State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1781

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Leanne Ranae Todd,
Appellant.

Filed September 11, 2017
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-14-5498

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Charlie F. Clippert, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this criminal appeal, appellant Leanne Ranae Todd argues that the state did not
prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that she was competent to stand trial.

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Because we conclude that the district cour t’s finding of competency is supported by
sufficient evidence, we affirm.
FACTS
Todd participated in the attempted robbery of two men in August 2014, during
which two co-defendants stabbed the men. Todd was charged with two counts of aiding
and abetting first-degree assa ult and two counts of aiding and abetting attempted first-
degree aggravated robbery.
The district court ordered a rule 20 evaluation to assess whether Todd was
competent to stand trial. Mi nn. R. Crim. P. 20.0 1. Dr. Ann Winskows ki filed the first
evaluation of Todd in November 2014. Winskowski diagnosed Todd with a mild
intellectual disability. Winskowski reported that Todd understood basic legal concepts
when unfamiliar concepts were explained to her and was able to evaluate her legal options.
Winskowski opined that Todd was competent to stand trial. The district court concluded
that Todd was competent based on Winskowski’s report.
At the request of Todd’s attorney, the di strict court ordered an updated competency
evaluation in January 2015. Winskowski also conducted the second evaluation.
Winskowski observed that Todd “presented as significantly more disabled” than during the
first evaluation. When Winskowski con fronted Todd about her behavior, Todd’s
“presentation shifted dramatically and she demonstrated a more complete understanding of
her legal circumstances.” Winskowski performed a portion of a CAST-MR, a test designed
to assess the competency of individuals with intellectual disabilities, and concl uded that

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Todd’s score was typical of individuals wh o are found competent. Winskowski again
concluded that Todd was competent.
Todd objected to Winskowski ’s second evaluation and requested an adversarial
competency evaluation. Dr. Harlan Gilbertson conducted two evaluations of Todd.
Gilbertson found that Todd had an IQ of 48 and an intellectual developmental disorder of
mild/moderate severity. Todd told Gilbertson that she did not regularly use a computer,
with the exception of “a little” Facebook. Gilbertson concluded that Todd was incompetent
because she lacked the ability to consult with her attorney to a reasonable degree.
The district court ordere d Winskowski to respond to Gilbertson’s reports.
Winskowski stated that Gilbertson’s reports provided further evidence that Todd was
malingering. As an example of Todd’s malingering, Winskowski demonstrated that Todd
exaggerated her lack of social-media pres ence by showing that Todd had an active
Facebook page. Winskowski noted that Todd was connected in her community, sought out
resources, and was at one time licensed to drive. Winskowski concluded, “[Todd’s] ability
to dramatically change her level of functio ning when confronted, her performance on the
CAST-MR, and information that suggests a profoundly different level of functioning than
she demonstrated during her second inte rview with me and her evaluation by
Dr. Gilbertson, clearly demonstrates that [Todd] is malingering and that she is competent.”
The district court ordered Dr. Dawn Peusch old, a third evaluator, to conduct a final
evaluation of Todd. Peuschold conducted three tests to assess whether Todd was
malingering, the results of which were consistent with malingering. Peuschold noted that
Todd appeared to function at a level greate r than Gilbertson’s reports suggested because

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Todd engaged in many activities—using mass tran sit, paying bills, participating in social
media, voting, and making doctors’ appointments—that were not consistent with the types
of disabilities identified by Gilbertson. Based on Winskowski’s initial report and
Peuschold’s own evaluation, Peuschold concluded that Todd was competent.
Gilbertson, Winskowski, Peuschold, a nd Todd’s attorney testified at the
competency hearing. Gilbertson testified that Todd appeared to be “psychologically
retreating.” Gilbertson also testified that he did not believe that Todd was malingering and
that he does not need to rely on specific malingering tests to determine whether an
individual is malingering. Winskowski testified that she had not heard of psychologically
retreating and that she believed Todd was ma lingering. Peuschold testified that she
believed Todd was malingering and that Todd ’s functioning was inconsistent with the
results of Gilbertson’s reports. Todd’s attorney testified that Todd “will shut down” when
meeting with her, but also testified that she and Todd had a “good working relationship.”
The district court concluded that Todd wa s competent to stand trial because it found
the evaluations of Winskowski and Peusc hold more persuasive than Gilbertson’s
evaluation. Todd pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree assault.
Todd appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Todd argues that the state did not prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that
Todd was competent to stand trial.
A criminal defendant is incompetent to stand trial if the defendant lacks the ability
to (a) rationally consult with counsel or (b) understand the proceedings or participate in the

