Jeremiah Akinnola, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1813

Jeremiah Akinnola,
Appellant,

vs.

Southampton Apartments, et al.,
Respondents

Filed June 19, 2017
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-15-6697

Jeremiah Akinnola, Minneapolis, MN (pro se appellant)

Christopher T. Kalla, Hanbery & Turner, P.A., Minneapolis, MN (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant-tenant challenges the district court’s award of attorney fees to
respondent-landlord and respondent -property manager , arguing that the attorney -fees
provision in the lease does not apply to this action and tha t, if it does, the award is
unreasonable. We affirm.

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FACTS
On April 15, 2015, appellant Jeremiah Akinnola filed a complaint against
respondents Southampton Apartments and Highland Management Group, alleging that
prior to signing an apartment -rental lease, he was assured that he did not have to worry
about dogs , but after moving into an apartment he saw several dogs and was nearly
attacked. Akinnola alleged, among other things, breach of contract, claiming that the
agreement between the parties required respondents to provide him an apartment and
common areas that were “safe and free of threats of dog bites.” Akinnola alleged that
respondents “breached the agreement when [they] failed to provide a safe apartment unit
and hallways in the condition the parties agreed to .” Akinnola sought damages in excess
of $20,000.
Respondents moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The
district court found that Ak innola argued that respondents breached an oral promise, but
that oral statements were inadmissible under the parol evidence rule because they
contradicted the integrated written lease that has a pet policy allowing certain dogs.
Respondents moved for attorney fees. The district court decided the issue on the
parties’ written submissions. The district court found that the lease provides for recovery
of reasonable attorney fees by the prevailing party in an action brought to enforce the terms
of the lease, and respondents prevailed on summary judgment. The district court also found
that the attorney fees were reasonable and awarded respondents attorney fees in the amount
of $16,021. This appeal followed.

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D E C I S I O N
Akinnola does not challen ge summary judgment , he seek s review only of the
attorney-fees award.
Hearing
Akinnola first argues that the district court should have granted him a hearing on
the attorney-fees motion.
On May 20, 2016, respondents moved for attorney fees pursuan t to Minn. R. Gen.
Pract. 119, which sets forth a procedure for recovering attorney fees. See Minn. R. Gen.
Pract. 119.01. The rule requires that application for attorney fees sought in excess of
$1,000 be made by motion, accompanied by an affid avit of a n attorney of record and a
memorandum of law discussing the basis for recovery and an explanation of the calculation
of fees. Id., .02, .04. The only ment ion of a hearing is under the provision of the rule
related to default proceedings, which is not applicable here. See id., .05.
Akinnola argues that the district court denied his request for a hearing. But the
record shows that Akinnola did not request a hearing.
On August 5, 2016 , Akinnola submitted a reply to respondents’ attorney-fees
motion. In it, Akinnola asserted that “a hearing will provide him the opportunity to fully
address [respondents’] arguments.” He concluded his reply stating, “[b]ased on the
foregoing, [Akinnola] respectfully requests that this [c] ourt denies [respondents’] motion
for attorneys’ fees. Alternatively, grant a hearing to review line -by-line [respondents’]
counsel bill entries.” (Emphasis added.) The district court did not deny Akinnola a hearing
because Akinnola did not request a hearing. The district court ruled on the motion after

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reviewing written submissions, presumably not finding it necessary to “alternatively” hold
a hearing on the matter.
Further, Akinnola was aware that the district court did not plan to sch edule a
hearing. On June 21, 2016, the district court conducted a telephone conference with the
parties. The district court addressed the motion for attorney fees along with issues raised
by Akinnola, including his request for reconsideration of the summary -judgment order.
The district court stated that it would hear the motion for attorney fee s on July 22, 2016.
Akinnola moved for a continuance due to travel plans.
On July 15, 2016, the district court issued an order stating “[g]iven [Akinnola’s]
unavailability, coupled with [ respondents’] amenability to a briefing schedule in lieu of
oral arguments,” respondents shall file a brief in support of their motion by July 29, 2016,
Akinnola shall file a reply brief by August 5, and respondents may file a reply brief by
August 10. Thus, Akinnola was aware that the district court did not plan to hold a hearing.
Further, on July 16, Akinnola sent a letter to the distri ct court seeking clarification of the
briefing schedule, but did not raise the issue of a hearing.
In July 2016, Akinnola also contacted the district court because he was having
trouble filing his papers because his in forma pauperis (IFP) status expired. On August 4,
2016, the district court issued an order regarding Akinnola’s IFP status, and noting that
“[d]ue to [Akinnola’s] unavoidable travel overseas, this [c]ourt ordered that this [attorney
fees] matter be argued via a briefing schedule.” Again, Akinnola was aware that the district
court did not plan to hold a hearing, and he did not raise the issue of a hearing.

