Madeline Guminiak, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1796

Madeline Guminiak,
Respondent,

vs.

Doug Sowokinos,
Appellant,

Diane Sowokinos, et al.,
Defendants.

Filed May 1, 2017
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19AV-CV-16-2646

Robin M. Wolpert, Towle Neu, Sapientia Law Group, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and
Christine Cahill Lake, Level Law Firm, Prior Lake, Minnesota (for respondent)
Matthew J. Schaap, Schaan P. Barth, Robert B. Bauer, Dougherty, Molenda, Solfest, Hills
& Bauer P.A., Apple Valley, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KIRK, Judge
Appellant tenant challenges an eviction judgment, arguing that tenant redeemed the
tenancy by depositing past-due rent into court, tenant should have been granted additional

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time to pay past-due rent, and nonpayment of rent is not a ground for eviction when a rental
property is not registered as required by local ordinance. We affirm.
FACTS
Beginning in late 2014, respondent Madeline Guminiak leased her single -family
home in Eagan to appellant Doug Sowokinos and his family (collectively, tenants). In May
2016, a new one-year lease began, under which tenants were to pay monthly rent of $3,520,
with a $240 late fee added on the 4th of the month. Tenants made their rent payments by
bank deposit. With limited exceptions, the rent was paid late.
On September 3, 2016, Guminiak inquired about the September rent. On September
6, 2016, Sowokinos responded that he was sick but would make the deposit by the end of
the day. After additional inquiries by Guminiak, Sowokinos replied that there was water
damage at the house. Sowokinos claimed that water was pouring from under the furnace.
Guminiak replied immediately, sending a plumber, and eventually a furnace technician, to
the house.
Guminiak filed an eviction complaint on September 27, 2016, alleging nonpayment
of rent and multiple non-monetary breaches of the lease. The district court held a hearing
on October 10, found that a dispute existed regarding the amount of rent due and/or whether
the leased premises are habitable, and ordered tenants to deposit into court $7,040 (rent for
September and October, not including late fees) by October 14 to secure a trial. That same
day, Guminiak registered the house as a rental property with the City of Eagan, which she
had just learned was required by city ordinance.

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The district court held an evidentiary hearing on October 27-28 that addressed both
nonpayment-of-rent and breach -of-lease grounds for eviction . Both part ies were
represented by counsel. Guminiak, Sowokinos, and Guminiak’s inspector testified.
The district court rejected tenants’ assertions about a furnace leak, determining that
the furnace was in good repair and the leak originated from the front -load washer, which
was tenants’ responsibility to maintain. The district court found that tenants did not pay
September or October rent and that Guminiak relies on rent to pay her mortgages. The
district court found that although Sowokinos claimed that the property was uninhabitable,
he lacked credibility. And although Guminiak did not regist er her rental prop erty until
October 10, 2016, the district court found that the failure to register the property did not
compromise habitability or void the lease. The district court found that tenants had “paid
$7,040.00 into escrow to secure a court he aring.” The district court entered judgment of
eviction based on nonpayment of rent. Sowokinos appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The expiration of the lease on April 30, 2017, does not make this appeal moot.

We first address Guminiak’s assertion that the appeal i s moot because the lease
expired by its terms on April 30, 2017. The mootness doctrine requires appellate courts to
“decide only actual controversies and avoid advisory opinions.” In re McCaskill , 603
N.W.2d 326, 327 (Minn. 1999). An a ssessment of mootness requires “a comparison
between the relief demanded and the circumstances of the case at the time of decision in
order to determine whether there is a live controversy that can be resolved.” In re
Minnegasco, 565 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Minn. 1997). “If a party to an appeal suggests that the

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controversy has, since the rendering of judgment below, become moot, that party bears the
burden of coming forward with the subsequent events that have produced that alleged
result.” Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 98, 113 S. Ct. 1967, 1976
(1993).
Generally, a tenant’s eviction appeal becomes moot if the tenant voluntarily vacates
the property. See Real Estate Equity Strategies, LLC v. Jones, 720 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Minn.
App. 2006) (concluding that appeal was not moot because tenant’s move from property
was not voluntary when precipitated by eviction judgment, issuance of writ of recovery,
and tenant’s inability to meet the conditions of a stay); Lanthier v. Michaelson, 394 N.W.2d
245, 246 (Minn. App. 1986) (concluding that because appellant relinquished the premises
voluntarily before execution of the writ of restitution, unlawful detainer appeal was moot),
review denied (Minn. Nov. 26, 1986). The record reflects that tenants remain in possession
of the property under the terms of a stay pending appeal. Based on the record before us,
Guminiak has not met her burden of showing that events subsequent to the district court’s
ruling make effective relief impossible. Thus, the appeal is not moot.
II. Tenants did not redeem under Minn. Stat. § 504B.291, subd. 1(a) (2016) , did
not object to a combined eviction hearing on multiple grounds, and had already
deposited rent required by Minn. Stat. § 504B.285, subd. 5(c) (2016).

