Maksud Ul Mahbub, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1852

Maksud Ul Mahbub, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed June 19, 2017
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File Nos. 62-CR-10-3372, 62-CR-10-3373, 62-CR-10-3374, 62-CR-10-3375

Maksud Ul Mahbub, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, A ssistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Pres iding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Appellant asks us to reve rse the district court’s summary denial of his second
petition for postconviction relief. Because each of appellant’s postconviction claims is
Knaffla-barred or meritless, we affirm.

2
FACTS
In March 2011, after trial on five consolidated cases, a jury found appellant Maksud
Ul Mahbub guilty of one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct and three counts of
fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct. 1 Mahbub was sentenced to 120 months’
imprisonment, and he timely appealed his convictions and sentences (direct appeal).
In April 2012, while Mahbub’s direct a ppeal was stayed at his request, Mahbub
petitioned for postconviction re lief (first postconviction petition). The district court
summarily denied Mahbub’s first postconviction petition, rejecting the sole postconviction
claim on its merits. We then dissolved the stay and affirm ed Mahbub’s convictions and
sentences, as well as the summary denial of Mahbub’s first postconviction petition, in an
unpublished opinion. State v. Mahbub, No. A11-1284, 2013 WL 4779009, at *3-9 (Minn.
App. Sept. 9, 2013), review denied (Minn. Nov. 26, 2013).2
Almost two years after the Minnesota Suprem e Court denied review of that decision,
Mahbub brought a second petition for postconviction relief and a lengthy pro se
supplemental second postconviction petition (second postconviction petition). The district
court summarily denied Mahbub’s second postconviction petition on the grounds that the
postconviction claims therein are Knaffla-barred and are, in any event, meritless. This pro
se appeal followed.

1 The facts of Mahbub’s crimes are set forth in State v. Mahbub, No. A11-1284, 2013 WL
4779009, at *1-3 (Minn. App. Sept. 9, 2013), review denied (Minn. Nov. 26, 2013).
2 Mahbub was represented by three different attorneys: a trial atto rney, a direct-appeal
attorney, and a postconviction attorney.

3
D E C I S I O N
“[A] person convicted of a crime” may petition the district court for relief from his
conviction or sentence based on a claim that “the conviction ob tained or the sentence . . .
made violated the person’s rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of
the state.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2016). A postconviction petitioner is entitled to
an evidentiary hearing “[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding
conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd.
1 (2016). “[Appellate courts] review a postconviction court’s decision to deny a petition,
including its decision to deny the petition with out granting an evidentiary hearing, for an
abuse of discretion.” Jones v. State , 883 N.W.2d 596, 599 (M inn. 2016) (quotation
omitted). To determine “whether the postconviction court abused its discretion, [appellate
courts] review the postconviction court’s fa ctual findings for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo.” Id. at 599-600 (quotation omitted).
Mahbub makes the following claims in his second post -conviction petition: (1) a
due-process claim based on the prosecutor’s alleged knowing use of perjured testimony;
(2) a due-process claim based on the state’s alleged failure to disclose evidence to the
defense at trial; (3) an ineffective-assistance- of-counsel claim as to Mahbub’s counsel in
the first postconviction proceedings (postconviction counsel) based on her alleged failure
to investigate and raise purportedly meritorious postconviction claims; (4) an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim as to Mahbub’s counsel on dir ect appeal (appellate counsel)
based on his failure to raise purportedly mer itorious appellate issues; (5) a due-process
claim based on the timing of the district c ourt’s denial of Mahbub’s first postconviction

