A16-1804

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1803
A16-1804

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Karyl Antone Ingalls,
Appellant.

Filed November 20, 2017
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Reilly, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File Nos. 55-CR-12-6879, 55-CR-12-6877

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, A. Michael Debolt, Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
On appeal from separate convictions of first-degree criminal sexual conduct,
appellant Karyl Antone Ingalls argues that (1) the district cour t erred by admitting the
victims’ out-of-court statements ; (2) he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor
committed prejudicial misconduct during closing arguments; and (3) the district court erred
by imposing lifetime conditional release for one of the convictions. We affirm appellant’s
convictions. However, because the district court erred by imposing lifetime conditional
release for one of appellant’s convictions when the guilty verdicts were accepted by the
district court simultaneously, we reverse and remand for resentencing.
FACTS
Appellant challenges two first-degree crim inal-sexual-conduct convictions for sex
crimes committed against his step-granddaughters, Child 1 and Child 2, both of whom were
under the age of ten at the time of the offenses. The ch ildren visited their paternal
grandmother and her husband, appellant, on M onday afternoons. In February 2012, the
children told their maternal grandmothe r, H.M., that appellant touched them
inappropriately when they were in his care. H.M. reported the allegations to the police,
and Rochester Police Officer Anne Johnson investigated the case and conducted a forensic
CornerHouse interview with each child. Following its i nvestigation, the state charged
appellant by amended complaint with firs t-degree criminal sexual conduct—sexual
penetration against each child , second-degree criminal sexual conduct—victim under the

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age of 13 against each chil d, and second-degree criminal sexual conduct—significant
relationship against each child.
The two cases were tried together during a five-day jury trial in May 2016. Both
children testified at trial. Child 1 testified th at appellant “used to to uch us up here in the
chest part, and it didn’t feel right,” and that appellant touched her “[d]own here a little,” on
her vagina. Child 1 testified that appellant “like[d] to put his hand down there sometimes,”
that it happened “[e]very day,” and that it “f elt weird . . . like some thing cold was going
down there.” She stated that he sometimes “put his hand through” her underwear and “put
his hand in them all the way.” The child sa id she felt “[r]eally scared” when appellant
touched her vagina, and he told her “[n]ever tell anybody about this.” Child 1 saw appellant
touch Child 2 on “[t]he chest and the vagina,” and said it “didn’t look right,” and he was
“doing the same stuff [to Child 2] as he did to me.” Child 2 testified that appellant touched
her on “[t]he butt,” underneath her underpants, and that his fingers went in between her
butt cheeks and it “felt really cold.” She testified that she “really hated that . . . [b]ecause
it did not feel good.”
Cynthia Jo Tri, a therapist specializi ng in trauma and work ing with children,
testified that she worked with the children more than 20 times between 2012 and the time
of trial, and testified about her therapy sessions with the children.
Appellant testified in his own defense. He denied to uching the children sexually,
and stated that he had back problems a nd breathing problems that prevented him from
engaging in strenuous activity. Appellant ca lled a number of witnesses to testify on his

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behalf, including the children’s father and former stepmother, appellant’s daughter-in-law,
the children’s paternal grandmother, a family friend, and a psychologist.
The jury returned a ve rdict finding appellant guilty of all charges. At sentencing,
the district court adjudicated appellant guilty of the first-degree criminal sexual conduct
offenses and sentenced him to concurrent sentences of 144 months in prison and ten years
of conditional release for the crime against Child 2, and 180 months in prison and lifetime
conditional release for the crime against Child 1. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by admitting the children’s
out-of-court statements.
We apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s evidentiary
ruling. State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003). “A [district] court abuses its
discretion when it acts arbitrarily, without justification, or in contravention of the law.”
State v. Mix , 646 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20,
2002). Appellant bears “the burden of establis hing that the [distric t] court abused its
discretion and that [the] appellant was thereby prejudiced.” Amos, 658 N.W.2d at 203.
The district court admitted certain of th e victims’ out-of-court statements under
Minnesota Statutes section 595.02 (2016), a st atutory exception to the hearsay rule that
allows into evidence certain out-of-court statements made by children under age ten in sex-
abuse cases.1 The statute provides:
An out-of-court statement made by a child under the age of ten
years . . . alleging, explaining, denying, or describing any act