5
defense due to mental illness or deficiency. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 2. The state
must show the defendant’s competence by a fair preponderance of the evidence. State v.
Ganpat, 732 N.W.2d 232, 238 (Minn. 2007). We independently review the record to
determine if the district court gave “proper weight to the evidence produced and if the
finding of competency is adequately supported by the record.” Id. (quotations omitted).1
A district court’s findings of fact may be implicit so long as those implicit findings
are supported by sufficient evidence. State v. Alvarez, 820 N.W.2d 601, 620 (Minn. App.
2012), aff’d, 836 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2013). We de fer to the district court’s credibility
findings and weighing of conflicting evidence. See State v. Schluter, 653 N.W.2d 787, 793
(Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 2003); see also State v. Miller , 659
N.W.2d 275, 279 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. July 15, 2003).
Ability to Rationally Consult with Counsel
The first issue is whether the district court’s finding that Todd did not lack the ability
to rationally consult with coun sel is supported by a preponde rance of the evidence. The
district court did not doubt that Todd “may be a difficult client with whom to communicate,
or that her counsel may need to explain lega l concepts multiple times and in a variety of
ways for [Todd] to understand the proceedings and her own legal options.” But the district
court also found that Todd had an “ongoing motivation to ‘shut down’ during these
proceedings,” implying that sh e had actively avoide d working with c ounsel because she

1 The district court’s findings of fact are labe lled as conclusions of law in its order. “[A]
fact found by the court, althou gh expressed as a conclusion of law, will be treated upon
appeal as a finding of fact.” Big Lake Lumber, Inc. v. Sec. Prop. Invs., Inc. , 836 N.W.2d
359, 366 n.8 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).

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was malingering. The district court concl uded that Todd had the ability to rationally
consult with counsel.
A finding that a defendant lacks the ability to rationall y consult with counsel is
generally founded on a defect of reason and not the defendant’s uncooperative nature. See
State v. Mills, 562 N.W.2d 276, 281-83 (Minn. 1997) (affirming a district court’s finding
that defendant was able to rationally consult with her attorney where she was clearly aware
of the participants of the court proceedings , was directable, and had a good relationship
with one of her attorneys). In Ganpat, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed a district
court’s finding that the defendant was able to rationally consult with counsel where the two
psychologists found the defendant to be malinge ring. 732 N.W.2d at 238. Of the three
psychologists who examined the defendant in Ganpat, two concluded that the defendant
was malingering and exaggerating the severity of his intellectual disabilities, and one
concluded that the defendant was not compet ent to stand trial after finding that the
defendant was intellectually disabled. Id. at 236-37. The Minnesota Supreme Court
affirmed because the district court’s finding of competency was supported by the testimony
and conclusions of two of the psychologists. Id. at 238.
Similar to Ganpat, here, two evaluators—Winskowski and Peuschold—opined that
Todd was competent to stand trial and was ma lingering. Todd’s attorney testified that
Todd had a tendency to “shut down” during interviews, but that they had a “good working
relationship” and Todd had been “candid” about her concerns. Todd’s attorney testified
that she did not become concerned about To dd’s ability to consult with her until January
or February 2015. Winskowski’s November 2014 report showed that Todd understood

