Bryan Scherping, d/b/a JBR Farms; et al., Appellants,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1815

Bryan Scherping, d/b/a JBR Farms; et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

Amy Scherping, et al., defendants
and third party plaintiffs,
Respondents,
vs.

Bryan Scherping, et al.,
third party defendants,

Loren Scherping, et al.,
third-party defendants,
Co-Appellants

Filed July 3, 2017
Affirmed as modified
Worke, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CV-14-3597

Sarah R. Jewell, Reichert Wenner, P.A., St. Cloud, Minnesota (for appellants)

John J. Neal, Willenbring, Dahl, Wocken & Zimmerman, PLLC, Cold Spring, Minnesota
(for respondents)

Charles M. Schiff, Law Office of Charles M. Schiff, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for co -
appellants)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellants and co -appellants challenge the district court’s interpretation of the
parties’ settlement agreement and distribution of farming equipment. Appellants claim that
the district court erred by failing to award them fixtures to real property and $400,000 in
receivership funds under the settlement agreement. Appellants also argue that the district
court erred by failing to determine whether a partnership existed between appellants and
respondents. Co-appellants argue that the district court erred by failing to make findings
of fact in its final distribution order and by failing to award co -appellants items that were
conceded to them by respondents. We affirm as modified.
FACTS
This case involves a family dispute over farmland and farming equipmen t. Co -
appellants Loren and Jane Scherping are the parents of respondent Jason, appellants Bryan
and Randy, and third-party defendants Lori, Sandy, and Kristin . Co-appellant LaVern is
Loren’s brother, and respondent Amy is Jason’s wife.1
The dispute centers on three parcels of real property: the CJS Ranch Trust property,
the 162-acre property, and the 51-acre property. The CJS Ranch Trust property consists of
240 acres of farmland. Prior to this litigation, Jason, Bryan, Randy, Lori, Sandy, and
Kristin each had an ownership stake in the CJS Ranch Trust property.

1 For ease of reference, this opinion refers to individual parties by their first name. In the
decision section of this opinion, the parties are primarily referred to as appellants, co -
appellants, and respondents.

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The 162-acre property was originally owned by Loren and Jane. They forfeited the
property to the Federal Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in a foreclosure a ction, and Jason
purchased the property at auction. Jason also acquired the nearby 51-acre property.
In April 2014, Bryan and Randy sued Jason and Amy. The complaint alleged that
Jason holds title to the 162-acre property and the 51-acre property on behalf of JBR Farms.
Bryan and Randy claimed that JBR Farms was formed in 1998 by Jason, Bryan, and Randy
to farm the three properties . Bryan and Randy alleged that Jason withheld partnership
profits from them for several years. The complaint sought dissolution of the partnership
and an accounting of all JBR Farms’ assets and liabilities.
Jason and Amy subsequently filed a separate lawsuit against Bryan, Randy, and the
other parties in this matter, claiming that Jason was the “sole owner and operator” of JBR
Farms. They also claimed that Loren, LaVern, Bryan, and Randy trespassed and converted
their property. The dist rict court consolidated the cases and appointed a receiver to
“administer the assets of JBR Farms.”
In October 2015, the parties reached a settlement agreement. The district court
restated the parties’ agreement in an October 30, 2015 order. The order states that “Jason
shall assign his entire interest in the CJS Ranch Trust real property and fixtures to Bryan
and Randy.” It further states that “[t]he CJS Ranch Trust real property and fixtures shall
be owned by Bryan, Randy, Sandy, and Kristin free and clear of any claim by any other
parties.” It awards Bryan and Randy “100% of the [r]eceiver funds (approximately
$400,000.00), less and with the [r]eceiver paying from those funds all taxes for 2014 and
2015 and costs relating to JBR Farms (such as property taxes, income taxes from sales of

