State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1819

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Christopher Jerome Hill,
Appellant.

Filed November 27, 2017
Affirmed; motion granted
Reilly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-15-8482

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
On appeal from his conviction of one co unt of controlled-substance crime in the
fifth degree, appellant Christopher Jerome H ill argues that the discovery of cocaine was

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the fruit of an unlawful search and seizure and that the district court erred in admitting the
evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
During roll call at the start of his shif t, Officer Soucheray (officer) received
information that a blue Chrysler PT Cruiser was involved in a shots-fired incident. While
on patrol the officer noticed a blue PT Cruise r brake suddenly as it drove past his squad
car. Suspicious, the officer learned the car had expired tabs and was registered to a person
who lived in the area. Assuming the driver of the car was driving home, the officer drove
toward the owner’s registered address to wait for the car to arrive. When the car did not
appear within a reasonable time, the officer grew suspicious that the driver may have been
impaired or was trying to elude him. Resu ming patrol, the officer glimpsed the car on a
main road and accelerated to catch up. The car then executed an illegal U-turn at a red
light and drove in the other dire ction. The officer turned on his squad car’s lights, called
for backup, and pulled the vehicle over.
The officer approached the vehicle with his gun drawn. The officer was unable to
see through the vehicle’s tinted windows, so he opened the re ar door on the driver’s side
to speak with its occupants. Appellant Christopher H ill was driving and two other
individuals were seated in the vehicle. The officer removed appellant from the vehicle to
secure him in his squad car for identification. Before placing appellant in the squad car,
the officer performed a pat-frisk on appellant for officer safety . The officer did not find
any weapons, but he did find a small bag of marijuana. The officer placed appellant in the
back of the squad car without handcuffs.

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Other officers arrived on the scene and sear ched the car after removing the two other
individuals. Police discovered a gun underne ath the driver’s seat. The officer then
handcuffed appellant and told him they found a gun in the car. At the station, appellant
dropped a baggie containing what would later be confirmed to be cocaine. Appellant was
charged with a fifth-degree controlled substance crime.
During the omnibus hearing, appellant move d to suppress the cocaine as the fruit of
an unlawful search and seizure. The district court denied appellant’s motion, finding the
confinement of appellant in the squad car and the accompanying pat-frisk were permissible.
The jury found appellant guilty of a violation of a controlled substance law. This appeal
follows.
D E C I S I O N
The issue before this court is whether the district court erred in admitting evidence
of the cocaine discovered as a result of an officer’s allegedly unconstitutional pat-frisk and
confinement of appellant. “When reviewi ng pretrial orders on motions to suppress
evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law,
whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” State
v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999) (citing State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 221
(Minn. 1992)). In this contex t, the reviewing court evaluates a district court’s factual
findings on the clearly erroneous standard, bu t views its legal determinations de novo.
State v. Onyelobi, 879 N.W.2d 334, 342-43 n.4 (Minn. 2016).

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A. The officer’s confinement of Hill was reasonable.
The United States and Minnesota Constitu tions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Co nst. art. I, § 10. Traffic stops under the
Minnesota Constitution are interpreted as investigative Terry stops. State v. Askerooth ,
681 N.W.2d 353, 363 (Minn. 2004). Under Terry, a traffic stop must be justified at its
inception. Id. at 364. This stop was justified, beca use the officer had probable cause to
stop Hill for either his illegal U-turn through a red light or driving a car with expired tabs.
See Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 819, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1777 (1996) (holding that a traffic
stop is reasonable where officer observes violation of traffic code).
Beyond the initial stop, police actions duri ng the stop must be reasonably related to
and justified by the circumstances that gave rise to the stop in the first place. Askerooth,
681 N.W.2d at 364. Police actions may also be justified by independent probable cause or
reasonableness. Id. at 365. That is, each incremental intrusion must be “strictly tied to and
justified by” either: (1) the circumstances making the stop valid in the first place;
(2) independent probable cause; or (3) Terry reasonableness. Id. at 364-65 (citing Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)). Hill’s confinement was not justified by the
initial circumstance of him driving with expired tabs. See id. at 365 (concluding that
confining a defendant in a police squad follo wing a traffic stop was unreasonable when
supported only by department policy); State v. Varnado , 582 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn.
1998) (holding that a minor traffic violation did not justify an investigatory search). Nor
was Hill’s confinement justifie d by independent probable cause, because the officer did
not yet know of appellant’s driving record.