1 Child 1 was over the age of ten at the time of trial.

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of sexual contact or penetration performed with or on the child
. . . not otherwise admissible by statute or rule of evidence, is
admissible as substantive evidence if:
(a) the court or person auth orized to receive evidence
finds, in a hearing conducted out side of the presence of the
jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement
and the reliability of the person to whom the statement is made
provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and
(b) the child . . . either:
(i) testifies at the proceedings; or
(ii) is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative
evidence of the act; and
(c) the proponent of the statement notifies the adverse
party. . . .
Id., subd. 3.
We consider the “totality of the circum stances” surrounding the statement when
assessing the reliability of a ch ild’s out-of-court statements. State v. Sime , 669 N.W.2d
922, 927 (Minn. App. 2003). A totality-of-the-circumstances analysis requires us to
consider time, content, the circumstances of the statement, and the reliability of the person
to whom the statements were made. Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3. Additional relevant
circumstances include “spontaneity, consistent repetition, mental state of the declarant, use
of terminology unexpected of a child of sim ilar age, and lack of motive to fabricate.” In
re Welfare of L.E.P., 594 N.W.2d 163, 170 (Minn. 1999). The district court also considers
the declarant’s knowledge, th e motives of the declarant and the witnesses to speak
truthfully, the proximity in time between the statement and the events described, whether
the person speaking with the child had a prec onceived idea of what the child would say,

6
and the lack of leading or suggestive questions. Id. A district court has “considerable
leeway in their consideration of appropriate factors as long as the factors considered relate
to whether the child was particularly likely to be truthful.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Children’s Grandmother, H.M.
The children told H.M. about a “good touch, bad touch” unit at school. H.M. asked
if anyone had touched them inappropriately, and Child 1 responded that appellant touched
both girls inappropriately. Child 1 told H.M. that when their paternal grandmother was out
of the house, appellant “had taken their pants down” and “rubbed them down there.” Child
2 stated that “Grandpa Karyl made me suck on his penis.” The girls told H.M. that the
abuse happened almost every Monday. The children told H.M. that appellant “would rub
them down in the groin area in their bottom,” that he “wou ld put his finger into their
bottom,” and that Child 2 “said it was cold, it hur t, and they asked him not to do that.”
H.M. testified that “the girls talked about how they had asked him to stop and how they
had felt uncomfortable.”
Before trial, the district court considered the admissibility of the children’s out-of-
court statements to H.M., recognizing that:
The Court needs to look at time, content, [and] circumstances,
to determine the reliability of the person to whom those
statements are made. There was the initial report, details
surrounding that, as well as th e actions the grandmother took
or who she called. She was a trusted caretaker of the
children. . . . And the children talked about their allegations
with that trusted caretaker and about the timing of the
Defendant to be alone with the girls, apparently on Mondays
when he took care of them. I find that with the totality of the
circumstances, it’s more probativ e than prejudicial, and there
is reliability of the statements.

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The district court considered each of th e statutory factors identified in Minnesota
Statutes section 595.02 and determined that the out-of-court statements to H.M. were
reliable. The evidentiary record supports these findings. Each of the victims testified at
trial that appellant touched her vagina. H.M. reported the allegations to the police, and the
victims gave similar accounts to Officer Johnson and to their therapist.
Appellant argues that the children’s stat ements to H.M. were not spontaneous
because H.M. prompted the discussion and asked for detailed information. But the record
shows that the discussion arose because of a lesson at school, and not because H.M.
prompted the discussion. Appellant also argues that H.M. was unreliable because she
lacked training or experience in child sex-abuse cases. The district court rejected these
arguments and, given the broad discretion granted to district courts in evidentiary matters,
we determine that the court’s ruling did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Officer Anne Johnson
The district court considered the ad missibility of the ch ildren’s out-of-court
statements to Officer Johnson during the Co rnerHouse interviews. The district court
reviewed the interviews and analyzed the o fficer’s proposed testimony in light of the
statutory factors and relevant caselaw. The district court found that the officer “did a good
job” during the interviews. Th e district court determined, ba sed upon its review of the
evidence and controlling law, that under “the totality of the circumstances the statements
had particular guarantees of trustworthiness for admission.”
The officer testified regarding her traini ng, her experience with child sex-abuse
victims, and her expertise with forensic interview techniques. The officer testified about

