Itasca County, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1773

Itasca County,
Appellant,

vs.

Teamsters Local 320,
Respondent,

Minnesota State Court System, Ninth Judicial District,
Respondent.

Filed June 26, 2017
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Itasca County District Court
File No. 31-CV-15-2083

Scott M. Lepak, Karen K. Kurth, Barna, Gu zy & Steffen, Ltd., Coon Rapids, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Patrick J. Kelly, Kevin M. Beck, Martin H. R. Norder, Kelly & Lemmons, P.A., St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Teamsters Local 320)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Jason Mari sam, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Minnesota State Court System, Ninth Judicial District)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Pr esiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Randall, Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges the dismissal of its action seeking a declaration from the
district court regarding the scope of its obligation to negotiate certain grievance procedures
and terms and conditions of employment under a proposed labor contract. We affirm.
FACTS
This appeal concerns a labor dispute that arose after appellant Itasca County and
respondent Teamsters Local 320 failed to ne gotiate a collective-ba rgaining agreement
under the Public Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA), Minn. Stat. §§ 179A.01–.25
(2016).
Local 320, an employee organization under PELRA, 1 petitioned the Minnesota
Bureau of Mediation Services (BMS) for a determination of an appropriate unit and
certification of Local 320 as the exclusive re presentative of probation officers in Itasca
County. Itasca County is a political subdivision of the State of Minnesota and has its county
seat in Grand Rapids. The county operates a correctional delivery system under Minn. Stat.
§ 244.19 (2016) in which the Minnesota Depa rtment of Corrections (DOC) provides
probation services for adult felons and the county provides probation services for juveniles
and adult non-felons.

1 PELRA defines “employee organization” as “any union or orga nization of public
employees whose purpose is, in whole or in part, to deal with public employers concerning
grievances and terms and conditions of employment.” Minn. Stat. § 179A.03, subd. 6.

3
During the mediation proceedings, Itasca County questioned whether it could be
deemed under PELRA to be the public employer 2 of the probation officers because the
county does not act as a trad itional employer in all respects. Specifically, the state court
system, not Itasca County, has the power to appoint and remove probation officers, and the
DOC reimburses a portion of the probation officers’ salaries and fringe benefits. The BMS
rejected the county’s arguments and concluded that Itasca County is the probation officers’
public employer under PELRA. Itasca County did not seek certiorari review of the BMS’s
decision. The BMS then conducted a mail-ballo t election, and Local 320 was certified as
the exclusive representative of the probation officers.
With the assistance of the BMS, Itasca County and Local 320 negotiated to reach a
collective-bargaining agreemen t, but the negotiations sta lled because of the county’s
position that, under Minn. Stat. § 244.19, the district court retained exclusive authority in
some employment areas. Specifi cally, the county questioned its authority to negotiate
certain grievance procedures and te rms and conditions of employment. 3 The parties did
not seek interest arbitration. See Black’s Law Dictionary 126 (10th ed. 2014) (defining
“interest arbitration” to be “[a]rbitration that involves settling the terms of a contract being

2 PELRA defines “public employer” to in clude “the governing body of a political
subdivision or its agency or instrumentality which has final budgetary approval authority
for its employees.” Minn. Stat. § 179A.03, subd. 15(a)(6).

3 PELRA defines “terms and conditions of employment” as “the hours of employment, the
compensation therefor including fringe benefits except retirement contributions or benefits
other than employer payment of, or contri butions to, premiums for group insurance
coverage of retired employees or severance pay, and the employer’s personnel policies
affecting the working conditions of the employees.” Minn. Stat. § 179A.03, subd. 19.

4
negotiated between the parties; esp., in labor law, arbitration of a dispute concerning what
provisions will be included in a new colle ctive-bargaining agreement”). Itasca County
instead sued Local 320, seeking a declaration of rights defining the scope of its bargaining
obligations.
After both parties moved for summary judg ment, the district court ordered Itasca
County to amend its complaint to add resp ondent Minnesota State Court System, Ninth
Judicial District, as a co-defendant. The Ninth Judicial District then moved to dismiss for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Itasca County and Local 320 opposed the motion to
dismiss. Following a hearing, the court dismissed the declaratory-judgment action,
concluding that it lacks subject-matter juri sdiction because Itasca County and Local 320
had not reached a contract and the dispute had not been arbitrated or resubmitted to the
BMS for clarification or a supplemental decision.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I
Itasca County and Local 320 challenge the district court’s conclusion that the court
lacks subject-matter jurisdicti on over the declaratory-judgme nt action. “Subject-matter
jurisdiction is the court’s authority to hear the type of dispute at issue and to grant the type
of relief sought.” Seehus v. Bor-Son Const., Inc., 783 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Minn. 2010). The
existence of subject-matter jurisdiction “is a question of law that [appellate courts] review
de novo.” Nelson v. Schlener , 859 N.W.2d 288, 2 91 (Minn. 2015) “Defects in subject-
matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, and cannot be waived by the parties.” Seehus,