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commodities, etc.).” The settlement awards Jason the 162-acre property and allows him to
“keep all the new farm equipment purchased, as shown on his tax returns; excluding
Imperial Investment equipment.” Ownership of the Imperial Investment equipm ent and
other personal property not divided in the settlement was reserved for future d ecision by
the district court.
After the settlement was reached, a court trial was held on the Impe rial Investment
equipment, the farming equipment that Loren, Jane, and LaVern sold to I mperial
Investments Inc . Jason leased and later purchased the equi pment from Imperial
Investments. During the trial, Loren, Jane, and LaVern testified that they never sold the
equipment to Imperial Investments. Although there was documentary evidence of the sale
and they testified in other litigation that the sale took place, they argued that the sale was a
sham designed to prevent the IRS from seizing the equipment. In its January 20, 2016
order, the district court found this testimon y not credible and awarded the Imperial
Investment equipment to Jason and Amy.
Bryan, Randy, and the sibling third-party defendants did not participate in the court
trial because they made no claim to the Imperial Investment equipment; however, they did
object at trial to the district court receiving evidence relating to fixtures on the CJS Ranch
Trust property, arguing that the settlement agreement awarded them these fixtures . The
district court sustained the objection but ruled that it was moot because the January 20,
2016 order did not address any such fixtures.
Jason and Amy then moved to enforce the January 20, 2016 order. Bryan, Randy,
and the sibling third -party defendants renewed their objection, arguing that the order

5
erroneously awarded fixtures on the CJS Ranch Trust property to Jason and Amy. They
listed specific farm equipment distributed by the order that they claimed as fixtures. On
April 28, 2016, the district court issued an order finding that none of the claimed items
were fixtures. The district court ordered the items transferred to Jason and Amy.
In its Janua ry 20, 2016 order, the district court also included a list of items that
remained undistributed. In the event that the parties failed to reach an agreement as to the
distribution of these items, the district court ordered them t o submit memoranda
addressing: 1) whether or not JBR Farms is a valid partnership; 2) if so, which parties were
members of that partnership; and 3) as to each piece of property, the owner of the property
and whether the property qualifies as a fixture.
The parties failed to reach an agreement, and after reviewing the parties’ final
submissions, the district co urt distributed the remaining property in an October 25, 2016
order. The order included no findings of fact, and the district court declined to determine
whether JBR Farms was a partnership. The district court awarded Jason and Amy the items
listed on Jason’s tax returns, duplicates of Imperial Investment equipment, and other items
not mentioned in the other parties’ submissions. Loren, Jane, LaVern, and the sibling third-
party defendants were awarded items listed in section IV of their submissions and items
conceded to them at trial. The remaining items were awarded to Bryan and Randy. This
appeal followed.

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D E C I S I O N
Fixtures
Appellants argue that the dis trict court erred by awarding respondents farm
equipment that appellants claim are fixtures on the CJS Ranch Trust property. Appellants
were awarded the CJS Ranch Trust property and “fixtures” in the settlement agreement.
As a threshold issue, responde nts argue that appellants’ claims to the farm
equipment must be denied because appellants waived their right to appeal in the settlement
agreement. “[W]aiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.” Valspar
Refinish, Inc. v. Gaylord’s, Inc., 764 N.W.2d 359, 367 (Minn. 2009) (quotations omitted).
“Settlement of claims is encouraged as a matter of public policy.” Voicestream
Minneapolis, Inc. v. RPC Props., Inc., 743 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Minn. 2008). “A settlement
agreement is a contract.” Dykes v. Sukup Mfg. Co., 781 N.W.2d 578, 581-82 (Minn. 2010).
When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, this court enforces the
agreement of the parties as expressed in the contract. Id. at 582. A contract is ambiguous
if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Id. This court reviews de
novo whether a contract is ambiguous. Id.
The district court’s order reiterating the parties’ settlement agreement states that
“[t]he parties wish to settle all of their differe nces.” It also states that “[t]he parties have
agreed to a complete settlement of all of the disputes exist ing between them.” The order
calls the settlement a “full and final settlement, compromise and release of all claims.”
But the settlement agreement also contemplates more litigation. It does not di vide
all property , and the order states that “[t]he only claims reserved for furthe r litigation