8
her interviews with the children and stated that both children used hand-drawn diagrams
and anatomically correct dolls to demonstr ate where appellant touched them. Child 1
“spilled out the whole abuse” and told the officer that “she had been touched by grandpa,”
“pointed on the diagram to her [chest] area and vagina area,” and “tried to take her own
hand and rub it on her chest ar ea to show [the o fficer] what had happened.” Child 1 told
the officer that appellant put his hands on he r “bagina,” and “said th at it went inside and
that it hurt.” Child 2 “immediately went in to talking about getting touches from grandpa
that she didn’t like.” Child 2 “talked abou t getting touches down her pants under her
clothing with [appellant’s] hand’s skin on her skin.” She said that appellant’s hands went
“inside” of her, and it “felt co ld when she was touched on he r butt.” The district court
found these statements reliable and the evidentiary record supports this determination. The
totality of the circumstances surrounding the children’s stat ements support the district
court’s reliability determination, and we determine that the district court’s evidentiary
ruling was not an abuse of discretion.
Therapist Cynthia Tri
Appellant argues that the children’s out-of-c ourt statements to their therapist were
unreliable, inconsistent, and not spontaneous. The district court found that the statements
were “not forensic,” and that Tri would not express any opinions. The district court found
that the play-therapy sessions were “nondir ective dealing with trauma,” where “[t]he
children direct the play.” Thus,
with that totality of circumstances, the observation of the notes,
the spontaneity of th e children, the purpose is not to uncover
abuse. I find that it’s releva nt and probative, more probative

9
than prejudicial, and renders th e declarant worthy of belief.
But again, it’s up to the jury to decide if it’s believable and
enough evidence for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The evidentiary record suppor ts the district court’s relia bility determination. Tri
testified that she specializes in trauma an d working with children, and had provided
therapeutic services to the ch ildren more than 20 times betw een 2012 and the trial. Tri
engaged in play therapy with Child 2 and mo re traditional talk ther apy with Child 1.
During these therapy sessions, Child 2 said that appellant “hurt her,” “made [her] suck his
pee pee,” and that she was afraid of him and had nightmares. Child 2 said she was afraid
of appellant because he was a “bad man,” and she was worried he “might sit on top of her
sister . . . again.” During another play -therapy session, Child 2 was playing with a
“Grandpa Karyl” doll and a child doll, and th e child doll yelled at the Karyl doll “I don’t
want to marry you and have to kiss you. You ’re a very bad man.” Child 1 told Tri that
appellant made her “sit on her hands and knees and he woul d get on top of her from
behind,” and rub his penis “on the middle of her back and on her buttocks.” The child
“knew he took his penis out [because] she h eard him unzip his zipper and she could feel
it.” Based on this record, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the therapist’s testimony regarding the children’s out-of-court statements
were reliable under the totality of the circumstances.
II. Appellant is not entitled to a new trial on the basis of prosecutorial
misconduct because any wrongfully admitted evidence did not significantly
affect the verdict.
The right to due process of law includes the right to a fair trial, and the right to a fair
trial includes the absence of prosecutorial misconduct. See Spann v. State , 704 N.W.2d