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We are left with whether the Terry reasonableness standard was satisfied. To be
reasonable, an officer’s actions during a traffic stop must satisfy the objective test: “would
the facts available to the officer at the mo ment of the seizure warrant a [person] of
reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.” Askerooth, 681
N.W.2d at 364 (quotation omitted). An officer’s action is “appropriate” if, on balance, the
government’s need to search or seize does not outweigh “the individual’s right to personal
security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2579 (197 5). Confinement in a squad car solely for
identification purposes or as a matter of rou tine practice is not reasonable police action.
Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 367. In determining whether confinement is reasonable, officer
safety is a compelling factor. Id. at 368 (citing Varnado, 582 N.W.2d at 891). But, officer
safety alone does not mandate a finding of reasonableness. Id. at 368.
The officer in this case confined appellant for the purpose of identifying him,
because appellant did not provide an ID. But the officer was also concerned that appellant
had eluded him while driving, increasing his unease. Importantly, appellant’s car also
matched the description of a vehicle recently involved in a shots-fired incident, presenting
a likelihood that the occupants of the car were dangerous. Looking at the totality of the
circumstances, the officer had a reasonable concern for his safety.
The presence of other officers can make a confinement motivated by officer safety
less reasonable. See Varnado, 582 N.W.2d at 891 (arguing that an additional officer could
simply “watch” the individual instead of reso rting to confinement). Other officers were
present on the scene during Hill’s confinement in the squad car. During that time, the other

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officers searched Hill’s vehicle and detained the two other individuals still in the car. While
the other officers’ presence can weigh against an officer safety determination, we decline
to rule that their presence outweighed officer safety concerns in this case.
The possibility that appellant’s car was involved in a recent shots-fired incident,
considered alongside appellant’s evasive driving, make the officer’s confinement
reasonable.
B. The officer’s pat-frisk was appropriate.
Appellant next claims the pat-frisk was an unlawful search. During a routine traffic
stop, a pat-frisk is improper unless additional suspicious or threatening circumstances are
present. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d at 891. “[P]olice may stop and frisk a person when (1) they
have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity
and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous.” State
v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992) (citation omitted).
Here, the officer had reason to believe H ill’s vehicle was recent ly involved in a
shots-fired incident, which provides the basi s for a pat-frisk. Hill’s vehicle matched the
description the officer received at roll call, and Hill drove evasively when the officer started
following. The officer had a r easonable belief that Hill might be armed and dangerous.
While the stop was initiated by a traffic viola tion, there were “additional suspicious or
threatening circumstances” that justified a pat-frisk. In re Welfare of M.D.B., 601 N.W.2d
214, 216 (Minn. App. 1999) (c itation omitted). The pat-frisk was justified by individual
articulable suspicion.

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We therefore conclude that the officer’s confinement and pat -frisk of Hill were
justified by reasonable suspicion of other threatening circumstances, and the district court
did not err in admitting the cocaine evidence discovered as a result of Hill’s arrest.1
Affirmed; motion granted.

1 For the first time on appeal in his reply brief appellant argues that the car wasn’t blue and
that appellant wasn’t arrested for his driv ing record. Respondent’s motion to strike
appellant’s newly raised arguments in his reply brief is granted. State v. Yang, 774 N.W.2d
539, 558 (Minn. 2009) (holding that this c ourt does not consider arguments made for the
first time in a reply brief).