7
relate[] to ownership over the Imperial Investment equipment . . . or otherwise disputed by
the parties shall be submitted to the [c]ourt for final decision.” It also states, “[a]ll other
equipment and tools not specified herein shall be divided by agreement of the parties with
the [c]ourt making the final decision.” Likewise, the settlement agreement itself provides
that the issue of ownership of the Imperial Investment equipment is “reserved for further
litigation.” It also provides that “[a]ll other equipment and tools not specified herein shall
be divided by agreeme nt of the parties with the [district court] being the final deci der.”
Based upon this language, we conclude that appellants did not waive the right to appeal the
distribution of the Imperial Investment equipment and other property not specified in the
settlement agreement.
Respondents characterize the statement that the district court will make “the final
decision” or be the “final decider” as akin to a bindi ng “agreement allowing the mediator
to make the final decision.” But the fact that the district court makes the final decision in
no way indicates that appellants intentionally relinquished the right to appeal. See Valspar,
764 N.W.2d at 367. The district court generally makes the final decision in litigation and
then that decision is subject to review by appellate courts . See Minn. R. Ci v. App. P.
103.03 (stating that “final” “judgment[s],” “order[s],” and “decision[s]” are appealable).
Moreover, even if appellants waived their right to appeal the district court’s
distribution of property, they did not waive their right to enforce the settlement agreement.
Appellants claim that t he district court violated provisions of the agreement by awarding
fixtures on the CJS Ranch Trust property to respondents. Appellants moved to enforce this
portion of the settlement agreement after the distri ct court’s January 20, 2016 order. See

8
Voicestream, 743 N.W.2d at 271 (stating that a settlement agreement can be “enforced by
motion in the original lawsuit”). The district court denied that motion without an
evidentiary hearing, determining that the farming equipment in question did not constitute
fixtures on the CJS Ranch Trust property.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that a district court should treat a motion
to enforce a settlement agreement “as it would a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at
273. “[District] courts have the inherent power to summarily enforce a settlement
agreement as a matter of law when the terms of the agreement are clear and unambiguous.”
Id. at 272 (quotations omitted). But “[i]f material facts are disputed, an evidentiary hearing
is required.” Id.
In summarily denying appellants’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement and
determining that the disputed farm equipment did not constitute fixtures, the district court
essentially granted summary judgment in favor of respondents. On appeal from a grant of
summary judgment, this court reviews de novo whether there are any genuine issues of
material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of the law. Riverview
Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Gr p., LLC , 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010).
Construction of an unambiguou s settlement agreement is also a question of law that we
review de novo. Horodenski v. Lyndale Green Townhome Ass’n , 804 N.W.2d 366, 371
(Minn. App. 2011).
Appellants argue that the district court erred in its application of the law because it
erroneously defined the word “fixture s.” The district court used the following definition

9
from Holy Ghost Catholic Church of Two Harbors v. Clinton , 169 Minn. 253, 259, 211
N.W. 13, 15-16 (1926):
To constitute a fixture, the thing must be of an accessory
character and must be, in some way, in actual or constructive
union with the realty and not merely brought upon it. That the
thing is removable with but little injury to the building is a
factor to be considered, so also that it was installed by a tenant;
that it is not removable without being taken to pieces, and is
practically worthless when removed, are circumstances to be
considered in determining the intent of the parties and the
character of the addition.

Based on this definition, the district court determined that the items claimed by appellants
are not fixtures because “each of them are designed to be detachable and removable with
little to no damage or loss of value to the real prop erty upon which they have origin ally
been installed . . . or to the items themselves.”
In challenging the definition of fixture s used by the district court, appellants cite
several authorities that actually support the district court’s determination. A ppellants cite
Minn. Stat. § 272.03, subd. 1 (2016), which defines “real property” for tax purposes. The
statute provides that “‘real property’ includes the land itself, rails, ties, and other track
materials annexed to the land, and all building s, structures, and improvements or other
fixtures on it.” Minn. Stat. § 272.03, subd. 1(a). The statute further explains:
A building or structure shall include the building or
structure itself, together with all improvements or fixtures
annexed to the building or structure, which are integrated with
and of permanent benefit to the building or structure . . . and
which cannot be removed without substantial damage to itself
or to the building or structure.