10
486, 493-94 (Minn. 2005). “A prosecutor engages in pros ecutorial misconduct when he
violates ‘clear or established standards of co nduct, e.g., rules, laws , orders by a district
court, or clear commands in this state’s case law.’” State v. McCray, 753 N.W.2d 746, 751
(Minn. 2008) (quoting State v. Fields , 730 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Minn. 2007)). When
assessing whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred during closing argument, “we look
to the closing argument as a whole, rather than to selected phrases and remarks.” Ture v.
State, 681 N.W.2d 9, 19 (Minn. 2004). The district court has broad discretion to determine
the propriety of a prosecutor’s statements during closing argument. McCray, 753 N.W.2d
751-52.
The standard of review varies based on whether an objection was raised at the time
of the alleged error. State v. Yang, 774 N.W.2d 539, 559 (Minn. 2009). When reviewing
claims involving objected-to prosecutorial misconduct, we apply a two-tiered approach
determined by the severity of the misconduct. State v. Caron, 300 Minn. 123, 127-28, 218
N.W.2d 197, 200 (1974). Under this approa ch, if a claim involves unusually serious
prosecutorial misconduct, we review the c onduct to determine whether it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 127, 218 N.W.2d at 200. We review claims regarding
less-serious misconduct to determine whether the conduct “likely played a substantial part
in influencing the jury to convict.” Id. at 128, 218 N.W.2d at 200-01; see also State v.
Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 390 n.9 (Minn. 2007). It is unclear whether this two-tiered
standard still applies. See State v. Carridine , 812 N.W.2d 130, 146 (Minn. 2012)
(concluding that because “the one instance of objected-to prosecutorial misconduct here is

11
harmless even under the standard for more se rious misconduct, we do not reach the issue
of the continued applicability of the Caron test to objected-to prosecutorial misconduct”).
a. The prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument.
i. Arguing facts not in evidence; in flaming passions of jury; vouching
A prosecutor may not make arguments that are unsupported by the evidence or that
are designed to inflame the jury’s passions or prejudices against the defendant. State v.
Rucker, 752 N.W.2d 538, 5 51 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Sept. 23, 2008).
Prosecutors may present “legitimate arguments on the evidence, to analyze and explain the
evidence, and to present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom,” State v. Smith, 541
N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. 19 96), but it is “unprofessiona l conduct for the prosecutor
intentionally to misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.”
State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 142 (Minn. 2009) (citation omitted). Additionally, “[t]he
assessment of a witness’s credibility is exclusively the provi nce of the jury.” State v.
McCray, 753 N.W.2d at 754 (quotation omitted). It is improper for the state to “express[]
a personal opinion as to a witness’s credibility.” State v. Jackson, 773 N.W.2d 111, 123
(Minn. 2009). Vouching occurs “when the government implies a guarantee of a witness’s
truthfulness, refers to facts outside the reco rd, or expresses a personal opinion as to a
witness’s credibility.” State v. Patterson, 577 N.W.2d 494, 497 (Minn. 1998) (quotation
omitted).
During closing, the defense challenged the credibility of the children, arguing that
their “minds are like a crime scene that’s be en trampled over again and again” and that
their “memories are fallible.” On rebuttal, the prosecutor made co mments related to an

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individual’s ability to remember the events of September 11, 2001 and to a war veteran’s
combat experience. The prosecutor argued: “[Y]ou probably remember with vivid detail
just precisely where you were on September 11, [2001], when the planes crashed into the
Twin Towers in New York and they collapsed.” The prosecutor continued: “Thousands of
[war veterans] have returned home with shra pnel still in their bodies. . . . The emotional
harm and injury from sexual abuse is not unlike this shrapnel that’s imbedded in your flesh.
You can’t see it. You don’t feel it. But it’s in there.” Later during rebuttal, the prosecutor
summarized the testimony of the children’s CornerHouse interviews and play-therapy
sessions and argued that their statements we re “spontaneous” and “natural” disclosures,
shared without “prompting or prodding.” Th e prosecutor then segued into a Spanish
expression, “Solo los borrachos y los ninos siempre dicen la verdad”—“only drunks and
little children always tell the truth”—and argued that “children and drunks don’t filter what
they say. It just comes out.”
The defense objected to these statements, which the district court overruled. The
district court erred. When the credibility of the witnesses is a central issue, as it was here,
a reviewing court will “pay special attention to statements that may inflame or prejudice
the jury.” State v. Morton, 701 N.W.2d 225, 2 36 (Minn. 2005). “Because sexual-abuse
cases generally evoke emotional reactions, an attempt by the prosecutor to exacerbate such
reactions by making any emotive appeal to the jury is likely to be highly prejudicial.” State
v. Rucker, 752 N.W.2d 538, 551 (Minn. App. 2008) (citation omitted). We determine that
the prosecutor’s references to the events of September 11, 20 01, were not objectionable,
considering the closing argument as a whol e. However, the prosecutor’s statements