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Because rule 119 does not contemplate a hearing under the circumstances presented
here, Akinnola did not request a hearing, and Akinnola failed to object to the district court
deciding the issue based on written submissions, the district court did not err by not holding
a hearing on respondents’ motion for attorney fees.
Attorney-fees provision
Akinnola next argues that the district court erred in its interpretation of the attorney-
fees provision in the lease. An appellate court “typically will not interfere with a district
court’s award of attorney fees absent an abuse of discretion.” In re Stisser Grantor Trust,
818 N.W.2d 495, 509-10 (Minn. 2012). And an appellate court “will not set aside a district
court’s factual findings underlying an award of attorney fees unless they are clearly
erroneous.” County of Dakota v. Cameron, 839 N.W.2d 700, 711 (Minn. 2013) (quotation
omitted).
Generally, attorney fees are not recoverable unless authorized by statute or contract.
Dunn v. Nat’l Beverage Corp. , 745 N.W.2d 549, 554 (Minn. 2008). Respondents sought
attorney fees based on the parties’ lease agreement, which provides: “If a court action . . . is
brought to enforce the terms of this [l] ease, the prevailing party may recover reasonable
attorneys’ fees, but only to the extent that such party has actually paid attorneys’ fees an d
is seeking a reimbursement.” Akinnola challenges the district court’s determination that
the court action was brought to enforce the terms of the lease.
The construction and effe ct of an unambiguous c ontract present questions of law,
which this court reviews de novo. Denelsbeck v. Wells Fargo & Co. , 666 N.W.2d 339,
346 (Minn. 2003). This court will not rewrite, modify, or limit the effect of a contract

6
provision by a strained construction when the contractual provisi on is clear and
unambiguous. Travertine Corp. v. Lexington -Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Minn.
2004). The attorney-fees provision is unambiguous. It allows the prevailing party in a
court action brought to enf orce the terms of the lease to be reimbursed for reasonable
attorney fees. Akinnola asserts that he brought a court action to enforce an or al promise,
not the terms of the lease.
In his complaint, Akinnola alleged that respondents breached the contract, stating:
The agreement between [ respondents] and [Akinnola]
required that [ respondents] provide [Akinnola] an apartment
unit, including a [sic] hall ways that are safe and free of threats
of dog bites. In particular that [Akinnola] will not be exposed
to dogs threatening to bite him in exchange for [Akinnola]
making payments in a timely manner.

Akinnola alleged that respondents “breached the agreement when [they] failed to provide
a safe apartment unit and hallways in the c ondition the parties agreed to .” But the lea se
has the following provision: “The [r]esident agrees that the [o]wner has made no promises
or representations that are not stated in this [l]ease or any [a]ddendums thereto. This [l]ease
and [a] ddendum may only be changed in writing signe d by both the [r] esident and the
[o]wner.” Thus, the written lease was the only contract that respondents could have
allegedly breached because the lease states that no promises were made outside of the lease.
Akinnola argues that the oral promise was i ndependent of the lease. But p arol
evidence of previous understandings cannot be introduced to contradict the terms of a final
and integrated written expression. Apple Valley Red-E-Mix, Inc. v. Mills -Winfield Eng’g
Sales, Inc., 436 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Minn. App. 1989), review denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 1989).

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The determination regarding whether a contract is completely integrated and not subject to
variance by parol evidence is made upon consideration of the writing itself, along with “the
subject matter and purposes of the transaction, and like attendant circumstances.” Bussard
v. Coll. of St. Thomas, Inc. , 294 Minn. 215, 224, 200 N.W.2d 155, 161 (1972). “[I]f the
alleged oral agreement is one that parties similarly situated would embody in the written
agreement, then the written document is complete.” Id. at 225, 200 N.W.2d at 162
(quotation omitted).
Here, the lease represented the entire agreement between t he parties; thus, any oral
statement regarding dogs was inadmissible under the parol evidence rule because it would
contradict the written agreement that permits some dogs. If respondents intended to change
the terms of the lease to include a provision about dogs and dog size, it would have been a
written change as contemplated by the lease itself. Because the lease was a final written
expression of the parties’ agreement, it was the only agreement that respondents could have
allegedly breached.
Akinnola relies on casel aw outside this jurisdiction. He cites Ross v. Cagley , but
Ross involved a declaratory judgment action, not a lawsuit to enforce a contract or for
damages for breach of contract. 670 P.2d 190, 192 (Or. Ct. App. 1983). Akinnola alleged
a breach-of-contract claim; he did not seek declarato ry relief regarding his tenancy or the
presence/exclusion of dogs on the property.
Akinnola also cites Henderson v. Henderson Inv. Props. , in which the Supreme
Court of Idaho determined that members of a limited liabili ty company (LLC) were not
entitled to attorney fees. 227 P.3d 568 (Idaho 2010). In Henderson, a member of an LLC

