation.” Id. The state bears the burden of proving that the inventory -search
exception to the warrant requirement applies. State v. Ture, 632 N.W.2d 621, 627 (Minn.
2001).
Walton contends that Officer Moore would not have performed a valid inventory
search because his sole motivation was to discover evidence of a crime , not to safeguard
property. The district court found otherwise. The district court found that “Officer Moore
credibly and reasonably determined” that he had “a duty to remove [Walton’s] vehicle from
the roadway in order to prevent another accident from happening.” The district court noted
Officer Moore ’s testimony that he made that determination based on “the time of day,
which was nighttime, the lack of lighting on the roadway, [and] the speed limit on Creek
Road, which was 55 miles an hour.” In addition, Offi cer Moore testified that there was
snow on the ground and that he was concerned that Walton’s car might cause an accident
if it were left on the side of the road. Officer Moore also testified that his decision to tow
and impound Walton’s car was consisten t with a written policy of the Chaska Police
Department and that he would have conducted an inventory search of the vehicle after it
was impounded. On cross -examination, Walton’s attorney did not attempt to discredit
Officer Moore’s decision to tow and impound the car and did not attempt to elicit evidence
that Officer Moore’s sole purpose was investigatory. The lack of such evidence prevents
this court from overturning the dis trict court’s findings. See id. at 629 (concluding that
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search was proper because it “was conducted in accordance with standard procedure” and
was at least partially motivated by inventory purposes).
Walton also contends that an inventory search was not inevitable because he should
have been “afforded an opportunity to move the vehicle to a safer location further off the
road, or locate a licensed driver to take possession of his vehicle.” His contention is not
supported by the evidentiary record. Because Walton did not have a valid driver’s license,
he could not move the car himself. Officer Moore testified that Walton did not request an
opportunity to find another person to move the vehicle. Officer Moore further testified that
he knew that Walton was married and that Walton’s wife did no t have a driver’s license ,
which might explain why Walton did not request that she be allowed to move the car .
Officer Moore testified that Walton’s car was parked along a “narrow two-lane road” with
“very narrow shoulders.” The record does not contain e vidence of any ready alternatives
to Officer Moore’s decision to tow and impound the car.
In light of the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, the district court did
not clearly err by finding that Officer Moore would have conducted an inventory search of
Walton’s car and, thus, inevitably would have discovered the methamphetamine in the car.
The inevitable-discovery doctrine is a sufficient basis for denying the motion to suppress
evidence. Based on that conclusion, we need not consider Walton’ s contentions that the
pat search was unlawful, that Officer Moore did not have probable cause to arrest him, and
that Officer Moore’s search of the car was not lawful as a search incident to arrest.
Affirmed.