State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1767

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Mari Beth Hamdi,
Appellant.

Filed September 18, 2017
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-19052

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth R. Johnston, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Ap pellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant challenges her conviction of obstructing legal process, arguing that the
evidence is insufficient to prove that she obstructed, hindered, or prevented the police
2
officers’ execution of arrest warrants. She contends that we must reverse her conviction
because her conduct was not dire cted at the police, did not substantially frustrate the ir
search, and did not occur in their presence. We affirm.
FACTS
On June 28, 2015, Golden Valley police received a tip that S.Q., who was the subject
of four arrest warrants, was at his home. The police arrived at the home to execute the
warrants. They knocked on the partially opened door, announced their presence, and
entered the home. They observed appellant Mari Beth Hamdi walking up the basement
stairs. Hamdi told the police that S.Q. was not in the home. The police then ordered Hamdi
to walk towards them. She instead turned around and walked back down the stairs to the
basement. The police followed her, arrested her, and placed her in a squad car.
The police conducted an ex tensive search of the home for S.Q. and were initially
unsuccessful. They then realized that they had not searched the area beneath the basement
staircase. A large floor television stood against the wall of the staircase. The police moved
the television and discovered a removable access panel . They opened the access panel,
found S.Q in a crawl space, and arrested him. As the police escorted S.Q. out of the home,
Hamdi stated to S.Q., “What was I supposed to do?”
The state charged Hamdi with aiding a n offender, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.495, subd. 1(a) (2014). The state later added a second charge for obstructing legal
process, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(1) (2014). The parties agreed to the
evidence and the case proceeded to a stipulated facts trial under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.0 1,
subd. 3.
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The district court found Hamdi not guilty of aiding an offender but found her guilty
of obstructing legal process. The district court concluded that Hamdi obstruct ed legal
process because she placed the television in front of the access panel with the intention of
frustrating the police officers’ search efforts and hindering their ability to execute S.Q.’s
arrest warrants. The district court sentenced Hamdi to 90 days in the county work house.
Hamdi appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Hamdi contends that we should reverse her conviction because the evidence was
insufficient to show that she obstructed legal process. As an initial matter, the parties
dispute the standard of review. The state proposes that we evaluate whether the evidence
is sufficient to sustain the district court’s verdict. Under this standard, we review the
evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict and will not overturn the verdict if the fact-
finder could have reasonably found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the
charged offense. State v. Palmer , 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011). But, Hamdi
contends that the issue relates to what evidence is required for obstructing legal process,
which presents a q uestion of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. State v.
Tomlin, 622 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Minn. 2001). Because the issue in this case centers on
whether Hamdi’s conduct, specifically placing the television in front of the access panel,
fits within the scope of conduct prohibited by the statute, we review this issue de novo.
See State v. Pederson, 840 N.W.2d 433, 436 (Minn. App. 2013).
A person is guilty of obstructing legal process if she intentionally “obstructs,
hinders, or prevents the lawful execution of any legal process, civil or criminal, or
4
apprehension of another on a charge or conviction of a criminal offense.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.50, subd. 1(1). In other words, she “must commit conduct that obstructs or hinders
the lawful execution of legal process or apprehending a person in connection with that
process.” Pederson, 840 N.W.2d at 436. But, if her conduct merely interferes with a police
officer’s official duties, she does not obstruct legal process. Id.
A. Was Hamdi’s conduct directed at the police and did her conduct have a direct
effect on the police officers’ efforts to arrest S.Q.?

Hamdi first argues that her conduct did not constitute obstructing legal process
because her action of blocking the access panel with the television was directed at S.Q.,
not the police. In State v. Patch, we acknowledged the lack of caselaw indicating whether
an individual may be prosecuted for obstructing legal process for actions directed at
someone other than the police. 594 N.W.2d 537, 540 (Minn. App. 1999). In Patch, the
defendant warned a woman with outstanding arrest warrants that the police were in pursuit,
helped that woman find an exit, and offered her a ride. Id. at 537–38. We determined that
the defendant’s verbal conduct was not directed at the police and “did not have any physical
effect” on the pursuit of the woman. Id. at 538–39.
We have previously construed Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2), narrowly and stated
that “the statute applies only to conduct directed at police officers engaged in the
performance of official duties.” State v. Morin, 736 N.W.2d 691, 698 (Minn. App. 2007),
review denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 2007). In Morin, we concluded that the defendant’s
physical act of fleeing the police did not direct any physical activity toward the police, and
therefore the defendant did not violate Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2). Id.
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The parties do not dispute on appeal that Hamdi moved the television in front of the
access panel. Hamdi asserts that the purpose of moving the television was to hide S.Q.,
and she relies significantly on Patch and Morin to argue that her conduct only had an
indirect effect on the police officers’ efforts. But, Hamdi’s reliance on these cases is
misplaced. U nlike in Patch, her conduct was primarily physical conduct, not verbal
conduct. See 594 N.W.2d at 538 –39. And Morin is not directly on point becaus e we
analyzed a different subdivision of the obstruction statute in that case. 736 N.W.2d at 697;
see Pederson, 840 N.W.2d at 436–37 (noting the differences between Minn. Stat. § 609.50,
subd. 1(1), and Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2)).
While there is no published caselaw that explicitly permits prosecuting a defendant
for obstruction when the defendant’s acts are directed at another individual but not the
police, this case involves conduct that is directed at another individual and the police. See
Patch, 594 N.W.2d at 540. Hamdi’s placement of the television was conduct directed
towards both S.Q. and the police. And her conduct had the type of “effect” that is more
substantial than showing a fleeing individual an exit door or offering that individual a ride.
See id. at 538. We conclude that Hamdi’s conduct is exactly what Minn. Stat. § 609.50,
subd. 1(1), is intended to criminalize because it demonstrated her intent to hinder or prevent
the “apprehension of another.”
B. Did Hamdi’s conduct substantiall y frustrate or hinder the police officers’
search?

