State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1805

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Christopher Michael Means,
Appellant.

Filed October 2, 2017
Reversed and remanded
Peterson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-36035

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Cheri A. Townsend, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
PETERSON, Judge
In this appeal from his conviction of first-degree aggravated robbery, appellant
argues that his guilty plea was not accurate because the record does not show that he knew

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that others were going to take the victim’s property or that he intended to aid in t he
commission of the robbery. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
Appellant Christopher Michael Means was one of three peo ple who assaulted
another person in Minneapolis. Means and the other assailants followed the victim when
he got off a light -rail train. Means threw the first punch, hitting the victim in the back of
the head, and all three punched the victim as he fell down and then tried to escape. The
victim said that Means was his primary attacker. The victim’s injuries included a broken
nose, a deviated septum, a five -centimeter laceration to his forehead, and knee damage.
During the assault, one of the other assailants took the victim’s cigarettes.
A surveillance video showed the assault and assisted police i n identifying Means.
He was charged with first -degree aggravated robbery and entered a guilty plea with no
agreement as to what his sentence would be.
During the plea hearing, Means testified that he had been drinking on the night of
the offense and so me gang members on the train with him, who he did not know , “were
. . . the people that [he] went and committed [the] robbery with.” Means admitted that he
punched the victim and knocked him to the ground, but he denied that he and the other
assailants decided beforehand to beat up or rob the victim. He testified that he remembered
only parts of the incident because he blacked out , and he did not remember standing over
the victim to prevent his escape. Means agreed that he was part of the group that “did this,”
and he knew that it was wrong.

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The prosecutor asked whether Means “basically helped out the other two guys,”
knowing that “they were going to rob” the victim, and Means said, “No. I didn’t know that
we were going to rob him, sir.” He t estified, “I thought it was, like, going to be me and
him—not, you know, other people.” Means acknowledged that the robbery occurred, but
he testified that he did not remember it. When pressed, Means agreed that while he did not
take anything from the victim, his assault enabled the others to “get away with the
cigarettes.” When asked why he pleaded guilty, Means said, “I’m just pleading guilty
because I know what I did was wrong, and I know that I don’t remembe r, but I wouldn’t
be here if it wasn’t serious.” The prosecutor then stated, “I’m satisfied with the Norgaard
plea, your Honor.”
After a bench conference, the prosecutor again asked Means whether, despite his
inebriation, he believed statements that the victim and one of the other assailants made to
police, and Means answered, “If I say yeah, then I’ll be —a lie, because I don’t know, you
know, what went on that night.” He stated that he was “guilty to a certain extent” because
he hit the victim.
Defense counsel again questioned Means, asking:
Q: And although you don’t remember it, you’re not saying that
a robbery didn’t occur, you just can’t remember ; is that
correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And after reading the police reports and having me describe
what’s on the video, you’re aware that you continued to punch
him after that initial blow?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that as you and the other people were beating him up,
they were also taking property from him?
A: Yes, sir.

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Q: And you and I have talked about the th eory of aiding and
abetting, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Would you agree that you’re guilty of this offense?
A: Yes, sir.

The prosecutor then questioned Means again and asked whether, in light of his
failure to remember the facts, Means would agree to allow the judge to examine the
complaint and police reports “in the process of accepting your plea of guilty,” to ensure
that Means was “pleading guilty to an offense that he’s guilty of.” Means agreed.
The district court accepted the plea, entered a con viction, and imposed a 48-month
executed sentence. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Means argues that his guilty plea is invalid and, therefore, he must be allowed to
withdraw it. He contends that his plea is invalid because it is inaccurate. In a pro se brief,
Means essentially makes the same argument.
The validity of a guilty plea is a question of law subject to de novo review, and the
defendant has the burden to establish that a plea is invalid. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d
90, 94 (Minn. 2010). “To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate,
voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. If a guilty plea fails to meet any of these three requirements,
the plea is invalid. State v. Theis , 742 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Minn. 2007). “A defendant is
free to simply appeal directly from a judgment of conviction and contend that the record
made at the time the plea was entered is inadequate in one or more of these respects. ”
Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989).