10
Id., subd. 1(b) (emphasis added). Appellants omit the n ext clause of the statute, which
states that “[r]eal property does not include tools, implements, machinery, and equipment
attached to or installed in real property for use in the business or production activity
conducted thereon, regardless of size, weight or method of attachment.” Id., subd. 1(c)(i).
The supreme court recently interpreted Minn. Stat. § 272.03, subd. 1, and other tax
statutes and rules as excluding “trade fixture[s]” from the definition of real property .
Comm’r of Revenue v. Dahmes Stainless, Inc., 884 N.W.2d 648, 660 (Minn. 2016). Under
the trade-fixtures doctrine, “a fixture is considered tangible personal property, rather than
real property, when it is used for trade purposes and if removal does not result in material
and permanent damage to the real estate.” Id. at 656. This conclusion is consistent with
the district court’s determination that the farm equipment at issue here are not fixtures
because they are “designed to be detachable and removable” with little to no loss in val ue
to the real property or the equipment itself.
In addition, appellants cite Black’s Law Dictionary , which defines “fixture” as
“[p]ersonal property that is attached to land or a building and that is regarded as an
irremovable part of the real property, such as a fireplace built i nto a home.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 713 (9th ed. 2009). This definition is also consistent with the district cou rt’s
exclusion of removable farm equipment from the definition of fixture s. The district court
did not err in defining “fixtures.”
Appellants argue that the following farm equipment distributed in the district court’s
January 20, 20 16 order constitute fixtures: silo unl oaders; barn cleane r; “[h]ay bale
conveyor belt installed inside [a]ppellants’ cattle barn”; “[w]ater heaters and coolers,

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installed in [a]ppellants’ barns”; “[f]eed mill/grinder, installed and electro nically hard
wired inside one of [a]ppellants’ barns”; and a “vacuum pump [and] milk tank.”
Respondents submitted affidavits from Jason and other individuals in the industry
who frequently work with these items. The affidavits assert that the items can be easily
removed from real property without any damage to the real property or the items
themselves. They also state that these items are routinely removed and resold. Appellants
submitted pictures of the items to show that the items are “fastened,” “affixed,” and
“wired” to the real property. These pictures do not contradict respondents’ evidence that
the items can be removed from the property without causing damage.
The district court properly defined “fixtures,” and appellants have failed to raise any
genuine issue of materi al fact as to whether the items in question meet that definition.
Accordingly, the district court did not err by determining that the items distributed to
respondents are not fixtures.
Appellants also argue that the following items distributed in the d istrict court’s
October 25, 2016 order are fixtures to the CJS Ranch Trust property: silos; grain bin; grain
dryer; “[b]unk feeder inside [a]ppellants’ cattle barn”; hopper bins; “[a]utomatic watering
units, installed both inside and outside [a] ppellants’ barn”; a “t oilet, vanity and set of
cabinets installed inside a shop located on [a]ppellants’ real estate”; and “cattle chutes and
cattle maternity pens built inside of [a]ppellants’ barns.”2

2 Appellants’ brief states that silos, automatic watering units, cattle chutes, and cattle
maternity pens were distributed in t he January 20, 2016 order. W e could not locate these
items in that order. There were, however, items matching these descriptions distributed in
the October 25, 2016 order.

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First, appellants failed to preserve for appeal their claim that a “toilet, vanity and set
of cabinets” constituted fixtures on their property. Appellants argued generally at the
October 2015 trial that “toilets” and “vanities” constituted fixtures . But the district court
found that objection moot because it did not take any action on toilets or vanities in its
January 20, 2016 order. In their subsequent submissions prior to the October 25, 2016
order, appellants did not claim the toilet, vanity, or cabinets as fixtures, and the district
court did not address the matter. Accordingly, appellants have forfeited that claim. See
Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that appellate courts do not
consider matters not raised before and addressed by the district court).
Second, the remaining item s, with the exception of the cattle maternity pens, are
listed on Jason’s tax returns. Under the settlement agreement, “Jason shall keep all the
new farm equipment purchased, as shown on his tax returns.” The district court stated in
its October 25, 2016 order that it was awarding respondents “the prope rty listed on
Jason[’s] . . . tax returns.” When a contract contains both general and specific provisions
on a particular issue, the specific provision may govern over the general. See Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 203(c) (1981) (“[S]pecific terms and exact terms are given greater
weight than general language[.]”). The items listed on Jason’s tax returns are more specific
than fixtures on the CJS Ranch Trust property. Notably, the parties’ original settlement
agreement did not even include the term “fi xtures.” That was added later in the district
court’s order. Accordingly, even if these items constitute fixtures, the district court did not
err by awarding them to respondents.

