State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1747

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Camille Elizabeth Jensen,
Appellant.

Filed August 7, 2017
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-5682

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Wynn C. Curtiss, Hopkins City Attorney, Chestnut Ca mbronne, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Robert M. Christensen, Robert M. Christ ensen, P.L.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant challenges her convictions of tw o counts of second-degree driving while
under the influence (DWI), arguing that the police officer who approached her stopped
2
vehicle violated her Fourth Am endment rights by asking her for identification. Because
the limited intrusion was warranted under the totality of circumstances, we affirm.
FACTS
On February 21, 2015, at approxima tely 1:41 a.m., Hopkins police officer
Alexander Cady saw a car stopped in the middle of an intersection. Both of the car’s front
doors were open, and he observed the driver, Camille Elizabeth Jensen, kneeling over her
friend, who was lying on the ground. Officer Cady radioe d for medical assistance and
requested an additional officer at the scene. As Office r Cady left his squad car and
approached the stopped car, he observed Jensen helping her friend into the passenger seat,
saw vomit on the ground, and heard one of the two say, “F—k, is that the cops?”
Jensen stated that the fri end had had too much to drink and that she was giving her
a ride home. Officer Cady asked both occupants for identification and whether they needed
an ambulance. During Jensen’s reply, Officer Cady detected indicia of intoxication on her,
including “a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from her facial region, . . . watery
eyes, . . . and slurring [of] her words.”
After Jensen failed field sobr iety tests and a preliminary breath test, she was arrested
on suspicion of DWI. Jensen later consented to take a breath test, which indicated an
alcohol concentration of .20. She was charge d with two counts of second-degree DWI.
Jensen moved to suppress the ev idence “obtained as a result of identification procedures
used during the investigation,” alleging a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.
The district court denied the motion follo wing a hearing, dete rmining that Jensen
was not improperly seized because her act of parking in the middle of an intersection was
3
sufficient to justify an investigatory stop. Th e court further ruled that the car’s location,
coupled with Jensen’s presence with a drunk friend at that time of the morning and Officer
Cady’s overhearing the statement of “F—k, is that the cops?” also provided Officer Cady
with reasonable suspicion that Jensen was enga ged in criminal activity . Consistent with
Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, Jensen agreed to a stipulated-facts trial in order to obtain
appellate review of the pretrial ruling. She was found guilty on both counts, and this appeal
followed.
D E C I S I O N
“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may
independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court
erred in suppressing—or not suppressing the evidence.” State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90,
98 (Minn. 1999). “The correct approach in a case where the facts are not significantly in
dispute is to simply analyze the testimony of the officers and determine if, as a matter of
law, the officers were justified under the cases in doing what they did.” State v. Storvick,
428 N.W.2d 55, 58 n.1 (Minn. 1988).
The Fourth Amendment to the United St ates Constitution and article I, section 10
of the Minnesota Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures of citizens. U.S.
Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 10. But “[n]ot all encounters between the police
and citizens constitute seizures.” Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 98.
Persons found under suspicious circumstances are not clothed
with a right of privacy whic h prevents law-enforcement
officers from inquiring as to th eir identity and actions. The
essential needs of public safety permit police officers to use
their faculties of observation an d to act thereon within proper
4
limits. It is not only the right but the duty of police officers to
investigate suspicious behavior, both to prevent crime and to
apprehend offenders.

State v. Hollins , 789 N.W.2d 244, 249 (Minn. Ap p. 2010) (quotation omitted), review
denied (Minn. Dec. 22, 2010). A seizure is acco mplished when the liberty of a person is
restrained due to a show of police au thority or use of physical force. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S. Ct. 1 868, 1879 n. 16 (1968 ). Whether a person has been seized is
judged by the totality of circumstances. State v. Cripps , 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn.
1995) (stating that “a person has been seized if in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed th at he or she was
neither free to disregard the police questions nor free to terminate the encounter”).
“[U]nder the totality of the circumstance s test, the more intrusive a request for
identification is the more likely that it will be considered an investigative stop and, thus, a
seizure.” State v. Pfannenstein , 525 N.W.2d 587, 589 (Mi nn. App. 1994). Mere
questioning by a police officer at a parked car does not constitute a seizure. Harris, 590
N.W.2d at 98; (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar. 14, 1995). But if a police
officer “requests identification and asks the driver to leave a vehicle, the officer must” have
“specific and articulable facts which, together with reasonable inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant the intrusion.” LaBeau v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 412 N.W.2d 777,
779 (Minn. App. 1987); see Cobb v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 410 N.W.2d 902, 903 (Minn.
App. 1987) (stating that “police need a partic ularized and objective basis for the minimal
intrusion occasioned by asking the driver to identify himself”). When an armed officer in
uniform summons a driver to a squad car to be questioned and to provide identification
5
without any suggestion of unlawful or suspici ous activity on the part of the driver, the
seizure violates the Fourth Amendment. State v. Day, 461 N.W.2d 404, 407 (Minn. App.
1990), review denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 1990).
Jensen argues that Officer Cady “dema nded Ms. Jensen’s identification when he
had no reasonable basis to suspect that she was engaged in criminal activity.” We disagree.
Unlike in Day, where nothing in the police encounter suggested that the defendant had
engaged in unlawful conduct, id., the totality of circumstances here supported a reasonable
basis for Officer Cady to suspect criminal activity. When Officer Cady encountered
Jensen’s vehicle at 1:41 a.m., it was parked in the middle of an intersection, and both
occupants had left the vehicle. The passenge r was admittedly intoxi cated, had vomited,
and needed a ride home. One of the two vehicle occupants uttered an expression of dismay
at the presence of police. From these fact s, Officer Cady could reasonably suspect the
following criminal activity to support his asking Jensen for identification: (1) Jensen may
have violated the law by parkin g her car in the middle of an intersection; (2) the time of
night, the choice of location to stop a vehicl e, the admitted inebriation of the passenger,
and the expletive-filled expression of dismay at realizing they had been noticed by police
suggested that Jensen could be under the influence; and (3) the expression of dismay, alone,
was suggestive of some sort of nefarious conduct. Cf. State v. French, 400 N.W.2d 111,
116 (Minn. App. 1987) (stating that “evidence of flight suggests consciousness of guilt”),
review denied (Minn. Jan. 27, 1987). Based on th e totality of these circumstances, we
conclude that the district court did not e rr by denying Jensen’s motion to suppress the
evidence obtained after she was asked for identification. See Pfannenstein, 525 N.W.2d at
6
589 (upholding officer’s single request for identification, unaccompanied by any other
show of police force, upon encountering a disabled vehicle).
Affirmed.