Sowokinos asserts that the district court failed “to adhere to” Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.291, subd. 1(a) , which entitles a tenant to redeem a tenancy under certain
circumstances. In “an eviction action for nonpayment of rent . . . unless the landlord has
also sought to evict the tenant by alleging a material violation of the lease under section
504B.285, subdivision 5,” a tenant may redeem the premises and be restored to possession

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if the tenant pays “rent that is in arrears, with interest, costs of the action, and an attorney’s
fee not to exceed $5.” Minn. Stat. § 504B.291, subd. 1(a).
Sowokinos argues that by depositing $7,040 into court to secure a court hearing ,
tenants redeemed the tenancy. We need not resolve Sowokinos’s argument that the right
to redeem applies here, where the complaint alleges both breach of lease and nonpayment
of rent, because even if section 504B.291, subdivision 1 (a), applies, Sowokinos did not
satisfy its requirements. Sowokinos acknowledged at oral arg ument that he did not
specifically raise the redemption issue to the district court . And although it is undisputed
that tenants deposited September and October rent with the court, it is also undisputed that
tenants did not deposit late fees, interest, costs of the action, or attorney fees of $5, nor did
tenants request additional time to do so.
The right to redeem extends up until the time that “possession has been delivered.”
Minn. Stat. § 504B.291, subd. 1(a) . Possession is delivered within the meaning of the
statute when the court issues “an order dispossessing the tenant and permitting reentry by
the landlord.” Paul McCusker & Assocs., Inc. v. Omodt , 359 N.W.2d 747, 748 (Minn.
App. 1985) (quoting 614 Co. v. D.H. Overmyer Co., 297 Minn. 395, 397, 211 N.W.2d 891,
894 (1973)), review denied (Minn. March 29, 1985). Thus, the right to redeem extends up
until the court issues a writ of recovery of the premises and order to vacate. Id. Here, the
district court ent ered judgment on November 2 and issued the writ of recovery on
November 14. From the filing of the complaint through issuance of the writ of recovery,
the record reveals no attempt by tenants to invoke or fulfill the redemption requirements of

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Minn. Stat. § 504B.291. We therefore conclude that, assuming redemption was available,
tenants did not redeem the tenancy.
Sowokinos also argues that eviction was not available because the district court was
required by Minn. Stat. § 504B.285, subd. 5(c), to afford tenants an additional seven days
to pay any rent determined by the court to be due. When multiple grounds for eviction are
alleged, nonpayment-of-rent and breach-of-lease allegations are to be heard as alternative
grounds, with breach-of-lease allegations addressed first. Minn. Stat. § 504B.285, subd. 5
(2016). A tenant is not required to pay into court to defend against breach -of-lease
allegations. Minn. Stat. § 504B.285, subd. 5(b). If a tenant prevails on breach -of-lease
grounds, the tenant may then present defenses to nonpayment of rent. Id., subd. 5(c). The
tenant “shall be given up to seven days of additional time to pay any rent determined by
the court to be due.” Id.; see also Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 61, 213 N.W.2d 339,
343 (1973) (holding that when a tenant withholds rent and claims breach of statutory
covenants of habitability as a defense to eviction based on nonpayment of rent, the district
court “will order the tenant to pay the rent to be withheld from the landlord into court”).
Here, Sowokinos had already deposited September and October rent with the court
on October 13. Sowokinos had an opportunity to present defenses to breach of lease and
nonpayment of rent on October 27 and 28. Although the statute calls for consideration of
breach-of-lease allegations before a deposit is required to proceed to trial on nonpayment
of rent, Sowokinos did not object to the district court ’s order to deposit rent before a
combined hearing. Moreover, Sowokinos received a full hearing on nonpayment of rent,

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including his habitability defense .1 Accordingly, the procedure employed by the district
court does not warrant reversal.
III. Landlord’s failure to register the rental property as required by local
ordinance is not a breach of the implied covenant to maintain the premises in
compliance with applicable health and safety laws under Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.161, subd. 1(a)(4) (2016).

Minnesota law implies, in every residential lease, statutory covenants known as the
covenants of habitability. See Fritz , 298 Minn. at 56 -57, 213 N.W.2d at 340 -41. The
covenants of habitability cannot be waived and are liberally construed. Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.161, subds. 1(b), 3 (2016 ). Relevant to this dispute, a landlord covenants “ to
maintain the premises in compliance with the applicable health and safety laws of the state,
and of the local units of government where the premises are located. ” Id., subd. 1(a) (4)
(emphasis added). It is well settled that “[b]ecause the statutory covenants of habitability
are made a part of every residential lease and are mutual with the covenant to pay rent, the
rent, or at least part of it, is not due under the terms of the lease when the landlord has
breached the statutory covenants.”2 Fritz, 298 Minn. at 59, 213 N.W.2d at 342.