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Finally, the district court did not rule on whether these items are fixtures. Even if
the matter was raised, this court generally does not address matters not ruled on by the
district court. See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582. Moreover, after the district court issued its
October 25, 2016 order, appellants did not move for reconsideration or amended findings
or otherwise ask the district court to rule on whether these items are fixtures. We do not
review facts not addressed by the district court when the appellant has failed to request a
new trial or amended findings on that issue. First Nat’l Bank of Cold Spring v. Jaeger, 408
N.W.2d 667, 669-70 (Minn. App. 1987). Because the district court made no findings as to
whether the farm equipment in question are fixtures, we are unable to consider appellants’
claim.
The district court properly defined “fixtures” and appellants failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the items distributed in the district court’s January 20,
2016 order meet that definition. Moreover, appellants have failed to preserve for appeal
whether the items distributed in t he district court’s October 25, 2016 order are fixtures.
And, even if appellants had preserved that issue for appeal, most of the items were properly
distributed to respondents because they are listed on Jason’s tax returns. The district court
did not err by awarding the farm equipment that appellants claim as fixtures to respondents.
Receivership funds
Appellants next argue that the district court erred by allowing the JBR Farms
receiver to pay his own fees and other costs out of the JBR Farms receive rship funds.
Appellants claim that they were awarded approximately $400,000 in receivership funds

14
under the settlement agreement and that these payments improperly detract from that
award.
As stated above, the district court may summarily enforce a clear and unambiguous
settlement agreement. Voicestream, 743 N .W.2d at 272 . A settlement agreement is
ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Dykes, 781
N.W.2d at 581 -82. This court reviews de novo whether a settlement a greement is
ambiguous. Id. at 582.
The district court appointed a receiver to administer the assets of JBR Farms in June
2014. The appointment order allowed the receiver to “pay and reimburse itself with funds
generated through the operation, sale and liquidation of the [r]eceivership [p]roperty.”
The district court’s order on the parties’ October 2015 settlement agreement states,
“Bryan and Randy shall receive 100% of the [r]eceiver funds (approximately $400,000.00),
less and with the [r]eceiver paying from those funds all taxes for 2014 and 2015 and costs
relating to JBR Farms (such as property taxes, income taxes from sales of commoditi es,
etc.).” The order also states that “[t]he [r]eceiver shall stay on until all equipment has been
divided.” Finally, the order states that all prior orders “that are not inconsistent or in
conflict” with the settlement order “remain in full force and effect.”
Contrary to appellants’ contention, the settlement agreement did not guarantee
appellants $400,000. It states that the costs of the receivership will continue to be paid out
of the receivership funds. It also orders the receiver to remain on until the rema ining
property is divided. And because the order appointing the receiver is not inconsistent with

15
the settlement agreement, that order remains in effect . The appointment order allows the
receiver to pay itself fees and other costs from the receivership funds.
The settlement agreement unambiguously allows the recei ver to continue to pay
itself costs and fees from the receivership funds. Accordingly, the district court did not err
by allowing the receiver to continue to pay itself costs and fees from those funds.
Partnership
Appellants next argue that the district court erred by failing to determi ne whether
JBR Farms is a valid partnership. Appellants argued in district court that because JBR
Farms was a partnership between Jason, Bryan, and Randy, the farming equipment that
remained undistributed after the January 20, 2016 order should be divided equally between
the three brothers. Despite previously asking the parties to address whether JBR Farms
was a partnership, the district court did not make any findings on this issue in its October
25, 2016 order. The district court stated that “[b]ecause the [c]ourt made no determination
that JBR Farms was acting as a partnership under Minnesota law, the [c]ourt did not find
it appropriate to divide the property in equal portions, as proposed by [appellants].”
Appellants ask us to find that a valid partnership exists. Whether a partnership exists
is a question of fact. Cyrus v. Cyrus , 242 Minn. 180, 183, 64 N.W.2d 538, 541 (1954).
This court does not make findings of fact. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn.
1988). Moreover, this court generally does not address matters not ruled on by the district
court. See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582. And, as stated above, appellants did not move for
a new trial or amended findings after the district court issued its October 25, 2016 order.
The failure to seek amendment of the district court’s findings or a new trial precludes

