In re the Matter of: Sedina Glover, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1746

In re the Matter of:
Sedina Glover, petitioner,
Respondent,

Hennepin County,
Petitioner Below,

vs.

Clement Olertey Totimeh,
Appellant.

Filed July 17, 2017
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-PA-FA-14-753

Sedina Glover, Golden Valley, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Clement Totimeh, Torrington, Connecticut (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and
Toussaint, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
In this custody matter, a ppellant-father argues tha t the district court abused its
discretion in granting respondent-mother sole legal custody of the parties’ child and
awarding father less than 25% of the parenting time. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-father Clement Olertey Totimeh and respondent -mother Sedina Glover
are the parents of M.T., born November 2, 2012 . After Hennepin County and mother
initiated a paternity action, father’s parentage was established on A pril 23, 2015. Father
saw M.T. three or four times in the year following his birth, but did not see him again until
October 2015. In between, m other offered father numerous opportunities to spend time
with M.T. But he declined, stating he only wanted to see M.T. if they could be alone. The
district court authorized supervised parenting time in a September 2015 temporary order.
Father did not exercise any parenting time for six months.
Jason Chinander from Hennepin County Family Court Services conducted a custody
evaluation during the fall of 2015 . He met with both par ties, observed them wit h M.T.,
obtained medical and other records, and obtained collateral information concerning the
parties. Chinander reported that M.T. was thriving in mother’s care and is a jubilant child.
He noted that father had not seen M.T. in the two years preceding the custody evaluation
despite mother’s invitations to do so. And he expressed concern that father did not
understand or appreciate M.T.’s emotional needs. Chinander concluded that it would be

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in M.T.’s best interests for mother to have sole legal and ph ysical custody, and for father
to initiate parenting time in a monitored setting to establish a relationship with M.T.
The parties submitted the issues of custody, parenting time, and child support to the
district court.1 Following a May 2016 trial, the district court found that it is in M.T.’s best
interests for mother to have sole legal and physical custody, and for father to begin having
unsupervised parenting time on a graduated schedule. Father appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding mother sole legal
custody of M.T.

A district court has broad discretion to provide for the custody of children. In re
Best Interest of M.R.P.-C., 794 N.W.2d 373, 378 (Minn. App. 2011). We limit our review
of custody determinations to “whether the [district] court abused its discretion by making
findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly applying the law.” Pikula v. Pikula,
374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1985). The law “leaves scant if any room for an appellate
court to question the [district] court’s balancing of best -interests considerations.”
Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 477 (Minn. App. 2000).
Father does not challenge the district court’s best -interests findings. But he argues
that the court abused its discretion in granting mother sole legal custody of M.T. because
the court did not make findings of domestic abuse or inability to cooperate in raising the
child to defeat the presumption of joint legal custody. We disagree.

1 Child support is not at issue on appeal.

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Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2016), lists 12 factors a district court must consider
when evaluating what custody status serves a child’s best interests. “Joint legal custody is
presumed to be in a child’s best interests.” Wopata v. Wopata , 498 N.W.2 d 478, 482
(Minn. App. 1993). But joint legal custody should be granted “only where the parents can
cooperatively deal with parenting decisions.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Where the
evidence indicates that the parties lack the ability to cooperate and communicate, joint legal
custody is not appropriate.” Id. And there is a rebuttable presumption that joint legal
custody is not in a child’s best interests if domestic abuse has occurred between the parents.
Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b)(9) (2016).
Father’s contention that the district court did not find domestic abuse between the
parties is accurate. But the district court did make findings regarding the parties’ inability
to cooperate in parenting M.T. The district court found that “[t]he parties have no history
of cooperating and working together to raise the child.” And the court noted the parties’
communication problems, finding that “[t]he parties’ animosity toward each other,
[f]ather’s disregard for [m]other’s wishes when the child was an i nfant, the circumstances
of the conception and [f]ather’s absence from the child’s life (mostly due to his own
behavior) all contribute to difficulty in communication and cooperation.” The district court
credited mother’s testimony that working with father would be difficult because he was on
a “constant power trip,” and concluded that father’s involvement in M.T.’s life thus far has
shown that a “co-equal decision-making relationship would not be successful between the
parties.” These unchallenged findings support the district court’s determination that joint
legal custody is untenable.