Hamdi next argues that because the police eventually found S.Q., her conduct did
not substantially frustrate or hinder the police officers’ search but rather merely interrupted
6
their efforts. The Minnesota Supreme Court has determined that “physically obstructing
or interfering with a police officer involves not merely interrupting an officer but
substantially frustrating or hindering the officer in the performance of his duties.” State v.
Krawsky, 426 N.W.2 d 875, 877 (Minn. 1988). The state questions the applicability of
Krawsky in this case because the legislature amended the statute after Krawsky by adding
language to the statute and reorganizing the statute into multiple subdivisions. 1989 Minn.
Laws. ch. 5, § 4, at 18.
While Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(1), concerns obstruction of “the lawful
execution of any legal process, civil or criminal, or apprehension of another,” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.50, subd. 1(2) relates to obstruction of a police officer “eng aged in the performance
of official duties.” Our analysis not only considers the nature of the defendant’s conduct,
but also the nature of the police duties that were being disrupted. See Pederson , 840
N.W.2d at 437 –38 (rejecting interpretation that focu ses solely on defendant’s conduct
because interpretation would render meaningless articulated distinction between police
duties under Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(1), (2)). Because the Krawsky rationale mirrors
the language in Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2), it is not directly applicable to
circumstances of the police engaging in duties enumerated in Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd.
1(1).
Even if Krawsky is relevant to this case, Hamdi’s conduct of placing the television
in front of the access panel rendered the police officers’ search more difficult, resulting in
the failure of the police officers’ initial search to find S.Q. Although the police , after a
second search, eventually discovered S.Q. in the crawl space, we conclude that Hamdi’s
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decision to move the television and conceal S.Q.’s whereabouts substantially frustrated and
hindered the police officers’ attempt to execute the arrest warrant.
C. Does Hamdi’s conduct amount to obstructing legal process even though she did
not move the television in the presence of police?

Hamdi also contends that she could not have committed obstruction because she did
not move the television while in the police officers’ presence. In Tomlin, the supreme court
determined that the defendant’s statements that were made to third parties while the police
were not present did not physically obstruct or interfere with police duties. 622 N.W.2d at
549. And, we concluded in Patch that the defendant’s verbal assistance to a person with
outstanding warrants, which occurred outside the presence of police, did not constitute
obstruction under Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(1). 594 N.W.2d at 5 39–40. Although
Tomlin and Patch suggest that whether the person’s conduct occurred in a police officer’s
presence is a factor in analyzing an obstruction case, neither case explicitly establish es it
as a requirement.
Hamdi argues that punishing acts committed outside the police officers’ presence
inappropriately broadens Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(1) ––a statute that she argues
Minnesota courts have previously construed narrowly. See Krawsky, 426 N.W.2d at 878
(“[T]he statute does not apply to ordinary verbal criticism directed at a police officer even
while the officer is performing his official duties and does not apply to the mere act of
interrupting an officer, even intentionally.”); see also Morin, 736 N.W.2d at 698 (stating
that Minnesota courts interpret Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2), narrowly). The issue in
this case is not whether Hamdi’s verbal conduct obstructed legal process; rather, the issue
8
is whether Hamdi’s physical conduct in moving the television so as to hide S.Q. from the
police constitutes obstructing legal process.
Hamdi asserts that upholding her conviction would result in future defendants being
convicted of obstruction for hiding drugs in dresser drawers or locking doors before police
arrive. But Hamdi’s hypothetical situations overlook the fact that Minn. Stat. § 609.50,
subd. 1(1) prohibits conduct that “obstructs, hinders, or prevents the lawful execution of
any . . . apprehension of another .” (Emphasis added.) Concealing or hiding a person to
hinder or prevent his or her apprehension is conduct that generally must occur outside a
police officer’s presence in order to be successful. T hough Hamdi moved the television
when the police were not present, we conclude that her conduct still amounts to obstructing
legal process.
Affirmed.