5
783 N.W.2d at 147. “Additionally, subjec t-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by
consent of the parties.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Itasca County and Local 320 argue that the district court has jurisdiction to consider
the lawsuit under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 555.01–.16
(2016). The act gives courts of record the “pow er to declare rights, status, and other legal
relations whether or not furt her relief is or could be cl aimed.” Minn. Stat. § 555.01.
Specifically, “[a]ny person . . . whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by
a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise may have determined any question of
construction or validity arising under the . . . statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and
obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.” Minn. Stat.
§ 555.02. But a court has no jurisdiction ov er a declaratory-judgment action unless a
justiciable controversy exists. Onvoy, Inc. v. ALLETE, Inc., 736 N.W.2d 611, 617 (Minn.
2007). A justiciable controversy exists when the claim “(1) involves definite and concrete
assertions of right that emanate from a lega l source, (2) involves a genuine conflict in
tangible interests between parties with adverse interests, and (3) is capable of specific
resolution by judgment rather than presenting hypothetical facts that would form an
advisory opinion.” McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing , 808 N.W.2d 331, 336–37 (Minn.
2011) (quotation omitted).
The Ninth Judicial District argues that PELRA places ju risdiction over the dispute
with an arbitrator, not the di strict court. We agree. Unde r PELRA, “[a] public employer
has an obligation to meet and negotiate in go od faith with the exclus ive representative of
public employees in an appropriate unit regarding grievance procedures and the terms and

6
conditions of employment.” Minn. Stat. § 179A.07, subd. 2(a); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 179A.06, subd. 5 (providing that public employees have a reciprocal obligation to meet
and negotiate in good faith with their employ er). To assist with negotiations, both the
public employer and the exclusive representa tive have the right to petition the BMS for
mediation services. Minn. Stat. § 179A.15. Alte rnatively, the parties may request interest
arbitration. Minn. Stat. § 179A.16. In any event, PELRA requires the public employer and
the exclusive representative to “execute a written contract or memorandum of contract
containing the terms of the negotiated agreemen t or interest arbitr ation decision and any
terms established by law.” Minn. Stat. § 179A.20, subd. 1; see also Minn. Stat.
§ 179A.01(c)(2) (stating that public policy is best accomplished by “requiring public
employers to meet and negotiate with public employees in an appropriate bargaining unit
and providing that the result of bargaining be in written agreements”).
This statutory scheme demonstrates that the legislature has divested the district court
of jurisdiction to resolve this dispute. “Min nesota has a strong public policy of favoring
arbitration as a means of resolving labor disputes.” Ellerbrock v. Bd. of Ed., Special Sch.
Dist. No. 6 , 269 N.W.2d 858, 862 (Minn. 1978). And the supreme court has recognized
that the “underlying policy and purpose of PELRA is to discourage litigation and promote
simple, informal procedures for resolution of conflict.” Minn. Ed. Ass’n v. Indep. Sch. Dist.
No. 495, 290 N.W.2d 627, 629 (Min n. 1980) (quotation omitted). By seeking declaratory
judgment, the county is improperly attempting to circumvent the statutory requirement to
execute a written agreement through negotiation or arbitration. See Minn. Stat. § 179A.20,
subd. 1.

7
Itasca County argues that the district court has jurisd iction and maintains that the
district court is “not being asked . . . to make a declar ation regarding the terms and
conditions of the probation officers’ employment” but rather “to declare what the County’s
obligations are to meet and negotiate in good faith regarding grievance procedures and the
terms and condition[s] of employment.” The county asserts that a declaration regarding its
obligation to negotiate would allow “the parties [to] get ‘back to the table’ to discuss the
actual terms and conditions of employment that the County is authorized to negotiate.” But
the county does not explain why arbitration would be insufficient to resolve this dispute,
and we see no such reason. Allowing parties to seek declaratory judgment under these
circumstances would undermine the policy that impasses encountered in labor negotiations
should be resolved in arbitration. See Ellerbrock, 269 N.W.2d at 862.
Itasca County and Local 320 also argue th at arbitration “is not an option” here
because the probation officers are nonessential employees. 4 In support of their argument,
they cite Gen. Drivers, Helpers, & Truck Terminal Emps., Local 120 v. City of St. Paul ,
270 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 1978). In that case , two bargaining units of nonessential
employees commenced a lawful strike after their employer, the City of St. Paul, declined
to engage in arbitration. Local 120, 270 N.W.2d at 878 & n.1. Labor unions representing
city employees in other bargaining units then brought an action seeking a declaration that