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“A guilty plea is inaccurate if it is not supported by a proper factual basis.” State v.
Johnson, 867 N.W.2d 210, 215 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2015).
A factual basis is proper if there are sufficient facts on the record to establish that the
defendant’s conduct was within the charge to which he pleaded guilty. Id. If the
defendant’s statements during his plea negate an essential element of the offense, the
factual basis for the plea is inadequate. State v. Iverson , 664 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn.
2003). Means argues that his guilty plea is inaccurate “because he testified he did not know
the principals were going to commit a crime and he did not intend to aid the commission
of that crime.”
Means pleaded guilty to first-degree aggravated robbery.
Whoever, having knowledge of not being entitled
thereto, takes personal prop erty from the person or in the
presence of another and uses or threatens the imminent use of
force against any person to overcome the person’s resistance
or powers of resistance to, or to compel acquiescence in, the
taking or carrying away of the property is guilty of
robbery . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 609.24 (201 4). “Whoever, while committing a robbery, . . . inflicts bodily
harm upon another, is guilty of aggravated robbery in the first degree . . . .” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.245, subd. 1 (2014). At the plea hearing, Means testified that he did not take anything
from the victim but admitted that his assault enabled the others to “get away with the
cigarettes.”
Under the aiding-and-abetting statute, “[a] person is criminally liable for a crime
committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires
with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime. ” Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1

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(2014). The intent element of aiding and abetting “embodies two important and necessary
principles: (1) that the defendant knew that his alleged accomplices were going to commit
a crime, and (2) that the defendant intended his presence or actions to further the
commission of that crime.” State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 805 (Minn. 2012) (quotation
omitted); see State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 682 (Minn. 2007) (stating that aiding and
abetting first -degree murder requires proof that the defendant “knew that his alleged
accomplices were going to commit a crime and . . . intended his presence or actions to
further the commission of that crime”); State v. Gates, 615 N.W.2d 331, 337 (Minn. 2000)
(stating, “ [t]o impose liability for aiding and abetting, the state must show that the
defendant played a knowing role in the commission of the crime” (quotation omitted)) ,
overruled on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354
(2004).
Means’s testimony at the plea hearing was insufficient to establish that he
committed first-degree aggravated robbery. Means admitted that he assaulted the victim,
but he denied that he and the other assailants planned to rob the victim or that he knew that
the other assailants planned to rob the victim. Means agreed that the district court could
examine the complaint and the police reports to ensure that he was guilty of the offense to
which he was pleading guilty , but, although the police reports establish Means’s
participation in the assault, they also state that Means said that he did not intend to rob the
victim.
We also reject the state’s argument that Means’s plea is a valid Norgaard plea. In
a Norgaard plea, a defendant may “plead guilty even though he or she claims a loss of

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memory, through amnesia or intoxication, regarding the circumstances of the offense.”
State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994); State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 261
Minn. 106, 110 N.W.2d 867 (1961). But to make a valid Norgaard plea, the defendant
must admit “that he or she is likely to be convicted of the crime charged.” State v. Solberg,
882 N.W.2d 618, 621 n.1 (Minn. 2016). When Means was asked if he agreed that the
information contained in the complaint and the police reports would support a guilty verdict
to the charge of robbery, he said, “No.”1
Because there are not sufficient facts on the record to establish that Means’s conduct
constituted first-degree aggravated robbery, we reverse and remand to the district court so
that Means can withdraw his guilty plea.
Reversed and remanded.

1 For the same reason, Means’s plea is also not a valid Alford plea. An Alford plea requires
the defendant to maintain innocence while conceding that a jury would likely convict on
the charged offense. State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760-61 (Minn. 1977).