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sought to dissolve the company. Id. at 569. The supreme court reversed the award of
attorney fees to the other members of the LLC because t he dissolution action was not an
action to enforce the parties’ operating agreement; rather the party sought a judicial
dissolution to terminate the operating agreement. Id. at 571-72. Akinnola did not seek to
terminate the lease; thus Henderson is inapplicable, as are other cases cited by Akinnola.
See, e.g., Cascade Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Citizens Bank of Or. , 612 P.2d 332 (Or. Ct.
App. 1980) (inapplicable because action filed was for damages for tort not to enforce a
contract); Smith v. Crossman, No. M2003-01108-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 1732319, at *2
(Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2004) (inapplicable because lease did not include recovery of
attorney fees for “prevailing party” as it does here).
Accordingly, because Akinnola alleged breach of contract and the only contract that
respondents could have allegedly breached was the lease, respondents’ motion was
properly brought by the prevailing party for reimbursement of attorney fees in an action to
enforce the terms of the lease.
Reasonableness of fees
Akinnola argues that even if the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
respondents attorney fees, the award is unreasonable.
Minnesota courts use the lodestar method for determining the re asonableness of
attorney fees. Cameron, 839 N.W.2d at 711 . The lodestar method first requires “the
number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation” to be multiplied by “a reasonable
hourly rate.” Id. (quotations omitted). A ll relevant circumstances are considered when
evaluating the reasonableness of the hours expended and an attorney’s hourly rate. Id.

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Relevant f actors include the hours expended; hourly rates; nature an d difficulty of the
litigation; amount in controversy; results obtained; fees customarily charged f or similar
services; experience, reputation, and ability of counsel; and the fee arrangement between
counsel and client. City of Maple Grove v. Marketline Constr. Capital, LLC, 802 N.W.2d
809, 819 (Minn. App. 2011).
The district court determined that the fees were reasonable, relying in part on this
court granting respondents’ motion for attorney fees against Akinnola in the appeal of the
related eviction action. This court stated:
In light of the numerous issues raised by Akinnola, the
brief submitted by respondent, the supporting documentation
provided with the fee request, the results obtained, the awards
made by this court in similar cases, and the records as a whole,
we conclude that the requested fees, costs, and d isbursements
are reasonable.

Arrow Southampton, LLC v. Akinnola, No. A15-0731 (Minn. App. May 10, 2016) (order).
The district court also noted the attorneys’ hourly rates ($195 prior to August 2015 and
$225 thereafter), that the fee arrangement was on an hourly basis, and the total hours billed.
The district court also addressed Akinnola’s argument that the attorney fees had no
direct nexus to the underlying action and were needless and excessive, stating: “[Akinnola]
has brought a number of frivolous motions in support of what the [c]ourt twice deemed a
frivolous claim,” and “[t]hroughout the course of litigation, [Akinnola] has filed numerous
briefs, sent a large number of emails, and has, without merit, moved the [c] ourt to take
action. [Respondents] are well within their rights to review these documents and respond
in kind.”

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The district court stated in its order granting summary judgment that Akinnola
scheduled a discovery conference, moved to amend the complaint, moved to compel
production of documents, deposed two witnesses, supplemented his motion to compel,
moved a second time to amend the complaint, moved to continue summary judgment, and
moved to amend the scheduling order to allow additional discovery. Following summary
judgment, Akinnola sought reconsideration of the summary judgment order, filed an appeal
with this court that was dismissed, moved for a continuance, and required the district court
to order respondents to file a motion explaining a technical error in their filing. The record
is dense, containing nearly 1,200 pages.
Respondents’ attorney filed a memorandum in support of their motion and an
affidavit with a printout of logged hours. Akinnola argues that some entries are related to
the eviction case, but provides no support for this. He also asserts that needless or excessive
hours were spent on e-mails, but fails to cite any caselaw that prohibits billing for electronic
communication. Akinnola similarly challenges hours billed related to settlement efforts
without citation to legal authority that this work was inapprop riately billed. Akinnola’s
legal argument insufficiently support s his challenge to the attorney -fees award. Because
the record shows that the attorney fees sought for reimbursement are reasonable, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding respondents their requested attorney fees.
Affirmed.