16
consideration on appeal of facts which the district court did not address. Jaeger, 408
N.W.2d at 669-70. Because the district court made no findings as to whether JBR Farms
was a partnership and because appellants failed to request amended findings or a new trial
on the issue, we cannot address the matter.
Furthermore, appellants waived their partnership claim in the settlement agreement.
The settlement agree ment and subsequen t order provide that “[t]he only claims reserved
for further litigation” relate to the Imperial Investment equipment and “Bryan’s wage claim
against [Jason’s] trucking business.” “All other claims are forever waived.”
Findings of fact
Pursuant to their notice of related appeal (NORA), co -appellants argue that the
district court erred by failing to make any findings of fact to support its property
distribution in the October 25, 2016 order. The district court made findings of fact in it s
January 20, 2016 order, but made no additional findings in the October 25, 2016 order.
Instead of making findings of fact, the district court stated that it was awarding respondents
the property listed on Jaso n’s tax returns, duplicates of Imperial Investment equipment,
and other items not mentioned in the other parties’ submis sions. Co-appellants were
awarded items listed in section IV of their submissions and items conceded to them at trial.
“In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court
shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct
the entry of the appropriate judgment.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. However, if the “record
is reasonably clear and the facts not seriously disputed, the judgment of the [district] court

17
can be upheld in the absence of [district] court findings made pursuant to Rule 52.01.”
Bettes v. Fuel-Scott, 415 N.W.2d 409, 411 (Minn. App. 1987) (quotation omitted).
In the January 20, 2016 order , the district court awarded the Imperial Investment
equipment to respondents based on documentary evidence and a finding that co-appellants’
testimony was not credible. The district cour t’s award of duplicates of the Imperial
Investment equipment to respondents in the October 25, 2016 order is supported by those
findings. The October 25, 2016 order also awarded to respondents the items listed on
Jason’s tax returns. Jason’s tax returns are in the record, and the settlement agreement
supports that distribu tion. The district court determined that the remainder of the items
distributed to respondents were not disputed by the other parties. Accordingly, the district
court’s October 25, 2016 order may be upheld based on the district court’s prior findings
of fact, the clear record, and the lack of serious dispute between the parties. See Minn. R.
Civ. P. 52.01; Bettes, 415 N.W.2d at 411.
On appeal, the only issue co-appellants have with the district court’s distribution is
that the district court failed to award them property conceded to them by respondents. As
we discuss below, respondents acknowledge that they conceded this property to co -
appellants. Accordingly, there is no need to remand for findings.
Property conceded to co-appellants
Finally, pursuant to their NORA, co -appellants argue that the district court clearly
erred by distributing property to respondents that respondents conceded to co-appellants at
trial or that was listed in section IV of co-appellants’ final submissions. Despite stating in
its January 20, 2016 order that it was awarding co-appellants all property conceded to them

18
by respondents or listed in section IV of co-appellants’ final submissions, the district court
awarded the following property to respondents: a pressure washer, a Melroe spra-coupe, a
1,000 gallon propane tank, and a 500 gallon LP propane tank. Respondents concede on
appeal that these items should have been awarded to co -appellants. The record also
supports co-appellants’ claims that the above items were conceded to them at trial or listed
in section IV of their final submissions.
The district court clearly erred by implicitly finding that these items were not
conceded to co -appellants or listed in section IV of co -appellants’ final submissions.
Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co. , 8 32 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 2013) (stating that
district court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error). We modify the district court’s
October 25, 2016 order to award these items to co-appellants.3
Affirmed as modified.

3 Appellants’ brief contains a request for “attorney’s fees and costs for having to bring this
appeal.” A party seeking attorney fees on appeal must submit their request by motion, and
“[a]ll motions for fees must include sufficient documentation to enable the appellate court
to determine the appropriate amount of fees.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 139.06, subd. 1.
Because appellants have not filed a motion or documentation to all ow us to determine the
appropriate amount of fees, we do not address the request for fees.