1 Sowokinos contends that the district court improperly suggested that he was required to
pursue a rent-escrow action instead of relying on a habitability defense to eviction and that
the district court did not fully consider his defense s. Sowokinos appears to take out of
context the district court ’s findings that Sowokinos gave no reason for his refusal to pay
rent and that he did not file a rent-escrow action. The record reflects that the district court
considered and rejected Sowokinos’s habitability defense.

2 A residential tenant may also initiate a rent-escrow action to remedy violations of the
covenants of habitability. Minn. Stat. § 504B.385, subd. 1 (2016); see Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.001, subd. 14 (2016) (defining “violation” to include violations of the covenants of
habitability in section 504B.161, subdivision 1).

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Sowokinos argues that Guminiak’s failure to register her rental property with the
City of Eagan constitutes a breach of a statutorily implied covenant that excuses his duty
to pay rent and precludes his eviction for nonpayment of rent. The relevant city ordinance
provides, “All residential rental properties shall be registered with the city by either the
residential rental property owner or ren tal manager.” Eagan, Minn., City Code § 6.55 ,
subd. 5(A) (2015). The ordinance specifies certain information that must be submitted
with the registration form, such as the contact information for the owner or manager and a
statement whether criminal background checks are conducted on all tenants. Id.
Sowokinos asks us to apply our unpublished opinion in Beaumia v. Eisenbraun, No.
A06-1482, 2007 WL 2472298 (Minn. App. Sept. 4, 2007) , to reverse the eviction
judgment. In Beaumia, we concluded that a lan dlord’s failure to comply with a similar
registration ordinance enacted by the City of Alexandria was a breach of the covenant to
“maintain the premises in compliance with the applicable health and safety laws.”
Beaumia, 2007 WL 2472298, at *2. But u npublished opinions are not precedential,
Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch , 502 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn. App. 1993) (citing Minn. Stat.
§ 480A.08, subd. 3(c) (1992)) , and with respect to the Eagan ordinance, Beaumia is not
persuasive.3

3 Sowokinos also points to Mac-Du Props. v. LaBresh , 392 N.W.2d 315 (Minn. App.
1986), review denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 1986) , but in Mac-Du, the terms of the lease
conditioned tenant’s duty to pay rent on landlord’s completion of improvements required
to bring the commercial property into compliance with city ordinances. Mac-Du, 392
N.W.2d at 316. Because no similar lease provision exists here, and the covenants of
habitability expressly apply only to residential properties, Mac-Du is inapposite.

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Guminiak argues that her failure to register the property as required by Eagan City
Code section 6.55 is not a breach of the covenant “to maintain the premises in compliance
with” applicable law because registration is not directly related to maintenance of the
premises. The district court agreed with Guminiak, finding that Guminiak was unaware of
the registration requirement, Eagan does not require an on -site inspection as part of the
registration process, and the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 504B.161 does not require
registration.
The district court’s construction of the ordinance and relevant statutory covenant of
habitability is sound. The relevant covenant requires a landlord “to maintain the premises
in compliance with the applicable health and safety laws,” not simply to “comply with the
applicable health and safety laws.” When interpreting a statute, “no word, phrase, or
sentence should be deemed superfluous, void, or insignificant.” Am. Family Ins. Grp. v.
Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000). “Maintain” in this context means “to care
for” or “engage in general repair or upkeep.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1097 (10th ed. 2014).
“Maintain the premises” thus refers to the care and upkeep of the rental property.
Eagan’s rental-property registration ordinance does not require a showing that the
premises are maintained in compliance with health or safety laws. The ordinance provides
that upon completion of a basic registration form that requires no information about a rental
house aside from its address, “the city shall issue to the registrant a certificate of registration
as proof of the registration.” Eagan, Minn., City Code § 6.55 , subd. 5 (B) (2015).
Furthermore, the Eagan ordinance does not prohibit a landlord from collecting rent in the

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absence of a registration certificate, and the statutory covenant s do not expressly require
compliance with business-licensure requirements.
Here, Guminiak submitted a registration form to the city on October 10, the same
day she learned of the registration requireme nt, and was issued a registration certificate
immediately. The city did not require an inspection of the property in connection with the
registration. W ith respect to the maintenance of the premises, the district court rejected
Sowokinos’s claim that the property was uninhabitable . These factual findings are not
challenged on appeal.
In light of the unchallenged factual findings, the minimal requirements of the Eagan
registration ordinance, and the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 504B.161, subd. 1(a)(4), the
district court properly concluded that Guminiak did not breach the covenant “ to maintain
the premises in compliance with the applicable health and safety laws” by failing to register
the property with the city before October 10.
Affirmed.