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legal concepts when explained to her and was able to understand and evaluate legal options
when presented with hypotheticals. During Winskowski’s January 2015 evaluation, Todd
presented as more disabled than befo re—which Winskowski later diagnosed as
malingering—but, once confronted, was again able to understand basic legal concepts and
evaluate legal options. Winskowski and Peus chold testified that Todd was malingering
and that she was therefore incentivized to exaggerate her intellectual disabilities to appear
incompetent. Peuschold further testified that the attorney’s difficulty communicating with
Todd was consistent with malingering. Suffici ent evidence supports the district court’s
findings that Todd had the ability to rationally consult with counsel and that any difficulties
in communication were the result of Todd’s malingering and not her intellectual disability.
Ability to Understand the Proceedings and Participate in the Defense
The second issue is whether the district court’s finding that Todd did not lack the
ability to understand the proceedings and participate in the defense due to mental illness or
deficiency is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The district court relied on
Winskowski’s and Peuschold’s evaluations in finding that Todd was malingering and
found that Gilbertson’s conclusions were “likely less reliable” because Gilbertson did not
administer malingering tests. The district c ourt found that Todd understood basic legal
concepts, had abilities consistent with someone who was competent, and therefore had the
ability to understand the proceedings and participate in the defense.
Todd argues that the evidence does not s upport the district court’s finding that she
had the ability to understand the proceedings. Winskowski’s first report shows that Todd
understood the charges against her, the serious ness of the charges, th e roles of attorneys

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and the judge, and plea bargaining. Todd was able to understand unfamiliar concepts after
Winskowski explained them to her. Todd performed similarly during Winskowski’s
second evaluation. Sufficient evidence supports the district court’s finding that Todd was
able to understand the proceedings.
Todd argues that the district court di d not make any findings regarding Todd’s
ability to “participate in the defense.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 2(b). In its order,
the district court entitled this part of its anal ysis, “Mental Illness or Deficiency Affecting
Defendant’s Ability to Understand the Proceedings.” Todd correctly notes that the title to
this part makes no mention of Todd’s ability to participate in the defense. Nevertheless, in
its conclusion, the district c ourt concluded, “[Todd] is able to rationally consult with
counsel and is able to understand the proceedin gs and participate in her defense.” This
conclusion is supported by sufficient findings. In its analysis of whether Todd was able to
rationally consult with counsel, the district court found that Todd understood basic legal
concepts, had a good working relationship with her attorney, and had the ability to evaluate
her legal options. The distri ct court implicitly incorporat ed these findings into its
determination that Todd was able to participate in her defense. See Alvarez, 820 N.W.2d
at 620. In addition, in the part entitled “Mental Illness or Deficiency Affecting Defendant’s
Ability to Understand the Pro ceedings,” the district court found, based on Peuschold’s
report, that Todd was able to pay bills, use public transit, and advocate for her needs. These
abilities are evidence that a defendant, par ticularly one who is malingering and not
forthcoming about the severity of her disabilities, is able to participate in the defense. See

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Ganpat, 732 N.W.2d at 238. Sufficient findings support the district court’s conclusion that
Todd did not lack the ability to participate in the defense due to mental illness or deficiency.
Todd also argues that the district court should have given more weight to the
testimony of Todd’s attorney and Gilbertson. With respect to Todd’s attorney, a court need
not “accept without question a lawyer’s representations concerning the competence of his
client.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 177 n.13, 95 S. Ct. 896, 906 n.13 (1975). With
respect to Gilbertson’s conc lusion that Todd was not malingering and had a severe
intellectual disability, the district court fo und Gilbertson’s conclu sions unpersuasive.
Gilbertson testified that Todd was “psychologically retreating.” Winskowski testified that
she had never heard of this diagnosis. Gilb ertson testified that he determined that Todd
was not malingering without conducting any malingering tests. Peuschold conducted three
malingering tests, all of which indicated that Todd was malingering, and testified that
clinical intuition without sp ecific malingering tests was an unreliable measure of
malingering. We defer to the district court’s weighing of the testimony of Todd’s attorney
and Gilbertson. See Miller, 659 N.W.2d at 279; Schluter, 653 N.W.2d at 793.
We conclude that the district court did not err in concluding that Todd was
competent to stand trial.
Affirmed.