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Other best-interests findings further demonstrate that joint legal custody is not
appropriate at this time. Father has not been a significant part of M.T .’s life and has
provided little support to mother. Despite mother’s efforts, father chose not to see M.T.
more than three or four times during the first year of his life. As a result, M.T. never got
to know father, and did not see him again until the custody-evaluation process, almost two
years later. Father did not exercise his court -ordered parenting time until shortly before
trial, seeing M.T. only six times since the temporary order.
On one of his earliest supervised parenting sessions, father brought along his tw o
sons from another relationship . This surprised and confused M.T. Bringing these other
children without mother’s consent or a court order also violated the policy of the facility
where father met with M.T. Based on this evidence, the district court found that father is
unable “to put the child’s emotional needs over his own” because he has shown a lack of
regard for M.T.’s emotional needs to become acquainted in a gradual way.
In sum, father’s assertion that he is entitled to joint legal custody because the district
court did not find domestic abuse or non -cooperation fails on this undisputed record.
Evidence of father’s non -cooperation with mother, lack of presence in M.T.’s life to this
point, and lack of regard for M.T .’s emotional needs amply supports the district court’s
custody determination. On this record, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district
court in awarding mother sole legal custody of M.T.

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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding father less than 25%
of the parenting time.

Minnesota law creates a rebuttable presumption that parents are “entitled to receive
a minimum of 25 percent of the parenting time for the child.” Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd.
1(g) (2016). District courts have broad discretion to decide parenting -time qu estions.
Olson v. Olson, 534 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Minn. 1995); Suleski v. Rupe, 855 N.W.2d 330, 334
(Minn. App. 2014). We will not reverse a parenting -time decision absent demonstrated
abuse of the district court’s broad discretion by misapplication of the l aw or by making
findings of fact that are not supported by the record. Dahl v. Dahl, 765 N.W.2d 118, 123
(Minn. App. 2009). Parenting -time allocations less than 25% can be justified by reasons
related to the child’s best interests. Hagen v. Schirmers, 783 N.W.2d 212, 218 (Minn. App.
2010).
Father argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding him only 7%
of the parenting time without making findings of fact sufficient to justify an award below
the 25% presumptive minimum. The parenting-time schedule grants father four hours of
unsupervised time with M.T. each week during the first month. Thereafter, father’s
parenting time gradually increases; within six months father has a weekend overnight. 2
The district court found that this graduated schedule is in M.T.’s best interest s because it
will reduce his stress and allow him to gradually develop a bond with father over time.
Father does not challenge a graduated approach, but asserts that the schedule should be

2 The parenting -time schedule is similar to what the custody evaluator and mother
recommended.

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extended so he has equal parenting time when M.T. begins kindergarten. We are not
persuaded. The district court made numerous unchallenged findings that support its
parenting-time determination. Father has not yet established a meaningful presence in
M.T.’s life. He chose to see M.T. only six times since the September 2015 temporary
order. And his limited interactions demonstrate he is unable to fully understand and meet
M.T.’s emotional needs. In addition, he could not explain how he would get M.T. to
daycare or to school when father and mother live in different school districts. Contrary to
father’s suggestion, the parenting -time award is not a restriction. Prior to the challenged
order, father had no parenting time with M.T. whatsoever. The district court’s findings
regarding father’s prolonged absence from M.T.’s life and M.T.’s emotional needs rebut
the presumption that father should have 25% of the parenting time. As father’s relationship
with M.T. develops, father may ask the court to modify the parenting-time schedule. Until
then, and on this record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion with
respect to father’s parenting time.3
Affirmed.

3 Father forfeited his remaining arguments that the district court erred in keeping mother’s
address confidential and in not awarding him conduct-based attorney fees because he did
not raise them in the district court . See Putz v. Putz, 645 N.W.2d 343, 350 (Minn. 2002)
(stating that issues not raised in the district court will not be considered on appeal).