13
regarding the trauma suffered by injured war veterans were prejudicial because they were
meant to evoke an emotional reaction in the jury. Additionally, the prosecutor’s reference
to the expression that “only . . . little children always tell the truth” operated as an
endorsement of the credibility of the witnesses, and was therefore improper.
ii. Shifting the burden of proof
A prosecutor improperly shifts the burden of proof by implying that a defendant has
the burden of proving his innocence. State v. Jackson, 773 N.W.2d 111, 122 (Minn. 2009).
“[M]isstatements of the burde n of proof are highly imprope r and constitute prosecutorial
misconduct.” State v. Coleman, 373 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Minn. 1985).
During the state’s closing argument, the pr osecutor identified the elements of the
charged offenses and argued that the state had met its burden of proof with respect to each
element. In rebuttal, the prosecutor argued that the children’s testimony was credible and
concluded: “So I ask you again, do you be lieve [the children]? If you do, then the
Defendant is guilty of criminal sexual conduct, and you may re turn a verdict of guilty.”
Appellant argues that these statements distorted the state’s burden of proof by suggesting
that appellant could not be acquitted unless the jury believed the children were lying.
We disagree. “[A] prosecutor’s attempts to shift the burden of proof are often
nonprejudicial and harmless where . . . the district court clearly and thoroughly instructed
the jury regarding the burden of proof.” State v. McDonough, 631 N.W.2d 373, 389 n.2
(Minn. 2001). Here, the district court properly instructed the jury on the state’s burden of
proof, stating:

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[The presumption of innocence] remains with the Defendant
unless and until the Defendant has been proven guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. That the Defendant has been brought
before the Court by the ordinary processes of the law and is on
trial should not be considered by you as in any way suggesting
guilt. The burden of proving guilt is on the State. The
Defendant does not have to prove innocence.
We presume that the jury followed th e district court’s instructions. State v. Ridley , 776
N.W.2d 419, 428 (Minn. 2009). Analyzing the closing argument as a whole, we determine
that the prosecutor did not shift the burden of proof to appellant. See Ture, 681 N.W.2d at
19 (directing reviewing court to “look to the cl osing argument as a whole, rather than to
selected phrases and remarks”).
b. The errors were harmless.
Because we determine that the prosecutor committed misconduct by inflaming the
passions of the jury a nd vouching for the credibility of witnesses, we next turn to a
consideration of whether the error “si gnificantly affected the verdict.” State v. Barajas ,
817 N.W.2d 204, 220 (Minn. App. 2012), review denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 2012). This
standard is not met if the verdict is “surely unattributable” to the error. Id. (quotation
omitted). We will not reverse a conviction if the state proves the error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. State v. Al-Naseer, 690 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Minn. 2005).
We determine that the state satisfied its burden of demonstrating that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury heard extensive testimony regarding
appellant’s ongoing sexual abuse of the childre n. The children testified that appellant
touched each of them on the chest and th e vagina. H.M., Officer Johnson, and Tri
corroborated this testimony, and the state al so presented videotaped evidence of the