4 PELRA defines “essential employee” in part as “firefighters, peace officers subject to
licensure under sections 626.84 to 626.863, 911 system and police and fire department
public safety dispatchers, guards at co rrectional facilities, confidential employees,
supervisory employees, assistant county attorneys, assistant city attorneys, principals, and
assistant principals.” Minn. Stat. § 179A.03, subd. 7.

8
employees in those units could lawfully initiate sympathy strikes. Id. at 879. In its recitation
of the facts of the case, the court stated in a footnote: “It is only where the employees are
‘essential,’ and therefore may not strike, that the employer must agree to arbitration.” Id.
at 878 n.1 (citing St. Paul Prof’l Emps. Ass’n v. City of St. Paul , 303 Minn. 106, 226
N.W.2d 311 (1975)).
Itasca County and Local 320 appear to read Local 120 to hold that arbitration is not
available here because the probation officers are nonessential employees. But the case does
not support that conclusion. Instead, the Local 120 court merely recognized that, when
faced with a request for arbitration from nonessential employees, the public employer has
the options of arbitrating or accepting a lawful strike. Id. at 878 (“In this situation the city
had a choice between agreeing to arbitration or accepting a lawful strike by the two
bargaining units represented by Council 91.” (footnote omitted)). The case does not suggest
that arbitration is unavailable to nonesse ntial employees. Indeed, PELRA specifically
authorizes arbitration in situations invo lving nonessential employees: “An exclusive
representative or an employer of a unit of employees other than essential employees may
request interest arbitration by providing written notice of the request to the other party and
the commissioner.” Minn. Stat. § 179A.16, subd . 1 (emphasis added). The argument that
arbitration is “not an option” under these circumstances therefore fails.
Finally, Itasca County suggests that the di strict court has jurisdiction over the
declaratory-judgment action because of the separation-of-powers doctrine. But the county
does not develop the argument or provide any supporting authority. The argument therefore

9
is forfeited. See Melina v. Chaplin , 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982) (stating that issues
not adequately briefed on appeal need not be addressed).
II
The Ninth Judicial District argues alternatively that the declaratory-judgment action
is an attack on the BMS’s decision, which may be reviewed only by writ of certiorari. The
argument is unavailing. “District courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction over claims
that must be resolved in a certiorari appeal .” Zweber v. Credit River Twp. , 882 N.W.2d
605, 609 (Minn. 2016) (citing Dokmo v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11 , 459 N.W.2d 671, 676–
78 (Minn. 1990)). The Ninth Judicial District asserts that the declaratory-judgment action
here is actually a challenge to the BMS’s dete rmination that Itasca County is the public
employer of the probation officers under PELRA. Itasca County and Local 320 dispute that
characterization and maintain that they are not challenging the BMS’s determination that
the county is the public employer of the probation officers.
Contrary to the Ninth Judicial District’s assertion, the declaratory-judgment action
does not challenge the BMS’s decision. The BMS indicated at the beginning of its decision
that it was resolving four issues: (1) “Who is the public employer, under Minnesota Statute
§ 179A.03, Subd. 15 (2013), for Probation Office rs in Itasca County?”; (2) “What is the
description of the appropriate bargaining un it?”; (3) “Which employ ees fall within the
appropriate bargaining unit?”; and (4) “Has [Local 320] submitted the required showing of
interest to warrant the conduct of an electi on?” Itasca County’s complaint for declaratory
judgment does not challenge the BMS’s conclusions regardi ng any of those issues. The
county concedes in its complaint that it is a public employer of the probation officers under

10
PELRA. And the complaint asks for a declaration as to the co unty’s “obligations to meet
and negotiate in good faith with [Local 320] regarding grievance procedures and the terms
and conditions of employment pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 179A.07 and Minn. Stat.
§ 244.19.” That issue was not resolved by the BMS. Becaus e the declaratory-judgment
action is not challenging the issues previous ly decided by the BMS, the Ninth Judicial
District’s argument fails.
Affirmed.