4
petition; (6) a due-process claim based on th e alleged incompletene ss of the record on
direct appeal; (7) various claims based on the district court’s denial of certain motions for
disclosure and production in the second postconviction proceedings; (8) a right-to-counsel
claim based on the state’s alleged conduct of a photo lineup outside the presence of
Mahbub’s attorney; (9) a cl aim that Mahbub’s unspecif ied “constitutional right” was
violated when a search warrant was executed outside his pr esence; (10) various claims,
including an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, based on appellate counsel’s failure
to disclose an alleged conflict of interest; (11) a due-process claim based on our denial of
a February 2013 motion by Mahbub to stay his direct appeal a second time; and (12) an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on appellate counsel’s alleged failure to
pursue postconviction relief.
Claims (5), (6), (7), and (11) challenge acti ons or omissions by the district court
during the first and second postconviction proceedings and by this court on direct appeal.
Postconviction relief is not available on those claims, and the district court did not abuse
its discretion by summarily denying them. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (providing
that a petitioner may seek postconviction relief by claiming that the conviction obtained or
the sentence imposed violated the person’s ri ghts under the Constitution or laws of the
United States or the state); Hannon v. State , 889 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Minn. 2017) (“[A]
postconviction evidentiary hearing is not required when the petitioner alleges facts that, if
true, are legally insufficient to grant the requested relief.” (quotation omitted)).
Claims (1), (2), (8), and (9) are based on events that allegedly occurred at or before
Mahbub’s trial. Thus, those claims were known or should have been known by Mahbub

5
at the time of the first postconviction proceedings and direct appeal. See Swaney v. State,
882 N.W.2d 207, 215 (Minn. 2016) (noting that claims based solely on events that occurred
at or before trial are Knaffla-barred because these claims were or should have been known
to the petitioner at the time of his direct appeal). Mahbub did not raise those claims in his
first postconviction petition; they are therefore Knaffla-barred. See Colbert v. State , 870
N.W.2d 616, 626 (Minn. 2015) (“[T]he Knaffla rule bars consideration of claims that . . .
could have been raised . . . in a previous postconviction petition.”).
Similarly, claim (3)—an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim as to
postconviction counsel—could have been raised on direct appeal, which was an appeal of
Mahbub’s convictions and sentences and an appeal of the district court’s summary denial
of Mahbub’s first postconvicti on petition. Because claim (3) is based on facts that are
adequately captured by the record on direct appeal, it also is Knaffla-barred. See Pearson
v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 597 (Minn. 2017) (“Under the Knaffla rule, once a direct appeal
has been taken, . . . all claims that were kno wn or should have been known but were not
raised in the direct appeal are proc edurally barred.” (quotation omitted)); cf. Swaney, 882
N.W.2d at 216 (“But an ineffective-assistance claim is not Knaffla-barred when the claim
. . . cannot be resolved solely on the basis of the record and the briefs.”). The district court
did not abuse its discretion by summarily de nying claims (1), (2), (3), (8), and (9). See
Pearson, 891 N.W.2d at 597 (“[A] postconviction court may summarily deny a claim that
is procedurally barred by the Knaffla rule.”).
Claims (4), (10), and (12), which are ineffe ctive-assistance-of-counsel claims as to
appellate counsel, are not Knaffla-barred. See Reed v. State, 793 N.W.2d 725, 732 (Minn.

6
2010) (“[A]n ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim is not subject to the Knaffla
bar when it cannot be said that the defendant knew or had a basis to know about the claim
at the time of direct appeal .”). They are, however, meritl ess. Mahbub complains that
appellate counsel did not raise certain issues on direct appeal. Appellate counsel raised
eight other issues, and Mahbub has not overcome the “strong presumption” that appellate
counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment in raising those issues to the exclusion
of others. See Morrow v. State, 886 N.W.2d 204, 206 (Minn. 2016) (“Appellate counsel
does not have a duty to raise all possible issu es, and may choose to present only the most
meritorious claims on appeal.”), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1383 (Mar . 27, 2017). Mahbub
also insists that appellate counsel should ha ve, but did not, pursue postconviction relief.
Appellate counsel did attempt to pursue post conviction relief, as evidenced by Mahbub’s
February 2013 motion for a second stay of his direct appeal. Finally, Mahbub asserts that
appellate counsel had a conflict of interest because his pro hac vice sponsor is an advocate
for women’s rights and a state representative of a district in which one of the five
complainants lived. Mahbub does not attempt to explain how the alleged conflict-of-
interest resulted in unreasonable performance by appellate counsel. The district court did
not abuse its discretion by summarily denying Mahbub’s unsupported claims that appellate
counsel was constitutionally ineffective.
Affirmed.