15
CornerHouse interviews. Officer Johnson testified that during the CornerHouse interview,
Child 1 “spilled out the whole abuse” without prompting and shared that appellant had
rubbed her chest and her vagina. Child 2 “immediately went into talking about getting
touches from grandpa that she didn’t like.” And Tri testified in detail about her play-
therapy sessions with the victims and the disclosures made during those therapy sessions.
The jury’s verdict was supported by over whelming evidence. Because the jury’s
verdict was surely unattributable to the error in the state’s rebuttal, appellant is not entitled
to a new trial. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01 (“Any erro r that does not affect substantial
rights must be disregarded.”).
III. The district court’s sentencing decision is erroneous.
When a court commits an offender to pr ison for a first-degree criminal-sexual-
conduct conviction “and the offender has a prev ious or prior sex offense conviction, the
court shall provide that, after the offender has been released from prison, the commissioner
shall place the offender on conditional release for the remainder of th e offender’s life.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 7(b) (2010). A conviction is a “prior sex offense” if:
the offender was convicted of committing a sex offense before
the offender has been convicte d of the present offense,
regardless of whether the offende r was convicted for the first
offense before the commission of the present offense, and the
convictions involved separate behavioral incidents.
Id., subd. 1(g) (2010). A conviction occurs when the district court adjudicates a defendant
guilty on the record. State v. Nodes , 863 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. 2015). We review the
interpretation of a statute de novo. Id. at 80.

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Appellant argues that the district cour t erred by imposing lifetime conditional
release, and we agree. The recent case of State v. Nodes is instructive. In that case, the
defendant entered a plea of guilty to two coun ts of criminal sexual conduct arising from
separate behavioral incidents with separate victims. Nodes, 863 N.W.2d at 78. The district
court formally accepted the guilty pleas at sentencing, adjudicated defendant guilty of the
two offenses to which he pleaded guilty, and stayed execution of the sentences. Id. at 78-
79. The state argued that if defendant’s sentences were ever executed, he would be subject
to a ten-year conditional-release period on the first count, and lifetime conditional release
on the remaining count. Id. at 79. The district court disagreed and set the conditional-
release period at ten years for each count. Id. We affirmed on appeal, reasoning that “when
multiple convictions are entered on the record at the same time, those convictions are
simultaneous and neither is a prior conv iction with respect to the other.” Id. (quotations
omitted). The supreme court disagreed, and reversed and remanded for resentencing. Id.
The Nodes court defined a “prior sex offense convi ction” as “a conviction for a separate
behavioral incident entered be fore a second conviction, whethe r at different hearings or
during the same hearing,” and concluded that a defendant “who, in a single hearing, is
convicted of two sex offenses, one immediately after the other, each arising out of separate
behavioral incidents, has a ‘prior sex offens e conviction’ under Minn. Stat. § 609.3455.”
Id. at 77, 82.
Nodes held that a conviction occurs when the district court accepts a guilty plea and
adjudicates the defendant guilty on the record. Id. at 80-81. The decision reasoned that
“[a]s long as one conviction is entered before the second, it is a ‘prior conviction’ under

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the plain language” of Minnesota Statutes section 609.3455. Id. at 82. But Nodes did not
resolve the question of how to treat two convictions when they are entered simultaneously,
rather than sequentially, which is the factual posture presented here. Unlike Nodes, the
district court in this case adjudicated appellant guilty of two first-degree criminal-sexual-
conduct offenses at the same time during sentencing. Addressing appellant at sentencing,
the district court judge stated: “If you woul d stand. You’re adj udicated guilty of the
offenses for which you were co nvicted by the jury.” The di strict court then sentenced
appellant to concurrent sentences of 144 m onths in prison and ten years of conditional
release for the offense committed against Child 1, and 180 mo nths in prison and lifetime
conditional release for the offense committed against Child 2. The district court
adjudicated appellant guilty of the two offenses at the same time, and, as a result, appellant
was not convicted of one count before he was convicted of the other.
Because appellant did not have any previous or prior sex-offense convictions at the
time he was adjudicated guilty, and because the convictions were entered simultaneously,
we determine that the district court erre d by imposing lifetime conditional release on the
second offense and we revers e and remand with instructions to impose a ten-year
conditional-release period on each offense.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.